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Energy security is high on the policy-making and research agenda, but the focus of 
currently available analytical tools does not allow capturing the essence of the abstract 
and multifaceted concept. Exposing the process of constructing energy security issues 
– securitization – is pivotal for understanding the highly contextual nature of energy 
security, and it is the main purpose of this study. 
The study conceptualizes securitization as a policy process, explores its fundamentals, 
constructs a theoretical framework that reflects its peculiarities in relation to a specific 
referent object, and applies the framework to the analysis of securitization processes 
in the governance of oil and gas supply chains (upstream and midstream segments) in 
three case studies – China, Canada, and Russia. 
The study makes several contributions. First, it enhances the original securitization 
theory by addressing major sources of its criticism through the synthesis of insights 
from the field of international relations and three other social science disciplines – 
public policy, neoinstitutionalism and strategic management. Second, the 
securitization framework represents a valuable tool for structured, yet flexible, 
analysis. Third, the study systematizes existing knowledge on the governance of oil 
and gas supply chains in China, Canada, and Russia, and uncovers securitization 
trends in these three national contexts. 
Clear understanding of securitization processes is a valuable asset at the decision-
makers’ disposal: it can inform them about the challenges of insecurity and 
securitization and their effect on the performance of a threatened referent object; it is 
useful for untangling seemingly irrational behavior of their counterparts and analyzing 
their motivations; it helps make sense of other states’ national energy policies and 
energy security priorities; and, finally, it can be a useful tool in identifying a roadmap 
towards ensuring efficient regional and global energy governance. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1 Problem Statement & Rationale 
Access to energy resources is a major concern for states around the world as energy is 
critical for their survival. Physical and economic development, a functioning military, 
and the well-being of the population are all highly dependent on a state’s reliable access 
to affordable energy supplies. Ensuring such access requires a large number of energy 
policies involving multiple stakeholders that address a variety of challenges, from 
political and economic to technical and environmental, on sub-national, national, and 
foreign policy levels. Due to the close link between the state’s survival and energy, the 
latter increasingly becomes a security issue. 
Although the concept of energy security is widely used, it is generally vague and 
loaded. In many policy-making circles of national governments and international 
organizations ‘energy security’ has become a cliché highlighting the overall 
significance and urgency of energy issues without explicit interpretations attached to it. 
Numerous scholars and analysts have been tackling these interpretations for decades 
trying to explain the evolving concept of energy security. 
Hence, energy security is high on the policy-making and research agenda, but the focus 
of currently available analytical tools does not allow capturing the essence of the 
abstract and multifaceted concept. A survey of literature on energy security (See 
Chapter 2) reveals that most studies attempt to provide an acceptable definition of the 
concept, quantify it, or move beyond definition and measurement and place energy 
security into a larger context of national, regional and global energy governance. 
Energy security can be interpreted in many ways and depends on the subject (who is 
interpreting), the object (what is being interpreted) and the purpose (why is ‘who’ 
interpreting the ‘what’?) of inquiry. As a result, no consensus on how to best define and 
measure energy security exists or should be expected to be reached. 
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The absence of a universal consensus highlights the contextual nature of energy 
security and the literature’s lack of focus on explaining how energy issues become 
energy security issues. Thus, exposing the process of constructing energy security 
issues – securitization – is pivotal for understanding the highly contextual nature of 
energy security. 
Securitization and security are related concepts, but are very different in their 
connotations and research implications. Studies dealing with security per se are 
generally not concerned with how a certain issue entered a security domain. It is 
securitization studies that address this question, which allows for a contextual 
exploration of factors shaping the actors, the tools they use, and the environment they 
operate in. 
Thus, securitization is an important feature of policy-making that lacks attention in 
energy policy analysis. Understanding the fundamentals of how the securitization 
process unfolds can inform decision-makers about the optimal steps they can take, 
potential challenges they might face as well as implications for the performance of the 
securitized object. This is also relevant for analyzing motivations, objectives and 
actions of their fellow decision-makers. For policy analysts, understanding how energy 
issues become securitized is essential for making sense of national energy policies and 
states’ behavior in the international arena. Knowledge of what determines a state’s 
energy policy choices, and construction of their energy security priorities is 
indispensable in meeting the ultimate challenge posed by energy insecurity – provision 
of efficient regional and global energy governance architecture. 
 
1.2 Objectives 
This study pursues methodological and empirical objectives. On the one hand, it aims 
to advance a systematic understanding of securitization processes by creating a 
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theoretical framework1 as a tool for structured, yet flexible, analysis. On the other hand, 
it seeks to contribute thorough accounts of the policy-making processes surrounding the 
governance of specific national oil and gas (O&G) supply chains. Both objectives are 
pursued through the exploration of the central research question: how oil and gas 
supply chains are securitized. 
Methodologically, this study will take a multidisciplinary approach and synthesize 
useful insights from the field of international relations and three other social science 
disciplines – public policy, neoinstitutionalism and strategic management. The 
theoretical contributions and analytical tools offered by these disciplines will be 
combined in an overarching framework in order to provide an analysis of securitization 
processes that is more nuanced than previously available. For instance, the framework 
will consider the role of both actors and the environments that they operate in. It will 
not discriminate between state and non-state actors giving equal consideration to a 
multitude of participating actors. Where necessary, it will analyze both domestic and 
international trends and events relevant to securitization processes in order to contribute 
to a better understanding of regional and international oil and gas governance. 
Empirically, the application of the framework in historical and current national policy 
contexts pursues a dual goal. It will help untangle an obscure web of interconnections 
between the multiple elements of securitization processes. Comparative case study 
analysis will follow the roadmap established in the framework, verify the theoretical 
relationships specified in the framework, and ultimately improve its explanatory power. 
In addition, the framework will help organize qualitative and quantitative data from the 
analyzed sources. Primary and secondary data on various aspects of oil and gas supply 
chains in Canada, China, and Russia are abundant, but they are also piecemeal and do 
                                                            
1 In this context, ‘theoretical framework’ should not be equated with ‘theory.’ Rather, it is an analytical 
tool for combining insights from multiple theories. The framework is understood as comprised of a 
variety of theories, which, in their turn, specify elements of the framework relevant to the central 
research question and make general working assumptions. Theories consist of models that make precise 
assumptions about a limited set of variables. 
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not explain securitization processes. The securitization framework will systematize 
existing knowledge on oil and gas supply chains in these three national contexts and 
will explore the following issues in depth: 
 the relationship between oil and gas, the two resources commonly treated as 
belonging to a single sector, 
 the larger effect of legal, policy and administrative arrangement factors on a 
country’s exporter/importer status compared with the physical availability of oil and 
gas resources,  
 the role of the institutional environment in shaping the behavior of policy actors and 
the performance of supply chains. 
Finally, if the analysis of O&G supply chains in the securitization framework is deemed 
valuable, this theoretical framework could be applied in other areas of non-traditional 
security beyond the O&G and energy sector. The use of O&G supply chains as a 
referent object for this study could stimulate securitization research on such issues as 
food, health, migration, and the environment. 
 
1.3 Structure 
While this chapter, Chapter 1, is an introductory guide to this study, Chapter 2 is its 
foundational component. As such, Chapter 2 pursues multiple objectives, from 
establishing the link between energy security and energy securitization, and outlining 
the central research question along with its essential elements to critically assessing 
several bodies of literature. It provides a review of works on energy securitization, 
theory of securitization in IR as well as public policy, institutional analysis and strategic 
management. The insights from the last three disciplines are used to counter the 
weaknesses of the existing securitization theory and help redefine securitization as a 
policy process. Relevant contributions from the three disciplines are then structured 
according to three types of inputs, which will be incorporated into the theoretical 
framework. 
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As a logical continuation of the previous chapter, Chapter 3 introduces the theoretical 
framework and ties together the research question, the framework and the 
methodology. The proposed securitization framework consists of three core elements – 
Type I, Type II, and Type III inputs. Respectively, they originate from the deepest 
layers of the institutional ecosystem, from the policy arena specific to the referent 
object, and from the linkages between the referent object’s performance and the 
institutional arrangement governing it. 
Following the detailed overview of the theoretical framework, previously analyzed 
weaknesses of the original securitization theory are discussed to make sure the 
framework addresses them appropriately. The chapter then revisits the central research 
question and presents a number of core elements that would serve as a roadmap for 
upcoming case study analysis. The section on methodology details how the constructed 
theoretical framework will be operated in the empirical context of comparative case 
study analysis and provides justification for the choice of three case studies. 
Chapters 4 – 6 represent three national level case studies of O&G supply chains in 
China, Canada, and Russia. The analysis is conducted in line with the components of 
the proposed securitization framework, following Type I, Type II, and Type III inputs, 
establishing links between them, and identifying securitization trends detailing the 
processes of how securitization has (not) unfolded in the context of O&G sectors of 
these three countries. 
Chapter 7 serves as a platform for the comparative discussion of case study findings, 
and identifies research propositions for future analysis based on the central research 
question. It also addresses the limitations of the framework and avenues for its 




Chapter 2: Literature Review 
2.1 Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide a comprehensive literature review on the 
subject of this study – securitization. It examines four strands of literature in relation 
to the concept of securitization. One is international relations, the body of scholarship 
where securitization theory originated. The other three include public policy, 
institutional analysis, and strategic management. They represent the pillars of the 
multidisciplinary approach of this study, and aim at improving theoretical 
understanding and practical application of securitization. 
The chapter consists of three blocks. The first one (Sections 2.2 – 2.4) establishes the 
link between two related, but different concepts of energy security and energy 
securitization, outlines the research question of this study, and analyzes existing body 
of work on the topic of energy securitization. The second block (Sections 2.5 – 2.6) 
explores the theoretical foundation of securitization in the international relations 
literature and identifies its weaknesses. The third block is the most extensive one: it 
justifies incorporation of new perspectives on securitization that are outside the scope 
of the international relations literature (Section 2.7), reinterprets securitization as a 
policy process and defines its components (Section 2.8), and introduces the referent 
object of this study – oil and gas supply chains (Section 2.9). 
Finally, the chapter’s conclusion (Section 2.10) summarizes the benefits of a detailed 
analysis of the securitization process and the implications of a multidisciplinary 
approach employed in this study. 
 
2.2 Energy Security: the Concept and its Limitations 
By the early 2000s, a vast majority of net importers and net exporters of various 
energy resources adopted the concept of energy security in their national policy 
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narratives. The maturity of this concept is reflected in the depth and breadth of its 
discussion in such government documents as national security strategies and energy 
plans. The discussions vary from a one-sentence mention of energy security and its 
importance for the state to detailed resource breakdowns, the blueprints on achieving 
national self-sufficiency targets for each resource, and international cooperation 
between resource-poor and resource-rich countries and regions. Some states are 
satisfied with the definition of energy security provided by the International Energy 
Agency (IEA) and simply copy-paste it into their national energy plans. According to 
the IEA, energy security is “the uninterrupted availability of energy sources at an 
affordable price.”2 Other states are more particular and choose to devote more time 
and space to describe their interpretations of energy security. 
Bradshaw (2009) argues that “these alternative visions of energy security are absent 
from the existing literature.”3 He is somewhat correct from the perspective of scarcity 
of high-quality analytical research, but his statement will not hold true for long 
because accounts scrutinizing national energy security positions are on the rise. For 
instance, a number of major exporters (Russia, Saudi Arabia, and Venezuela) and 
importers (China, the European Union (EU), India, Japan, United States) of oil seen 
as the major players in the global energy market have received significant attention 
from analysts of energy security in recent years. 
Russia prioritizes state control of major energy resource assets and their transport to 
customers abroad.4 Venezuela’s major focus is on physical security of oil, gas and 
electricity infrastructure.5 The United States is concerned with “protecting Middle 
                                                            
2 International Energy Agency, “Energy Security,” IEA Website, 
http://www.iea.org/topics/energysecurity/. 
3 Michael J. Bradshaw, “The Geopolitics of Global Energy Security,” Geography Compass 3, no. 5 
(2009), 1920–37. 
4 Benjamin K. Sovacool and Marilyn A. Brown, “Competing Dimensions of Energy Security: An 
International Perspective,” Annual Review of Environment and Resources 35, no.1 (2010): 77–108. 
Daniel Yergin, “Ensuring Energy Security,” Foreign Affairs 85, no.2 (2006), 69-82. 
5 Lila Barrera-Hernandez, “The Andes: So Much Energy, So Little Security,” in Energy Security: 
Managing Risk in a Dynamic Legal and Regulatory Environment, eds. Barry Barton, Catherine 
Redgwell, Anita Rnne, and Donald N. Zillman (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 217-52. 
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East suppliers and shipping lanes against piracy and attacks” as much as with 
“reducing physical threats to energy infrastructure” at home.6 Resource-poor Japan is 
currently taking a market approach to energy security combined with a strong 
government lead in foreign energy resource investment. China is heavily engaged in 
diplomatic efforts to secure energy resources all over the world, from neighboring 
Asian countries to Africa and Latin America.7 Similar to China in its energy needs, 
but owing to domestic political scrambles, India is lagging behind in developing its 
own energy resources and engaging with the regional and global energy markets.8 
Twenty-eight members of the EU are struggling to design a common energy strategy 
due to substantial differences in their national energy policies.9 
In addition to national perspectives on energy security, specialized international 
organizations (IEA, OPEC) as well as those indirectly concerned with the subject of 
energy security (the World Bank, the UN, G7, G20) put forward their own 
interpretations. The World Bank identifies three pillars of energy security: energy 
efficiency, diversification of supply, and minimization of price volatility.10 Various 
multilateral forums – the G7 (G8), G20, and G77 – whose energy security definitions 
                                                            
6 Sovacool and Brown, “Competing Dimensions of Energy Security,” 80. Yergin, “Ensuring Energy 
Security.” Jan H. Kalicki and David L. Goldwyn, Energy and Security: Toward a New Foreign Policy 
Strategy. (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2005). 
7 Joseph Y. S. Cheng, “A Chinese View of China’s Energy Security,” Journal of Contemporary China 
17, no.55 (2008), 297–317. Philip Andrews-Speed and Roland Dannreuther, China, Oil and Global 
Politics (Abingdon, Oxford; New York: Routledge, 2011). Guy CK Leung, Aleh Cherp, Jessica Jewell, 
and Yi-Ming Wei, “Securitization of Energy Supply Chains in China,” Applied Energy 123 (2014), 316–
26. 
8 Ashok Sharma, “India and Energy Security,” Asian Affairs 38, no.2 (July 2007), 158-72. Ligia 
Noronha and Anant Sudarshan, eds., India’s Energy Security (London, New York: Routledge, 2009). 
Ramchandra Pode, “Addressing India’s Energy Security and Options for Decreasing Energy 
Dependency,” Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews 14, no.9 (December 2010), 3014-22. Vivek 
Dhall, India’s Energy Security (New Delhi: Vij Books India Pvt Ltd, 2013). Talmiz Ahmad, “India’s 
Energy Security Challenges,” Indian Foreign Affairs Journal 9, no. 4 (October – December 2014), 351-
69. 
9 Bradshaw, “The Geopolitics of Global Energy Security.” Yergin, “Ensuring Energy Security.” 
10 The World Bank, "Energy security issues," (English) Documents & Reports. (Washington DC: World 
Bank, 2005). http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/464811468175435408/Energy-security-issues. 
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are arguably “limited in scope” have gone through multiple periods of fading and 
peaking interest in energy security.11 
Analytical literature on energy security as a whole deals with questions beyond 
defining energy security, and the studies have become much more nuanced over time. 
Some of the most recent attempts at conceptualizing energy security are based on the 
syntheses of previous works and introduce new dimensions. These include authors 
arguing against paying too much attention to the concept and calling for a shift to 
more important details.12 Meta-syntheses of existing literature are giving rise to new 
approaches to the study of energy security including construction of diverse 
analytical frameworks which work the concept into various contexts and explore its 
interplay with and effect on other variables (Global energy security system (GESS)13, 
Complexity Theory and three distinct arenas within global energy governance 
(energy security, energy access, and climate change),14 market mechanisms for oil 
and gas,15 examination of energy as a public good,16 regime complex and issue 
areas,17 and contextual application of energy security18. 
As the experience of practitioners and academic researchers illustrates, definitions of 
energy security are abundant, but no consensus on how to best define and measure 
                                                            
11 Charles Ebinger and Govinda Avasarala, “The “Gs” and the Future of Energy Governance in a 
Multipolar World,” in The Handbook of Global Energy Policy, ed. Andreas Goldthau (John Wiley & 
Sons, 2013), 190. 
12 Anas F. Alhajji, “What Is Energy Security? Definitions and Concepts,” Oil, Gas & Energy Law 
Journal (OGEL) 6, no.3 (2008). Sovacool and Brown, “Competing Dimensions of Energy Security.” 
Aleh Cherp and Jessica Jewell, “The Three Perspectives on Energy Security: Intellectual History, 
Disciplinary Roots and the Potential for Integration,” Current Opinion in Environmental Sustainability 
3, no.4 (September 2011), 202–12. Benjamin Sovacool and Ishani Mukherjee, “Conceptualizing and 
Measuring Energy Security: A Synthesized Approach,” Energy 36, no.8 (August 2011), 5343–55. 
Christian Winzer, “Conceptualizing Energy Security,” Energy Policy 46 (July 2012), 36–48. 
13 Kalicki and Goldwyn, Energy and Security. 
14 Aleh Cherp, Jessica Jewell, and Andreas Goldthau, “Governing Global Energy: Systems, Transitions, 
Complexity,” Global Policy 2, no.1 (January 2011), 75–88. 
15 Jan Martin Witte and Andreas Goldthau, Global Energy Governance: the New Rules of the Game. 
(Washington, D.C.; Berlin: Brookings Institution Press ; Global Public Policy Institute, 2010). 
16 Ann Florini and Benjamin K. Sovacool, “Who Governs Energy? The Challenges Facing Global 
Energy Governance,” Energy Policy 37, no.12 (2009), 5239–48. Ann Florini and Benjamin K. Sovacool, 
“Bridging the Gaps in Global Energy Governance,” Global Governance: A Review of Multilateralism 
and International Organizations 17, no.1 (2011), 57–74. 
17 Kal Raustiala and David Victor, “The Regime Complex for Plant Genetic Resources,” International 
Organization 58 (2004), 277-309. 
18 Lynne Chester, “Conceptualising Energy Security and Making Explicit Its Polysemic Nature,” Energy 
Policy 38, no.2 (2010), 887–95. 
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energy security is or should be expected to be reached. Yet, even if Bradshaw’s 
concern is ultimately addressed and all national perspectives are heard, our 
understanding of energy security will not be complete. These definitions illustrate the 
multifacetedness of the energy security concept, but are not nuanced enough, with a 
few exceptions19, for at least two reasons. First, a state is treated as a static and 
homogenous actor. Dynamics within the government as well as closely related 
structures – relevant ministries, government offices, and national oil companies – are 
traced only on a descriptive level, state-market interaction is not thoroughly analyzed, 
and no long-term view is taken to explain energy security as a fluid and relative 
concept. Second, energy security is the subject of analysis, and while full attention is 
given to security, not many make an effort to explain what they mean by energy in 
their particular work. It is not a very productive way of analysis when whole national 
energy complexes (including different supply chains, electricity systems, etc.) are 
under scrutiny in 5,000-7,000 word articles. These works are not detailed enough or 
simply do not have it as their objective to answer the questions of how energy 
security issues come about, if they are able to move back into the non-security 
domain and what the implications of such processes are. Cherp and Jewell (2014) 
emphasize that energy security “finds different expressions under different 
conditions.”20 The absence of a universal consensus highlights one of the most 
essential attributes of the concept, that is, contextuality. Thus, it is logical to assume 
that exposing the process of constructing energy security issues – securitization – 
would be useful in understanding a highly contextual nature of energy security. 
 
                                                            
19 Cheng, “A Chinese View of China’s Energy Security.” Andrews-Speed and Dannreuther, China, Oil 
and Global Politics. Leung, Cherp, Jewell, and Wei, “Securitization of Energy Supply Chains in China.” 
20 Cherp & Jewell, “The Concept of Energy Security: Beyond the Four As,” Energy Policy 75 (2014), 
416. 
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2.3 Research Question 
Securitization is an important feature of policy-making, but it lacks attention in policy 
analysis. Understanding the fundamentals of how this policy process unfolds can 
inform decision-makers about the optimal steps they can take, potential challenges 
they might face along the way and implications securitization might have for their 
goals and performance of the referent object. 
Thus, equipped with the analytical strength of a multidisciplinary approach, the study 
is designed to address the central research question: 
How are oil and gas supply chains securitized? 
Since how is a broad question, it will be broken down into more manageable 
questions, which will make use of the constructed theoretical framework by exploring 
theoretical relationships established between its components. These questions will be 
outlined alongside the discussion of the theoretical framework in Chapter 3. 
 
2.4 Energy Securitization: An Overview 
Securitization and security are related concepts, but are very different in their 
connotations and research implications. Studies dealing with security per se might 
explain why a certain issue is a security issue, but are generally not concerned with 
how this issue entered the security domain. It is the securitization studies that address 
the how question, or the securitization process. Focusing on the how allows for a 
contextual analysis of dynamic relationships between actors involved in the 
securitization processes. Contextual analysis entails exploration of participating 
actors including their resources, objectives and beliefs, as well as the environment 
they operate in, which is shaped by the actors themselves and other factors outside 
their direct control. 
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Despite clear potential benefits of studying energy securitization, literature on the 
subject is almost non-existent, especially when compared with abundant energy 
security analyses. A quick search of ‘energy security’ on ScienceDirect reveals that 
the number of articles containing these two words in their titles published in 
journals21 dedicated to energy policy matters increased exponentially between 2000 
and 2015, from 86 to 1,362. At the same time, energy securitization articles – in title 
alone – are much more scarce. 
A number of scholars have explored energy securitization in the context of bi- and 
multilateral state relations. In a superficial application of securitization theory, 
Radoman (2007) concludes that treatment of energy supply as a security issue “will 
lead to a security dilemma” between Russia and the EU.22 Natorski and Surrallés 
(2008) explore a negative effect of securitization on the framing of the EU’s common 
energy policy via a detailed discourse analysis of the member-state and the EU level 
positions on energy issues between 1970s and 2006.23 Kirchner and Berk (2010) pick 
EU-Russia relations for empirical examination, but use Regional Security Complex 
Theory (RSCT), which securitization theory is a part of, to outline the relationship.24 
Adamides and Christou (2016) also use RSCT as the framework for analysis of Israel 
– Cyprus – Turkey trilateral (non-)cooperation in the energy sphere.25 McGowan 
(2011) also analyzes the EU and critically applies the concept of securitization. This 
article is one of the most extensive applications of the concept in the energy sector.26 
The implications of energy securitization on regional security in the presence of great 
                                                            
21 A sample of selected Elsevier journals includes Applied Energy, Energy, Energy Economics, Energy 
Policy, International Journal on Electrical Power and Energy Systems, Renewable Energy, Renewables 
and Sustainable Energy Reviews, and the Electricity Journal. 
22 Jelena Radoman, “Securitization of Energy as a Prelude to Energy Security Dilemma,” Western 
Balkans Security Observer-English Edition no.4 (2007), 36. 
23 Michal Natorski and Anna Herranz Surrallés, “Securitizing Moves to Nowhere? The Framing of the 
European Union’s Energy Policy,” Journal of Contemporary European Research 4, no.2 (2008), 70–89. 
24 Emil Kirchner and Can Berk, “European Energy Security Co-operation: Between Amity and Enmity,” 
JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies 48, no.4 (2010), 859–80. 
25 Constantinos Adamides and Odysseas Christou, “Beyond Hegemony: Cyprus, Energy Securitization 
and the Emerngence of New Regional Security Complexes,” in The Eastern Mediterranean in 
Transition: Multipolarity, Politics and Power, eds., Spyridon N. Litsas and Aristotle Tziampiris (New 
York: Routledge, 2016), 179–90. 
26 Francis McGowan, “Putting Energy Insecurity into Historical Context: European Responses to the 
Energy Crises of the 1970s and 2000s,” Geopolitics 16, no.3 (2011), 486–511. 
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power rivalry are studied in the work of Phillips (2013).27 The author uses historical 
comparative analysis to trace energy securitization in Asia from 1972 to 2011, but 
focuses on the effects rather than the process of securitization. Özcan (2013) devotes 
more than half of his paper to the overview of security and securitization theory, and 
only a small section to arguing for the application of this theory to the energy 
sector.28 It is useful as a starting point in the study of securitization of energy, but 
cannot be called an application of the theory as such. Finally, Christou and Adamides 
(2013) “treat energy as an intervening variable in securitization relations among 
states” in the New Middle East in the period of the Arab Spring.29 The article raises 
important points on the role of energy as a separate sector in securitization studies 
and supports its propositions with multiple mini case studies from the region. Bridge 
(2014) discusses the association between oil imports and energy security, and 
interprets energy securitization as “a set of imaginative and calculative practices” 
(‘geo-metrics’).30 
Several other works focus on national contexts as the major precondition for energy 
securitization and its implications for countries’ foreign affairs. Kuzemko (2014) 
emphasizes the role of “the language of security as being politically potent,”31 and 
uses it as an instrument to trace depoliticization of UK’s energy policy in the 1980s – 
1990s and its securitization by the late 2000s. Leung et al. (2014) use securitization 
theory along with other theoretical insights to design a framework for explaining 
securitization of energy supply chains in China.32 Nyman and Zeng (2016) also turn 
to China, but expand the subject of their research to include both energy and climate 
                                                            
27 Andrew Phillips, “A Dangerous Synergy: Energy Securitization, Great Power Rivalry and Strategic 
Stability in the Asian Century,” The Pacific Review 26, no.1 (2013), 17–38. 
28 Sezer Özcan, “Securitization of Energy through the Lenses of Copenhagen School,” European 
Journal of International Relations 4, no. 4 (2013). 
29 Odysseas Christou and Constantinos Adamides, “Energy Securitization and Desecuritization in the 
New Middle East,” Security Dialogue 44 no. 5-6 (2013), 519. 
30 Gavin Bridge, “Energy (In)Security: World-Making in an Age of Scarcity,” The Geographical 
Journal 181, no.4 (December 2015), 328-39. 
31 Caroline Kuzemko, “Politicising UK Energy: What ‘Speaking Energy Security’ Can Do,” Policy & 
Politics 42, no.2 (April 2014), 270. 
32 Guy CK Leung, Aleh Cherp, Jessica Jewell, and Yi-Ming Wei, “Securitization of Energy Supply 
Chains in China,” 316-26. 
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policies. They review the links between security and these two policy areas in the 
academic and policy-making circles.33 
Energy security has been climbing up both research and policy agendas, but it is 
unclear why energy securitization has received so little attention in the energy policy 
analysis, especially given that it aims at widening the concept of security and 
applying it beyond the military sector. Although in its original form the theory is very 
general and is not designed specifically for the energy sector, scholars in other fields 
including environment, migration, religion and health have been successfully 
applying it since the late 1990s.34 There are also numerous critiques of securitization 
theory pointing out to its analytical narrowness, normative weaknesses, and 
limitations of its main instrument – discourse analysis (all of which will be discussed 
in detail later in this chapter, in Section 2.6). Nevertheless, the theory has been 
challenged and tested on numerous occasions since its emergence in 1998, and today 
it is “one of the most vibrant areas of research in contemporary security studies.”35 
 
2.5 Securitization Theory as the Foundation for the Theoretical Framework 
Securitization theory appeared in Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde’s 1998 book 
“Security: A New Framework for Analysis,”36 but its origins can be traced back to 
earlier works of Buzan37 and Wæver38. These scholars constitute the core of the 
                                                            
33 Jonna Nyman and Jinghan Zeng, “Securitization in Chinese Climate and Energy Politics,” WIREs 
Climate Change 7, no.2 (March/April 2016), 301-13. 
34 Some of the most recent examples include: Thierry Balzacq, ed., Securitization Theory: How Security 
Problems Emerge and Dissolve (London: Routledge, 2011). Anne Hammerstad, “Securitisation from 
Below: The Relationship Between Immigration and Foreign Policy in South Africa’s Approach to the 
Zimbabwe Crisis,” Conflict, Security & Development 12 no.1 (2012), 1–30. Jonathan Bright, 
“Securitisation, Terror, and Control: Towards a Theory of the Breaking Point,” Review of International 
Studies 38, no.4 (2012), 861–79. 
35 Columba Peoples and Nick Vaughan-Williams, Critical Security Studies: An Introduction. (Abingdon: 
Routledge, 2010), 75, 85. 
36 Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver, and Jaap De Wilde, Security: a New Framework for Analysis (Lynne 
Rienner Publishers, 1998). 
37 Barry Buzan, People, States & Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-cold 
War Era (ECPR Press, 1991). 
38 Ole Wæver, “Conflicts of Vision: Visions of Conflict,” in European Polyphony: Perspectives beyond 
East-West Confrontation, eds., Ole Wæver, Pierre Lemaitre and Elzbieta Tromer (London: Macmillan, 
1989). Ole Wæver, Securitization and Desecuritization (Copenhagen: Centre for Peace and Conflict 
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Copenhagen school of security studies. They define securitization as the positioning 
of a particular issue as an existential threat to a referent object (what is being 
threatened) by a securitizing actor (who has legitimate securitizing power) through a 
speech act (securitizing move). The audience consent with the securitizing actor 
enables the latter to use extraordinary measures, which signifies “the suspension of 
‘normal politics’ in dealing with the issue” (securitization).39 
In an attempt to widen the concept of security, Buzan et al. (1998) distinguish five 
sectors in which securitization can occur: military, political, economic, society and 
environment.40 It has been argued, however, that this sectoral classification “does not 
go far enough in recognizing context.”41 The authors too acknowledge that in reality 
these sectors often overlap, but differentiating between them is helpful in discerning 
the unique security dynamics. Energy, in Buzan et al. (1998), “is considered strictly 
as an economic referent object.”42 Nevertheless, the authors’ point is contested almost 
by everyone in the small group of works on energy securitization. Most of them 
support Natorski and Surrallés (2008) who argue that “energy could be a referent 
object in any of the aforementioned five sectors.”43 
According to securitization theory, the roles of a securitizing actor, a securitizing 
move and the audience consent are crucial. All three have to be in place for a 
securitization to occur because they contribute to the “process of constructing shared 
understanding of what is to be considered and collectively responded to as a threat,” 
that is, securitization theory is not concerned with “some objective threats that 
                                                                                                                                                              
Research, 1993). Ole Wæver, “Securitization and Desecuritization,” in On Security, ed., Ronnie D. 
Lipschutz (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995). 
39 Ole Wæver, Securitization and Desecuritization. Buzan et al. Security. Matt McDonald, 
“Securitization and the Construction of Security,” European Journal of International Relations 14, no.4 
(2008), 567. 
40 Buzan et al., Security. 
41 McDonald, “Securitization and the Construction of Security,” 571. 
42 Buzan et al., Security, 116. 
43 Natorski and Surrallés, “Securitizing Moves to Nowhere?” 71. Christou and Adamides, “Energy 
Securitization and Desecuritization in the New Middle East.” Özcan, “Securitization of Energy through 
the Lenses of Copenhagen School,” 12. 
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‘really’ endanger some object.”44 However, when a shared understanding is 
constructed and the audience legitimizes the use of extraordinary means in dealing 
with the threat, this same audience is shut down from an open dialogue and 
engagement into normal politics. Once securitized, the issue enters the security 
domain, which is the opposite of normal politics.45 Thus, in the view of the 
Copenhagen school, security has a negative connotation, while asecurity should be 
the desired condition because actors “who do not feel insecure, do not self-
consciously feel (or work on being) secure; …are more likely to be engaged in other 
matters.”46 Given that both security and asecurity are attainable, it is possible for 
securitized issues to undergo the process of desecuritization. The concept of 
desecuritization is discussed by Wæver (1995)47, but is “much less well specified in 
securitization theory and is a source of continuing intellectual ferment.”48 
 
2.6 Limitations of Securitization Theory 
In addition to poor integration of the concept of desecuritization, securitization theory 
has five common sources of criticism: its stance on normal politics, the speech act, 
the securitizing actor, the concept of audience and the context of securitization. The 
definition of normal politics as open for dialogue and engagement of actors other than 
the elites is rooted in the overwhelming focus of the theory on the liberal democratic 
Western states. While the Eurocentric character of the theory is self-evident, it is the 
rest of the points that have invited a plethora of scholars to critically assess 
securitization theory. Some of the most substantive critiques belong, but are not 
limited to the Paris and Welsh (also known as the Aberystwyth) schools of security 
studies. Others come from the representatives of the Copenhagen school itself. 
                                                            
44 Buzan et al., Security, 26. 
45 Wæver, “Securitization and Desecuritization.” 
46 Ole Wæver, "Insecurity, Security, and Asecurity in the West European Non-War Community," 
Cambridge Studies In International Relations 62 (1998), 71. 
47 Wæver, “Securitization and Desecuritization.” 
48 Peoples and Vaughan-Williams, Critical Security Studies, 85. 
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Finally, there is a number of independent security experts not associated with any of 
these schools who comment on the benefits and limitations of the securitization 
theory. Instead of separating the existing critiques by source and their relation to one 
group of scholars or another, this section groups them on the basis of the objects of 
their appraisal: (1) the moment of securitization and the speech act; (2) securitizing 
actor; (3) the audience; and (4) the context of securitization. 
First, the issues of the moment of securitization and a speech act as the sole 
instrument of securitization have been brought up numerous times by various 
scholars. According to Buzan et al. (1998), “the way to study securitization is to 
study discourse and political constellations.”49 The restricted meaning of a 
securitizing move seen exclusively as a speech act reflects the narrow boundaries of 
the original securitization theory, and points to negligence of contextual factors. 
Proponents of discourse analysis as the principal method of analysis argue for 
televisual communication as an acceptable securitizing move. For instance, as stated 
by Williams (2003), “securitization theory must develop a broader understanding of 
the mediums, structures, and institutions, of contemporary political 
communication.”50 Paris School supporters go beyond discourse analysis to suggest 
that the study of securitization requires a “focus on the creation of networks of 
professionals of (in)security, the systems of meaning they generate and the productive 
power of their practices.”51 Overemphasizing the role of speech acts is dangerous as 
this practice can lead to omitting a “range of often routinized practices... that enable 
emergency measures.”52 Weldes et al. (1999), Hansen (2000), and Wilkinson (2007) 
concur with McDonald (2008) in that in its extreme preoccupation with the speech 
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act, securitization theory completely overlooks physical action which is beyond the 
scope of discourse analysis.53 
Too narrow of a focus on a distinct act of securitization like a speech act can also lead 
to misinterpretation of the process of securitization. A focus on a single act assumes a 
momentary transition of an issue from normal politics to the security domain, and, 
thus, disregards “a situation [which] is being gradually intensified, and thus rendered 
susceptible to securitization, while remaining short of the actual securitizing 
decision.”54 In some situations “issues can become institutionalized as security issues 
or threats without dramatic moments of intervention.”55 In such scenarios, a snapshot 
of a speech act, or the moment of securitization, would be inadequate in providing an 
explanation of why and how an issue entered the security realm. Beck (1999), 
Abrahamsen (2005), and Aradau and Van Munster (2007) criticize the excessive 
focus on the moment of securitization from the perspective of a too simplistic dual 
representation of an issue, where it is either an issue or an existential threat. In their 
opinion, this approach neglects a possibility of continuums (i.e., issue, problem, risk, 
threat).56 Due to the theoretical and methodological problems with the speech act, 
Balzacq (2010) offers a pragmatic approach to defining a securitizing move. He 
describes it as “a pragmatic act, i.e.: a sustained argumentative practice aimed at 
convincing a target audience to accept, based on what it knows about the world, the 
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claim that a specific development is threatening enough to deserve an immediate 
policy to curb it.”57 
The second and third points of criticism are concerned with the nature and function of 
securitizing actor and the audience, two of the three main conditions for successful 
securitization (along with the securitizing move) in the original securitization theory. 
Even though a state is the principal unit of analysis in security studies,58 focus on 
political elites and their perception of threat create a partial picture of the 
securitization processes where broader contextual – historical, social and bureaucratic 
– practices are discarded.59 For example, in her analysis of the 2008 Zimbabwe crisis, 
Hammerstad (2012) finds that grassroots level actors, rather than the political elites, 
played a role of securitizing actors.60 Therefore, actors within the political elite 
should not be considered as the most likely or the only possible securitizing actors by 
default. Instead, a broader securitization context has to be considered and actual 
relationships between the securitizers and the referent object deciphered. 
With regards to the audience in securitization theory, several points of criticism can 
be distinguished: its ambiguous definition, the role of consent as opposed to coercion, 
and the potential for the audience to transform into a securitizing actor. Wæver in his 
later work briefly discusses the confusing role of the audience, but does not provide 
any clarifications. He only mentions that understanding audience in the narrow terms 
of the general population is misleading as “it actually varies according to the political 
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system and the nature of the issue.”61 Evidently, abundant criticism of the place of the 
audience stems from its unclear description in the securitization theory. 
Stritzel (2007) points out that “in empirical studies one cannot always figure out 
clearly which audience is when and why most relevant, and when exactly an audience 
is ‘persuaded’.”62 His concerns are reiterated in Williams (2003), Kaunert and 
Leonard (2011), Bright (2012), and Salter and Mutlu (2013).63 The act of audience 
persuasion performed by the securitizing actor is ambiguous because potentially the 
two may not be easily separated, and “given the power of securitizing actors, 
‘persuasion’ may not be necessary.”64 Even Buzan et al. (1998) note that coercion is 
as important as consent, and the audience accepting a securitizing move does not 
have to take place in a “civilized, dominance-free discussion.”65 Similar to a potential 
situation where multiple securitization actors are present, Huysmans (2006), Roe 
(2008), Salter (2008), Stritzel (2007), and Hammerstad (2012) raise a question of the 
possibility of multiple audiences in the securitization processes.66 
Another important point on the role of the audience is its potential to perform a 
securitizing move and thus become a securitizing actor. Such actors in the audience 
as civil society representatives (i.e., NGOs) and the media could potentially make a 
speech act powerful enough to attract attention of the other members of the audience 
and most importantly change behavior of securitizing actors. If a situation like this 
were to occur, would it mean that the roles of securitizing actors and the audience can 
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reverse (at least temporarily)? Thus, the nature and the role of the audience are not as 
static and simple as described in securitization theory and require further 
examination. 
Fourth, related to the predetermined role of securitizing actors and the audience in 
securitization theory is the issue of the Copenhagen school ignoring the context of 
securitization. Many critics who find contextual factors essential in defining “both 
patterns of securitization and the broader construction of security”67 argue that 
securitization theory overlooks political, cultural, and social context of securitizing 
moves.68 The theory is criticized for focusing narrowly on the ephemeral speech act 
rather than the persisting conditions in which speech act as a securitizing move is 
created. Although Wæver (2000) does recognize the importance of the “conditions 
historically associated with the threat,” this analysis is not incorporated into the 
securitization theory.69 
In conjunction with the extensive evaluations of the securitization theory, some 
scholars have propagated a broader approach to the construction of security. 
McDonald (2008) argues that securitization theory “pays insufficient attention to the 
means through which particular articulations of security and threat become possible” 
and that it should “focus on how political communities themselves are constituted.”70 
One of the questions he raises is the role of narratives of history, culture and identity 
in the process of securitization. Balzacq (2010) calls for more attention to “the nature 
and functions of policy tools” in order to advance the study of securitization 
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methodologically.71 Along similar lines, Doty (1998) encourages researching the 
empowerment of certain actors to assume the role of securitizing actors.72 
To recap the contents of this extensive yet essential section, the assessment and 
application of securitization theory have resulted into four major points of criticism. 
These points correspond with the central elements of the theory, namely a speech act 
and a moment of securitization, securitizing actor, and the audience as well as the 
context of the securitization process. Understanding the limitations of securitization 
theory is key to identifying potential avenues for the theory’s improvement. 
All of the above limitations significantly reduce the theory’s explanatory power, 
justify its rare and cautious application to the energy security issues, and emphasize 
the need to incorporate additional theoretical and methodological instruments. This 
study sees securitization theory as potentially beneficial for the energy security field, 
and aims at reviving the theory and operationalizing the concept of securitization by 
looking at it through the lens of policy analysis. The ultimate goal of theory 
improvement is to create a comprehensive, yet straightforward and practical 
framework for systematic analysis of how securitization, seen as a complex policy 
process, unfolds. 
The remainder of this chapter provides the groundwork for the construction of the 
analytical framework. The following three sections provide justifications for the 
modification of the securitization theory (Section 2.7), translate the IR concept of 
securitization into the policy analysis language and examine the new elements to be 
incorporated and rationale for their use (Section 2.8), and finally introduce the 
referent object of the study – oil and gas supply chains (Section 2.9). 
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2.7 Justifications for the Modification of Securitization Theory 
The proposed modifications broaden securitization theory and at the same time refine 
its major components to address the five major challenges described above. A 
number of scholars have called for changes in securitization theory, but only a few 
attempted to significantly improve it. While existing attempts tend to address only 
one problematic element of the theory at a time73, this research takes a systematic 
approach at improving all major problem areas simultaneously. 
As discussed in the previous section, in its current form, securitization theory lacks 
precise explanation of its central elements – securitizing actors, the audience, their 
perceptions, actions (securitizing moves, consent), relations between them, as well as 
the environment they operate in. This research offers a policy analysis perspective on 
securitization, arguing that it resembles a policy process where actors make (and 
accept/reject) policy decisions. As a result, insights from public policy, institutional 
analysis and strategic management are examined to identify concepts, methods, 
theories and frameworks that would help shed light on the challenging elements of 
the securitization theory. These three broad disciplines have been selected as the most 
relevant for the purposes of this research since they use tools not readily available to 
security studies. Insights from these three disciplines are complementary, and, 
compared with security studies, they are more context-oriented and better equipped to 
deal with actor dynamics, organizational, institutional, and ideational change. 
 
2.7.1 Public Policy Literature 
Public policy studies offer a number of sophisticated concepts and models that can 
contribute to a thorough analysis of the problematic areas of the securitization theory, 
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including the origins, behavior and influence of securitizing actors and the audience, 
the range of policy instruments beyond the speech act, and triggers of policy change 
among others. 
In public policy literature, relationships between securitizing actors, their securitizing 
moves, and the audience belong to a policy subsystem (policy arena). This concept 
directs attention to actions and behavior that are hard to explain otherwise, and “helps 
to capture the interplay of actors, institutions, and ideas in policy-making.”74 Public 
policy analysis suggests that securitizing actors can emerge from the policy arena as 
opposed to the narrow political elites. At the same time, the role of audience limited 
to providing consent (or dissent) in the aftermath of the speech act in securitization 
theory may be much greater as the audience can potentially influence the process of 
policy formulation which speech act is a part of. 
Also, the role of speech act is exaggerated in securitization theory because in reality, 
it is not a single tool at the securitizing actor’s disposal. Public policy scholars have 
advanced numerous taxonomies of policy instruments that can help expand the 
concept of securitizing move beyond the speech act: a variety of tools corresponding 
to limited ends75, the link between instrument preferences and policy decisions76, and 
other instrument typologies77. Moreover, instrument choice is not a simple technical 
exercise; it is influenced by the institutional conditions it is embedded in, by the 
policy sector these tools are applied to and by instrument bias.78 
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Finally, the notion of policy change is essential for the study of securitization where 
the process of securitization can be associated with the process of change in the 
policy arena’s perceptions about a particular issue. The nature of the arena reveals its 
propensity to respond to changes in ideas and interests.79 Ideas and interests have 
been incorporated into research on policy formulation by Schneider and Ingram 
(1997), who proposed a policy design framework.80 In the framework, ideas and 
actors are a part of the institutional arrangements, and interaction between the three 
elements is multi-directional and multi-level. 
 
2.7.2 Institutional Analysis Literature 
Similar to public policy studies, institutional analysis helps to capture the context of 
securitization processes. While the main units of analysis in public policy are policy 
arenas and their participants, institutional analysis is concerned with broader and 
deeper structures and processes that affect policy stability and change. It also helps to 
understand policy actors’ beliefs and motivations behind varying policy choices. 
Guided by their respective beliefs and constrained by established norms, both policy 
actors and institutions can be “a force in political inertia and political change.”81 
Institutions contribute to the trajectory of a policy as “the rules of the game”82 and 
through absorption of ideas and trends. “Once ideas become embedded in rules and 
norms, they constrain public policy.”83 At the same time, policy actors are capable of 
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manipulating institutionalized ideas and other institutional components to their 
advantage. 
Thus, institutional analysis is a valuable tool for examining securitizing actors, the 
audience, and ways in which the broader environment affects their behavior. The 
institutional context is also partly responsible for forming actors’ perceptions of 
existential threats to a referent object and thus their decision to go ahead with the 
securitization. 
 
2.7.3 Strategic Management Literature 
Strategic management is private sector oriented, and its major objectives are related 
to providing practical guidelines for doing business. In the past, the discipline used to 
downplay the role of public sector and package all its activity into the “regulatory 
environment” box in the competition category. Nevertheless, today the emphasis on 
creating public value is one of the emerging tools for bridging the gap between policy 
design and implementation.84 By virtue of dealing with a policy process, the concept 
of public value serves as a link between the fields of strategic management and public 
policy. 
Using principles of micro- and macroeconomics as well as organization theory, 
strategic management literature offers dozens of analytical frameworks for achieving 
the end goal of successful business.85 Companies, their products, customers and 
competition are the four key elements of research in this field. The company is 
usually the unit of analysis, but all four elements are interdependent.  
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In public policy (PP) and institutional analysis (IA) terms, the company can be 
interpreted as a policy actor, the product – as a referent object, and the customer – as 
the audience. Whether the policy actor is a single individual or an organization (a 
group of individuals), tools for company analysis offered by strategic management 
remain valid. The referent object benefits significantly from the economic product-
like analysis. This insight has been picked up by the IA as well.86 The role of the 
audience as active customers capable of influencing policy actors and policy process 
in general seems to be better captured by strategic management than by the tools 
available in IA or PP. As for the competition, it can be seen as a policy environment 
characterized by institutions, which restrict and enable activity of actors who make 
their own strategic choices, have their customer base, and offer their own policy 
products. This perspective on policy environment leaves behind an arbitrary 
distinction between domestic and foreign, national and international competition, 
treating all actors as belonging to one playing field. Most importantly, this playing 
field is not a subjective construct; rather, it depicts a realistic dynamic environment 
shaped by its participants. 
 
Overall, public policy, institutional analysis and strategic management are suitable 
candidates for enhancing securitization theory. As self-sufficient branches of social 
sciences with long research traditions, they offer a lot of analytical material, not all of 
which is relevant to this study. Hence, combining the appropriate insights calls for the 
adoption of a common language with major concepts interpreted in relation to 
securitization and the central research question. In order to do that, Section 2.8 offers 
a new definition of securitization and explores its components – type I, type II and 
type III inputs – by bringing together elements from the three disciplines. Detailed 
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theoretical relations between multidisciplinary concepts will serve as the foundation 
of the theoretical framework constructed in the next chapter (Chapter 3). 
 
2.8 Redefining Securitization as a Policy Concept 
In light of the review of the insights from strategic management, public policy and 
institutional analysis, the concept of securitization itself requires reassessment. It 
needs to be translated into the policy analysis language necessary for the construction 
of a coherent theoretical framework. The original definition derived from the 
International Relations literature describes securitization as 
the positioning of a particular issue as an existential threat to a referent object by 
a securitizing actor through a speech act. The audience consent with the 
securitizing actor enables the latter to use extraordinary measures, which 
signifies “the suspension of ‘normal politics’ in dealing with the issue.87 
Translated into policy analysis language, securitization can be understood as 
a policy process driven by a securitizing actor who perceives a referent object as 
threatened and attempts to alter its performance, and shaped by the 
interdependent inputs from the larger institutional ecosystem (type I), the 
relevant policy arena (type II), and interaction between the referent object’s 
performance and corresponding institutional arrangement (type III). 
Thus, for the purposes of this research, securitization is a policy process defined by 
three types of inputs. Type I inputs involve the deepest layers of the institutional 
ecosystem, namely the embedded institutions and the institutional environment. They 
constitute the conditions in which policy arenas operate. The other attributes of the 
institutional ecosystem are relevant temporal and spatial scope. The specification of 
these attributes usually reflects the timeframe for the policy process from agenda-
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setting to the end of implementation, and the geographical extent of the impact of the 
system. Type II inputs are born as a result of securitizing actor(s) – policy 
stakeholders’ interaction within the policy arena. Finally, type III inputs originate 
from the linkages within and between institutional components, the institutional 
arrangement, and the performance of the referent object. 
Although Type II inputs are the ones that distinguish securitization from other policy 
processes as they represent the conscious effort of a securitizing actor – the driver of 
securitization, all three input types affect the referent object’s performance via 
changes in the components of the relevant institutional arrangement. Moreover, the 
detailed look at the institutional ecosystem demonstrates that the referent object and 
the policy arena are located within the same institutional environment. 
The next three sections provide detailed analysis of the elements of each of the three 
input types, their origin and value for the theoretical framework of this study. 
 
2.8.1 Type I Inputs: Institutional Ecosystem 
The actions of policy actors are shaped by their beliefs, resources and objectives, and 
are dependent on the attributes of the policy arena they operate in (interaction with 
the beliefs, resources and objectives of other actors), but are also affected by the 
larger institutional ecosystem beyond the policy arena. 
2.8.1.1 Hierarchical Ordering of Institutions 
Several inter-linked layers of institutions form the institutional ecosystem. They also 
create a bridge between the institutional ecosystem and the policy arena. The top 
(least deeply-rooted) layers of institutions are not only embedded into the lower 
institutional layers, but govern policy arena-specific transactions. Nevertheless, 
despite apparent links between various institutional and policy arena elements and for 
the purposes of maintaining a logical flow of the argument, the analysis of the 
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institutional ecosystem – home to type I inputs affecting securitization process – is 
performed in a separate section. 
Institutional analysis represents a range of perspectives – historical, sociological, 
discursive and economic among others – on the study of institutions. They depart 
from different assumptions, and focal points of their analyses vary, but despite 
debates on the role of ideas,88 exogenous vs. endogenous sources of institutional 
change,89 institutional path dependence and its criticism,90 several institutional 
qualities persist across these disciplines. First, institutions are an indispensable 
component of the policy-making process and thus policy analysis. Second, 
institutions enable and constrain actions of policy actors by influencing their beliefs, 
resources, and objectives. At the same time, actors are capable of creating, modifying 
and terminating institutions. Third, institutions are an instrument of communication 
as they help transmit information. Fourth, institutions are versatile and can take shape 
of values and norms, formal and informal rules, and other structures regulating 
different spheres of human interaction. Fifth, the shape of institutions depends on 
their scope and maturity. As numerous combinations of institutions varying in 
maturity and scope exist, discussions about institutional layering and nested-ness are 
prevalent. 
The concepts of layering and nested-ness are related to the principle of hierarchical 
ordering of institutions.91 Layers of institutions are nested within one another and 
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have the ability to influence the other layer through feedback and constraints, albeit 
deeply rooted layers experience minimal changes over long periods of time and top 
layers are more susceptible to change. For instance, Williamson (2000) discusses 
three levels of institutions, from the most deeply embedded to the most easily 
adjustable ones: (L1) embedded institutions (customs, traditions, religion, etc.), (L2) 
institutional environment (more concrete, ‘formal rules of the game’ such as judiciary 
and political system) and (L3) institutions governing individual transactions 
(structures to implement formal rules of the game; for instance, contracts).92 In the 
institutional analysis and development (IAD) framework, Ostrom identifies three 
hierarchical categories of rules: constitutional, collective choice, and operational 
rules-in-use.93 Moreover, Ostrom’s IAD framework, along with Saleth and Dinar’s 
institutional decomposition and analysis (IDA) framework, follows Davis and 
North’s distinction between the institutional environment and the institutional 
arrangement.94 The meaning of the institutional environment is the same for all of the 
above authors, including Williamson. Institutional arrangement is represented by the 
L3 institutions in Williamson, three categories of rules in Ostrom, and three types of 
rules – legal, policy, and organizational – in Saleth and Dinar. 
The institutional environment consists of “general institutions dealing with other 
spheres of the economy, ranging from constitution and macro-economic policies to 
social and political institutions.”95 In public policy literature, these are the conditions 
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generally referred to as external conditions. In Advocacy Coalition Framework 
(ACF), the institutional environment is described by the relatively stable parameters 
and external system events. ACF labels three types of IAD’s external underlying 
assumptions as relatively stable parameters.96 These include the attributes of the 
problem area, distribution of natural resources, fundamental socio-cultural values and 
social structure, and basic rules (i.e., constitution). Hence, ACF parameters and IAD 
assumptions are roughly the same. Political stream of Multiple Streams Model 
(MSM) partly considers political institutions of the institutional environment. PET, 
however, does not provide much insight into this subject. Generally, in public policy 
analysis, the institutional environment is acknowledged as a grand pillar decision-
making processes rest on, but it is often treated as an external, often superficially 
analyzed, variable. 
In strategic management, the institutional environment is understood as the general 
environment in which a more narrow competitive environment (in policy analysis 
terms, a policy arena or a policy subsystem) is placed. Instead of identifying nested 
layers of institutions, the field of strategic management sees institutional factors 
which affect the performance of competitive environment and firms as a number of 
trends. The general environment includes six broad trends and events: demographic, 
sociocultural, political/legal, technological, economic, and global.97 Aspects from 
these six groups of factors are important in the policy context. Sociocultural, 
economic and political/legal factors are already widely considered in the institutional 
analysis. Demographic trends and events have an effect on the public opinion which 
is a resource for policy actors. Global factors are generally subdivided into economic 
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and political trends and events in relation to the policy processes. Finally, 
technological innovation matters as it is directly related to beliefs and resources of the 
actors, and thus, indirectly, to the potential changes in the institutional ecosystem. It 
is capable of changing the nature and functions of the institutions, erasing borders 
between them, creating new institutions and making old ones obsolete. Despite its 
importance, the role of technology is not well integrated into the institutional 
ecosystem. Both public policy and institutional analysis scholars have called for a 
more precise incorporation of technology into the explanation of policy processes.98 
The level of the institutional arrangement is at the top of the hierarchically structured 
ecosystem, where institutions become narrower in scope, and the institution-to-
institution and institution-to-policy actor boundaries differ depending on the 
institutional environment and characteristics of the policy arena. As a result, 
conceptualization of the institutional arrangement is a challenging task. One major 
issue is differentiating between institutions and organizations. Institutional analysis 
scholars mentioned above offer contradicting views. For example, North (1990) 
characterizes institutions as the rules of the game, and organizations as the actors 
playing by these rules. Williamson (1985) treats institutions and organizations 
equally. In addition to these perspectives, Scott (2013) cites Dobbin (1994), Meyer 
and Rowan (1977), and Zucker (1983), who argue that due to a strong reciprocal 
relationship between institutional processes and organizational structure, “the modern 
organization is itself an institutionalized form.”99 In fact, each perspective adds to the 
understanding of the complex nature of the institutional arrangement. The theoretical 
framework of this study aims to reconcile the differences between these perspectives. 
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2.8.1.2 Horizontal Linkages between Institutions 
In addition to the hierarchical linkages between layers of nested institutions, there are 
horizontal linkages between the same-layer institutions. The position of an institution 
within a particular layer is its important attribute as it can help predict the patterns of 
inter-institutional (non-)interaction. Aggarwal (1998) is one of the scholars who have 
shed light on the horizontal linkages between institutions. If there is no link between 
institutions of the same layer, they can be called independent. Independent 
institutions do not communicate at all as they have completely separate jurisdiction. 
As a result of non-communication, the probability of conflict between them is almost 
non-existent. If there is a link between institutions, they can be seen as either 
overlapping, or complementary. Overlapping institutions can have “similar mandates 
– at least in part.”100 Complementary101 institutions work together towards the same 
broad objective. Overlapping institutions face potential conflicts in areas where their 
mandates intersect. Complementary institutions are not as likely to clash as 




Type I inputs refer to the institutional ecosystem in which policy actors operate and 
multiple policy arenas co-exist. The subject of institutional analysis is broad and 
offers countless interpretations of institutions, their attributes and functions. As the 
source of the underlying causes of securitization, institutions can be perceived as 
                                                            
100 Aggarwal, Reconciling Institutions, 3. 
101 Modified from Vinod K. Aggarwal, Institutional designs for a complex world: bargaining, linkages, 
and nesting (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998) ‘parallel’ and Aggarwal, Reconciling Institutions 
‘horizontal’ institutions; meaning is the same as Aggarwal (1998, 2005). 
  35 
nested layers ordered hierarchically with horizontal connections within the same 
layer. 
The three disciplines add to the overall understanding of the complex subject of 
institutions. Institutional analysis complements public policy frameworks, while 
strategic management offers to treat institutional environment as a collection of 
trends. All these perspectives will be integrated into the theoretical framework of this 
study in the following chapter. 
 
2.8.2 Type II Inputs: Factors Originating from the Policy Arena 
Focus on the policy arena is advantageous for painting a large, yet detailed picture 
with “relevant actors, the more general institutional context, and the characteristics of 
the decision situation from a multi-actor perspective.”102 This research relies on a 
number of policy process frameworks that address the complexity of “interdependent 
political environments where hundreds of participants interact in the context of nested 
institutional arrangements, uneven power relations, and uncertain… information 
about problems and alternatives.”103 The frameworks “represent different research 
programs marked by different research cultures, assumptions, scopes, and emphases 
on major concepts.”104 But they complement each other in putting together the pieces 
of policy arena participants, structures and processes. 
Inquiry into multiple frameworks of policy analysis helps identify major policy arena 
objects, their attributes and functions. Essential characteristics of the policy arena 
components are picked up from Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF), Multiple 
Streams Model (MSM), and Punctuated Equilibrium Theory (PET). 
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Although nominally they are frameworks, theories and models, in fact, all of the 
above can be classified as frameworks. A number of scholars have called for a 
distinction between frameworks, theories and models for the purpose of creating a 
common language of analysis, but there is no universal separation of these concepts 
and more often than not they are used interchangeably.105 Nevertheless, these 
concepts are very different. The framework is comprised of theories, which in their 
turn specify elements of the framework relevant to a certain question and make 
general working assumptions. Theories then consist of models that make precise 
assumptions about a limited set of variables. Hence, all of the above are treated as 
frameworks rather than theories or models, and are described below in order to 
understand how their contributions fit into the analytical framework to be created for 
the purposes of this research. 
 
2.8.2.1 Relevant Public Policy Frameworks and Theories 
ACF, MSM, and PET offer useful insights into who policy actors are, their beliefs 
and tools they employ to achieve their objectives. Many elements originating from 
these frameworks will be incorporated into the theoretical framework in the next 
chapter. They will be combined to further illuminate the process of securitization, 
namely classify the various roles of policy actors, create a typology of securitizing 
actors, explore differences between homogenous and heterogeneous policy arenas, 
and account for various triggers of securitization processes. 
Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) 
ACF is one of the most advanced frameworks in public policy analysis. The three 
most important insights that ACF offers are attributes of the actors, typology of 
beliefs, and avenues of policy change. In relation to the process of securitization, 
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ACF is a valuable tool for understanding the structure of a policy arena, the interplay 
between securitizing actor and the audience, actors’ beliefs, and possible triggers of 
securitization process. 
According to the framework, a policy arena is composed of a single hegemonic or 
multiple competing advocacy coalitions. Members of the same coalition possess 
certain resources,106 share “a set of normative and causal beliefs,"107 their actions are 
coordinated, and policies they design are “translations of [their] beliefs.”108 An 
individual actor is “boundedly rational with limited abilities to process stimuli; relies 
on beliefs as the principal heuristic to simplify, filter, and sometimes distort stimuli; 
and remembers losses more than gains.”109 
Second, actors’ belief system is multi-layered with deep core beliefs constituting the 
foundation, policy core beliefs – the middle, and secondary beliefs – the top, or the 
least stable, part of the system. As the definition suggests, deep core beliefs are the 
broadest assumptions about the workings of the world. Policy core beliefs are also 
resistant to change, but are more flexible and able to adjust in response to new 
information and experience. Secondary beliefs are the narrowest in scope and the 
most amenable to change. 110 ACF’s classification of beliefs is discussed further in 
this chapter in Section 2.8.1.2 as part of the policy actors’ attributes. 
Third, policy change occurs via four possible paths: external subsystem events or 
shocks, policy-oriented learning, internal subsystem events, and negotiated 
agreements between coalitions. External events include broad socio-economic 
changes, and “can foster change in a subsystem by shifting and augmenting 
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resources, tipping the power of coalitions, and changing beliefs.” Learning “result[s] 
from experience and/or new information… and mainly affects secondary beliefs.” 
Internal events generally point at failures in the current subsystem practices and are 
aimed at fixing those. Negotiated agreements involve two or more coalitions, and 
require one of the nine identified conditions in order to take place.111 
All of the above changes affect secondary beliefs and the periphery of the core policy 
beliefs. Hence, the deep and policy core beliefs remain largely unchanged which 
explains rare fundamental policy shifts.112 Moreover, multiple empirical tests of ACF 
have shown that (a) “not all external shocks lead to major policy change, and (b) the 
effects of external shocks cannot be understood in isolation from internal subsystem 
affairs, meaning that intervening effects between external shocks and policy change 
originating from inside the subsystem including changes in coalition membership, 
strategies, beliefs, and minor policy changes should be considered as well.”113 
ACF has its limitations too. The framework has been criticized for the lack of 
attention to a number of its essential elements,114 but only some of them are relevant 
to the construction of the theoretical framework of this study. To begin with, in terms 
of the policy actor attributes, ACF is narrowly focused on beliefs, and although 
resources possessed by the actors are mentioned quite often and are a part of the 
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framework, they are never discussed in detail. The role of the policy broker needs to 
be explored as well because the concept may be important in relation to the 
securitizing actor and the audience in the securitization process due to the fluid nature 
of these participants in the policy arena as noted by many critics of the original 
securitization theory. Other potential triggers of securitization processes, internal and 
external to a policy arena, should be surveyed to account for the major explanatory 
variables. Finally, factors outside policy arena, referred to as ‘relatively stable 
parameters’ and ‘long-term coalition opportunity structures’, require the use of 
institutional analysis tools to strengthen links with other elements of the framework. 
Multiple Streams Model (MSM) 
Complementary to ACF, Multiple Streams Model (MSM) offers further clarifications 
on the attributes of actors and the place of policy brokers in the policy process, as 
well as reasons for changes in agenda-setting. Unlike ACF which discourages the 
separation of the policy process into discrete stages, MSM has been seen as a 
framework for the analysis of the first stage of the policy cycle, the agenda-setting. 
MSM does not make a distinction between a more general policy system and a more 
narrow policy arena. But even though it may seem less focused and less advanced 
than ACF, MSM offers some useful insights. 
The Model examines interaction of three independent streams – problem, policy, and 
political, the role of policy entrepreneurs and other factors in constructing and 
utilizing temporal policy windows by coupling (bringing together) the three streams 
to bring certain issues of interest onto the government agenda. The three streams are 
interactive because “how a problem is defined depends partly on what solution is 
available and whether politicians are receptive.”115 Policy windows “open and close 
based on dynamic interaction of political institutions, policy actors and articulation of 
                                                            
115 Rick Travis and Nikolaos Zahariadis, "A Multiple Streams Model of U.S. Foreign Aid 
Policy," Policy Studies Journal 30, no. 4 (2002), 497. 
  40 
ideas in the form of proposed policy solutions.”116 In fact, they can be compared to 
critical junctures because they are “fleeting ‘opportunities’ for advocates of proposals 
to push their pet solutions, or to push attention to their special problems.”117 These 
advocates, policy entrepreneurs, “attach problems to their solutions and find receptive 
politicians to their ideas”118 to make use of policy windows. However, the presence of 
policy entrepreneur is not a prerequisite for the coupling of three streams. Other 
facilitating conditions include predictable and unpredictable focusing events as well 
as the origin (problem or political) and level of institutionalization/routinization of a 
window. 
MSM contributes to the actor-specific analysis zooming in on the role of policy 
entrepreneurs. They are similar to policy brokers in ACF, but are portrayed as less 
neutral with explicit self-interest. It also broadens the range of potential triggers of 
policy change, but samples of focusing events are not as well systematized as ACF’s 
paths of policy change. The model also integrates what ACF refers to as the relatively 
stable parameters which are the characteristics of the political stream. This is one of 
the strongest qualities of MSM, because so-called environmental (political system) 
factors are seamlessly incorporated into the framework. But they represent only a 
partial one-sided view of the broader institutional context as they deal purely with 
political factors. In order to make a picture more complete, other relatively stable 
parameters from ACF could be added to the political stream of MSM: basic attributes 
of the problem area (referent object), fundamental socio-cultural values and social 
structure, and basic institutional rules.119 Finally, it addresses the moment – policy 
window – of change, although the viability of this proposition has to be empirically 
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tested in relation to the process of securitization considering the criticism of excessive 
focus on a possibly non-existent moment of securitization. 
Punctuated Equilibrium Theory (PET) 
Punctuated Equilibrium Theory (PET)120 encompasses both stability and change in 
the policy process,121 and “focuses on interaction of political institutions, interest 
mobilizations, and boundedly rational decision-making.”122 Central elements of PET 
are the policy subsystems, policy images and policy venues. Policy subsystems can 
be hetero- or homogenous with the latter being more resistant to policy change. 
Decision-makers inside policy subsystems are the “prisoners to their limited attention 
spans, and the key governor of the allocation of attention: emotion.”123 In this respect, 
PET is similar to ACF, but unlike ACF, it focuses on shifts in attention rather than 
rooted beliefs. Attention shifts occur episodically, not gradually; they also explain 
choice inconsistencies and account for choice reversals.124 Functional specialization 
and robust organizational structure help overcome limitations of human nature by 
allowing parallel, rather than serial, processing of inputs. 
Policy images and policy venues are mutually dependent meaning that change in one 
can cause change in the other and vice versa, and play a critical role in the policy 
process. Policy image is a representation of how the public and policy elites 
understand policies. Policy venues are “sets of institutions where authoritative 
decisions over policy are made.”125 Decision-makers use the strategy of ‘venue 
shopping’ in order to control policy images and search for appropriate policy venues. 
The strategy is implemented through either one or a combination of (a) appeals to a 
                                                            
120 David F. Prindle, "Importing Concepts from Biology into Political Science: The Case of Punctuated 
Equilibrium," Policy Studies Journal 40, no. 1 (2012): 21-44. The author suggests that the theory should 
be renamed as punctuated incrementalism. 
121 James L. True, Bryan D. Jones, and Frank R. Baumgartner, “Punctuated-Equilibrium Theory: 
Explaining Stability and Change in American Policymaking,” In Theories of the Policy Process, ed., 
Paul A. Sabatier, 2nd Ed. (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2007), 97-116. 
122 Frank R. Baumgartner and Bryan D. Jones, Agendas and instability in American politics (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1993). 
123 Jones and Baumgartner, "From There to Here,” 3. 
124 Jones 1994. 
125 Baumgartner and Jones, Agendas and instability in American politics. 
  42 
broader audience, (b) actions promoted by concerned outsiders, (c) attacks on current 
policy arrangements from decision-makers in other venues aiming to extend their 
own policy jurisdictions.126 As a result, actions within and between policy subsystems 
(by decision-makers, concerned outsiders, actors from other policy subsystems) 
produce two types of feedback. Neither one has to directly lead to a policy change, 
but while negative feedback is “a force of balance and equilibrium,”127 positive 
feedback is a force of “radical change.”128 
PET adds an insight into the activity of MSM’s policy entrepreneurs. Providing a 
more detailed account of the actions of policy entrepreneurs, venue shopping can be 
interpreted as one of the tools they employ in order to facilitate coupling of the three 
streams and opening a policy window. Similar to MSM’s policy entrepreneurs, 
ACF’s policy brokers could be seen using this same tool as well. Analysis of venue 
shopping in PET can also be applied to the intra- and inter-coalition communication 
or coordination in the ACF. PET’s positive and negative feedback does not have an 
equivalent in MSM, but relatively stable parameters and long-term coalition 
opportunity structures of ACF can be compared to feedback, although there is no 
distinction between feedback reinforcing incrementalism and causing change. 
 
However, the insights from the analyzed public policy frameworks into policy actors’ 
resources and objectives are limited. While ACF offers a comprehensive view on 
policy actor’s beliefs, none of the frameworks devote much attention to resources and 
objectives as the key attributes of policy actors. This is where other public policy 
works and strategic management literature become useful. In continuation of the type 
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II inputs analysis, policy actors’ key attributes – resources, objectives, and beliefs – 
are discussed below followed by the examination of triggers of policy change. 
 
2.8.2.2 Attributes of a Policy Actor: Resources, Objectives, and Beliefs 
Resources 
The overview of existing policy-relevant resources shows that it is an objective 
concept meaning that resources exist independently from policy actors. The ability to 
use these resources turns them into some actors’ strengths and other actors’ 
weaknesses. Since resources are considered to be a somewhat self-explanatory 
concept, detailed accounts of their typologies and categorizations in public policy 
literature are scarce. Often explanations stop at the separation of resources into 
several groups including political, legal, economic and organizational. The most 
commonly used interpretation of policy-related resources is Hood (1986)’s NATO 
typology. NATO abbreviation stands for: nodality (access to information related to 
the policy actor’s access to power), authority (legal power), treasure (money), and 
organizations (ability to organize).129 Weible (2006) contributes a six-fold typology 
of resources, which include legal authority, public opinion, information, mobilizable 
troops, financial resources, and skillful leadership.130 Dente (2014) provides one of a 
few detailed accounts of actors’ resources, and groups them as political, economic, 
legal, and cognitive action resources.131 The last group, cognitive action resources, 
makes a connection between actors’ resources, bounded rationality, beliefs, 
uncertainty, and information complexity. 
Understanding of resources is more nuanced in strategic management literature than 
in public policy analysis mainly because resources are directly linked to the firm’s 
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competitiveness and survival. So-called Resource-Based View of the Firm (RBV), a 
framework that combines both internal analysis of the firm and external analysis of 
the industry and competitive environment, splits the firm’s resources into three 
groups: tangible, intangible and organizational132 (See Table 2.1). The only obvious 
limitation of a firm-based analysis is the absence of political/legal resources, while 
the rest of the resources are transferrable into the policy context. 













Capacity to combine tangible and intangible resources 
Source: Dess et al., Strategic Management. 
 
As public policy and strategic management perspectives demonstrate, countless 
classifications of resources exist. Based on their review, a comprehensive 
classification of resources is suggested in Chapter 3 as part of the theoretical 
framework. 
Objectives 
In addition to resources, actors possess various objectives. Some of the frameworks 
touch upon actors’ objectives directly or indirectly, but the concept requires further 
elaboration. The process itself does not have a specific goal; instead, policy actors 
who pursue their respective objectives initiate and manipulate the securitization 
process. Their objectives may or may not be directed at neutralizing identified threat 
or immediately securing the referent object. In fact, if security of a referent object 
could be achieved immediately, a securitization process would not take place. Thus, 
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securitized referent object and secured referent object are by no means synonyms. It 
looks like a paradoxical situation: the pretext for securitization process is the need to 
secure a referent object, but it also brings the referent object into the ranks of security 
issues, which is likely to exacerbate the perception that the threat is existential, 
solutions are difficult to attain, the referent object is absolutely indispensable and its 
full security is unfeasible in the short to medium term (securitizing the referent 
object). Hence, by initiating a securitization process, policy actors acknowledge that 
the referent object is insecure and that they are ready to take measures to secure it. At 
the same time, there is no guarantee that the goal of securing the referent object will 
be realized. 
The proclaimed (or inferred) goal may or may not be the only or the ultimate goal for 
all the actors. All goals can be divided into two broad categories: content- or process-
related. Content-related goals tend to be more short-term oriented and narrow, such 
as specifically relating to the referent object. Process-related goals are more implied 
or hidden, complex and harder to disentangle, as they are more deeply involved with 
interactions between the actors, while a referent object serves as a proxy for inter-
actor contact.133 In policy-making, many actions are driven by process-related goals, 
thus, making it harder to trace the rationale behind the actors’ decisions and make 
sense of certain policy choices. For example, one can argue that Japan would like to 
decrease its dependence on imported natural gas (a content-related goal). But its 
imports have been increasing annually not only due to growing domestic demand, but 
also because the Japanese government would like to secure long-term supplies of a 
vital resource and maintain healthy relations with its trading partners in the Middle 
East (a process-related goal). Thus, since securitization generally involves 
participation of more than one policy actor, multiple overlapping objectives drive the 
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process. Regardless of their ultimate goal, the more actors share the perception that 
the referent object is threatened and continue to push for measures to secure it, the 
more persistent securitization process becomes. 
Beliefs 
Similar in their qualities to intangible resources, beliefs are difficult to capture and 
measure. But their role is indispensable in linking the actors to their objectives and 
the institutional environment they belong to. Classification of beliefs is borrowed 
from ACF. More specifically, ACF distinguishes three hierarchical levels of policy 
actors’ beliefs. Deep core beliefs form the foundation of the actors’ beliefs and 
represent the intrinsic connection with the deepest level of institutions – embedded 
institutions (traditions, culture, etc.). Policy core beliefs are influenced by the deep 
core beliefs as well as informed by the higher levels of institutions located in closer 
proximity to the policy arena. But the context of policy arena is usually the most 
decisive factor in the formation of this level of beliefs as they are often discussed and 
contested. As a result, policy core beliefs have a higher propensity to change. Finally, 
secondary beliefs are embedded into the policy core beliefs and are the narrowest in 
scope. They refer to policy actors’ views and opinions on specific policy issues and 
events within and outside the policy arena. Being on top of the belief pyramid, 
secondary beliefs are the most volatile and predisposed to change. 
 
2.8.2.3 Triggers of Policy Change 
Triggers of policy change are discussed in more or less detail in ACF (four paths of 
policy change), MSM (focusing events) and PET (internal and external shocks). They 
are important due to their ability to alter perceptions, reallocate resources and 
ultimately reshuffle whole policy subsystems, and create changes in the institutional 
environments and structures. All these changes could create small- and large-scale 
policy change. In addition to these three well-recognized frameworks in the public 
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policy literature (ACF, MSM and PET), other authors have considered the role of 
events capable of triggering change. Rose (1988, 1991) examined lesson-drawing, 
Hall (1993) discussed social learning, and Heclo (1974) addressed exogenous sources 
of change.134 Major types of events triggering policy change have been summarized 
by Howlett, Ramesh and Perl (2009). 
Howlett, Ramesh and Perl (2009) make a distinction between normal (incremental) 
and atypical change.135 Hence, sources of change correspond to this distinction. The 
major source of normal change is the structure of a policy subsystem functioning as 
normal, as long as the subsystem does not experience any fundamental (atypical) 
changes. The structure of the policy subsystem affects policy ideas that enter the 
policy process, shapes policy discourse, influences the choice of policy instruments, 
and determines the course of policy outcomes’ evaluation. Normal change involves 
slight adjustments of existing policies. 
However, the authors’ classification of atypical change sources is not very precise, 
and requires further clarification. The authors discuss six types of sources of atypical 
change, with two classified as exogenous, other two as endogenous to the policy 
subsystem, and the last two not belonging to any category. Exogenous sources 
include systemic perturbations, such as wars, disasters and elections, and policy 
spillovers via subsystem intersection or convergence. Endogenous sources consist of 
a venue change and policy learning. The last two uncategorized sources of atypical 
change, namely policy entrepreneurs and processes contributing to the 
fragmentation/weakening of the policy monopoly, belong to the group of endogenous 
sources of change. Policy entrepreneurs introduce new ideas into the policy 
subsystem. Even if a policy entrepreneur is originally an outsider, facilitating 
                                                            
134 Richard Rose, "What is Lesson-Drawing?" Journal of Public Policy 11, no. 01 (1991): 3-30. Richard 
Rose, Lesson-Drawing in Public Policy (Chatham, NJ: Chatham House, 1993). Peter A. Hall, "Policy 
Paradigms, Social Learning, and the State: The Case of Economic Policymaking in Britain," 
Comparative Politics 25, no. 3 (1993): 275-96. Hugh Heclo, Modern social politics in Britain and 
Sweden; from relief to income maintenance (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1974). 
135 Howlett, Ramesh and Perl, Studying Public Policy, 202-6. 
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conditions and timing (coupling of streams) endogenous to the subsystem would 
matter greatly for the ability of the entrepreneur to infiltrate the subsystem. As for the 
second uncategorized source of atypical change, according to PET, policy 
monopolies enhance stability and hinder change136, but despite persistent actions of 
policy monopolies aimed at preserving their dominance, several common processes 
of policy development – layering, drift, conversion, and redesign137 - can lead to their 
decline. 
Importantly, policy change is not caused simply by the presence of normal and/or 
atypical sources of change. For the change to occur, these sources have to be 
combined with the policy actors’ reaction to them. This is especially true for the 
exogenous sources of change, because when the same exogenous triggers appear in 
different contexts, it is the difference in actors’ perceptions and reactions that 
explains the variation in policy responses. 
In theory, triggers of policy change do not strictly fall under any of the three input 
types. But due to their high degree of influence on the actors’ behavior and stability 
of policy subsystems, they have to be considered as part of the theoretical framework. 
In Chapter 3, they will be discussed in relation to policy actors’ types and functions. 
 
2.8.2.4 Summary 
Type II inputs originate from the policy arena where policy actors with various 
resources, objectives and beliefs interact. Examined public policy and strategic 
management concepts help distinguish different roles of policy actors and their 
                                                            
136 Baumgartner and Jones, Agendas and instability in American politics. Roderick A. W. Rhodes, 
Understanding governance: policy networks, governance, reflexivity, and accountability (Buckingham: 
Open University Press, 1997). Linze Schaap and Mark J. W. van Twist, “The dynamics of closedness in 
Networks,” in Managing Complex Networks, eds., Walter. J. M. Kickert, Erik-Hans Klijn and Joop F. M. 
Koppenjan (London: SAGE Publications, 1997), 62-78. Thomas A. Birkland, After disaster: agenda 
setting, public policy, and focusing events (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 1997). 
137 Howlett, Ramesh and Perl, Studying Public Policy, 204. 
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attributes, define securitizing actors’ functions, and survey policy change triggers, 
which could potentially serve as triggers of securitization processes. 
The following section on type III inputs takes a closer look at the institutional 
arrangement in relation to the performance of a referent object. It demonstrates that 
within a specific institutional arrangement (i.e., governing country-specific oil and 
gas supply chains), institutional components including ‘rules’ and ‘players’ 
(organizations) have to co-exist for the highest level of the institutional ecosystem to 
remain functional. 
 
2.8.3 Type III Inputs: Institutions – Referent Object Link 
The institutional arrangement level is a meeting point of type I inputs from the 
institutional ecosystem and type II inputs from the policy arena. Sector- and issue-
specific institutions representing this level absorb countless factors shaping 
securitization process. Absorbed inputs have two major features. First, they create 
feedback for the micro- (policy arena) and macro-(institutional ecosystem) levels of 
the framework. Second, they influence type III inputs which situate the referent 
object within the theoretical framework and directly affect the referent object’s 
performance. Similar to other types of inputs, type III inputs can propel the receiving 
referent object to generate feedback. Type III inputs of this study are the institutional 
arrangements governing oil and gas supply chains in three different national contexts. 
2.8.3.1 Institutional Decomposition and Analysis (IDA) 
For the analysis of the oil and gas supply chains as part of the institutional ecosystem, 
this study’s theoretical framework adopts Institutional Decomposition and Analysis 
(IDA) approach proposed by Saleth and Dinar (2004). Originally developed for the 
analysis of the water sector, the IDA “map[s] and evaluate[s] layers of linkages… in 
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institution – [sector] performance interaction.”138 For the purposes of this study, the 
referent object performance is equated with what IDA conceptualizes as sector 
performance. In IDA, the influence of institution on the referent object’s performance 
is revealed through clear separation of the institutional components from the sector 
performance. Decomposed sector performance has four dimensions: physical, 
financial, economic, and equity.139 But parameters of these dimensions chosen to 
reflect characteristics of the water sector will be reviewed in Chapter 3 in relation to 
the referent object of this study because oil and gas and water sectors are by no means 
identical. 
 
2.8.3.2 Institutions Decomposed: Legal, Policy, and Organizational Dimensions 
An institution in IDA is “conceptualized as an entity defined interactively by three 
main components: the legal framework, policy regime, and administrative or 
organizational arrangements.”140 The three components affect performance of the oil 
and gas sector institutional arrangement individually, but since in reality they do not 
exist separately, it is important to also consider the joint effects on their respective 
institutional arrangement and the performance of oil and gas supply chains as a 
referent object. Following Saleth and Dinar’s advice on narrowing down the range of 
elements inside each component, the most relevant aspects of oil and gas supply 
chains’ law, policy, and administration will be identified from the relevant academic 
and policy literature. Each of these elements will be discussed in detail in the context 
of three case studies (Chapters 4-6). 
Although IDA does not consider the distinction between institutions and 
organizations, its three institutional components embody the dichotomy. While laws 
are the farthest from organizations in their characteristics, administrative design 
                                                            
138 Saleth and Dinar, The institutional economics of water, 91. 
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resembles a group of organizational structures. Policies then play the role of a liaison 
transmitting information between the two. 
Despite the fact that Saleth and Dinar (2004) explicitly state that IDA “focuses only 
on the formal… segments of water institutions,”141 organizations, which are a part of 
the institutional components in IDA, always have an informal side to them.142 Some 
researchers emphasize that organizations’ informal practices, rather than formal 
procedures, better reflect their behavior. Others, including Saleth and Dinar, see 
informal institutions as major sources of path dependence due to the more enduring 
nature of informal versus formal institutions.143 Thus, ‘informal’ components of 
organizations (and institutions) have to be analyzed alongside formal practices in 
three institutional components.  
Overall, IDA is considered an effective analysis tool. It links the institutional 
arrangement with (a) the institutional environment it is set within, (b) the relevant 
policy arena, and (c) the referent object which shares the same institutional 
environment with the policy arena. In doing so, IDA helps capture the essence of the 
referent object’s performance, and disentangle the combined effect of its legal, policy 
and administrative components on securitization. 
 
2.8.3.3 Referent Object: Oil & Gas Supply Chains 
The referent object can be seen as an object of policy actors’ manipulations, as a part 
of the policy process, and as a source of various policy goods. The essence of policy 
goods cannot be fully captured by supply-demand characteristics, as they have 
additional qualities such as equity. While strategic management insights are useful for 
deciphering the economic side (supply – demand) of the referent object’s goods, 
institutional analysis demonstrates the link between different types of goods produced 
                                                            
141 Ibid., 71. 
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by the referent object and relevant institutions, and provides evidence that this link is 
bi-directional. The institutional arrangement can change the performance of the 
referent object, and its modified performance might make institutional arrangement 
no longer suitable. Thus, the referent object is a dynamic system capable of 
internalizing institutional change and providing feedback. 
According to securitization theory, the energy sector is not one of the identified 
sectors in which the process of securitization can take place. The variety of sub-fields 
energy sector consists of and fields it overlaps with would make the study of energy 
securitization as a whole unfeasible. In securitization theory, the object of study is 
specified through identification of a referent object which can be a part of or 
represent a system. Energy is “a set of interlinked systems each consisting of 
elements connected to each other and to the outside world.”144 The system is “critical 
for the functioning and stability of a society,” and relationships between the elements 
inside the system – “resources, materials, infrastructure, technologies, markets and 
other elements” – are stronger than with similar elements outside the system.145 The 
strength of the relationship between the elements inside the system is explained by 
low substitution rate of these elements by the ones originating outside the system. 
Energy systems are abundant and some of the examples include oil supply chains, gas 
supply chains, coal supply chains, national electricity grids and power plants, national 
transportation systems, residential/commercial/industrial sectors, and energy exports. 
For the purposes of making the object of this study clear and manageable, and the 
goal of exploring securitization processes attainable, only two of the many existing 
energy systems will be analyzed: oil and gas supply chains. 
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Correctly stated by Dubash and Florini (2011) and supported by many writings on the 
topic, “the debate over [international] energy security remains a debate about access 
to oil (and increasingly natural gas).”146 The 1973 oil crisis is considered to be the 
major event that brought energy security on the policy agenda of many states. 
Security of oil supplies has emerged as an energy security issue because oil is one of 
the most widely used energy resources in the world. Many economies are heavily 
dependent on access to oil with their industrial (mostly petrochemical) and 
transportation sectors being major consumers of the resource. 
As of 2016, natural gas consumption is the fastest growing among fossil fuels and is 
expected to overcome coal as the second most widely consumed fuel in the world, 
following oil, by 2040.147 But if the share of coal is expected to decrease by 2035 and 
beyond, the share of natural gas is projected to increase. Moreover, its application is 
much wider than that of oil as it is consumed by the industrial, residential, 
commercial, and electric power sectors. 
With unconventional oil and gas resources being currently developed around the 
world, these two fuels will remain the primary energy resources for decades to come. 
In 2015, oil and natural gas had a combined share of 56.4% of energy resources 
consumed in the world.148 According to different sources, this number is estimated to 
be anywhere between 54% and 60% by 2040.149 In real numbers, this share implies 
significant growth in production and consumption of oil and especially natural gas as 
the world energy consumption is estimated to increase 48% by 2040.150 
Although oil is believed to have reached its peak consumption point in the OECD 
countries, the developing countries of the Asia-Pacific region represent a huge pool 
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of consumers, which will be sustaining oil demand in the next decades. Natural gas 
consumption is set to grow as the combination of technological progress and national 
regulatory policies unlock the shale gas potential around the world. Natural gas is 
also the cleanest fossil fuel essential for further development of renewable energy 
resources. 
Oil and gas supply chains constitute systems with relatively well-defined borders, 
institutional arrangements, and interaction patterns between actors in the system. 
These qualities contribute to the organization and rigor of the research. Thus, the 
object of this study is narrowed down from the obscure concept of energy 
securitization to securitization of oil and gas supply chains. 
Although oil and gas supply chains are systems with relatively well defined borders 
and other characteristics, they have to be narrowed down further for this study to 
make use of the theoretical framework and be able to systematically analyze these 
supply chains. In a typical oil and gas supply chain, the number of industry actors 
increases as products travel down the supply chain, from upstream to midstream to 
downstream. Out of the three segments, downstream has the widest variety of 
products and actors. At the same time, it is the least directly affected by international 
factors. The downstream segment receives much less attention than up- and 
midstream segments as the subject of energy security studies even though it is not 
immune from threats and securitization. If in downstream the majority of problems 
encountered by oil refiners and O&G distributors are related to physical security (i.e., 
industrial facilities, infrastructure, and transport), exploration and production in the 
upstream and transportation in the midstream segments are exposed to more domestic 
and international factors contributing to physical and non-physical insecurity of oil 
and gas supply chains. Hence, with the goal of keeping the object of this study 
focused, only upstream and midstream segments of oil and gas supply chains are 
explored in detail within the securitization framework. 
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2.8.3.4 Summary 
Type III inputs result from the interaction between the institutional arrangement and 
the performance of the referent object. They also serve as a link between the policy 
arena, the institutional ecosystem, and the corresponding referent object. Zooming in 
on a specific set of institutions allows for the contextualization of securitization 
process. Case study analysis reveals sector-specific details and ensures that the 
theoretical relations between multiple elements of the constructed framework are not 
detached from reality. IDA framework serves as the basis for disaggregating the two 
components of type III inputs. The institutional arrangement consists of the legal, 
policy and administrative components. The focus on the O&G supply chains as the 
referent object of this study is explained, while the elements of the referent object’s 
performance will be reviewed in the next chapter. 
 
2.9 Conclusion 
This chapter established the link between energy security and energy securitization, 
outlined the research question of this study, and analyzed existing body of work on 
the topic of energy securitization. It then explored the theoretical foundation of 
securitization in the international relations literature and identified its weaknesses. In 
order to enhance understanding of securitization provided by the field of international 
relations, three other strands of literature were introduced, namely public policy, 
institutional analysis, and strategic management. They represented the pillars of the 
multidisciplinary approach of this study, and helped reinterpret securitization as a 
policy process shaped by three types of inputs. 
Type I inputs embody the institutional ecosystem and trends originating from it. Type 
II inputs include vital components of a policy arena, including policy actors and their 
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resources, objectives and beliefs, as well as triggers of policy change. Type III inputs 
link the elements of the institutional arrangement and the referent object’s 
performance. 
Overall, the process of construction of security issues is more complex than presented 
by the original securitization theory. The examination of a handful of analytical 
concepts from strategic management, public policy and institutional analysis 
demonstrates the potential value of incorporating these three perspectives into the 
study of securitization. It allows for a more precise definition of the core concepts as 
well as for establishing strong links between the main components of securitization 
theory, the policy context and the institutional ecosystem. 
The next chapter will integrate elements originating from the literature review and 
structured as three types of inputs into the theoretical framework. The research 
methodology and more specific guiding questions derived from the central research 
question and the theoretical framework will be discussed as well.  
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Chapter 3: Theoretical Framework and Methodology 
3.1 Introduction 
With the objectives and the central research question in mind, the proposed roadmap 
for this study involves conceptualizing securitization as a policy process, constructing 
a theoretical framework that would reflect the peculiarities of this process in relation 
to a specific referent object, and applying the framework to the analysis of 
securitization processes in three country-level case studies. The previous chapter set 
the stage for envisioning securitization as a policy process. To recap, it took Buzan et 
al.’s securitization theory as the basis for organizing the current state of knowledge 
on securitization, identified its weak spots and inconsistencies, and justified 
incorporation of new perspectives on securitization processes under a single umbrella 
of a broad theoretical framework. 
As a logical continuation of the previous chapter, Chapter 3 introduces the theoretical 
framework as a tool for structured, yet flexible, analysis and ties it with the research 
question and the methodology. Section 3.2 lays out the theoretical framework. After 
that, Section 3.3 briefly reviews five previously analyzed limitations of the original 
securitization theory to make sure the framework addresses them appropriately. 
Section 3.4 revisits the central research question and details a number of more 
specific elements that are linked to the developed theoretical framework. Section 3.5 
focuses on the methodology explaining how constructed theoretical framework will 
be subjected to empirical tests in the upcoming chapters, and presents three case 
studies, which will be the sources of empirical context. Section 3.6 serves as 
conclusion and summarizes the key points on the framework and methodology. 
Depending on the goals and scope of analysis, one can use a whole framework, pick 
any of its components or focus on questions within a specific component, and yet be 
able to adhere to organization. 
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3.2 Theoretical Framework: Securitization as a Policy Process 
This section draws on the discussion of three types of inputs put forward in Chapter 
2. All three types of inputs are new to the original securitization theory, and the 
previous chapter serves as a platform for synthesizing the discussed insights from the 
disciplines of public policy, institutional analysis and strategic management. If 
Chapter 2 detailed the origins of the inputs, provided justification for their 
incorporation into the theoretical framework, and explored their elements, this section 
applies these inputs to the framework in a systematic manner illustrating logical 
connections and interdependencies between the inputs and their distinct 
multidisciplinary components. 
Three types of inputs comprise factors originating from the institutional ecosystem 
(type I), the policy arena (type II), and institutional – referent object link (type III). In 
simple terms, they represent the three levels of analysis encapsulated in the 
theoretical framework, where type I inputs correspond to the macro-level, type II 
inputs – to the micro-level, and type III inputs – to the meso-level. 
3.2.1 Type I Inputs: Institutional Ecosystem 
This section synthesizes a number of insights from different approaches to 
institutional analysis, including definitions and classifications of institutions, 
identified in the previous chapter and integrates them into the framework. 
3.2.1.1 Hierarchical (Vertical) Linkages 
Schematically, the institutional ecosystem can be depicted as a constellation of 
hierarchically nested, yet interdependent, layers. Each institutional layer represents a 
group of institutions, and three layers can be distinguished: embedded institutions, 
institutional environment, and institutional arrangements. 
Embedded institutions are the foundation of any ecosystem, and embody a collection 
of sturdy interdependent pillars like culture, traditions, religion, and social norms. 
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The institutional environment represents the next institutional level. It consists of 
structures not as extensive as embedded institutions, but substantial enough to endure 
sizeable shocks and ignore strong trends. The structures include the judiciary and the 
political, social and macroeconomic systems. Moreover, the institutional environment 
is not only the basis for the next institutional layer, but also a place of aggregation 
and diffusion of six powerful trends originating from the same and other 
environments: demographic, sociocultural, political/legal, technological, economic 
and global. 
The institutional arrangement is the configuration of narrower, issue- or sector-
specific institutions within the institutional environment. While policy actors within 
their respective policy arenas decide upon institutional arrangement, the institutional 
environment largely determines the range of their choices. The institutional 
arrangement is the main channel of communication between policy actors and 
referent object. Hence, its analysis serves as a magnifying glass for revealing the 
intricacies of the referent object performance (See Section 3.2.3 “Type III Inputs: 
Institution – Referent Object Link” below). 
 
3.2.1.2 Horizontal Linkages 
With regards to their relative positions in a particular layer, institutions can belong to 
one of the three categories: independent, overlapping, or complementary. 
Independent institutions, which are more likely to show a higher degree of autonomy 
and self-sufficiency, should be expected at the upper levels of institutional ecosystem 
because this is where institutional boundaries become the most pronounced and 
functions the most specific. However, this is not always the case in today’s reality, 
where institutions face complex problems, and fight or cooperate to obtain more 
resources and, as a result, a larger sphere of influence. 
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Thus, once independent institutions can evolve into complementary or overlapping. 
Complementary institutions serve as an adhesive device between same-level 
institutions as they work towards the same broad objective. Overlapping institutions 
do not necessarily share the same objective, but they do have at least partly similar 
scope. Consequently, instead of working together, overlapping institutions are likely 
to clash repeatedly (See Figure 3.1). 
Figure 3.1: Type of Institutions and Likelihood of Inter-institutional Conflict 
 
 
3.2.1.3 Institutional Ecosystem – Policy Arena Link 
In the national context, numerous policy arenas are set within the top institutional 
layer pertaining to governance of various referent objects. One or more policy arenas 
can be linked to the same institutional arrangement, and they have strong connections 
with each nested institutional level below. The deepest level of institutions – 
embedded institutions – forms the deepest level of policy actors’ beliefs. Actors’ 
resources are assigned and redistributed, multiplied and diminished within the context 
of the policy arena, but in their majority stem from the institutional environment and 
peculiarities of institutional arrangement. Institutional arrangement is a bridge 
between the actors’ objectives, institutional environment, and the referent object. 
Even though the scale and scope of a policy arena is small compared with those of the 
institutional levels, policy arena does have an influence on stability and change in the 
institutional ecosystem. Provided embedded institutions and the institutional 
environment form the foundation of the entire ecosystem and are its most deeply 
Independent Complementary Overlapping 
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rooted layers, they are least affected by the perturbations originating from the remote 
policy arena. However, minimal impulses hardly felt by the deepest institutional 
levels could potentially result into more serious effects, if sent repeatedly or aided by 
the events in the upper layer of institutional arrangement. 
 
3.2.2 Type II Inputs: Policy Arena 
Building on the insights from Chapter 2, which analyzed the origins of Type I inputs, 
including the questions of what policy arena is and what characteristics policy actors 
have, this section examines (1) constant and variable attributes of policy actors, (2) 
the difference between securitizing actors and policy stakeholders, (3) types of 
securitizing actors, (4) the differences between homogenous and heterogeneous 
composition of the policy arena, and, finally, (5) the nature and the role of triggers in 
the securitization process. 
 
3.2.2.1 Policy Actors’ Attributes 
Constant attributes are the basic assumptions about the human nature of policy 
actors, whereas variable attributes include actors’ objectives, beliefs and resources 
(See Table 3.1). 
Table 3.1: Attributes of Policy Actors 
Object Attribute 
 Constant Variable 
Policy Actor 
 is boundedly rational 
 has limited abilities to process 
stimuli 
 remembers losses more than gains 
 has explicit/implicit self-interest 
 has a limited attention span 
 is governed by emotion 
 beliefs 
 secondary 
 policy core 
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All policy actors share the same constant attributes. Hence, it is the configuration of 
variable attributes – beliefs, objectives, and resources – along with external factors 
that determine the roles of policy actors in the securitization process. 
Beliefs are the most elusive attributes of policy actors. They are difficult to capture 
and measure, but are essential in understanding policy actors’ objectives as well as 
the policy arena and the institutional ecosystem they are rooted in. Classification of 
beliefs is borrowed from Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) as it represents the 
most advanced taxonomy of this attribute supported and echoed by many others in 
policy analysis.151 
Policy actors’ objectives can be either content- or process-related, and distinction 
between the two is explained in detail in Chapter 2. Actors define problems in terms 
of their own objectives. A problem is a perceived gap between an actor’s objective 
and a current situation. Depending on the size of the gap, problems range from 
‘issues’ and ‘risks’ to ‘threats’. While issues are the lowest on the policy actors’ 
agenda, threats are the highest and are prioritized over risks. 
A threat is any policy problem that can be portrayed by a securitizing actor as 
negatively and immediately affecting the performance of a referent object, yet not 
possible (in the opinion of a securitizing actor) to eliminate. The inability to deal with 
the threat directly is a distinctive feature of securitization vs. non-securitization 
processes. When initiating securitization, policy actors portray it as a move towards 
‘securing’ the referent object from the threat. However, despite the shared perspective 
on a threatened referent object, they are likely to have diverging objectives and might 
not agree on the exact path towards securing the referent object. As a result, the 
referent object may be kept on top of the policy agenda and be securitized, but remain 
in perpetual state of insecurity. 
                                                            
151 See Chapter 2, Section 2.8.2.1 (Advocacy Coalition Framework) and Section 2.8.2.2 (Beliefs). 
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With regards to the theoretical framework of this study, it is thus important to note 
that the internal characteristics of the problem do not matter as much as the policy 
actors’ perceptions of the policy problem’s characteristics. Independent of the 
objective existence of a threat, the securitization process can be initiated if there is a 
shared perception between policy actors that the referent object is threatened. A threat 
would be perceived as a problem serious enough to be capable of disrupting the 
regular performance of a referent object. 
Resources have to be a part of the analysis of securitization processes because they 
play an important role in shaping actors’ behavior. Resources are the assets at policy 
actors’ disposal that allow them to function effectively. As public policy and strategic 
management sources demonstrated in the previous chapter, countless classifications 
of resources exist. Based on the review of multiple categorizations of resources, the 
following classification of resources is suggested (See Table 3.2). It combines 
perspectives of two disciplines and captures the variety of tangible, intangible and 
organizational resources. 
Table 3.2: Classification of Policy Arena Resources 







 Innovation and creativity 
 Reputation 
 Authority 
 Competencies and skills 
 Capacity to combine 
tangible and intangible 
resources 
Sources: Dess et al., Strategic Management; Hood, The Tools of Government; Sabatier and Weible, 
“The Advocacy Coalition Framework: Innovations and Clarifications;” Dente, Understanding 
Policy Decisions. 
 
3.2.2.2 Securitizing Actor vs. Policy Stakeholder 
The major distinction between numerous actors inside the policy arena is based on 
their role in the securitization process. According to this criterion, two types of policy 
actors can be distinguished: a securitizing actor and a policy stakeholder. The driver 
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of the securitization, who generally152 has to be present for the process to start, may 
be a single policy actor or a collection of thereof. Such driver assumes the role of a 
securitizing actor. Once the driver is identified, other policy actors within the same 
policy arena are labeled policy stakeholders. The latter are less active, but, 
nevertheless, their reaction to securitizing actor’s actions can play a detrimental role 
in the process. Moreover, while securitizing actors are the initiators and propagators 
of the securitization process, the features of the policy arena they are a part of matter 
as well. These features include characteristics of both policy arena (homogeneity vs. 
heterogeneity) and policy stakeholders (their beliefs, objectives, and resources). 
 
3.2.2.3 Securitizing Actors Typology 
Possessing various beliefs, aiming to achieve a multitude of objectives and endowed 
with different resources, securitizing actors do not follow a single behavioral 
blueprint. Depending on their functions, securitizing actors can belong to one of three 
types distinguished in this study. The function-based typology of securitization actors 
is partially derived from the ACF, MSM and PET frameworks examined in Chapter 
2. These frameworks are centered on dynamic interactions between various policy 
actors. Although their interpretations of policy processes differ and there is no 
association between the types of policy actors they identify, this study treats the types 
of policy actors described by the ACF, MSM and PET as a range of behavioral 
models available to a securitizing actor. While the terms ‘policy entrepreneur’, 
‘policy broker’, and ‘coalition’ are borrowed from the ACF and MSM frameworks, 
the meaning attached to them is modified to fit the goals of this study and theoretical 
framework. Overall, the suggested typology encapsulates the major routes a 
securitizing actor might choose to take. 
                                                            
152 Three types of securitizing actors will be discussed below (See Section 3.2.2.3). However, there are 
cases when securitization process takes off without an explicit action on the part of securitizing actor. 
This occurs when other factors, namely external and internal triggers of the securitization are at play. 
These triggers are also discussed below (See Section 3.2.2.5) 
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Hence, depending on the structural characteristics of the policy arena and institutional 
background, the securitizing actor can perform one of the following functions: 
(1) policy broker would mobilize the resources at hand, and 
manipulate the policy arena and/or external 
factor(s) to create a shared perception of threat; 
or 
(2) policy entrepreneur would take advantage of an already existing 
consensus on a threat among policy actors; or 
(3) dominant decision-maker 
(coalition) 
would be unconcerned with the other 
stakeholders’ reaction to his (their) actions 
because their approval or discontent do not 
matter. 
 
In the situation of a generally accepted threat, policy actors align their objectives, 
thus, creating a stimulus for cooperation. They are willing to compromise their beliefs 
and share resources in order to achieve the goal. A policy entrepreneur identifies 
these conditions as a policy window – an opportunity to couple policy, politics and 
problem streams and push policy actors towards the securitization process. 
The task of a policy broker is somewhat more complicated as it requires identifying a 
common goal between policy stakeholders as well as resolving the challenges of 
resource sharing and belief clashes. This type of securitizing actor is likely to 
originate from a policy arena where two or more coalitions – groups of policy actors 
– compete for influence. 
The functions of a dominant decision-maker are very different from those of the other 
two types of securitizing actors. While policy entrepreneur and policy broker put a lot 
of effort into negotiation, the dominant decision-maker is preoccupied with the 
preservation of the status quo through control of policy arena resources, which 
ensures that no alternative beliefs and objectives emerge to challenge the dominant 
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ones. As a result, if any challenges to the dominant decision-maker arise, they are 
more likely to come from outside than from inside the policy arena. 
 
3.2.2.4 Policy Arena Structure 
The structure of the policy arena has a significant influence on the course of the 
securitization process and securitizing actor’s behavior. There are two types of policy 
arena: homogenous and heterogeneous. A homogenous policy arena may either 
consist of policy actors with limited variability in resources, beliefs and objectives, or 
be dominated by one strong actor/coalition. In a heterogeneous policy arena, 
differences between policy actors’ attributes are more apparent, and no single actor or 
group is dominant. 
All external factors being equal, initiating a securitization process is a more 
complicated task for securitizing actors located in a heterogeneous policy arena than 
in a homogenous one. The presence of multiple competing advocacy coalitions and 
possibly networks within them, and stakeholders with vastly diverse beliefs and 
objectives, who are also likely to be in disagreement over the resources available in 
the policy arena, make the job of a securitizing actor harder. Heterogeneity keeps in 
check the power of potential dominant decision-makers present in the policy arena, 
but it is vulnerable to the rise of this type of securitizing actor from the broader 
institutional environment. Hence, overall, dominant decision-makers are more likely 
to originate from a homogenous policy arena, whereas policy entrepreneurs and 
policy brokers are pertinent to both types of policy arena. 
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3.2.2.5 Triggers of Securitization 
A dominant decision-maker and a policy broker can originate only from within the 
policy arena or a broader institutional environment,153 but a policy entrepreneur can 
also be an outsider infiltrating a policy arena in person or via a proxy. Emergence of 
an outside policy entrepreneur is one of the three external factors that make the 
distinction between homogenous and heterogeneous arenas less significant. The other 
two include systemic perturbations and policy spillovers. Systemic perturbations refer 
to external crises, which disrupt established workings inside the policy arena. The 
examples may include weather-related disasters, terrorist attacks, wars and elections. 
Policy spillovers occur when changes in one policy arena spread into another policy 
arena; they happen either when policy arenas intersect (issue-specific, often 
temporary changes), or converge (more long-term changes). External factors are 
equally capable of changing the behavior of policy actors in homogenous and 
heterogeneous policy arenas originally not predisposed to carrying out a 
securitization process. However, the presence of external factors has no effect on a 
policy arena unless the latter reacts to them. 
Another set of three internal factors – originating from within the policy arena – can 
also aid a securitizing actor in initiating a securitization process. This set includes 
venue changes, negotiated agreements, and policy learning. Venue changes occur 
when policy actors pursuing their interests modify some strategies they are 
dissatisfied with. Negotiated agreements involve building a consensus between policy 
actors with opposing strategies and/or objectives. Learning from their own and other 
policy actors’ experience constitutes policy learning. It may or may not be triggered 
by the external factors described above. Out of the three, policy learning is the least 
controlled by the securitizing actor. It is a process rather than an event, which 
includes many members of the policy arena. Venue change and negotiated 
                                                            
153 not from another policy arena 
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agreements, on the other hand, are designed and implemented directly by the 
securitizing actor, although not without the participation of the policy stakeholders. 
In addition to external and internal triggers of securitization, there is one more 
process that cannot be clearly defined as belonging to one category or the other. This 
process is policy monopoly fragmentation and is mostly relevant to homogenous 
policy arenas. It can take place via one or a combination of the following paths: 
layering, drift, conversion, and redesign. As a complex and lengthy development, it 
would have the strongest effect on aiding the initiation of the securitization process 
when policy monopoly fragmentation is at the later stages. Thus, the structure of the 
policy arena is fluid and can undergo significant changes over time. 
 
3.2.2.6 Summary 
In summary, the composition of a policy arena, relations between its components as 
well as their linkages to external factors have a significant role to play in the 
securitization process. They help explain the behavior of policy actors and define the 
functions of a securitizing actor and policy stakeholders (See Table 3.3). 
Nevertheless, it is only one part of the analysis because understanding the policy 
arena is not sufficient for drawing a complete picture of the securitization process. 
The other part is the examination of the institutional ecosystem in which policy arena 
is located and securitization process takes place. These conditions also affect 
behavior and performance of the policy arena structure, securitizing actors and policy 
stakeholders. 
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Table 3.3: Key Elements of the Policy Arena in the Securitization Process 
OBJECT 
FACTORS affecting object performance [on the 
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3.2.3 Type III Inputs: Institutions – Referent Object Link 
Type III inputs explain how a referent object fits into the securitization process by 
linking it to the corresponding institutional arrangement (See Figure 3.2). As 
discussed in Chapter 2, this section applies IDA to analyze the institution-referent 
object link. Although IDA structure is transferrable in principle, the elements of 
institutional components and the referent object are context-specific and have to be 
adjusted to fit oil and gas supply chains. 
Figure 3.2: IDA Structure 





Type III Inputs 
Physical Financial 
Policy Regime  Economic Efficiency Compliance* 
Source: Adapted from Saleth and Dinar, The Institutional Economics of Water. 
Notes: *In IDA, this box is titled ‘equity’ 
 
As Figure 3.2 demonstrates, one of the components of the referent object 
performance, equity, has been replaced with compliance. Equity is essential to the 
water sector performance because water is a common-pool resource. Oil and gas 
supply chains, however, provide different types of goods and services, and, unlike in 
the water sector, equitable allocation of oil and gas resources (or products) is not 
among primary objectives pursued by the oil and gas sector. Therefore, focus on 
compliance, rather than equity, is more representative of oil and gas sector 
performance. Importance of compliance with regulations, taxes and trade rules among 
others is illustrative of the link between the referent object and corresponding 
institutions, which are responsible for constructing these rules and regulations. 
Moreover, prior to filling in each box, it is important to note that Saleth and Dinar 
(2004) designed IDA to fit quantitative methodology. As a result of methodological 
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choice, referent object performance and institutional components are broken down 
into variables that are possible to codify and quantify. They take the form of dummy, 
categorical and scale variables.154 Since this study does not use a quantitative method, 
and the goal is to capture the breadth and depth of a policy process as opposed to 
measuring it, the elements of each component are less precise. Some echo elements 
of original IDA in that they interpret factual information (e.g., supply/demand, 
profits, etc.); others are based on open-ended questions and leave room for qualitative 
assessment (e.g., social responsibility, public image, etc.). The advantages and 
limitations of qualitative approach are discussed in relation to the overall 
methodology of this study later in this chapter (See Section 3.5). 
 
3.2.3.1 Oil & Gas Institutions Decomposed 
Similar to oil and gas supply chains, institutions governing them are not uniform in 
structure. IDA treats an institution as an amalgamation of laws, policies, and 
administrative arrangements (See Table 3.4). The three components belong to the 
same institution because they govern the same referent object. There are no clear 
hierarchical links between these components; rather, they co-exist in a symbiotic 
relationship. For the purposes of consistency with the language of the theoretical 
framework, IDA’s institutional components are referred to as the components of the 
institutional arrangement. 
Once again, the purpose and the methodology of this study differ significantly from 
the ones pursued in Saleth and Dinar (2004)’s application of IDA. Hence, the 
framework of this study does not seek to reduce the scope of the institutional 
arrangement to quantifiable variables. Instead, IDA’s perspective on institutions is 
used as an effective way of structuring the analysis. The elements of the three 
                                                            
154 Saleth and Dinar, The institutional economics of water, 110. 
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institutional components are aimed at exploring the depth and breadth of the 
institutional arrangement governing oil and gas supply chains. 
Table 3.4: Oil and Gas Institutions: Components and their Elements 
Legal Framework Policy Regime Administrative Arrangements 
 O&G rights 
 land use 
 scope of private 
participation 
 health, safety and 
environment 
 conflict resolution 
 regulatory regime 
 O&G trading 
 (foreign) investor rights 
 accountability 
 technology policy 
 nationalization/privatization 
 health/environment policies 
 tax burden/incentives 
 licensing regime 
 trade agreements 
 project selection 
 cost recovery 
 structure of regulatory 
authority(-ies) 
 finance patterns 
 pricing 
 fee collection 
 regulation/accountability 
 information capability 
 technical capacity 
Source: Adapted from Saleth and Dinar, The Institutional Economics of Water, 102. 
 
3.2.3.2 Referent Object Performance 
Upstream and midstream segments of oil and gas supply chains are the referent object 
of this study, and Chapter 2 specified and provided reasons for only two of the three 
consecutive stages of the supply chains to be included in the analysis. But, as a center 
piece of securitization process, referent object requires a more nuanced understanding 
than the one suggested by conventional ‘upstream’ and ‘midstream’ definitions. A 
more complete description involves not only (1) defining the supply chain in terms of 
products and services it yields, but also (2) positioning it inside the securitization 
framework. 
First, supply chains are not monolithic. Even in the case of vertically integrated 
companies, players representing different parts of the supply chain differ. Depending 
on their role in the supply chain, companies or their business units have distinct 
structure, resources, and goals (See Table 3.5). The analysis of supply chain 
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components helps one understand how each of them contributes to the referent object 
performance and the securitization process. 
Table 3.5: Oil & Gas Supply Chains 
Upstream 
OIL & GAS 






















































Notes: CDU – crude distillation unit,  DHC – distillate hydrocracker, 
FCC – fluid catalytic cracking, HDS - hydrodesulfurization, 
H2S – hydrogen sulfide,  LNG – liquefied natural gas, 
LPG – liquefied petroleum gas, NG – natural gas, 
VDU – vacuum distillation unit. 
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Hence, a sense of overall performance of oil and gas supply chains can be gathered 
from the performance indicators of the players in the upstream and midstream 
sectors. A brief survey of industry analyses155 as well as company-specific 
methodology and reports156 on oil and gas sector performance demonstrates that 
companies’ performance is judged against numerous criteria in several areas. These 
include physical assets (infrastructure, reserves replacement ratio, etc.), finances 
(capital investment, cash flow, shareholder return, etc.), human resources (overall 
employment, diversity, human development, injury frequency, etc.), environmental 
effects (greenhouse gas emissions, loss of primary containment, etc.), and compliance 
with government regulations (legal, fiscal, operational, etc.). 
Second, a referent object, such as a supply chain, cannot be assessed purely on the 
basis of its components. It belongs to a policy process; it affects and is affected by the 
factors external to the supply chain. In the theoretical framework, such factors are 
depicted as type I, II, and III inputs. According to the definition of securitization 
constructed in Chapter 2, a securitizing actor attempts to influence the performance of 
a referent object. Hence, securitizing actor’s objectives should be a part of a 
composite benchmark for assessing the performance of a referent object. This is 
where the link between the referent object and institutions comes into play. Since 
policy actors rarely have a direct say in how the entire oil and gas sector (as opposed 
to individual oil and gas players, i.e., NOCs) should behave, their demands on the 
                                                            
155 Abdullah M. Al-Obaidan and Gerald W. Scully, “Efficiency differences between private and state-
owned enterprises in the international petroleum industry,” Applied Economics 24:2 (1992): 237-46. 
Nadejda Victor, “On Measuring the Performance of National Oil Companies (NOCs),” Working Paper 
#64 (Program on Energy and Sustainable Development, Stanford University, 2007). Paul Stevens, “A 
Methodology for Assessing the Performance of National Oil Companies” (Washington, DC: The World 
Bank Group, 2008). Christian Wolf, “Does Ownership Matter? The Performance and Efficiency of State 
Oil vs. Private Oil (1987 – 2006),” Energy Policy 37, no. 7 (2009): 2642-52. Stacy L. Eller, Peter R. 
Hartley and Kenneth B. Medlock, “Empirical Evidence on the Operational Efficiency of National Oil 
Companies,” Empirical Economics 40, no. 3 (2010): 623-43. Mark C. Thurber, David R. Hults, and 
Patrick R. P. Heller, “Exporting the “Norwegian Model”: The Effect of Administrative Design on Oil 
Sector Performance,” Energy Policy 39, no. 9 (2011): 5366-78. 
156 BP, "Our key performance indicators," BP Global, 2016. Shell. Web Version of the Royal Dutch Shell 
plc Annual Report and Form 20-F 2014. Shell Website. 2015. John McCreery, Ethan Phillips, and 
Francesco Cigala, “Operational Excellence: The Imperative for Oil and Gas Companies,” Bain & 
Company, February 25, 2013. Riccardo Bertocco and John McCreery, “Operational Excellence: 
Managing Performance in the Oil and Gas Industry,” Bain & Company, May 28, 2014. 
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sector are channeled through appropriate institutions. They are restrained or 
empowered by type I inputs from the institutional ecosystem, mixed in with type II 
inputs from the policy arena, and finally (fail to) reach the referent object as part of 
type III inputs. 
Taking into consideration IDA insights adapted to the oil and gas sector as well as the 
purpose of this study, four groups of performance indicators are formed: physical, 
financial, economic efficiency, and compliance (See Table 3.6). Two sets of 
indicators from surveyed sources – environmental effects and human resources – are 
given less attention in this study for the following reasons. Performance with regards 
to the environment is reflected in the compliance group of indicators. Human 
resources performance is related to company-specific values and strategies in terms 
of human capital development, which is not relevant to the process of securitization. 
Four groups of performance indicators will be used to analyze behavior of players in 
country-specific settings to assess the overall oil and gas supply chains performance 
in three case studies. Physical performance incorporates tangible assets that 
companies own, the gap between supply and demand in products and services offered 
by the supply chains, the condition of oil and gas infrastructure, efficiency of conflict 
resolution within the supply chain, and corporate structure within companies. 
Financial indicators are the ones revealing monetary and fiscal health of the players 
in the sector, including available capital, indebtedness, profits and others. Economic 
efficiency is reflected through oil and gas prices, and the ability of companies to 
maintain operational costs within the budget. Finally, compliance sets oil and gas 
sector within an institutional landscape, and unveils its (in-) ability to cope with 
numerous rules and regulations. 
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state of infrastructure 
reserves replacement 
smoothness of supply chain operations 
corporate structure 
capital investment (sources, inflow) 
expenditure vs cost recovery 
growth rate (earnings, debt, etc.) 
Economic Efficiency Compliance 
price 
purchasing and procurement 
(suppliers, service providers) 
corporate relations (contractual obligations, trading) 
regulatory compliance 
tax compliance costs 
Source: Headers adapted from Saleth and Dinar, The Institutional Economics of Water with the 
exception of “Compliance.” Other cell content is based on the author’s research. 
 
3.2.3.3 Summary 
Type III inputs are indispensable to the theoretical framework that attempts to explain 
the process of securitization. It links otherwise disjointed and convoluted relations 
between the oil and gas sector and structures and processes that govern them. 
Additionally, type III inputs are the binding element inside the framework, which 
brings together other types of inputs. On the one hand, type I and type II inputs meet 
at the referent object-specific institutional arrangement feeding into the institutions’ 
performance and affecting type III inputs. On the other hand, type III inputs reveal 
the mechanisms through which type I and type II inputs are able to reach and 
influence the referent object. 
 
3.2.4 Theoretical Framework Overview: Relevant Concepts and Visual Representation 
Figure 3.3 below visualizes the theoretical framework. Although this study uses the 
original Buzan et al. (1998)’s securitization theory as a foundation, securitization has 
been redefined as a policy process. Consequently, modifications and clarifications 
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should be made to some other essential concepts of securitization process. For the 
purposes of this study, 
securitization is a policy process shaped by the interdependent Type I, 
Type II and Type III inputs, where a securitizing actor 
attempts to alter the performance of a referent object, which 
it perceives as threatened; 
politicization is defined differently from securitization theory; no policy 
processes are free of politics, but the politicization of a 
referent object is considered a part of securitization. In other 
words, a politicized referent object is either in the process of 
securitization or has already been securitized; 
institutional 
ecosystem 
is a constellation of hierarchically nested (embedded 
institutions, institutional environment, and institutional 
arrangements) and horizontally interlinked (within each 
hierarchical level) collections of objects and is the source of 
Type I inputs in the securitization framework; 
policy arena is the context where policy actors responsible for the 
governance of a certain referent object co-exist and is the 
source of Type II inputs in the securitization framework; 
depending on the characteristics of policy actors and 
institutional ecosystem, this context can be defined as 
homogenous or heterogeneous; 
institutional 
arrangement 
is a narrow in scope institution in the institutional ecosystem 
designed to govern a specific referent object; it consists of 
three elements – legal framework, policy framework, and 
administrative arrangement, and is the source of Type III 
inputs in the securitization framework; 
securitizing actor is a policy actor who has, or is able to obtain and use, 
securitizing power; depending on the structure of the policy 
arena and external forces at play, a securitizing actor can 
play a role of (a) policy broker, (b) policy entrepreneur, or 
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(c) dominant decision-maker; 
securitizing power is the securitizing actor’s ability to drive the securitization 
process based primarily on the actor’s variable (objectives, 
resources, and beliefs) as well as constant attributes; 
securitizing move is not constrained by the discourse analysis definition of it as 
a speech act; instead, it is a policy instrument employed by a 
securitizing actor in order to achieve securitization 
objectives in relation to a certain referent object; it is (in-) 
directly expressed through type I inputs; 
referent object is a system (oil and gas supply chains), perceived threatened 
by the securitizing actor who then attempts to secure it by 
altering its performance; 
audience are policy stakeholders, who are less active than a 
securitizing actor, but whose reaction to the securitizing 
actor’s actions can play a detrimental role in 
advancing/blocking the securitization process. 
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Figure 3.3: Theoretical Framework: The Securitization Process 
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3.3 Does the Framework Address Limitations of the Original Securitization Theory? 
The previous chapter identified five significant limitations of the original 
securitization theory. The constructed framework is designed to address the 
limitations. The major sources of the theory’s criticism included its (1) Eurocentric 
character and treatment of normal politics, (2) definition of the securitizing move and 
the moment of securitization, (3) the origin of securitizing actors, (4) definition and 
role of the audience, and (5) the context of securitization.157 
First, the current analysis treats securitization as a policy process and makes the issue 
of Eurocentricity, and political system in general, irrelevant. Normal politics no 
longer lies within the confines of a liberal democracy where normal refers to 
negotiation and consultation between the policy actors. Instead, it is the institutional 
context and characteristics of the policy arena that determine what is normal and what 
is out of the ordinary. For instance, normal politics within a homogenous policy arena 
with a dominant decision-maker might not require consensus-building measures. 
Thus, the securitization framework is applicable to any political system. 
Second, the securitizing move and the moment of securitization are redefined to 
address the criticism. Faulted for their narrow scope, in their original interpretation 
both concepts do not translate well into actions and events in practice. Rather than 
defining securitizing move as a speech act proclaiming the act of securitization, this 
theoretical framework treats it as an initial step undertaken by the securitizing actor. 
This step is context-specific and differs depending on the policy arena and 
institutional conditions, which shape the role of securitizing actor as a policy 
entrepreneur, a policy broker or a dominant decision-maker. Hence, the securitizing 
move is dependent on the securitizing actor’s role. A policy broker would create a 
shared perception of threat among policy stakeholders. A policy entrepreneur could 
potentially employ a variety of policy tools to initiate securitization. A dominant 
                                                            
157 See Chapter 2 for the detailed discussion. 
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decision-maker might not need a bold securitizing move at all in order to pursue 
securitization objectives. Although they are not always easily observable, securitizing 
moves are evident in changes implemented in the institutional arrangement governing 
the threatened referent object. 
Similarly, the moment of securitization is not the moment the referent object becomes 
securitized. Instead, it can be referred to as a moment when the relevant conditions 
converge and set the securitization process in motion. The original definition of the 
moment of securitization no longer applies because, once again, securitization is 
treated as a process and not an isolated event. 
With regards to the third and fourth points of criticism, the developed theoretical 
framework provides a thorough assessment of the nature and roles of securitizing 
actors and the audience. Although the label of ‘securitizing actor’ is preserved, the 
audience is referred to as policy stakeholders, because the new concept better 
illustrates the relationship between the actors within a policy arena and avoids 
confusion between policy stakeholders (the audience in Buzan et al.’s securitization 
theory) and the general public (the common understanding of the audience). 
The fifth and final point on the absence of context is the overarching theme of the 
many critical assessments of the securitization theory. The theoretical framework of 
this study eradicates this point of criticism, because it is constructed on the premise of 
providing a detailed answer to how securitization process unfolds. While the original 
theory does not touch on the broader context securitization emerges from, this 
theoretical framework shows that securitization is deeply rooted within an 
institutional ecosystem. 
Due to the fundamental problems addressed above, some assumptions about the 
process of securitization need to be revisited and checked for inconsistencies as well. 
To begin with, according to Buzan et al., the three indispensable components of 
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securitization are the securitizing actor, the securitizing move and the audience’s 
(policy stakeholders’) consent. On the basis of the developed theoretical framework, 
this study argues that out of these three components only the emergence of a 
securitizing actor is a necessary condition. A bold securitizing move and policy 
stakeholders’ agreement with the actions of the securitizing actor may or may not be 
required. 
Moreover, the detailed analysis of the policy and institutional structure surrounding 
the process of securitization demonstrates that the focus of the original securitization 
theory on the construction of a shared meaning of a threat is erroneous. A threat is 
secondary to the actors’ objectives, as it is an interpretation of the latter. Thus, it is 
more important that policy actors agree that a threat exists and if multiple objectives 
exist, that they are related to the same referent object. At the same time, the actual 
meaning of a threat does not matter, but the shared understanding of the scale of a 
problem that makes it a threat does. In other words, securitization can take place if 
parallel goals linked to the same referent object exist and there is an equally 
substantial gap between currently unacceptable situation and the actors’ respective 
goals. 
Furthermore, contrary to the view expressed in Buzan et al.’s securitization theory, 
this study argues that as a process, securitization cannot be measured in binary terms, 
either success (yes) or failure (no). Rather, it is a continuum, where the value, or the 
degree, of securitization at any given moment ranges from the weakest to the 
strongest in relation to the referent object. It is also dependent on the referent object’s 
previous experience with securitization. This study does not aim at calculating the 
degree of securitization of a referent object, as changes in different components of 
institution do not carry an equal weight. For instance, modifications in the 
administrative arrangements are generally the easiest to come about, while legal and 
policy transformations are much harder to achieve. Although this is usually the case, 
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reverse examples do exist as well. Thus, these peculiarities are context-specific and 
have to be dealt with on a case-by-case basis. 
Based on the observations of institutional behavior, there is an inverse correlation 
between the institutional depth of securitization and the duration of securitization 
process on the one hand and the likelihood of its reversal on the other hand. The more 
deeply rooted securitization is (institutional environment vs. institutional 
arrangement) and the longer it persists, the less likely the process is to be reversed. 
This is due to the fact that institutions are path-dependent, and institutions that are 
more mature and located closer to the institutional ecosystem’s foundation are less 
open to radical change. If a securitization-related law, policy or administrative detail 
is implemented, the more time passes from the moment of implementation, the less 
likely it is to be removed at the later stages. Hence, institutional qualities make 
securitization a sticky process. 
While the process of securitization cannot be interpreted in success and failure terms, 
the outcome of this process can be. Similar to the institutional environment, 
securitization has to be analyzed within a pre-selected spatial and temporal scope. 
Hence, the outcome of securitization is a subjective concept defined as a state of the 
referent object at the end of the analyzed time period. Failure occurs when the 
referent object is perceived as insecure, which is anywhere within the extreme ends of 
securitization. Success is achieved when the referent object is perceived as secure, 
which happens beyond the extreme ends of securitization. Unlike insecurity, which is 
interpreted through degrees of securitization, security has no gradation (See Figure 
3.4). Security of the referent object can be attained as a result of (a) the referent 
object losing its relevance in the eyes of the securitizing actor, or (b) the policy actors 
meeting their goals and, thus, thinking that they have addressed the perceived threat. 
It is possible to tell whether or not a particular goal is met by comparing that goal 
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with the relevant aspects of the referent object’s performance at the moment in time 
in which the outcome is analyzed. 













Thus, the developed theoretical framework demonstrates that securitization is a 
policy process, which has two major features differentiating it from the other policy 
processes: securitizing actor(s), and a referent object recognized as vitally important 
by the policy actors who have a jurisdiction over it and perceived as threatened. 
During this process type I inputs produced by the institutional environment, type II 
inputs controlled by the securitizing actor and influenced by policy stakeholders, and 
type III inputs created by the components of a relevant (to the referent object) 
institutional arrangement enter into a dynamic interaction to modify the performance 
of a referent object to meet the objectives of policy actors. 
 
3.4 Research Question Detailed 
In order to create a complete picture of how oil and gas supply chains are securitized, 
this study breaks down the central research question into more specific elements 
illustrative of relationships established in the theoretical framework within and 
Insecure RO 
Secure RO 
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between the three types of inputs. Shaped as questions, they are grouped according to 
the types of inputs they are related to: institutional ecosystem (type I), policy arena 
(type II), and institution – referent object link (type III). Guided by the theoretical 
framework, the analysis of oil and gas supply chains’ securitization in three national 
contexts (Chapters 4 -6) is performed with these questions in mind. 
 
3.4.1 Elements Related to Type I Inputs 
Q1.1: Do quantifiable and easily observable trends affect the process of 
securitization more than qualitative and barely visible trends? 
Q1.2: What are the indicators of securitization originating from the institutional 
environment as opposed to the institutional arrangement? 
 
3.4.2 Elements Related to Type II Inputs 
Q2.1: Can the securitization process move forward if policy actors perceive the 
referent object as threatened, but do not share a common definition of threat? 
Q2.2: Do external triggers of securitization incentivize competing policy actors in a 
heterogeneous policy arena to compromise their conflicting beliefs and share 
their resources? 
Q2.3: Do policy stakeholders have any influence on pausing/reversing/advancing a 
securitization process led by a dominant decision-maker? 
Q2.4: Do securitizing actors always try to build a policy core belief consensus 
among policy stakeholders and under what conditions? 
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3.4.3 Elements Related to Type III Inputs 
Q3.1: Does securitization involve changes in all three components of the 
institutional arrangement (legal and policy frameworks, and administrative 
arrangements) relevant to the referent object? 
Q3.2: Do independent, complementary and overlapping institutions have a different 
impact on the securitization of a referent object? 
 
3.5 Methodology 
3.5.1 Multiple Case Study Analysis 
The method employed is a multiple case study analysis utilizing exploratory 
“building block” cases in structured, focused comparison. This methodology differs 
significantly from the way securitization theory prescribes to study securitization, but 
it is consistent with the combined deductive – inductive logic of this study, fits its 
objectives, and allows for proper investigation of the central research question. 
Unlike the research process of traditional securitization analysis that is rooted in 
constructivist approach, this study originates from the perspective of logical 
positivism. Undoubtedly, epistemological choices have a significant effect on both 
theoretical and methodological foundations of research. For example, discourse 
analysis is a widely used research tool in social sciences, but the field of applied 
linguistics is considered the laboratory for its advancement. In international relations 
theory, discourse analysis is associated with the constructivist school of thought, 
which explores the “process” of formation of state identities and interests.158 While 
treatment of discourse in applied linguistics belongs to the tradition of critical 
discourse analysis, international relations scholars lean towards the tradition of post-
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structuralism.159 The difference between the two is that “for critical discourse analysis 
scholars, text analysis is always the (insufficient) starting point of one’s analysis that 
needs to be supplemented by broader sociopolitical… research.”160 Hence, 
securitization theory with its narrow focus on a speech act is rooted in the post-
structuralism tradition, while many of its critiques are based on critical discourse 
analysis arguing for widening the scope of the theory by assigning more weight to 
contextual sociopolitical factors. 
As opposed to discourse analysis, this study relies on case study analysis as its core 
methodology. “Case study methods have wide applicability” in many epistemological 
traditions,161 and researchers in many social science fields “welcome the comparative 
advantages of case studies for addressing qualitative variables, individual actors, 
decision-making processes, historical and social contexts, and path dependencies.”162  
In line with its epistemological and theoretical orientation, this study pursues a 
combined deductive-inductive logic in formulating and exploring the central research 
question. The deductive component stems from the construction of the 
interdisciplinary theoretical framework aimed at filling the gaps in the original 
securitization theory via synthesis of insights from four disciplines. The inductive 
component is brought about by employing a case study method in order to apply the 
deductive theoretical framework, analyze suggested and potentially omitted 
influential variables, and trace complex causal processes at play. 
The nature of both deductive and inductive components indicates that the study will 
benefit greatly from the qualitative research design. Some of the major acknowledged 
reasons for employing qualitative studies include “explor[ing]… little known… or 
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[not] adequately understood phenomena,” “approaching [them] from the perspective 
of a… non-observer,” generating hypotheses or research propositions based on in-
depth data analysis, and focusing on discovering and analyzing as opposed to 
measuring variables and causal mechanisms.163  Thus, qualitative research design best 
fits the purposes of this study as it corresponds with both its methodological and 
empirical objectives: advancing systematic understanding of securitization processes 
through structured analysis, and contributing thorough accounts of the policy-making 
processes with regards to a specified referent object – oil and gas supply chains. 
As with any other research method there are certain trade-offs and limitations 
associated with the case study method. Such issues as parsimony vs. richness,164 
representativeness,165 ability to estimate and measure things,166 and questionable 
external validity can potentially undermine the value of the case study method. 
Nevertheless, attempts are made in the research design and in the process of case 
analysis to either eliminate or at least minimize these issues. 
Moreover, advantages of using case studies for researching the process of 
securitization clearly outweigh potential limitations. Commonly cited benefits 
inherent in the case study method and applicable to this study include: 
 ensuring high conceptual validity through “contextualized comparison” also 
known as “analytically equivalent phenomena” as well as construct validity;167 
 identifying new hypotheses, variables and causal mechanisms;168 and 
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 addressing equifinality and specifying “scope conditions of theories.”169 
Although case study analysis is nominally a method, there is no universal blueprint 
on how exactly the analysis is conducted. Numerous instruments can be employed, 
but they have to be consistent with the overall objectives and the research question. In 
this study, focus on ‘systematic understanding,’ ‘thorough accounts,’ and ‘how’ 
question calls for the (1) multiple-case approach, (2) structured, focused comparison 
and (3) process tracing as well as a number of other supplementary tools available for 
applying case study method. 
First, multiple-case as opposed to single-case analysis is selected in order to “include 
both within-case analysis of single cases and comparisons of a small number of 
cases.”170 This increases the amount of evidence for supporting, refining or revising 
the theoretical framework. While case selection is discussed in the next section, 
selected cases combine several ideal types suggested in the literature and can be 
defined as exploratory171  “building block”172  cases. In other words, their function is 
to explore securitization processes with the goal of “identify[ing] common 
patterns,”173 “developing more general theoretical propositions, which can then be 
tested through other methods, including large-N methods,” and “contribut[ing] to the 
process of theory construction rather than to theory itself.”174 
Second, while this composite type of case studies contributes to the specification of a 
multitude of variables as well as causal mechanisms, uncovering intervening causal 
mechanisms (equifinality), exploring reciprocal causation and endogeneity effects, 
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the instrument of structured, focused comparison enhances multiple case study 
analysis further to ensure that uncovered evidence “would yield useful generic 
knowledge.”175 The theoretical framework is the foundation for both ‘structured’ and 
‘focused’ analysis ensuring that every case is scrutinized using the same questions, 
data collection is standardized, and focus on securitization as the dependent variable 
is equally retained in each case throughout the analysis. 
Third, structured, focused comparison is conducted through the application of several 
instruments. Thissen and Walker (2013) offer a review of a wide range of policy 
analysis techniques, some of which are applicable to this multiple case study research 
design.176 As Table 3.7 illustrates, various instruments are used to address the 
questions associated with three input types of the theoretical framework. Each 
instrument helps to conduct a systematic analysis of different object components. 
Objectives hierarchy is helpful in uncovering and comparing goals of numerous 
policy actors, including policy stakeholders and securitizing actors. As discussed 
earlier, objectives are not always straightforward and easy to disentangle. Objectives 
hierarchy specifies them in terms of levels of related proxies.177 Means-Ends analysis 
sheds light on policy actors’ values as well as complements the previous instrument 
in identifying their fundamental goals. Also, as the name of this instrument suggests, 
it helps to pay attention to the means that policy actors choose in order to achieve 
their ends.178 The analysis of Causal Relations looks at external factors affecting the 
object of investigation. Unlike the means-ends approach which deals with the actors’ 
intended, or perceived, goals, causal relations analysis indicates causal influences 
from the factors that are out of policy actors’ direct control.179 Components of the 
IDA analysis have been discussed in great detail as part of the theoretical framework. 
They relate to the referent object performance and decomposition of relevant 
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institutions (See Section 3.2.3). Finally, process tracing is “a powerful method of 
inference” because throughout the case research process it insists “on providing a 
continuous and theoretically based historical explanation of a case.”180 It contributes 
to the analysis of historical context of each case in relation to the theoretical 
framework and established relationships between numerous variables, which are 
reflected in the elements of the central research question. 
Table 3.7: Instruments of Case Study Research 
Object of the Theoretical Framework Instrument of Analysis 
Type I Inputs 
Causal Relations Analysis 
Process Tracing 
Institutional Analysis 
Type II Inputs 
Objectives Hierarchy 
Means-Ends Analysis 
Causal Relations Analysis 
Type III Inputs 
IDA 
Sector Performance Analysis 
 
 
3.5.2 Case Study Selection 
The case study selection process is based on three criteria. First, a candidate case has 
to have mature oil and gas supply chains as an indicator of a dynamic oil and gas 
sector with a variety of actors and numerous observations over a significant period of 
time. Second, it has to be one of the top producers and consumers of both fossil fuels, 
which is illustrative of the importance of the oil and gas sector in national policy-
making processes. Third, two selected cases are net exporters of both oil and gas and 
one case is a net importer of both fuels. The analysis of both exporters and importers 
is expected to allow for the variation in the dependent variable – performance of oil 
and gas supply chains. Countries well-endowed with oil and gas resources, net 
exporters are expected to be satisfied with security of their supplies and to be less 
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concerned with securitization. Supply chains in countries that are net importers of oil 
and gas are expected to be more predisposed to securitization. 
Table 3.8: Top Oil and Gas Producers and Consumers in the World (2015) 
Crude Oil Natural Gas 
Producers Consumers Producers Consumers 
1. United States 1. United States 1. United States 1. United States 
2. Saudi Arabia 2. China 2. Russia 2. Russia 
3. Russia 3. India 3. Iran 3. China 
4. Canada 4. Japan 4. Qatar 4. Iran 
5. China 5. Saudi Arabia 5. Canada 5. Japan 
6. Iraq 6. Brazil 6. China 6. Saudi Arabia 
7. Iran 7. Russia 7. Norway 7. Canada 
8. UAE 8. South Korea 8. Saudi Arabia 8. Mexico 
9. Kuwait 9. Germany 9. Algeria 9. Germany 
10. Venezuela 10. Canada 10. Indonesia 10. UAE 
Source: BP (2016), Statistical Review of World Energy. 
As evident from Table 3.8, the first choice of a case could be the United States. 
Although it is the top producer and consumer of both crude oil and natural gas, it has 
traditionally been an importer of both. The second potential case candidate is Saudi 
Arabia. While the largest exporter of crude oil, it is not a significant exporter of 
natural gas. Going further down the list of the top ten producers and consumers, 
Russia is the first country that fits all the criteria: a top producer and consumer of oil 
and gas as well as one of the largest exporters of both resources. Similarly, Canada is 
the only other country in the table that fits the same criteria. Thus, Russia and Canada 
have been selected as the two cases for analysis. They make interesting candidates for 
the application of the securitization framework in order to explore the following 
questions in depth: Is security of their respective supply chains compromised? If so, 
has securitization been present for a long time and has it applied equally to both oil 
and gas as the referent objects of this study? Most importantly, what are the 
mechanisms behind securitization? 
Finally, the case of China was selected in order to trace securitization dynamics 
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within the context of another top producer and consumer of crude oil and natural gas, 
but unlike Canada and Russia, a net importer of both fuels. From this perspective, the 
United States would be a suitable candidate case as well. But due to the close link 
between the US and Canada’s oil and gas supply chains, China is preferred as an 
independent case in order to ensure the variety of observations, players, and potential 
causal linkages originating from this case. 
According to the latest estimates, Canada, China and Russia together hold 17% of the 
world’s proved reserves of crude oil and 20% of natural gas. In 2015, they 
contributed over 21% of crude oil and about 25% of natural gas production in the 
world.181 Although the contexts of the three cases are hardly similar and they are 
expected to exhibit significant variation in the independent variables contributing to 
securitization, in the research design of the study this is an advantage rather than a 
limitation. “Looking at several cases that maximize variation across the independent 
variables” is useful in exploratory “building block” case studies because significant 
variation in the variables’ values results in a clearly illuminated causality.182 
Starting dates of analysis differ between case studies: Canada – 1947, China – 1949, 
and Russia – 1968. All three dates are chosen with the common international event in 
mind – the first major oil crisis of 1973 – that has had significant political and 
economic effects on many national O&G sectors and broader energy strategies 
around the world. Starting points for case study analyses predate the 1973 oil crisis 
with the goal of understanding national contexts responsible for variations in 
reactions to the crisis. In Canada, the beginning of a large-scale O&G industry dates 
back to 1947, when major reserves were discovered in Alberta. In China, the analysis 
starts with the establishment of the modern Chinese state – the People’s Republic of 
China – in 1949, even though O&G sector development did not begin until the early 
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1960s. Finally, in the case of Russia, 1968 is chosen as a starting point for analysis as 
the year when oil overtook coal as the leading fossil fuel183 in the USSR’s primary 
energy mix and started playing an increasingly important role in the national 
economy. The difference in the starting points of analysis for China and Russia is 
based on the author’s judgment that drastic changes in the institutional environment 
in case of Russia/USSR are more removed from the time when large-scale O&G 
development took off (1917 – 1968) as opposed to China where new statehood and 
significant O&G sector development are separated by a smaller time gap (1949 – 
early 1960s). 
The ending date for analysis is 2015. It corresponds to the latest year the data for this 
study are available at the time of case study analyses. This date is chosen to reflect 
the most recent developments in the national and international contexts in order to 
produce the most up-to-date analysis of securitization processes. 
While these cases are chosen based on their relevance to the research objectives of 
the study, the selection also takes into consideration the author’s resources and 
constraints in studying these national contexts including established familiarity with 
the political and institutional environment of these countries, language skills, and 
access to primary and secondary resources. 
 
3.5.3 Sources and Data 
This study uses secondary data, as well as primary and secondary sources in order to 
analyze three country-specific oil and gas supply chains over the span of five – seven 
decades. For the purposes of conducting a comprehensive research with minimal 
selection bias, guidelines on data and sources choice from the works of Stewart & 
Kamins (1993), Blaikie (2000) and Thies (2002) are adopted. 
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A distinction has to be made between primary and secondary data on one side and 
primary and secondary sources on the other. The latter classification is widely used 
by historians where primary source is “a document or physical object which was 
written or created during the time under study,” while secondary source interprets 
primary sources.184 Primary and secondary data, however, are both raw data, but the 
difference is in the source of their collection. For instance, some data related to 
China’s case study are secondary due to the author’s language limitations. Other data 
on the same case study are primary because most recently Chinese government and 
companies provide official English version of essential documents. Data used with 
relation to the other two case studies, Canada and Russia, are predominantly primary. 
Primary sources are diversified to ensure that research is based not simply on the 
most immediately available sources, but on the overall documentary evidence. While 
accounts might misjudge or misinterpret an event and government accounts (i.e., 
reports) can be affected by particular political conditions, including censorship,185 this 
limitation does not apply to official government documentation such as laws, 
executive orders and others because despite political conditions they reflect the 
unbiased reality of events and trends at the time of their passage and publication. 
In order to grasp the vast volumes of primary sources and make sure historical 
contexts are interpreted correctly, this research is heavily dependent on secondary 
sources. The use of secondary sources is associated primarily with relying on the 
work of historians and policy analysts. However, there are a few factors that make 
such reliance potentially problematic. For instance, Thies (2002) distinguishes two 
major problems with the use of secondary resources in qualitative research: 
investigator bias, and “unwarranted selectivity in the use of historical source 
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materials.”186 Both problems “can only be minimized, never eliminated.”187 As a 
result, one of the goals of this study is “to demonstrate that the choice of primary and 
secondary source materials was made to minimize the potential adverse effects of 
selectivity and bias.”188 
Further, the dangers of selection bias make it crucial to explicitly justify the selection 
of secondary sources to ensure that the spectrum of scholarly opinion is represented 
and that all evidence is considered, rather than focusing on the work of a limited 
number of scholars.189 For example, the dangers of “presentism,” whereby the 
“present is seen as the inevitable consequence of past events,” is a common danger in 
researchers’ accounts and can significantly taint empirical results.190 Thus, although 
this study heavily relies on secondary sources, the spectrum of scholarly thought is 
assessed, and well-regarded and methodologically sound monographs and other 
research accounts are used. 
Finally, along with analyses on the topic dating back to the 1970s – 1990s, the most 
recent secondary sources are examined in order to ensure that the most recently 
available evidence and analyses are reflected in the research.191 This is particularly 
important with regards to studying policy processes because many policy decisions 




This chapter established the detailed theoretical framework for the analysis of cases 
that follows in the next three chapters (Chapters 4 – 6). It has specified three types of 
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inputs within the framework that are relevant to the process of securitization, and a 
number of elements linking the main research question and the framework. It has also 
reviewed the constructed framework in light of the limitations of the original 
securitization theory to ensure the validity of the designed framework in addressing 
its critical weak spots. Finally, it discussed the methodology which will take the form 
of a multiple case study research and guide the application of designed theoretical 
framework to the analysis of oil and gas supply chains in three countries: Canada, 
China, and Russia over comparable time periods, namely 1947 – 2015, 1949 – 2015, 
and 1968 - 2015. 
In the chapters that follow, case study analysis will be conducted and structured in 
accordance with the theoretical framework. Case studies will provide empirical 
evidence for the theoretical relationships underpinning the securitization framework. 
Detailed elements of the research question related to the three inputs of the 
framework will guide the analysis of each case. They will also serve as an instrument 
for comparing the outcomes of the framework’s application in different national 
contexts as well as drawing case-specific and general conclusions and establishing 
research propositions for future research.  
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Chapter 4: Securitization of Oil and Gas Supply Chains in China 
(1949 – 2015) 
4.1 Introduction 
In the last 65 years, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) transformed from a 
predominantly agrarian to an industrialized state. Large-scale industrialization and 
remarkable economic growth have been underpinned by a steep increase in 
consumption of fossil fuels. While coal will remain the main source of energy supply 
in the near future, demand for oil is persistent and natural gas consumption is on the 
rise. China is the fifth largest producer of oil in the world, second largest consumer 
and the top oil importer as of 2015.192 The country’s gas resources are limited, but it 
is the third largest consumer of natural gas in the world.193 
Although oil and gas are combined under the umbrella of the same sector with 
legislation and many policies not distinguishing between the two resources, oil supply 
has been the primary objective of the sector and the policy-making processes 
surrounding it between 1960s and late 1990s. Government statements on encouraging 
gas development in China started to appear in the late 1990s, and natural gas received 
recognition as a crucial fossil fuel by the early 2000s. 
Energy security entered the language of official Chinese government documents in 
the early 2000s, and oil supply is one of its key components. However, the process of 
securitization of oil supply chains preceded the arrival of energy security, or oil 
security, concepts to the policy discourse by many decades. The securitization 
process in the management of oil supply chains was initiated by the petroleum 
group194 of the Ministry of Petroleum Industry (MPI) in the late 1950s. The members 
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of this group were policy entrepreneurs who advanced securitization in order to 
counter the threat of China’s full dependence on imports and potential external oil 
supply interruption. Once set in motion, the process of securitization did not require 
much effort on the part of the petroleum group through the 1970s. The new internal 
and external challenges of the 1980s contributed to the rise of a new securitizing actor 
– the NOCs. Originally acting as policy brokers, NOCs transformed into dominant 
decision-makers of the O&G policy arena by the 2000s. The securitization process is 
still underway, but new actors who may speed up or reverse the process are 
challenging the established power of NOCs. 
Securitization of natural gas supply chains is much more recent. Barely visible in 
China’s energy mix, gas is an emerging arena for clashing beliefs, interests, and 
objectives of numerous policy actors. Active securitization of gas supply chains 
began in the mid-2000s with the diversification of supply sources and infrastructure 
build-up. Construction of LNG terminals, promotion of coalbed methane (CBM) and 
shale gas, and ongoing extension of existing pipeline infrastructure beyond national 
borders are the measures being implemented with the goal of securing long-term gas 
supplies. However, unlike oil, gas supplies are not politicized, and in current 
conditions of low demand and low prices, policy actors do not perceive gas supply 
chains as immediately threatened. 
Following the structure of the securitization framework constructed in Chapter 3, this 
chapter analyzes securitization trends in China’s upstream and midstream segments 
of oil and gas supply chains. Type I inputs (Section 4.2.1) demonstrate that the nature 
of the institutional ecosystem determines the general policy direction of various 
policy arenas, including the one responsible for oil and gas supply chains. A unique 
set of hierarchically nested embedded institutions, the institutional environment, and 
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institutional arrangements creates China’s institutional ecosystem in which O&G 
supply chains operate and are managed by the policy actors. Type II inputs (Section 
4.2.2) analyze the role of the central level, provincial level and peripheral actors, 
distinguish securitizing actors from policy stakeholders, and separate securitization 
processes within oil supply chains and gas supply chains. Type III inputs (Section 
4.2.3) detail changes in the components of the institutional arrangement governing 
O&G supply chains and their effect on the evolving configuration and performance of 
the key players in the sector – international oil companies (IOCs), private domestic 
companies, and NOCs. The final section synthesizes the key findings on the 
securitization processes in China’s O&G supply chains (Section 4.3). 
 
4.2 China’s O&G Supply Chains in the Securitization Framework 
4.2.1 Type I Inputs: Institutional Ecosystem 
4.2.1.1 Embedded Institutions 
Cultural characteristics of the Chinese society have formed centuries prior to the 
establishment of the current institutional environment under the leadership of the 
Communist Party in 1949. They take their roots in Confucianism, importance of 
family and personal ties, and acceptance of a highly hierarchical society among 
others.195 In the energy field, and oil and gas sector in particular, the core norms and 
traditions have manifested themselves in such concepts as self-reliance, “a belief in 
man’s ability to master nature”, and “acceptance of austerity.”196 
The elements of embedded institutions illustrate the influence of history and culture 
on the policy course as well as the ability of deeply rooted beliefs and ideas to adapt 
to changing circumstances. For instance, the concept of self-reliance has evolved 
significantly over time. It can be traced back to the 19th century “self-strengthening 
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movement” and interpreted as a government response to constant foreign interference 
in China’s domestic energy system.197 Having emerged as a rather simplistic idea of 
banning foreign involvement in China’s energy sector in the 1950s, it was modified 
to allow foreign technology in domestic industrialization process only a decade 
later.198 In the 1970s, ‘self-reliance’ was combined with the ‘open door’ policy, thus 
becoming even more inclusive.199 Gradually, a complete transformation of the 
concept took place whereby self-reliance turned into a new instrument of actively 
involving foreign capital and joint ventures (JVs) “to modernize and expand mineral 
and energy production and exports.”200 Finally, by the early 2000s, self-reliance 
justified a new ‘going out’ strategy in the wake of China’s new status as a net oil 
importer in 1993 and net crude oil importer in 1996. 
The importance of cultural attributes as the deepest layer of the institutional 
ecosystem is echoed as far as the policy arena governing oil and gas supply chains. 
For instance, by virtue of being appointed by the central government, NOCs’ leaders 
enjoy “direct access to the Chinese leadership.”201 Personal ties between the 
government and NOCs’ leadership are a source of preferential treatment when it 
comes to investment approvals202 and government appointments. This practice dates 
back to the creation of first SOEs for servicing joint ventures in the early 1980s, when 
Chinese companies were granted an automatic preference in competition with foreign 
counterparts.203 It inevitably contributes to challenges of a close relationship between 
the central government and NOCs. 
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With regards to securitization processes, embedded institutions underpinning China’s 
institutional environment are likely to facilitate the ascent of a securitizing actor. As a 
strong policy actor, the securitizing actor could potentially use personal ties to his/her 
advantage and benefit from the well-defined hierarchical structure. Moreover, 
embedded institutions are a “reservoir [that] feeds the soil”204 in which institutional 
environments bloom and fade, and where individual actors behave according to 
certain norms and expectations.205 At the same time, individuals manipulate cultural 
norms and ideas they generate. As a result, embedded institutions might aid 
securitizing actors in undermining certain elements of the institutional environment 
that look unappealing to them (i.e., constitutional norms). Thus, understanding 
embedded institutions helps make sense of why some elements of the institutional 
environment function more effectively than others, such as the Communist party vs. 
the Constitution. 
 
4.2.1.2 Institutional Environment 
According to the securitization framework, the institutional environment is shaped 
largely by the underlying embedded institutions, but it also internalizes a variety of 
domestic and global trends, and can be influenced by numerous policy arenas it hosts. 
Even institutional environments designed to be radically different from their 
predecessors, as was the case with the establishment of the PRC in 1949, cannot 
escape the influence of deeper institutional layers. The Chinese Communist Party 
(CCP) is at the core of China’s current institutional environment, and its ideology is 
consistent with the deeply rooted societal values such as significance of hierarchies, 
acceptance of austerity, and focus on self-reliance. It is also capable of adapting itself 
and other institutions to changing conditions and new trends entering the institutional 
                                                            
204 David L. Shambaugh, China's Communist Party: atrophy and adaptation (Washington, D.C.: 
Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2008), 6. 
205 Yongnian Zheng, The Chinese Communist party as organizational emperor: culture, reproduction 
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environment. Finally, the influence of specific policy arenas on the overall 
institutional environment is reflected in the CCP ensuring that the dominant ideology 
is subordinate to policy.206 
As the supreme institution,207 the CCP is outside and beyond the boundaries designed 
to contain the power of all other institutions, and is responsible for managing its own 
adaptation and ultimate survival.208 A handful of mechanisms209 employed by the 
Party help sustain its central role (See Appendix 1). Together they have a strong 
impact on legislative and executive branches of the Chinese government, manage 
China’s political life, its human resources, and channels of communication. Relevant 
to the management of oil and gas supply chains are such mechanisms as the 
nomenklatura system (leadership of the ministries and NOCs is decided by the central 
government represented by the Central Committee) and dangzu (established in major 
NOCs210). 
The CCP also dominates and manipulates the legal system and “enjoys[s] the 
privilege of being above the Constitution and the law.”211 Manipulations are reflected 
in the design of the legal system, in the amendments212 to the Constitution, which 
correspond with the changes in the Party’s long-term vision, in the lack of a strong 
                                                            
206 Built on Marxist-Leninist ideology, the Party does not have the privilege to reject the ideology if it no 
longer suits its interests and objectives. Instead, it has to “finesse and adapt the ideology to suit policy 
decisions taken on nonideological grounds” (Shambaugh, Ibid., 105). 
207 The Party is analyzed as the central element of the institutional environment and not as one of the 
policy actors because it is a single defining element of the entire system. 
208 Shambaugh, Ibid., 2. 
209 Various classifications of these mechanisms exist. For instance, they can be divided according to 
three types of power exercised by the CCP: coercion, bargaining, and reciprocity (Zheng, Ibid., 33-4). 
They can also be associated with the organizational structures that the Party uses to achieve the desired 
outcome. The multiplicity of organizations and the range of their functions demonstrate deep and 
extensive reach of the Party as an institution. 
210 The Party groups make up “the core decision-making body for the company, deciding on all major 
issues ranging from corporate development and investment strategy to personnel selection” (Kong, 
China's international petroleum policy, 25). 
211 The National People’s Congress of the People’s Republic of China, The Constitution of the People’s 
Republic of China (December 4, 1982), Article 5. Zheng, Ibid., 113. 
212 Adopted in December 1982 by the 5th National People’s Congress, the Constitution experienced 
several rounds of revision. During one of them, in November 2002, Jiang Zemin’s “Three Represents” 
theory was added to the Constitution’s Preamble (Xinhua, "Important thought of Three Represents 
written into CPC constitution," China Daily (November 14, 2002)). “Three Represents” resolved the 
factional fight proclaiming the victory of reformists, and introduced new principles of “full 
marketization, private ownership, and asset circulation” (Shambaugh, Ibid., 111-13). 
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designated constitutional enforcement authority,213 and Chinese courts generally not 
taking the Constitution into account when making decisions on cases.214 Nevertheless, 
the Constitution serves as the foundation for the management of mineral resources, 
and thus, for resource-specific legal frameworks215 at the level of multiple 
institutional arrangements nested within the institutional environment. Article 9 of the 
Constitution states that “mineral… and other natural resources are owned by the state, 
that is, by the whole people, with the exception of the [resources] that are owned by 
collectives in accordance with the law,” and “the state ensures the rational use of 
natural resources.”216 
In order to keep up with constantly emerging intra-party challenges and trends 
outside its direct control, the CCP strives to preserve its coherence and power in the 
institutional environment. For instance, as early as the 1960s, factional politics 
alarmed the CCP’s leaders to the necessity to accommodate different interests and 
institutionalize intra-party relations.217 In the absence of interest accommodation and 
formal rules, “factions might form an alliance to fight against the dominant 
factions”218 and put at risk stability and smooth power succession. Although the issue 
of factional politics remains on the table, and aggravations are still feared during 
power successions,219 institutionalization of intra-party politics has progressed 
                                                            
213 Officially, the National People’s Congress (NPC) has the power to amend the Constitution and 
supervise its enforcement (The Constitution of the People’s Republic of China, Article 62 (62.1 and 
62.2). In practice, it has no “time, expertise, or resources to effectively supervise enforcement of the 
constitution and execution of the laws” (Kam C. Wong, Police reform in China (Boca Raton, FL: CRC 
Press, 2012), 320). In 2002, the NPC created a special committee for these purposes. 
214 Joanna Chu, "China's Constitutional Crisis," The Atlantic (September 3, 2013). 
215 See Section 4.2.3.1 for the discussion of O&G legal framework. 
216 The Constitution of the People’s Republic of China, Article 9. 
217 The petroleum group and the Gang of Four discussed later in this chapter in the context of the rise of 
the MPI and the petroleum industry as the backbone of China’s economic development are just two of 
many examples of factions. 
218 Zheng, Ibid., 96. 
219 In the most recent anti-graft campaign under Xi Jinping’s leadership in 2013-2015, two high-ranking 
politicians, Zhou Yongkang and Bo Xilai, who belonged to the faction of Jiang Zemin, were placed 
under investigation and found guilty of corruption. Members of the “Northwest faction” in the military 
have been prosecuted as well. Although some interpret these events as a feature of heated faction 
politics, others caution that such a view is flawed (Cheng Li and Tom Orlik, ”China’s Corruption 
Crackdown More Than Factional Politics,” Brookings Institution (July 31, 2014)). The latter opinion 
also recognizes a new, negative, attitude towards factions in Xi Jinping’s actions, which is “a departure 
from the party’s preferred narrative” on the united cadres (Minnie Chen, "'He made Xi Jinping very 
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significantly and is now much more “consensus-based and coalitional”220 than in the 
“strongman politics” eras of Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping.221 With regards to 
trends external to the CCP, most recently the Party broadened its recruitment base, 
pushed for economy marketization, promoted private ownership, and started paying 
increasing attention to social inequality inside the country.222 Even though the CCP 
often struggles to respond to challenges in a timely manner, some of its functions 
erode, and others become atrophied, on the whole, it has been able to maintain its 
leadership and legitimacy.223 Despite the fact that national policy-making processes 
have become more pluralistic, decentralization and increased inclusiveness were 
carried out by the Party with the ultimate goal of consolidating its resources and 
strengthening its authority. 
Thus, taking into account major characteristics of China’s institutional environment, 
it is possible to conclude that in securitization processes, the CCP can either be a 
strong ally in a securitizing actor’s attempts to initiate the securitization process, or a 
strong force capable of stopping a securitizing actor. The exploration of the CCP’s 
role makes it evident why even seemingly strong actors, such as the petroleum group 
and the NOCs, seek support of the Party in achieving their respective objectives. 
Through institutionalized mechanisms of nomenklatura and dangzu as well as the use 
of factional politics to its advantage, the Party ensures its control over the broad 
institutional environment and policy processes in specific policy arenas like the one 
governing oil and gas supply chains. 
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(July 31, 2015)). 
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4.2.1.3 Horizontal Institutional Linkages 
The one truly independent institution – the CCP – has always been concerned with 
subordinate government institutions acquiring too much power relative to the Party 
and getting out of its control. This dynamic has had different consequences for the 
energy sector as a whole compared with the O&G sector. Unlike the energy sector 
that appears to be transitioning from complementary to a single independent 
institution structure since 2010, oil and gas sector management is changing from the 
one dominated by independent institutions to governance by complementary 
institutions since the late 1990s. 
The energy sector saw the prevalence of overlapping institutions until the late 1980s, 
independent institutions until early 1990s, complementary institutions in 1993 – 
2003, and a single independent institution since 2008 – 2010. In the late 1980s, once 
the work of the energy sector was impeded to the extent that challenges such as 
electricity provision or oil production targets were no longer met, efforts were made 
to bring the overlapping institutions together under the auspices of a stronger 
independent institution. Ultimately, such efforts were short-lived because of the 
inability of the newly created State Energy Commission (1980 – 1982), the Ministry 
of Energy (1988 – 1993) and the State Economic and Trade Commission (1998 – 
2003) to exercise power in practice due to a faulty institutional arrangement design, 
where changes in the administrative arrangement were not accompanied by changes 
in the legal and policy frameworks. 224 When attempts to establish strong independent 
institutions failed, the Party in conjunction with the State Council tried to transform 
                                                            
224 For instance, the Ministry of Energy (MOE) was established to bring the functions of the Ministry of 
Petroleum Industry and other energy industries under one umbrella. Legally oil and gas ‘corporations’ 
limited MOE’s powers. With regards to the policy framework, MOE’s goals did not fit into the 
government recentralization programme and a Three-Year Austerity Programme (1988 – 1991) (Downs, 
“China,” 17-8; Dorian, Ibid., 75, 80, 114). 
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overlapping institutions into complementary ones. 225 Finally, independent institutions 
materialized in the shape of the NEA in 2008 and NEC in 2010.226  
The oil and gas sector, originally dominated by independent institutions, is now 
governed by a set of complementary institutions. As one of the most important 
sectors of the Chinese economy, the oil and gas sector has had a well-defined 
management structure since the 1950s. When it was not a part of a unified agency in 
charge of energy policy, the Ministry of Petroleum Industry (under different names) 
had a mandate separate from coal and chemical industries in 1955 – 1970 and 1978 – 
1988. Moreover, as demonstrated by the prominent position of the petroleum group in 
the 1960s – 1970s, the ministry in its various forms was a powerful actor in both oil 
and gas and national economic policy-making. The large-scale management 
restructuring and replacement of the ministerial system with the NOCs in 1993 was a 
lengthy well-thought process of resources and assets transfer from the Ministry of 
Petroleum to the NOCs. The same can be said about the regulatory control over 
NOCs, with the exception of the 1993 – 1998 period when NOCs were practically left 
to regulate themselves. Regulatory functions were transferred from the Ministry of 
Energy (1988 – 1993) to the NDRC (1993 – 1998) and further diffused to enhance 
their strength between the NDRC, SETC, and MLR (1998 – 2003), and between the 
NDRC, MLR and SASAC (2003 – present). Overall, current transition to 
complementary institutions is likely to make the job of existing securitizing actor 
                                                            
225 For instance, in the early 1990s, activities along oil and gas supply chains were clearly divided 
between major NOCs (Kong, China's international petroleum policy, 14; Bo Kong, An Anatomy of 
China’s Energy Insecurity and Its Strategies, Pacific Northwest National Laboratory. PNNL-15529 
(October 2005), 45-7). Since the late 1990s, when NOCs were transformed into vertically integrated 
companies, their domestic operations were divided geographically in order to avoid competition 
(International Energy Agency, “Developing China’s Natural Gas Market: The Energy Policy 
Challenges,” OECD (2002), 82; Philip Andrews-Speed, Stephen Dow and Zhiguo Gao, “The Ongoing 
Reforms to China's Government and State Sector: The case of the energy industry,” Journal of 
Contemporary China 9, no. 23 (2000), 12). During the same reform process, NOC regulatory oversight 
was distributed between the NDRC, SETC, and MLR. In 2003, SASAC was added to the mix of NOC 
regulators. 
226 Establishment of the latter, the NEC, is the most decisive move by the Chinese state to establish an 
independent overarching energy policy body to date because unlike its predecessors, the NEC is not 
subordinate to the powerful NDRC. However, even NEC’s independence is limited as it draws on the 
expertise of its members – ministers, chairmen, directors and other leaders in their respective fields and 
organizations. 
  108
(NOCs as the dominant decision-maker) in the O&G policy arena harder if there is a 
disagreement about the effect of perceived threat(s) on the sector performance. 
 
4.2.1.4 Institutional Ecosystem – Policy Arena Link 
The examination of China’s embedded institutions and the institutional environment 
demonstrates that there is no one-way relationship between the institutional 
ecosystem and the relevant policy arena. Depending on trends and shifting 
conditions, nested institutional layers propel changes in the policy arena and vice 
versa. On the one hand, despite the fact that the institutional ecosystem predetermines 
many characteristics and the course of action of the policy arena, individuals 
operating on the level of the policy arena can make changes that reach beyond their 
respective policy arena and well into the institutional arrangement and environment. 
Additionally, policy actors bring changes to the institutional environment by 
reinterpreting the values (i.e., the concept of self-reliance) deeply rooted in embedded 
institutions and aligning them with their evolving objectives. On the other hand, 
policy arena actors source their legitimacy from the institutional ecosystem in order 
to be successful in their attempts to implement changes. For instance, cultural 
acceptance of a highly hierarchical society has been preserved for generations. Also, 
the most powerful actors in Chinese policy-making process are the ones associated 
with the central institution, the CCP. 
The dominance of the CCP in the institutional environment and its ability to 
manipulate the core principles embedded deep in the institutional ecosystem make it 
an indispensable part of the securitization process in any policy arena, including the 
one governing oil and gas supply chains. Even if securitization has been driven by 
such policy actors as the petroleum group or the NOCs, it would not be able to 
advance without the support of the Party. 
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Following the structure of the securitization framework, Section 4.2.1 analyzed Type 
I inputs of the theoretical framework. It described two deepest hierarchical layers of 
the institutional ecosystem – embedded institutions and the institutional environment, 
and identified horizontal relations within institutional layers. The next section, 
Section 4.2.2, of this chapter will analyze Type II inputs originating from the policy 
arena governing oil and gas supply chains. 
 
4.2.2 Type II Inputs: Policy Arena 
4.2.2.1 Overview of Policy Actors 
In addition to being nested within broader energy policy-making, the management of 
oil and gas supply chains is linked to industrial, economic, trade and foreign policies. 
As O&G policy formulation and implementation continue to evolve, players directly 
and indirectly involved in the policy process change as well. Policy arena participants 
in charge of O&G supply chains can be grouped into central level, provincial level, 
and peripheral actors. The central level policy actors are represented by a number of 
supra-ministerial and ministerial policy-making bodies (Figure 4.1, Table 4.1). 
Provincial and local government and bureaucracies form an additional layer of policy 
arena dynamics and play an important role in decision-making processes (Figure 4.2). 
Last but not least, a growing number of research institutes, universities, media outlets, 
international organizations and public opinion influence the formulation of oil and 
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Figure 4.1: Major Actors in the Policy Arena Governing O&G Supply Chains (2015) 
Central Level  Provincial Level 
     
The State Council   
     
 NEC   See Figure 4.5 
     
NDRC  SETC  SASAC  Ministries  NOCs   
           
NEA           
           
Notes: The State Council228 oversees all commissions and ministries, drafts and implements national 
economic plans and the state budget, approves domestic and international energy investments, 
and appoints the heads of the national oil companies.229 
 The National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC),230 directly under the State 
Council, is a major coordinating body ensuring implementation of national energy policy.231 In 
the energy sector, it “is responsible for establishing policies for minerals and energy 
development,”232 allocating natural gas production quota and setting gas prices,233 and approving 
investment projects of more than US$30 million.234 In the framework of restructuring and 
decentralization in the last 35 years, NDRC has been challenged to share some of its policy-
making powers with subordinate, but more specialized energy agencies.235 
 The National Energy Administration (NEA)236 formed in 2008 and an even more powerful 
National Energy Commission (NEC)237 established in 2010 are two of the most recent central 
government’s attempts238 at creating an overarching national energy policy body. 
                                                            
228 The State Council is “directly responsible to the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist 
Party,” (Woodard, Ibid., 78) “is the executive body of the highest organ of state power in addition to 
being the highest organ of state administration” (Dorian, Ibid., 107). Although the State Council 
underwent a great deal of restructuring in the late 1980s – 1990s, it retained its major powers and 
responsibilities (Andrews-Speed et al. (2000), Ibid., 12). 
229 Dorian, Ibid., 107; Downs, “China,” 21-24; Kong, China's international petroleum policy, 42-43. 
230 Previously known as the State Planning Commission, SPC (1954 – 1998) and the State Development 
Planning Commission, SDPC (1998 – 2003). 
231 It is responsible for five-year planning, project financing (including making sure that conflicts are 
avoided between centrally funded and local projects which “may compete for control of the same 
resource potential” (Keith, Ibid., 56-67), and integrating sectoral and territorial planning by the 
ministries and local governments (Dorian, Ibid., 51, 107-8; Kong, An Anatomy of China’s Energy 
Insecurity, 20-21; Downs, “China,” 16). 
232 Dorian, Ibid., 50-51. 
233 International Energy Agency, “Developing China’s Natural Gas Market: The Energy Policy 
Challenges,” 86. 
234 Ibid., 293-294. 
235 For example, “there are at least seven offices within the NDRC that oversee the oil sector” (Downs, 
“China,” 16; Erica Downs, "China’s “New” Energy Administration," The Brookings Institution 
(November 19, 2008), 44). 
236 With a broad mandate of managing national energy policy, the NEA faces the same problems as its 
predecessors: its ability to successfully perform its duties is undermined by the NDRC’s power. First, it 
is a vice-ministerial body, hence, it does not have the authority over ministries and national oil 
companies, which are above the NEA. Second, the administration lacks human and financial resources, 
and the leadership of NDRC and NEA is closely intertwined. NEA’s two consecutive directors, Zhang 
Guobao (2008 – 2010) and Liu Tienan (December 2010 – March 2013) were simultaneously serving as 
the Vice-Chairs of NDRC. The current director of NEA, Nur Bekri, who assumed the post in December 
2014 (After Liu Tienan was sentenced to life in prison based on corruption charges, Wu Xinxiong 
headed the NEA (March 2013 – December 2014), who was chosen as an “interim pick as he neared 
retirement.” ("Energy regulator NEA's new chief Wu Xinxiong seen as neutral," South China Morning 
Post (March 20, 2013)), is also concurrently one of the vice-chairs of NDRC. Third, although NEA does 
have more autonomy than its predecessors and reports directly to the State Council, its logistics are still 
controlled by the NDRC and the latter preserved its power to set energy prices. Thus, considering all 
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 The State Economic and Trade Commission (SETC),239 created in 1993, was the NDRC’s 
main compeition in 1998 – 2003. The functions of two administrative bodies – SACI and SAPCI 
– inherited by the SETC became the foundation of its strength.240 
 The State-Owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC) was 
established in 2003 and gained important powers in relation to oil and gas management. It 
“serves as the watchdog of the state-owned assets in the hands of centrally owned SOEs, 
including the three oil companies”241 and employs two major mechanisms: financial planning 
and appointment of Chiefs of the Discipline and Inspection Groups.242 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                              
these limitations, NEA is likely to be “a transitional institution” (Downs, "China’s “New” Energy 
Administration," 42-45). 
237 The NEC is supplementary to the NEA, but hierarchically more significant. It is headed by the 
Premier and is free of NDRC’s control. The membership of the commission resembles “a smaller 
version of the State Council” (Zhiyue Bo, “China’s New National Energy Commission: Policy 
Implications,” EAI Background Brief No. 504 (February 5, 2010), 9). It consists of 23 heads of various 
ministries, central bank, bureaux and administrations (Among the current members of the NEC, there are 
10 ministers, chairmen of the NDRC and SASAC, NEA Director, and Vice Governor of the People’s 
Bank of China) and is tasked with “drafting a national energy development strategy and discussing 
major energy security and development issues” (Downs, "China’s “New” Energy Administration," 43). 
But its effectiveness has been questioned, since it is “designed as a consultation bureau” with no “control 
over the state-owned oil, gas and electricity companies” (Michal Meidan, Philip Andrews-Speed and Ma 
Xin. "Shaping China's Energy Policy: actors and processes," Journal of Contemporary China 18, no. 61 
(2009), 612). 
238 In the past, similar agencies included the State Energy Commission (1980 – 1982) and National 
Energy Bureau (2003 – 2008). The State Energy Commission (SEC) was established in order to integrate 
functions of various energy sectors, but it did not have clear responsibilities or sufficient resources, its 
mandate overlapped with that of NDRC, and although it was a superministerial body, it “had no coercive 
power over ministries.” (Lieberthal and Oksenberg, Ibid., 254; Downs, “China,” 17-8; Xuedong Ding 
and Jun Li, Incentives for innovation in China: building an innovative economy (New York: Routledge, 
Taylor & Francis Group, 2015), 129). The National Energy Bureau (NEB) was the first attempt of the 
government at consolidating energy policy in the hands of one overarching authority since 1993. But the 
bureau lacked financial and human resources to manage NOCs and other actors of the energy sector. Its 
major limitation was the fact that it was established under the NDRC and thus served its interests. Also, 
it was below ministerial level and was not given the power to “coordinate among more politically 
powerful stakeholders such as the state-owned energy companies and other ministries.” (Downs, 
“China,” 18) 
239 During the 1998 reforms, the two remaining energy ministries, of power and coal, were abolished and 
their tasks moved to the Department of Electrical Power (DEP) and the State Administration of the Coal 
Industry (SACI). (Dali L. Yang, Remaking the Chinese leviathan: market transition and the politics of 
governance in China (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2004), 38; Roselyn Hsueh, China’s 
Regulatory State: A New Strategy for Globalization (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 
2011), 150). At the same time, government functions were “theoretically removed” (International 
Energy Agency, “Developing China’s Natural Gas Market: The Energy Policy Challenges,” 294) from 
national oil companies and passed on to the newly established State Administration for Petroleum and 
Chemical Industries (SAPCI). Only two years later, SACI and SAPCI were abolished and their 
responsibilities became direct functions of the SETC. (International Energy Agency, Ibid., 82) 
Moreover, “the previous Chief Executive of Sinopec was appointed Chairman of the SETC.” (Andrews-
Speed et al. (2000), 12). 
240 Yanrui Wu, China's economic growth: a miracle with Chinese characteristics (London: 
RoutledgeCurzon, 2004), 96. Andrews-Speed et al. (2000), 12. 
241 Kong, China's international petroleum policy, 26. 
242 SASAC’s First Bureau for the Administration of Corporate Executives appoints and removes Chiefs 
of the Discipline and Inspection Groups in the state-owned oil companies and their subsidiaries. This is 
to ensure that party direction is followed through, anticorruption investigations are conducted 
thoroughly, and NOCs operate within constructed boundaries (Kong, Ibid., 26-7). 
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Table 4.1: Relevant Ministerial Level Actors in the O&G Supply Chains Policy 
Arena (1949 – 2015) 
Directly Relevant to Oil and Gas 
Ministry of Fuel Industry (1949 – 1955) Æ Ministry of Petroleum Industry (1955 – 
1970) 
Ministry of Petroleum Industry (1955 – 
1970) 
Æ Ministry of Fuels and Chemical Industry 
(1970 – 1975) 
Ministry of Petroleum and Chemical 
Industry (1975 – 1978) 
Æ 
Ô 
Ministry of Chemical Industry (1978 – 1998) 
  Ministry of Petroleum Industry (1978 – 
1988) 
Ministry of Petroleum Industry (1978 – 
1988) 
Æ Ministry of Energy (1988 – 1993) 
Ministry of Geology and Mineral 
Resources (until 1998) 
Æ Ministry of Land Resources (1998 – 
Present)1 
Supporting Ministries 
Foreign Ministry (MFA/MOFA)2 
Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM)3 
Ministry of Public Security 
Ministry of Construction (until 2008) Æ Ministry of Housing and Urban-Rural 
Development 
Ministry of Labour and Social Security + 
Ministry of Personnel (until 2008) 
Æ Ministry of Human Resources and Social 
Security 
State Environmental Protection 
Administration (until 2008) 
Æ Ministry of Environmental Protection 
State Science and Technology Commission 
(until 1998) 
Æ Ministry of Science and Technology 
Commission for Science, Technology and 
Industry for National Defense (until 2008) 
Æ State Administration for Science, 
Technology and Industry for National 
Defense (SASTIND) 
Finance 
Ministry of Finance4 Æ People’s Bank of Chinai (1978 – Present) 
People’s Bank of Chinai Æ China Development Bank (1994 - Present)ii 
 Ô Export-Import Bank of China (1994 - Present)ii 
Sources: 1 Dorian, Minerals, energy, and economic development in China, 51, 116-8; Andrews-Speed, 
Dow and Gao, “The Ongoing Reforms to China's Government and State Sector,” 12; IEA, 
“Developing China’s Natural Gas Market,” 295; 300-1; Kong, An Anatomy of China’s Energy 
Insecurity and Its Strategies, 20-21; Wang, China's oil industry & market, 117-8. 
 2 Downs, "The Chinese Energy Security Debate," 26; Downs, “China,” 16. 
 3 The Asia Research Centre, “China’s Energy Policy Report,” 11-13; Downs, “China,” 16. 
 4 Kong, An Anatomy of China’s Energy Insecurity and Its Strategies, 20-21; Downs “China,” 16. 
Notes: i People’s Bank of China was initially established under the Ministry of Finance, but received a 
full ministerial rank in 1978. 
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 ii Both policy banks “provide lines of credit to Chinese NOCs and foreign entities – mainly NOC 
counterparts – to support international expansion and secure oil or natural gas deals.”243 Although 
policy banks are state-owned, similar to NOCs, they pursue commercial objectives and make sure 
that their investments are profitable. Export-Import Bank of China (CEIB) does not have a 
ministerial rank but is listed here as one of the two policy banks relevant to the O&G sector. 
 
Figure 4.2: Major Provincial Level Actors in the Policy Arena Governing O&G 
Supply Chains 
Provincial Level 
Provincial Governments  Provincial Bureaucracies 









 Ministries  NOCs 
         
 
4.2.2.2 Securitizing Actors and Policy Stakeholders 
While in the experience of China’s oil and gas supply chains in 1949 - 2015 
securitizing actors originated from the ranks of the central level policy actors, the 
importance of other central level, provincial level and peripheral actors as policy 
stakeholders is undeniable. 
First, such bodies as the State Council and the NDRC are directly associated with the 
key institution, the CCP, and draw their power from the institutional environment. 
Securitizing actors are aware that underestimating the power of these stakeholders 
would endanger their potential success. Similarly, as the pure hierarchical regime244 
of absolute subordination on the part of provincial governments is evolving into a 
complex partnership with the Center, provinces gain access to a more active re-
shaping of deeply rooted values and ideas. For instance, in the late 1960s – early 
                                                            
243 Huw McKay and Ligang Song, Rebalancing and sustaining growth in China (Canberra, ACT: ANU 
Press, 2012), 339. For instance, in one of the latest cooperation efforts, CNPC and Sinopec each formed 
a strategic alliance with CDB in September 2010 in order to secure long-term low-rate loans for the 
companies’ expansion abroad (Julie Jiang and Jonathan Sinton, "Overseas Investments by Chinese 
National Oil Companies: Assessing the Drivers and Impacts," International Energy Agency (February 
2011), 16). 
244 The strong vertical link between the Center and the Province has always existed and continues to 
influence relations between the two. In the 1960s, the petroleum group went up the leadership ladder in 
less than 25 years. But its members “had to bargain and strike deals… to secure the cooperation of the 
pertinent ministries and provinces.” (Lieberthal and Oksenberg, Ibid., 169, 228-29) The tradition is still 
alive today with many of the 18th Central Committee members elected in November 2012 coming “from 
localities” and “all seven of the Politburo Standing Committee members hav[ing] served in multiple 
localities” (Steven W. Lewis, “Natural Gas in the People’s Republic of China,” Belfer Center, Harvard 
University (October 29, 2013), 19).  
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1970s, center – province symbiosis was evident in the “synthesis of the ‘open door’ 
[initiated by the central government] and ‘self-reliance’ [promoted at the local 
level].”245 In the 1980s, it was expressed in the dual strategy of “walking on two legs” 
of development and conservation.246 Thus, provincial governments have become 
additional “centers of power, institution building and economic development,”247 
which contribute to the proliferation of policy actors and policy arena heterogeneity. 
Second, each province248 has a government structure that “mirrors the center.”249 
Rivalry for resources between central and provincial stakeholders is commonplace, 
and bargaining practices are pervasive because “both Center and province command 
resources that the other needs, with the balance-of-power between the two in the 
Center’s favour.”250 Oil and gas proved an “important source of leverage and a 
resource each [side] is willing to pay a premium to obtain from the other.”251 This has 
been demonstrated multiple times by the bargaining process between the central 
government and Guangdong province in exploration and development of South China 
Sea resources, the growing presence of provincial governments in the refining 
industry,252 as well as the increasing legal, financial and technological role of well-
                                                            
245 Keith, Ibid., 64-65. 
246 Ibid., 47. 
247 Andrews-Speed, The governance of energy in China, 124. 
248 For convenience, “province” means provincial level governance, including municipalities, 
autonomous regions, and special administrative regions. 
249 Lieberthal and Oksenberg, Ibid., 340-2, 350-2. The central government and its multiple bureaucracies 
would not be able to effectively reach out to a country of 1.36 billion people (CPIRC, "China Population 
Information Network.") who are spread out through 22 provinces, five autonomous regions, four 
municipalities (Historically, the number of direct-controlled municipalities fluctuated significantly: from 
11 in 1927, to 12 in 1949, to 3 in 1954, and 4 in 1997. As of 2014, there are four direct-controlled 
municipalities in the PRC: Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai, and Chongqing. They enjoy the same rank as 
provinces), and two special administrative regions without provincial level policy actors. 
250 Lieberthal and Oksenberg, Ibid., 339, 349-50; Kong, An Anatomy of China’s Energy Insecurity, 22; 
Christian Constantin, "Understanding China's Energy Security," World Political Science 3, no. 3 (2007), 
4. The provinces’ strength lies in direct access to land, people, local governments, as well as investment 
contributions to projects of national significance through local capital mobilization (Lieberthal and 
Oksenberg, Ibid., 349-350; Keith, Ibid., 47). The Center competes with provinces for resources, manages 
competition for resources between the provinces, appoints loyal key provincial leaders, runs the central 
propaganda apparatus, controls provincial foreign currency accounts in the centralized Bank of China, 
and allocates electricity, petroleum, coal and other vital resources. 
251 Lieberthal and Oksenberg, Ibid., 353. 
252 Until the 1990s refining industry was financed exclusively by the Center (Dorian, Ibid., 225; Haijiang 
Henry Wang, China's oil industry & market (New York: Elsevier, 1999), 117-8). 
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developed provinces in the development of unconventional gas resources in China.253 
The central government is supportive of provinces’ participation in such projects, but 
depending on conditions of specific agreements, it expects to receive its share of 
benefits including profits, taxes, and in-kind production. 
Third, provincial and local governments share policy-making space with the 
representatives of almost all central level commissions and ministries. Provincial 
level bureaucracies are in charge of continuous sectoral planning originating from 
their superiors in Beijing, but experience tensions exacerbated by “vague directives” 
from the Center resulting in “poorly delineated jurisdictions” and ambiguity.254 
However, the role of provincial level bureaucracies and later provincial state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs) in the oil and gas sector declined overtime. If until the late 1980s, 
the MPI was highly centralized,255 the 1988 reforms transferred the power and 
responsibilities of the central petroleum ministry to a handful of large, medium, and 
small SOEs.256 In the process of deepening decentralization, multiple levels of SOEs 
caused coordination problems and diminished decision-making power of ministerial-
level NOCs.257 This resulted in a merger of all local level enterprises with the national 
level corporations.258 In the oil and gas sector, provincial and local enterprises were 
integrated into China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) and China Petroleum 
                                                            
253 Lewis, Ibid., 6. In shale gas regions, local governments willing to bypass central government and 
tedious bureaucratic procedures are “mobilizing senior cadres,” putting together “shale gas economic 
development leadership small groups,” and are participating in projects as “full partners” (Lewis, Ibid., 
12-3, 23). Provinces also have an important legal role, as local laws and regulations are a part of a larger 
fragmented legal system governing China’s oil and gas sector (International Energy Agency, 
“Developing China’s Natural Gas Market: The Energy Policy Challenges,” 83-4). 
254 The evidence is inconclusive on whether “looseness of the system” is a miscalculation or an 
intentional move on the central government’s part. Some argue that it may well be “a deliberate tactic of 
the Center to build a broad coalition in support of its policies” (Lieberthal and Oksenberg, Ibid., 339-40, 
343). 
255 Before the 1980s “the highly centralized MPI [led] its oil fields directly, and its provincial level 
agencies [did] not appear to be important actors” in its local operations. In the mid-1980s, MPI remained 
a very centralized bureaucracy with the “local petroleum enterprises operating as direct extension of 
their line ministries” (Lieberthal and Oksenberg, Ibid., 343). 
256 Kong, China's international petroleum policy, 1-2; Keith, Ibid., 49. 
257 Dorian, Ibid., 118; Jin Zhang, Catch-up and competitiveness in China: the case of large firms in the 
oil industry (London: Routledge, 2004), 6. 
258 Lieberthal and Oksenberg, Ibid., 344. 
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& Chemical Corporation (Sinopec) in 1998.259 Since then all management power over 
subordinate units is concentrated in the hands of central-level NOCs. 
Finally, peripheral policy actors participate in the “identification of problems and the 
elaboration of solutions.”260 Research arms of the State Council, ministries, NOCs 
and other government actors “shape the perceptions of the central leadership” through 
the findings of their studies and through input at the leadership’s request.261 The 
majority of public and private companies, including domestic and foreign ones, 
remain minor policy players. Nevertheless, they have been gaining importance in 
recent years coinciding with the gradual liberalization of China’s oil and gas sector. 
Maneuvering in this increasingly heterogeneous policy arena262 are the securitizing 
actors. From the early years of the Communist regime, the Ministry of Petroleum 
Industry (MPI) and its successors proved extremely influential in the management of 
O&G supply chains up to 1983. Also, major NOCs created using the MPI’s assets 
have enjoyed an influential position in the policy arena since the 1990s. The 
establishment of major NOCs including China National Offshore Oil Corporation 
(CNOOC), Sinopec and CNPC signified the beginning of the NOC-centered 
management of oil and gas supply chains. Due to their prevalent position in the 
process of securitization, the MPI and the NOCs are analyzed in detail as securitizing 
actors below, as components of the institutional arrangement (See Section 4.2.3.1) 
and as the O&G sector participants (only NOCs; See Section 4.2.3.2). 
                                                            
259 Dorian, Ibid., 118; International Energy Agency, Ibid., 295. 
260 He Li, “The Role of Think Tanks in Chinese Foreign Policy,” Problems of Post-Communism 49, no. 
2 (2002), 33-43. Barry Naughton, “China’s Economic Think Tanks: Their Changing Role in the 1990s,” 
China Quarterly, no. 171 (2002): 625-35. Constantin, Ibid. 
261 Kong, China's international petroleum policy, 48-51. However, NOCs’ research institutes are 
“guided and funded by the Chinese authorities,” which inevitably influence the direction of their 
research (Meidan et al., Ibid., 596). 
262 The number of policy actors increased from roughly ten in 1954 – 1978 to above twenty in 2008 – 
2015 (See Appendix 3). 
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Securitization of Oil Supply Chains (1950s – 2015) 
The petroleum group of the MPI took advantage of an existing consensus on a threat 
and pushed for domestic development of oil supplies. The widely accepted threat was 
China’s inability to control its oil supplies, which were vital for the state’s 
developmental agenda in the conditions of international isolation after 1949. Since 
the threat was accepted by the CCP and the government on the central, provincial and 
local levels, all actors involved were willing to compromise their beliefs and share 
resources. For instance, the CCP’s self-reliance concept was put to work, and Mao 
Zedong allowed for expansion of the petroleum group’s authority in the oil and gas 
sector and beyond.263 Even though the Party was looking to increase its power, while 
the MPI was concerned with rising above other ministries in the management of 
energy resources, an open policy window identified by the petroleum group allowed 
it to initiate the securitization process. 
The success of the petroleum group was conditioned by a combination of at least 
three major factors. First, the group persuaded the Communist Party leadership that 
the development of Daqing oil field was necessary “in a way that appeared to 
conform to the ideological predispositions of the preeminent leader Mao Zedong.”264 
The group was able to pursue its objectives as fully compatible with Mao’s deep core 
beliefs, while, at the same time, changing the leadership’s secondary beliefs and 
eventually policy core beliefs. Second, despite clear success of Daqing, the petroleum 
group had to continue “configuring their accomplishments to accord with Mao’s 
vision.”265 Through compliance with the demands and visions of a more powerful 
policy actor, the petroleum group was able to nurture its own resources to be used 
later with less opposition from the Party leadership. Third, events external to the 
policy arena aided the success of the petroleum group. In the 1960s, compared with 
                                                            
263 Keith, Ibid., 23; Lieberthal and Oksenberg, Ibid., 169. 
264 Lieberthal and Oksenberg, Ibid., 172-3. 
265 For instance, the role of technical expertise was purposefully understated, while the role of ideology, 
motivation, and organizational factors was exaggerated (Lieberthal and Oksenberg, Ibid., 180-1). 
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coal, performance of the petroleum sector was exemplary, and Mao paid close 
attention to the petroleum group as a potential pool of future national leaders.266 
Additionally, deteriorating Sino-Soviet relations267 and growing American presence 
in Vietnam268 triggered continued prioritization of self-reliance and further 
development of the petroleum industry. 
Nevertheless, it has not always been smooth sailing for the petroleum group. By the 
late 1960s, the idea of foreign technology and equipment imports vigorously 
promoted by petroleum group was stalled by a combination of new domestic and 
foreign events – Cultural Revolution and Vietnam War. Additionally, the emergence 
of radical opposition – the Gang of Four – was the first sign of heterogeneity in an 
otherwise homogenous policy arena.269 
By the mid-1980s, the country entered the period of transition from the ministry-
dominated decision-making and implementation to an SOE reliant system. At the 
same time, surging oil demand and flattening domestic oil production were a source 
of concern in the policy-making community and once again reignited the perception 
of threatened oil supply chains. In these conditions, three major NOCs – Sinopec, 
CNPC, and CNOOC – became drivers of the securitization process. Headed by 
former petroleum bureaucrats,270 the NOCs were entrusted with the reigns of 
cooperation with foreign firms271 and expected to combine commercial272 and public 
policy objectives. 
                                                            
266 Lieberthal and Oksenberg, Ibid., 183-4. 
267 Woodard, Ibid., 25-6; 54-7; Keith, Ibid., 4. 
268 Lieberthal and Oksenberg, Ibid., 186. 
269 But this time it lacked resources to achieve its objectives, and members of the faction were arrested in 
October 1976. Even Mao’s death in September 1976 did not trigger political turbulence because the 
decentralization course endorsed by the supreme leader in the Fourth Five-Year Plan and successors 
appointed to key government posts in the early 1970s had enough time to strongly root into the policy 
arena and the institutional environment. 
270 Kong, China's international petroleum policy, 42-3. 
271 Woodard, Ibid., 81. 
272 assuming “full responsibility for their own profits and losses” (Dorian, Ibid., 114; Zhang, Ibid., 5-6) 
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NOCs of the 1980s – 1990s represented a type of securitizing actor different from the 
petroleum group of the 1960s – 1970s. Unlike the petroleum group that assumed the 
role of a policy entrepreneur, NOCs, as a composite actor, fit the description of a 
policy broker. First, compared with the 1960s – 1970s, the number of participants in 
the oil and gas policy arena increased three-fold (See Appendix 3) and thus required 
more time and resources in building common beliefs and aligning goals. This is best 
reflected in the “going out” strategy, which was embraced by the NOCs almost a 
decade earlier than it was officially approved by the Chinese state.273 The perception 
of threatened oil supply chains existed since the 1980s, but it was not as coherent as 
in the 1960s. It took NOCs some time to build a perception of a common goal 
between policy stakeholders. The starting point of this process can be identified as the 
expression of interest by NOCs to invest abroad. The goal was finally achieved in the 
late 1990s when the government approved the “going out” strategy as a broader 
industrial initiative and offered its full support.274 The lag of almost a decade is 
illustrative of the time necessary for the securitizing actor to negotiate multiple 
agreements. Second, it is likely that China’s switch to an oil importer status in 1993 
aided the NOCs in persuading the government to pay more attention to overseas oil 
assets. 
By the early 2000s, collectively, NOCs looked increasingly like a dominant decision-
maker inside the policy arena rather than a policy broker. They consolidated enough 
power to be able to use securitized oil supply chains to their advantage. Transformed 
into vertically integrated regional majors,275 CNPC and Sinopec were now fully 
responsible for financing their operations, setting production targets, and determining 
hiring policies and wages.276 They started using the concept of energy security for 
                                                            
273 Downs, “China,” 38-9; Kong, China's international petroleum policy, 44. 
274 Downs, “China,” 7. 
275 International Energy Agency, “Developing China’s Natural Gas Market: The Energy Policy 
Challenges,” 82; Andrews-Speed et al. (2000), 14. 
276 Wang, Ibid., 9. 
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paying a premium for their assets in overseas ventures,277 engaged in competition 
over foreign assets which also resulted in overpaying and overlooked some of the 
government’s demands for compliance. For example, NOCs finalized their 
investment and cooperation decisions abroad prior to receiving approval from the 
NDRC.278 
Once again, similar to the petroleum group, the NOCs today are challenged by 
changes in and outside the policy arena. International events around the war in Iraq 
and wide-spread domestic electricity shortages of 2003-2004 triggered a more 
concerted effort among central government elite representatives not seen since 1993 
to create a centralized energy planning apparatus. Two relatively weak, yet 
centralized bodies - The National Energy Bureau under NDRC and Energy Leading 
Small Group headed by the Premier – were established.279 The central government 
also endorsed private investments in oil and gas in early 2005, but NOCs vigorously 
opposed and successfully blocked this initiative.280 The taxation regime was modified 
in 2011,281 and private and state-owned companies beyond the leading NOCs have 
received crude oil import licenses in 2014-2015 (See Section 4.2.3.1). All of these 
efforts illustrate policy monopoly fragmentation through intentional redesign of the 
policy arena and dispersion of NOCs’ power among a larger number of actors by the 
central government. 
 
                                                            
277 Downs, “China,” 39. 
278 Ibid., 24. 
279 Kong, An Anatomy of China’s Energy Insecurity, 44-5; Downs, “China,” 6, 16, 19-21, 48; Meidan et 
al., 595-6. 
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281 Wang, Ibid., 10-1, 65. "China Kicks off National Resource Tax Reform," China Briefing (October 13, 
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Securitization Potential for Natural Gas Supply Chains (2009 – 2015) 
The large-scale development of gas resources did not begin until the early 2000s, and 
since the share of natural gas in the national energy mix stands only at about 5%,282 it 
is too early to talk about gas as a security issue in the context of China’s oil and gas 
industry or the Chinese economy as a whole. 
Conditions surrounding China’s pursuit for gas are very different from the ones 
around supplying oil in the 1960s – 2000s. Unlike with oil, there is no fear of not 
being able to afford gas as it was with oil in the 1970s – 1980s. Also, China as a state 
and society is at a different development level today, and increase in natural gas 
consumption is a conscious choice rather than a desperate necessity. 
Nevertheless, in the situation of limited indigenous gas resources, China’s 
consumption283 and its import dependency rate284 are growing exponentially (See 
Figure 4.3 and Figure 4.4). Signs of a threatened gas supply started to appear by 
2009. Localized and wide-spread short-term shortages of natural gas supply in 2009 – 
2015 have been associated with adverse weather conditions,285 decreased coal 
consumption,286 and technical problems287. 
 
                                                            
282 In 2000 – 2008, natural gas accounted for roughly 2% of China’s overall primary energy 
consumption (Mikkal Herberg, “The Geopolitics of China’s LNG Development,” in China's energy 
strategy: the impact on Beijing's maritime policies, ed., Gabriel B. Collins (Annapolis, MD: Naval 
Institute Press, 2008), 62).  
283 A net exporter of gas until 2007, China consumed an average of 30 bcm of natural gas per year 
between 1990 and 2007. In 2008 – 2013, its average annual consumption of gas reached 124 bcm, and it 
is expected to reach anywhere between 262 bcm and 420 bcm by 2020. 
284 Import dependency rate is currently at 32%. According to various estimates, it is expected to grow 
from 32% - 57% in 2020 to 53% - 84% in 2030. Gas imports will remain almost equally divided 
between LNG shipments and pipeline gas supplies in 2020. 
285 In 2009, there was a nationwide gas shortage associated with an unusually cold winter (Gabe Collins 
and Andrew Erickson, "China Natural Gas Shortage Poised to Drive Record LNG Imports," China 
SignPost (December 8, 2013)). A similar situation took place in the fall and winter of 2013-2014 (David 
Stanway, “China cuts gas supply to industry as shortages hit,” Reuters (November 6, 2013)). 
286 In 2011, gas shortage “occurred in a few areas in Shandong and Hunan; in 2012, it spread to some 
areas in more than 10 provinces including Beijing, Hubei, Zhejiang, Jiangsu and Inner Mongolia” 
(Zhang Kang, "Natural gas supply-demand situation and prospect in China," Natural Gas Industry B 1, 
no. 1 (2014): 103-12). 
287 In December 2015, “natural gas supply in North China saw a temporary shortage… CNPC met 
difficulties in unloading the imported LNG in ports, causing a temporary shortage of natural gas supply 
in North China” (Lan Lan, "North China encounters gas supply shortage," China Daily Europe 
(December 28, 2015)). 
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Figure 4.3: Natural Gas Production and Consumption in the PRC (1990 – 2013) 
 
Data Source: BP, Statistical Review of World Energy. 
 
Figure 4.4: China’s Natural Gas Consumption Projections (2000 – 2030) 
 
Notes: 1 Data source for 2000-2011 and 2012 (Scenario I) is US EIA. 
2 Data source for 2012 (Scenario II), and 2013 and 2014 estimates is CNPC Economic and 
Technology Research Institute (June 2012). 
3 Scenario I is based on the CNPC's projections of China's natural gas consumption to rise by 8% 
annually between 2011 and 2030. 
4 Scenario II is based on the Chinese government's statement from April 23, 2014 discussing an 
increase of China's natural gas supply to 420 bcm/year by 2020. 
5 Domestic Production after 2013 is a rough estimate based on IEA's estimates of China's 

















































As China becomes more dependent on gas, the government and NOCs are putting 
forward measures for securing gas supply chains. If policy actors succeed in creating 
a perception of secure gas supplies through expansion of infrastructure, attainment of 
assets overseas, and signing of a variety of delivery contracts while limited demand 
and low gas prices persist, securitization of gas supply chains is unlikely to take off. 
Moreover, NOCs more than anyone else are interested in demonstrating secure rather 
than securitized gas supply chains because the latter would signify their failure to 
manage supply chains effectively. In the current conditions of gas supply chains 
increasingly perceived as more threatened than before NOCs should ensure their 
security. Otherwise, they risk losing their power to emerging players – private O&G 
companies – in an increasingly heterogeneous policy arena and the gas sector. 
 
4.2.2.3 Summary 
This section outlined relationships between securitizing actors and other policy 
stakeholders involved in the O&G policy-making process. It has also separated 
securitization process within oil supply chains and gas supply chains to highlight the 
differences between the two and distinctive features of each. 
The analysis reveals five key characteristics of the policy arena governing China’s oil 
and gas supply chains. To begin with, its boundaries have expanded over time to 
include a growing number of actors. Despite increased heterogeneity and expanded 
borders, the entry into the policy arena is under tight control of its existing 
participants and institutional jurisdiction, and there have been no instances of policy 
arena infiltration by outside policy entrepreneurs. Also, the policy arena governing oil 
supply chains has seen the rise of three different types of securitizing actors: policy 
entrepreneur (the petroleum group in the 1950s – 1970s), policy broker (NOCs in the 
1980s – 1990s) and dominant decision-maker (NOCs since the early 2000s). All of 
the above securitizing actors emerged from among the central level policy actors. 
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Finally, the analysis demonstrates that one type of securitizing actor can evolve into 
another. 
 
4.2.3 Type III Inputs: Institutions – Referent Object Link 
4.2.3.1 Oil and Gas Supply Chains Institutions Decomposed 
Type I inputs from embedded institutions and the institutional environment and Type 
II inputs from the policy arena explored in the previous sections affect the referent 
object’s performance by influencing the institutional arrangement where Type III 
inputs – represented by the policy framework, legal framework, and administrative 
arrangements – are generated (See Figure 4.5). 
In the context of oil supply chains’ securitization, out of the three components of the 
institutional arrangement, policy actors used to prioritize changes in the 
administrative arrangements over the legal and policy frameworks as the major 
instrument of control over the O&G sector. This was until the policy shift towards 
accepting foreign participation in the upstream in the late 1970s, which required the 
development of an appropriate legal base. Additionally, in terms of policy direction, 
the O&G sector was originally following the overall objectives of the national 
economic development, whereas since the 1990s, narrower policies directed at 
conventional and unconventional oil and gas resources have been put forward. 
While oil and gas are governed by the same actors and share the same legal base, 
policies of the last decade demonstrate that gas is gradually branching out into an 
independent sector with its own legal and policy guidelines. Gas supply chains as a 
referent object in the securitization process are a new phenomenon. Changes in the 
institutional arrangement result in incremental changes in the sector’s performance, 
and securitization of gas supply chains is yet to materialize. 
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Figure 4.5: Changes in the Institutional Arrangement Relevant to the Securitization of 
China’s O&G Supply Chains (1949 – 2015) 
OIL 
3   3 3 3 3 
   3 3  3 
3 3  3 3 3 3 
 1950s 1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s 2010s 
GAS 
     3 3 
   3 3  3 
       
Notes: “3” signifies the presence of changes (relevant to securitization) in the components of the 
institutional arrangement governing oil and gas supply chains in China. 




1950s – 1970s: Focus on Policy Development 
Historically, China’s oil and gas policy discourse prioritized measures of increasing 
supply over measures of curbing domestic demand.288 Heavy emphasis on the 
importance of oil supply originated in the 1950s from the lack of developed 
indigenous resources, which were believed to be essential for the success of China’s 
developmental model fuelled by strong industrial growth. In the administrative 
arrangements this policy focus was reflected in the MPI overtaking the Ministry of 
Geology’s original functions in the upstream activities, spearhead the development of 
the Daqing oil field – the major sought-after source of petroleum in the country – and 
ensure the PRC’s self-sufficiency in petroleum production. The MPI’s ability to 
deliver on the leadership’s expectations led to growth of MPI’s “budget and its ability 
to control” the oil and gas supply chains.289 Thus, underpinned by the pursuit of self-
reliance, which maximized domestic capacity and minimized foreign involvement, 
                                                            
288 Philip Andrews‐Speed, Xuanli Liao and Roland Dannreuther, “The Strategic Implications of China's 
Energy Needs,” The Adelphi Papers 42, no. 346 (2002), 49; Downs, “China,” 2, 25-6; David Pietz, “The 
Past, Present, and Future of China’s Energy Sector,” in China's energy strategy: the impact on Beijing's 
maritime policies, ed., Gabriel B. Collins (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2008), 50. 
289 Tatsu Kambara and Christopher Howe, China and the Global Energy Crisis: Development and 
Prospects for China’s Oil and Natural Gas (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 2007), 25. 
 - policy framework; 
 - legal framework; 
 - administrative arrangements. 
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and aided by the Soviet expertise,290 the initial focus on oil supply laid the foundation 
for a highly centralized hierarchical structure of policy-making in China’s oil and gas 
sector. 
After the break with the Soviet Union, reinforced focus on oil supplies was justified 
by domestic energy crisis and fuel shortages experienced by the PLA.291 As a result, 
policies of the early 1960s ensured that development of the Daqing oil field was sped 
up. Overall, in the 1950s – 1970s, “China’s oil industry developed in the fashion of 
military ‘massive campaigns’ (da hui zhan).”292 During this time, the MPI was solely 
responsible for designing and implementing these campaigns. The status of the 
ministry as a strong actor in the policy-making process of a highly centralized 
command-and-control environment was also illustrated by its ability to successfully 
initiate international technological exchanges with Japan and France in the mid-
1960s.293 Hence, the ministry acquired a range of duties along the oil and gas supply 
chain, from coordinating exploration and production to ensuring proper transportation 
and marketing. It also expanded its reach well beyond the central policy-making 
apparatus and into the provinces, being in charge of negotiating investment funding 
and allocating it to the subordinate Petroleum Administration Bureau (PAB).294 
The evidence of working policies came from China’s self-sufficiency in energy 
commodities achieved between 1963 and 1973,295 (See Figure 4.6) and small exports 
contributing to the country’s foreign currency reserves. By 1973 China reached the 
status of a net energy exporter with crude oil and oil products now delivered to Hong 
Kong, Japan, Thailand, and the Philippines. As a result, the 1973 oil crisis did not 
                                                            
290 The need to develop domestic natural resources created a favorable environment for China’s 
cooperation with the Soviet Union and Eastern Bloc countries. Not only did Soviet expertise improve 
China’s technical capabilities, it also left a sizeable imprint on the future direction of the oil and gas 
sector “which took a turn toward large-scale, centrally funded projects” (Woodard, Ibid., 32). 
291 Woodard, Ibid., 25-6; Lieberthal and Oksenberg, Ibid., 172. It is possible that security concerns 
outweighed economic problems. The Chinese leadership and the military perceived threats from multiple 
sources: the Soviet Union, Taiwan, and India (Lieberthal and Oksenberg, Ibid., 172). 
292 Zhang, Ibid., 5-6. 
293 Lieberthal and Oksenberg, Ibid., 194-5. 
294 Zhang, Ibid., 6. 
295 Woodard, Ibid., 222. 
  127
have a major negative impact on the Chinese oil and gas sector or the economy as a 
whole. 
Figure 4.6: Crude Oil Production and Consumption in the PRC (1965 – 2014) 
 
Data Source: BP, Statistical Review of World Energy. 
 
1979 Policy Shift and Legal Framework Expansion 
The 1979 decision to permit foreign equity is generally seen as a turning point in 
China’s oil and gas policy. But the process leading up to this decision was the result 
of a series of incremental steps taken over the course of more than 10 years.296 Also, 
this policy shift was deeper than a change at the policy arena or the institutional 
arrangement level.297 On the one hand, preparatory work took a long time because it 
needed unconditional support of country’s leaders in order to succeed. On the other 
hand, the changes in policy transformed the understanding of self-reliance, which has 
historical significance and is linked to embedded institutions and CCP’s ideology. 
                                                            
296 Although the tense political situation of the Cultural Revolution did not allow the idea of expanded 
foreign cooperation to officially enter China’s policy agenda until 1979, the network of contacts between 
Chinese oil and gas experts and the outside world started to emerge in the 1960s. Small Chinese 
delegations participated in international exhibitions as early as 1963 – 1964 and technological exchanges 
with Japan and France in 1964 – 1967. 
297 It involved changes in all three institutional components: policy framework (shift towards foreign 
cooperation and permission to create Sino-Foreign joint ventures), legal framework (relevant laws and 
regulations for onshore and offshore resources), and administrative arrangement (decreased power of 
























In preparation for the bold policy shift the country’s leadership was by no means 
united on the country’s future direction298, but the petroleum group of the MPI was 
able to offer consensus-building solutions and continued to lead the oil and gas 
industry and the national economy. Suggested solutions of imports financing through 
oil exports and accelerated oil field development through opening-up found support 
virtually from all sides of the debate on the future of China’s development.299 The 
biggest, previously unthinkable, policy break-through materialized despite the top 
leaders’ disagreements on overall development strategy and became “an interesting 
instance of coalition building in Chinese polities, where… leaders can agree on a bold 
departure in policy for different reasons.”300. Those who supported opening-up and 
increased foreign involvement cited, first and foremost, economic benefits of joint 
ventures for the development of China’s domestic resources: enhancement of security 
of supply, “minimized Chinese financial obligations,” and “maximum technology 
transfer.”301 
The policy change of 1979 would not be possible without the development of a 
previously non-existent legal framework governing oil and gas supply chains. The 
first legal guidelines designed in 1979 – 1983 were forced by new economic realities 
of peaking oil production in the Daqing field and an urgent need to find and develop 
new oil fields.302 They were drafted during negotiations of the model contract303 
between local and foreign companies in joint ventures in order to maintain resource 
sovereignty in the presence of foreigners. The model contract was more significant 
than the vague Law on Sino-Foreign Equity Joint Venture Companies (1979)304 
                                                            
298 Lieberthal and Oksenberg, Ibid., 206. 
299 Ibid., 207. 
300 Ibid., 227-28. 
301 Lieberthal and Oksenberg, Ibid., 227-228. 
302 Ibid. 
303 The contract applied to all foreign companies doing business in China, was 30 years long and was 
divided into three phases corresponding to exploration, development, and production (Lieberthal and 
Oksenberg, Ibid., 241). 
304 In addition to the 1979 law regulating foreign investment in an equity joint venture, similar laws were 
passed with regards to two other forms of foreign participation allowed in Chinese oil and gas sector. 
One was the Law on Wholly Foreign-funded Enterprises (1986) and accompanying rules for its 
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which “left the foreign investment community devoid of any real certainty in its 
investment in China.”305  It became the foundation of the Chinese hybrid model and 
has not lost its relevance to this day.306 
Legislation for offshore resources management was developed around the same time 
as the model contract, as it also involved foreign participation due to the lack of 
“technology and equipment needed to develop offshore petroleum reserves.”307 
Regulations of the PRC on the Exploitation of Offshore Petroleum Resources in 
Cooperation with Foreign Enterprises (1982) entered into force, and China National 
Offshore Oil Company (CNOOC) – one of the first future major national oil 
companies (NOCs) – created during the same year obtained the responsibility for 
contract negotiation with foreign oil companies. 
A more comprehensive law on mineral and energy resources and their exploitation, 
the Mineral Resources Law of the PRC (1986), was enacted a few years later. It states 
that exploitation of resources by any authorized entity does not alter “state ownership 
of mineral resources.”308The law serves the purpose of “developing the mining 
industry, promoting the exploration, development, utilization and protection of 
mineral resources”309 for the benefit “of the socialist modernization programme.”310 It 
contains provisions for the payment of “resource tax and resource compensation”311 
                                                                                                                                                              
implementation (1990) and the other was the Law on Sino-Foreign Cooperative Joint Venture 
Companies (1988) followed by Regulations on its implementation (1995). Both laws were revised in 
2000. According to the regulations on the implementation of both laws, the Ministry of Commerce 
(MOFCOM) examines applications for and approves wholly foreign-owned enterprises (Ministry of 
Commerce of the People’s Republic of China, Detailed Rules for the Implementation of the Law on 
Wholly Foreign-Owned Enterprises (1990)) and cooperative joint ventures (Ministry of Commerce of 
the People’s Republic of China, Detailed Rules for the Implementation of the Law on Sino-Foreign 
Cooperative Joint Ventures (1995)). 
305 Barbara Campbell Potter, “China’s equity joint venture law: a standing invitation to the West for 
foreign investment?” University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Business Law 14, no. 1 (1993), 
14. Even though the Regulations to the JV Law (1983) clarified some controversial points of the law and 
expanded the avenues for dispute resolution, the law did not improve much until the substantive 
amendments were passed in 1990. 
306 Lieberthal and Oksenberg, Ibid., 230-1. 
307 Ibid., 194. 
308 Government of China, Mineral Resources Law of the People’s Republic of China (1986), Article 3. 
309 Ibid., Article 1. 
310 Ibid., Article 1. 
311 Ibid., Article 5. 
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and takes into consideration environmental protection measures, such as diligent 
reporting and prevention of pollution.312 Rules for Implementation of the Mineral 
Resources Law of the PRC (1994) promulgated a few years later, emphasized once 
again that “all mineral resources shall be owned by the state,”313 and gave the right of 
interpreting these rules to the then Ministry of Geology and Mineral Resources314 
(Ministry of Land and Resources (MLR) since 1998). 
Administrative Reforms of the 1980s 
In the 1980s, China remained wary of the international market’s influence on its 
domestic oil and gas sector. In addition to expanding the legal framework which 
specified the roles of the state, the domestic bureaucracy and foreign participants, 
Chinese leaders implemented measures to control the price dimension of energy 
supply security in order to ensure dominance of domestic government over external 
political and economic forces. Strict policies ensured that the government was in 
charge of O&G prices and volumes of imported crude oil at all times. These measures 
corresponded with major changes in the administrative arrangements – the end of the 
ministerial era and the beginning of the NOC era. 
The end of the ministerial era is associated with the termination of the MPI in 1988, 
when responsibilities of the ministry along with those of other energy resources 
ministries were transferred to the new overarching Ministry of Energy, and the 
abolition of the latter only a few years later in 1993. However, the demise of the 
petroleum group and the MPI on the national economic scene started before 1988 and 
“coincided with a period of major reorganization of the government bureaucracy” in 
1979 – 1983.315 It is explained not by the developments inside oil and gas industry 
management, but rather by “a massive effort to remove the petroleum group from the 
                                                            
312 Ibid., Articles 21 and 32.  
313 Ministry of Land and Resources of the People’s Republic of China, Rules for Implementation of the 
Mineral Resources Law of the People’s Republic of China (1994), Article 3. 
314 Ibid., Article 45. 
315 Lieberthal and Oksenberg, Ibid., 254-5. 
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commanding heights of the economic bureaucracies.”316 MPI’s power gradually 
declined despite attempts to restore it.317 By 1982, the MPI relinquished its 
responsibilities for negotiation of contracts with foreign oil companies to its 
subordinate organization, China National Oil and Gas Exploration and Development 
Corporation (CNODC). CNODC was the first in line of soon to mushroom oil and 
gas ‘corporations’, which would first be nurtured under the powerful wing of MPI 
and obtain independence by the late-1980s. The power of these corporations would 
also be, in part, responsible for the failure of the Ministry of Energy (1988 – 1993) to 
“gain control over the energy sector”318 in the wake of government recentralization 
and a Three-Year Austerity Programme (1988 – 1991).319 
Responsibilities of the MPI and other energy-related ministries were removed 
incrementally, allowing for a smooth organizational transition from ministries to 
SOEs. Major national oil companies (NOCs) were established as part of 
corporatization drive in different years between 1982 and 1988, using MPI assets: 
China National Offshore Oil Company (CNOOC) in 1982, China Petrochemical 
Corporation (Sinopec) in 1983320, and China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) 
in 1988. 
1990s: Security of Supply and Growing Role of Natural Gas 
The remainders of MPI and ministries in charge of other fossil fuels and chemical 
industry were merged into the Ministry of Energy (MOE). By 1993, the last bits of 
the MOE’s powers in the oil and gas sector were redistributed between the NDRC, 
SETC, and NOCs. The abolition of the MOE signified the end of the ministerial era, 
                                                            
316 Ibid., 252-3. 
317 In spring 1979, Finance and Economic Committee (FEC) was established, which created competition 
to the State Planning Commission, one of the MPI’s allies. A year later FEC was abolished and replaced 
with the Finance and Economics Leading Small Group led by the representatives of petroleum group. In 
August 1980, State Energy Commission was established under the leadership of the same individuals, 
but it “failed to provide coherence and coordination to energy policy” resulting in its abolition in May 
1982 (Lieberthal and Oksenberg, Ibid., 252-4). 
318 Downs, “China,” 17-18; Dorian, Ibid., 114. 
319 Dorian, Ibid., 75, 80. 
320 Zhang, Ibid., 5; Downs, “China,” 21-4; Wang, Ibid., 117-8, 127. 
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and the rise of the NOC-centered management of oil and gas supply chains. Serving 
the central objective of national energy self-sufficiency, NOCs were designed as 
novel instruments for achieving security of supply: addressing new challenges of 
acquiring foreign technology, developing industry expertise, cooperating with foreign 
companies in China, and streamlining both processes through separation of policy-
making and operations.321 
Overall, throughout the 1990s, three significant processes and events in the 
institutional arrangement took place: persisting misperceptions322 about non-existent 
or very limited legal framework despite its continuous expansion,323 restructuring and 
strengthening of NOCs in the context of industrial policy,324 China’s change of status 
to a net oil importer status325 (See Figure 4.6), and natural gas gaining significance as 
a substitute for oil.326 
                                                            
321 Dorian, Ibid., 114; Downs, “China,” 6, 21-4; Downs, "China’s “New” Energy Administration," 42-3. 
322 Dorian, Ibid., 238. 
323 By early 1998, the State Council enforced over 30 administrative laws, regulations and documents 
pertaining to the mineral industry. International Business Publications, USA, China mining laws and 
regulations handbook, Vol. 1, Strategic and Legal Information (Washington, D.C.: International 
Business Publications, USA, 2012), 46. In oil and gas, other relevant nation-wide laws and regulations 
include: Regulations for oil and gas pipeline protection (1989), Measures for Registration 
Administration of Exploration Blocks of Mineral Resources (1998), Regulation for Registering To 
Explore for Mineral Resources Using the Block System (1998), which replaced Interim Measures on 
Registration for Mineral Exploration (1987), and Interim Measures on Registration for the Exploration 
and Mining of Petroleum and Gas (1987), Measures for the Registration Administration of Mineral 
Resources Exploitation (1998), and Measures for the Administration of Transfer of Mineral Exploration 
Right and Mining Right (1998). Despite the fact that the laws and rules on their implementation did 
exist, lack of clarity remained a serious issue. In addition to laws implemented on the national level, 
local governments of provinces, autonomous regions and municipalities enforced laws and regulations. 
Overall, this body of laws provided satisfactory conditions for foreign investors and legalized the 
dominance of NOCs. 
324 NOCs continued to advance the concept of self-reliance. But as ‘companies’ they had an additional 
task of profit generation. Consequently, all major oil and gas policies of the 1990s culminating in the 
1998 SOE reform were devoted to strengthening NOCs’ performance and demarcating supply chain 
boundaries between them to avoid inefficiencies of competition in a centralized state-controlled 
environment. 
325 Domestic resources were able to satisfy domestic demand In 1993, oil consumption outpaced 
domestic oil production, and domestic resources were no longer able to satisfy the demand. Domestic 
production growth has since been incremental with a modest average annual increase of 1.9% in 1995 – 
2014 (BP, Statistical Review). The government did not anticipate that the country would become a net 
oil importer in 1993. First, 1993 was the year of oil sector liberalization, which worsened inflation and 
caused chaos in the oil market, mainly because rapid loosening up was not supported by a proper legal 
system. Second, in 1993, the Ministry of Energy – the major coordinating body of national energy policy 
was abolished. Although SETC was established in the same year to take over the ministry’s functions, it 
lacked the power to implement its duties and had to withstand competition with NDRC (despite the fact 
that nominally their functions were not overlapping). 
326 China turned to more active natural gas exploration in the late 1990s. In March 2001, at the Fourth 
Plenary Session of the 9th National People’s Congress Zhu Rongji stressed the importance of putting gas 
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This is when security of supply gained extra importance, and NOCs, which were seen 
as the leading mechanism for ensuring success of oil and gas policies, were put in 
charge of attaining necessary supply targets. For instance, the Regulations 
Concerning the Exploitation of Onshore Petroleum Resources in Cooperation with 
Foreign Enterprises (1993)327 gave CNPC a unique right to cooperate with foreign 
enterprises in onshore oil exploitation.328 These regulations also divided 
administrative powers between MOFCOM,329 MOF,330 and the State Council.331 
2000s: Energy Security, Administrative Changes, New Policies and Regulations 
In the aftermath of China’s transition to a net importer of oil and the abolition of the 
Ministry of Energy, government policies of the first decade of the 21st century were 
largely reactive and needed time to adapt to a new reality. First, “energy security” 
entered the official policy-making domain only with the implementation of the 
Special Energy Development Plan in the framework of the 10th Five-Year Plan (2001 
– 2005).332 The arrival of the concept into the policy language can be attributed to 
soaring imports and dramatic increase in oil prices. Oil imports increased from 154 
thousand barrels a day (b/d) in 1993 to 6,811 thousand b/d. in 2014.333 Second, it took 
China more than a decade to arrange for a viable alternative to the Ministry of Energy 
– coordinating body that would be in charge of national energy policy. Preceded by 
the National Energy Bureau (2003 - 2008) and National Energy Administration (2008 
– Present), National Energy Commission was finally put together in 2010. The 
                                                                                                                                                              
“on an equal footing with petroleum” (Kong, China's international petroleum policy, 47). Some of the 
avenues for increased gas consumption included expansion of transmission pipelines and distribution 
networks as well as the increase in imports (Ibid.). 
327 Government of China, Regulations concerning the exploitation of on-shore petroleum resources 
(October 7, 1993). 
328 According to Article 7 of the regulations, CNPC “shall have an exclusive right to engage in 
petroleum exploration, development and production in cooperation with foreign enterprises.” 
329 Given the power to approve contracts (Article 8). 
330 Given the power to design preferential treatment measures for lowering duties and taxes on 
equipment and materials for contracts (Article 12). 
331 Given the right to reassess MOFCOM’s approval and responsible for demarcating or delegating the 
responsibility of demarcating cooperation blocks (Article 6). 
332 The plan introduced strategic petroleum reserves, called for increased share of natural gas in the 
national energy mix, and emphasized the importance of a robust regulatory system for the oil and gas 
sector. 
333 BP, Statistical Review. 
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establishment of the NEA and NEC resulted in more concrete policies in the oil and 
gas sector, which remains central to the overall energy planning. In particular, the 
natural gas industry received a lot of attention with specific policies formulated for 
LNG, shale gas, and CBM.334 Also, a comprehensive nation-wide natural gas pricing 
reform was rolled out in 2013.335 
In the context of reactive piecemeal policies in the beginning of the 21st century, the 
oil and gas sector did not experience any major legal changes.336 But a wave of fiscal 
and regulatory reforms swept over China’s oil and gas landscape in 2010 – 2014. The 
changes include the Law of the PRC on the Protection of Oil and Natural Gas 
Pipelines (2010)337 and new tax regulations338 related to decentralization and growing 
                                                            
334 The share of unconventional natural gas resources in the overall supply is very small, but policies are 
being developed to increase their share until 2020 and beyond. 12 LNG receiving terminals have been 
built since 2006 (International Gas Union, “World LNG Report – 2014 Edition,” IGU (2015), 56-8), 
with at least two more currently under construction. (Guangxi LNG is expected to be commissioned by 
the end of December 2015: Xinhua Finance Agency, “Sinopec to commission LNG terminal in S. 
China’s Guangxi,” Xinhua Finance in Beijing (November 3, 2015); completion of Shenzhen LNG is 
planned for 2017-2018: Xinhua Finance Agency, “CNOOC slows down building of LNG receiving 
terminal in Shenzhen,” Xinhua Finance in Beijing (May 27, 2015)). The 12th Five-Year Programme 
(2011 – 2015) promotes the use of shale gas and CBM for the first time (Kang Wu, "China׳s energy 
security: Oil and gas," Energy Policy 73 (2014), 7). The NEA issued two policy documents important for 
the shale gas development: Shale Gas Development Plan (2011 – 2015) in March 2012 and First Shale 
Gas Industrial Policy in October 2013. In November 2012, the NEA and MOF issued a joint notice 
announcing a subsidy for shale gas production in 2012 – 2015. CBM development has been guided by 
the 12th Five-Year Coalbed Methane Development and Use Plan (2011 – 2015). According to the latest 
Energy Development Strategy Action Plan (2014 – 2020), shale gas and CBM production targets stand 
at 30 bcm per year each by 2020 (Xiang Bo, "Hina unveils energy strategy, targets for 2020," Xinhuanet 
(November 19, 2014)). 
335 While the old pricing regime failed to incentivize domestic gas supply development, the reformed 
system has limitations as well. The major disadvantages of the new pricing regime are that it fails to 
address local distribution and retail issues, and favors large suppliers (Sergey Paltsev and D. Zhang, 
Natural gas pricing reform in China: Getting closer to a market system? Report no. 282, MIT Joint 
Program on the Science and Policy of Global Change (MIT, 2015), 24). 
336 With the exception of a few additions to the legal framework like CBM specific regulations: Coalbed 
methane (CBM) received more attention in terms of legislation in 2000s. In 2006, MOF, General 
Administration of Customs (GAC) and State Administration of Customs (SAC) released a Circular on 
Distributing the Regulations of Exempting the Import Tariffs of Materials for the Coalbed Methane 
Prospecting and Exploiting (See Government of China, Circular of Ministry of Finance, General 
Administration of Customs and State Administration of Customs on distributing the regulations of 
exempting the import tariffs of materials for the coalbed methane prospecting and exploiting, Asian 
Legal Information Institute (October 25, 2006)). One year later, the NDRC, MOFCOM and MLR 
publicized a joint Notice on Issues Concerning Further Expanding the Cooperation with Foreign Parties 
in Mining Coal bed Methane (See "Notice of the Ministry of Commerce," Shanghai Nuo Di Law Firm 
(December 29, 2014)). Also, provisional rules for safety supervision and management of oil and gas 
pipelines (2000). 
337 The new Law of the PRC on the Protection of Oil and Natural Gas Pipelines (2010) covers planning 
and construction of pipelines, protection of pipeline operations, and coordination of pipelines between 
separate administrative regions as well as with other local and regional infrastructure. Although the law 
is dedicated to onshore pipelines, Article 60 authorizes the State Council to “formulate special 
provisions on the protection of pipelines of offshore oil and natural gas” (Law of the PRC on Protection 
of Oil and Natural Gas Pipelines (2010), Article 60). 
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role of provincial and local governments. Additionally, until 2011, there was no 
differentiation between oil and gas resources in the legislation with both resources 
being covered by the same laws. The current decade is characterized by increased 
attention to shale gas as an “independent mining resource” which fell outside the 
category of “conventional natural gas,”339 one of the encouraged industries for foreign 
investment.340 Finally, further elimination of legal barriers to foreign participation in 
the sector is ongoing. For example, Sino-Foreign joint ventures can now directly 
participate in bidding rounds,341 for several years (2007, 2011, 2013, and 2015) 
upstream oil and natural gas has been on the list of encouraged foreign investment 
industries,342 and two State Council’s decisions – from May 2013 and February 2014 
– relaxed regulations applicable to conventional and nonconventional oil and gas.343 
                                                                                                                                                              
338 New tax regulations which took precedence over the Provisional Regulations of the PRC on Resource 
Tax (1993) were implemented by the State Council in September 2011. The 1993 regulations had 
distinct local and central government taxes, which were collected separately, and distinguished between 
three basic taxes: a value-added tax (VAT), an enterprise income tax (EIT), and a personal income tax 
(PIT). (Wang, Ibid., 10-1, 65) The new law replaced production-based taxation with sales-based taxation 
at a 5-10 percent rate for crude oil and natural gas, and substituted royalties for resource taxes. If the 
1993 rules were designed to boost rapidly dropping central government revenue, 2011 regulations appear 
to benefit local governments. ("China Kicks off National Resource Tax Reform"; KPMG, “China 
Alert”). 
339 In 2011, the MLR’s Announcement №30 gave shale gas a new legal classification. 
340 According to the new issue of the recurring Catalogue of Industries for Guiding Foreign Investment 
released by the NDRC and MOFCOM in 2011. Foreign companies with experience in shale gas 
exploration and production were welcome to participate in China’s industry. (Stressed in the October 
2012 MLR Circular on Exploration, Exploitation and Administration of Shale Gas. It also specified 
conditions for being granted the right to operate in the industry) In 2011 – 2012, two rounds of bidding 
were held attracting an increasing number of participants and distributing a growing number of blocks. 
In the first bidding held in June 2011, six SOEs (CNPC, Sinopec, CNOOC, Yanchang Petroleum, 
CUCBM, and Henan CBM) participated in the invitation bidding and only two, Sinopec and Henan 
CBM, received exploration rights. In the next round, in September 2012, 83 companies participated, 
including two private firms, and 16 were granted the rights. The third round was initially scheduled for 
2013, but was delayed several times ultimately being rescheduled for early 2016. Unlike the previous 
two rounds, which were administered by the MLR, the third bidding process was supposed to be 
managed by the local governments. This change was a cause of concern among domestic private and 
foreign investors. (See Yue Wang, "China's Coming Shale Gas Auction Offers Little Hope To Private 
Investors," Forbes (August 07, 2014)) but, as of November 2015, administrative duties were transferred 
back to the MLR. (Bloomberg, "China Pushing Ahead With Shale While Falling Prices Dim Interest," 
Bloomberg.com (November 05, 2015)). All these initiatives opened up new avenues for foreign 
investment entering China’s oil and gas sector, but foreign companies can participate in upstream shale 
gas operations only as part of joint ventures with Chinese companies. 
341 This is demonstrated by the second bidding round for shale gas exploration. Earlier only Chinese 
joint ventures had this right. 
342 They enjoy simplified project approval procedures. See "Global Oil & Gas Newsletter: Views from 
around the World," Deloitte (April 2013); "Catalogue for the Guidance of Foreign Investment Industries 
(Amended in 2011)," Ministry of Commerce, People's Republic of China (February 21, 2012). 
343 The Decision to Eliminate or Delegate Certain Administrative Approval Items (May 2013) abolished 
the requirement for MOFCOM to approve oil and gas (including CBM) contracts with foreign parties. 
The Decision also delegated several approval items from NDRC and other central agencies to their local 
branches and provincial government authorities. The Decision to Further Eliminate Certain 
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NOCs remain under the central government’s control despite growing into powerful 
corporate entities. The Central Committee of the CCP continues to appoint NOCs’ 
top leadership and, as part of their management performance assessment, executives 
are evaluated on “how well they serve the CCP’s interests.”344 Also, the practice of 
NOC leadership reshuffling is a central government means to demonstrate its “control 
over these immensely powerful organizational actors.”345 Finally, a range of other 
control mechanisms includes government approval of substantial domestic and 
foreign investment, SASAC,346 petroleum production targets, health, safety, and 
environment (HSE) standards, as well as various economic and social targets.347 
However, the government is dependent on the NOCs as much as the NOCs are 
dependent on the government, and there is a mutual understanding that the role of the 
government is important for NOCs’ ability to secure interests overseas.348 The NOCs’ 
unique role in the O&G policy framework consists of consultations with the 
government, and policy inputs during the decision-making process.349 The dominant 
point of view sees NOCs as “the key drivers of “supply side” policies,”350 and policy 
implementers guided by both state goals and their own priorities.351 But there appears 
                                                                                                                                                              
Administrative Approval Items and Delegate Administrative Power to Lower Government Authorities 
(February 2014) removed the requirement to obtain MLR’s approval for E&P of mineral resources for 
the parties to the Sino-Foreign cooperation contract (Philip Andrews-Speed and Christopher Len, "China 
Coalbed Methane: Slow Start and Still Work in Progress," Energy Studies Institute (December 5, 2014)). 
344 Downs, "China’s “New” Energy Administration," 42-3. 
345 Lewis, Ibid., 9. The most recent NOC leadership reshuffling took place in 2011 and 2015. Michal 
Meidan, "The structure of China’s oil industry: Past trends and future prospects," The Oxford Institute 
for Energy Studies (May 2016). 
346 Kong, China's international petroleum policy, 26; Qunhui Huang and Jing Yu, “A New Approach to 
China’s SOE Reform and Governance,” China Economist (2014), 22. As discussed earlier in the chapter, 
SASAC employs two major mechanisms: financial control of state assets and Discipline and Inspection 
Groups appointments. 
347 Øystein Tunsjø, Security and profit in China's energy policy: hedging against risk (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 2013), 42. 
348 NOCs receive loans below market rates, and the government provides infrastructure investment and 
aid to oil producing states. (Downs, “China,” 41) This help is considered beneficial to both NOCs and 
the Chinese state as a whole, because NOCs are profitable and contribute significantly to the state 
budget. 
349 Downs, "The Chinese Energy Security Debate," 25; Kong, China's international petroleum policy, 1-
2. 
350 Downs, "The Chinese Energy Security Debate," 25. 
351 Pietz, Ibid., 54; Downs, “China,” 16, Gabriel B. Collins and Andrew S. Erickson, “Chinese Efforts to 
Create a National Tanker Fleet,” in China's energy strategy: the impact on Beijing's maritime policies, 
ed., Gabriel B. Collins (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2008), 92-93; Downs, "China’s “New” 
Energy Administration," 42-3; Dorian, Ibid., 51. 
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to be a disagreement on the role of NOCs in agenda setting and policy formulation. 
Some argue that “corporate actors… come into play...” during policy formulation and 
decision-making stages.352 Others believe that NOCs “are rarely present at the stages 
of problem identification or in the elaboration of policy alternatives… [and] only 
react to actual policies.”353 Regardless of the most recent reshuffles in their top 
management (2011 and 2015) and corruption purge (2012 – 2013),354 the NOCs 
continue to “work as high-ranking bureaucracies,”355 and influence the overall 
direction of energy policy. 
Summary 
China’s O&G policy framework reflects the influence of a variety of factors: 
institutional path dependence, organizational inefficiency (i.e., coordination and 
power-sharing issues), changes in administrative arrangements, ideological shifts 
over time, changes in the legal framework as well as factors outside direct control of 
China’s institutions and policy actors (e.g., foreign resource exploitation in 1842-
1949 and Soviet approach to development). 
The legal framework has from the beginning had the objective of attracting foreign 
capital and technical expertise, while ensuring that mineral resources belong to the 
Chinese state. While regulating various O&G sector participants, including state-, 
collectively-, and privately-owned enterprises, the legal framework promotes the role 
of major NOCs, especially CNOOC and CNPC. It guards their leadership position 
and protects assets administered by NOCs from private investment. For instance, 
none of major NOCs are participating in the SOE hybrid ownership reform underway 
since the late 2013,356 which is designed to attract more private capital into 
management of SOEs. Moreover, compared to the general trend of many industries 
                                                            
352 Meidan et al., Ibid., 593; Kong, China's international petroleum policy, 1-2. 
353 Constantin, Ibid., 18-19. 
354 Meidan, Ibid., 46, 50; David Lague, Benjamin Kang Lim, and Charlie Zhu, "Special Report: Fear and 
retribution in Xi's corruption purge," Reuters (December 23, 2014). 
355 Conglin Xu, "China's NOC's expansion," Oil & Gas Journal (April 22, 2013). 
356 "China names companies for SOE reform; oil companies move ahead with change," Platts (July 17, 
2014). 
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opening up for foreign investment, oil and gas remains one of the more regulated 
sectors. Although the 2015 list of sectors requiring foreign investors to partner up 
with a Chinese investor was reduced from 43 to 15, exploration and development of 
conventional and unconventional oil and gas resources is among those 15 sectors.357 
The central government’s “authority to direct, control, and implement” China’s oil 
and gas strategy is strong,358 but the administrative arrangements illustrate that it has 
limited resources to manage the O&G and the energy sector as a whole. While the 
overall energy policy of the PRC can be characterized as “muddling through and at 
times chaotic,”359 “paralyzed,”360 “reactive,”361 and governed by “fragmented 
institutional authority,”362 the same qualities, but of a smaller magnitude are 
characteristic of China’s oil and gas policy. There are specific administrative units 
governing the oil and gas sector, although the boundaries of their responsibilities are 
often blurred. NOCs are powerful entities and tend to promote China’s national 
interests with slight modifications, but they remain under the central government’s 
control. 
 
4.2.3.2 Referent Object Performance 
Since the late 1970s actors governing and participating in China’s oil and gas supply 
chains were no longer identical (See Table 4.2). Along with the first NOCs, foreign 
companies entered the sector in the late 1970s – early 1980s and were joined by 
domestic private companies in the 2000s. While NOCs remain the key players in the 
oil and gas sector and the performance of oil and gas supply chains is analyzed based 
                                                            
357 This is reflected in the Foreign Investment Industrial Guidance Catalogue, one of the most essential 
documents in the foreign investment regulatory regime. 
358 Tunsjø, Ibid., 51. 
359 Pietz, Ibid., 54. 
360 Downs, "China’s “New” Energy Administration," 42-3. 
361 Kong, China's international petroleum policy, 145. 
362 Downs, “China,” 24. 
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on their performance, foreign and domestic private companies are briefly discussed 
first. 
Table 4.2: Key Players in China’s Upstream and Midstream Oil and Gas Sector 
(1960s – 2015) 




















Notes: MPI – Ministry of Petroleum Industry (1955 – 1978), although the name of the ministry 
changed several times during this period 
 MFT – Ministry of Foreign Trade (1952 – 1982) 
 SPC – State Planning Commission (1954 – 1998), now known as NDRC 
 SOEs: CNPC, Sinopec, CNOOC, Sinochem, Yanchang Petroleum, Zhenhua Oil and others 
 Foreign companies have been present in China’s O&G sector since the 1980s, but can 
participate only in cooperation with Chinese companies (Sino-Foreign JVs) 
 Private companies refer to domestic companies: GUPC (a union of about 100 private 
companies), Guanghui Energy and its petroleum subsidiary, etc. 
 
Foreign Companies 
Prior to 1979, foreign companies played an important role of equipment sellers and 
consultants in contract design between the Chinese government and foreign O&G 
companies. By the early 1980s, MPI was forming many joint ventures with foreign 
firms in order to improve onshore production and “survey, explore, and develop 
China’s offshore potential.”363 Already in those JVs “foreigners obtained equity 
holdings in China.”364 The 7th Five-Year Plan (FYP) (1986 – 1990) called for a 
“gradual opening of China’s refining sector to foreign involvement.”365 During the 
1998 – 2000 NOC restructuring and flotation of their subsidiaries, foreign companies 
solidified their presence in China. In April 2000, British Petroleum acquired 20% of 
PetroChina’s shares. In October 2000, ExxonMobil, BP and Shell collectively bought 
                                                            
363 Lieberthal and Oksenberg, Ibid., 206-207, 260; Dorian, Ibid., 171. 
364 Lieberthal and Oksenberg, Ibid., 169. 
365 Dorian, Ibid., 172. 
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about 8% of Sinopec’s shares worth $7 billion.366 In February 2001, Shell acquired 
$200 million of CNOOC shares.367 
However, by 2004, all of the above foreign companies relinquished acquired shares. 
ExxonMobil, Shell and BP were not “in the list of top ten shareholders… as of 
Sinopec’s 2007 annual report date.”368 BP sold its PetroChina shares in 2004 
responding to international NGOs’ criticism over construction of a controversial 
Sebei-Lanzhou pipeline in Tibet.369 But all companies continue to cooperate with 
China’s NOCs via joint ventures mainly in the downstream, including activities like 
product marketing and brand building, and well as wholesale, retail, storage and 
transportation of refined oil products.370 For instance, BP maintained its presence in 
China via a joint venture with PetroChina – BP PetroChina Petroleum Co., Ltd. – that 
“owns and operates gasoline stations in China,”371 mainly in Guangdong province.372 
Thus, foreign companies flourished throughout the 1990s, but were dealt a setback in 
the 2000s. Currently, their participation in China’s upstream and midstream is 
minimal, and so is their importance in the securitization processes. They have not 
been able to rise to the ranks of very influential policy and sector players because the 
policy arena participants governing O&G supply chains and the institutional 
environment as a whole have always been wary of the outsiders, especially 
foreigners. 
 
                                                            
366 Xinting Jia and Roman Tomasic, Corporate governance and resource security in China: the 
transformation of China's global resources companies (New York: Routledge, 2010), 110. 
367 International Business Publications, USA, China energy policy, laws and regulation handbook, Vol. 
1, Strategic Information and Basic Laws (Washington, D.C.: International Business Publications, USA, 
2015), 72. 
368 Jia and Tomasic, Ibid., 110. 
369 "BP sells controversial PetroChina shares," International Campaign for Tibet (January 13, 2004). 
370 Sinopec Corp, Our Partners. 
371 Bloomberg, “Company Overview of BP Petrochina Petroleum Co., Ltd.” Bloomberg.com. 
372 Leslie Hook, "PetroChina open to closer ties with BP," Financial Times (July 12, 2010). 
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Domestic Participants Beyond NOCs 
Domestic players in China’s O&G sector started to emerge in the early 1980s. In 
addition to what later became major NOCs, private companies and collectively-
owned enterprises (COEs)373 were created.374 In the early 1990s, the government 
“ease[d] restrictions on investments into the nation’s interior provinces.”375 However, 
market liberalization “created chaos in the oil market due to an inadequate legal 
system,”376 and in 1994 the government reversed oil and gas sector decentralization 
measures including “price decontrol and unrestricted oil business licenses.” 377. As a 
result of tight government regulations, private companies, the majority of which 
flourished in the downstream sector, were forced out of business. During the next few 
years leading up to the extensive 1998 reform, NOCs were restructured and given 
more power than their private counterparts and COEs. This resulted in the 
consolidation of many COEs and private companies’ assets in the hands of the three 
major NOCs. 
Since the late 1990s, the dominance of a limited number of NOCs in the Chinese oil 
and gas market was preconditioned by their almost exclusive access to resource-rich 
acreage and unique right to import crude oil. These factors explain the lack of 
competition in the upstream and midstream sectors, with all other market players 
limited to operations in the downstream. Even though policies and regulations 
implemented in 2005 (known as “36 Non-State Articles”) encouraged development of 
private enterprises,378 restrictions on crude oil imports remained a powerful tool of 
market control in the hands of NOCs. In 2010, the “New 36 Non-State Articles” 
                                                            
373 COEs were “usually owned by the local community or local government of the townships and 
villages in which they [were] located; they obtain[ed] a small proportion of their supplies from the state 
and distribute[d] a small percentage of their sales through the state” (Wang, Ibid., 6). 
374 Wang, Ibid., 6; Dorian, Ibid., 222-4. 
375 Dorian, Ibid., 172. 
376 Wang, Ibid., 49. 
377 Ibid., 49-50. 
378 The Great-Wall United Petroleum Company (GUPC), “China’s first independent oil giant was 
formed in June 2005,” (Kong, An Anatomy of China’s Energy Insecurity, 45-7; Kong, China’s 
International Petroleum Policy, 79) representing “at least 100 domestic privately-owned oil firms” 
("Private Oil Companies Unite to Form Great-Wall," China.org.cn (May 26, 2005)). 
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became a more extensive attempt at reforming monopolized industries, but energy 
remained one of a few sectors where implementation of directives lagged behind.379 
Even the June 2012 “Implementation Opinions on Encouraging and Guiding 
Expanded Non-state Investment in the Energy Sector” by the NEA had no mention of 
relaxing the crude oil import rights requirement with regards to private oil companies. 
Expanding domestic refining capacity in 2010s resulted in lower profit margins 
among domestic refiners and led to a rise in petroleum product exports.380 In March 
2014, 3.4% exports increase and 25% imports decrease on the same month a year ago 
turned China into a net exporter of oil products for the first time since January 
2010.381 Finally, in August 2014, the petroleum subsidiary of Guanghui Energy “was 
granted an import quota of 200,000 metric tons of crude oil for 2014, becoming the 
first private company to obtain such a license.”382 In August 2015, two independent 
refiners – Dongming Petrochemical and Beifang Asphalt Fuel – were granted licenses 
to import crude oil as well.383 Hence, market liberalization in China’s oil and gas 
industry has been slow, but it is moving forward. Today, “SOEs as well as private 
domestic and international actors are… all part of the system.”384 
Thus, compared with the foreign players, China’s domestic private companies play an 
increasingly important role. Even though domestic non-SOE players are still very 
limited due to existing restrictions, given the developments of the recent years, they 
do change the competitive landscape and represent potential competition to major 
                                                            
379 Zhenhua Oil, a subsidiary of the China North Industries Group (“Norinco Group”) became the only 
recipient of an oil import permit besides NOCs and several other state-owned enterprises. But the 
company had “non-state crude oil import qualifications because of its military background,” and, thus, 
had no right to circulate imported oil domestically (Wu, Ibid., 8; Xingyuan Feng, Christer Ljungwall and 
Guangwen He, The ecology of Chinese private enterprises (Hackensack, NJ: World Scientific, 2015), 
50; Bloomberg, “Company Overview of China ZhenHua Oil Co., Ltd,” Bloomberg.com). 
380 As of 2015, China’s refining capacity stands above 14 million b/d ("U.S. Energy Information 
Administration - EIA - Independent Statistics and Analysis," U.S. Energy Information Administration 
(May 14, 2015)). 
381 Neil Hume, "China shifts to oil product exporter," Financial Times (April 11, 2014). 
382 Du Juan, "Private firm Guanghui gets oil import license, shares jump," China Daily USA (August 29, 
2014). 
383 "China approves crude import licenses for two independent refineries," Platts (August 25, 2015). 
384 Meidan et al., Ibid., 597. 
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NOCs. Their role in the policy process is very limited, but they can become vocal 
stakeholders in the near future. 
 
NOC Evolution 
While seven periods can be distinguished in the evolution of China’s oil and gas 
supply chains, the first three of them spanning over three decades (1949 – 1981) 
predate the establishment of the NOCs (See Table 4.3). Period I is characterized by a 
nascent oil and gas sector because it preceded the development of the first oil field in 
the PRC. Periods II and III are associated with the boom in the oil and gas industry, 
but since the sector was dominated by government agencies, its performance in these 
periods is better assessed through the analysis of the institutional arrangements 
conducted earlier in this chapter (See Section 4.2.3.1). Thus, the performance of oil 
and gas supply chains is analyzed in Periods IV – VII, which saw the formation, 
advancement and dominance of NOCs. 
Table 4.3: Distinct Time Periods in China’s Oil and Gas Sector Development (1949 – 
2015) 
Net Oil Importer Net Oil Exporter Net Oil Importer 
Period I Period II Period III Period IV Period V Period VI Period VII 
1949 – 59 1960 – 72 1973 – 81 1982 – 92 1993 – 98 1998 – 2002 2002 – 15 
Pre-NOC period NOC period 
 
Starting with Period IV, NOCs and their subsidiaries have outweighed all other 
actors, including foreign and private domestic companies, when it comes to their 
contribution to the referent object’s performance. Period IV (1982 – 1992) refers to 
the transition period when ministries were reorganized into SOEs. Period V (1993 – 
1998) is the period of continued corporatization of NOCs. Period VI (1998 – 2002) is 
the time of SOE reform, restructuring and flotation. Period VII (2002 – 2015) is the 
period of value maintenance and appreciation of state assets held by SOEs. 
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Securitization of oil supply chains initiated by the MPI persisted with the creation and 
development of the NOCs. First, the NOCs are the direct successors of the ministry, 
having inherited the leadership and general outlook on the management of oil supply 
chains. Second, corporate restructuring and changes in the institutional arrangement 
focus on improving the NOCs’ performance with the goal of ensuring secure oil and 
gas supply. Additionally, NOCs are using securitized supply chains for their own 
interests: to keep the competition out of the upstream and midstream segments (1982 
– 1992), to take advantage of the government financing (1993 – 1998), to eliminate 
competition in the form of their own subordinate units (1998 – 2002), and to use the 
concepts of energy and oil security to compete and obtain expensive assets overseas 
at any cost (2002 – 2015). 
Thus, oil and gas supply chains’ performance is analyzed based on the NOCs’ 
evolution during four consecutive stages between 1982 and 2015. The indicators – 
physical, financial, economic efficiency, and compliance – outlined in the 
securitization framework are used as a rough guide for analysis. 
 
Transition Period: from Ministries to NOCs (1982 – 1992) 
Although the first large NOC was formally established in 1982, the MPI – to – SOEs 
transformation started in the late 1970s and was accompanied by the struggle for 
mandates and resources as well as conflicting interests between incumbents and 
emerging actors. Based on the influence NOCs were able to obtain in the struggle for 
power and ministerial legacy, CNPC and Sinopec received a ministerial-level rank, 
while CNOOC was designated a general bureau (vice-ministerial rank).385 
                                                            
385 Dorian, Ibid., 51; Downs, “China,” 21-24; Kong, China's international petroleum policy, 14. 
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At initial stages of their development, NOCs were “segmented and focused on one 
single area of operation” within the oil and gas supply chain.386 CNPC was managing 
onshore upstream, CNOOC – offshore upstream, Sinopec –refining, and Sinochem –
domestic and international trading.387 At the time when oil and gas services space was 
overcrowded with NOC players,388 monopolization of supply chains’ segments was 
blocking healthy competition and impeding the NOCs’ ability to effectively respond 
to oil price volatility and supply insecurity. 
Instead of competing with each other and other players in the market, NOCs faced 
challenges from their own subordinate units. While the government took away 
NOCs’ rights to production plans, pricing and marketing, subordinate enterprises 
diminished CNPC and Sinopec’s “financial control, performance and monitoring, 
procurement, and R&D.” 389 Their subordinate production units had a lot of 
autonomy,390 from making investments and financing them through bank loans, to 
retaining a large share of profits. For instance, CNPC’s Daqing had aspirations to 
become an independent vertically integrated entity, and Sinopec’s Zhenhai refinery 
had ambitions to become the largest regional refiner through mergers and acquisitions 
(M&As).391 
Hence, this period in the oil and gas industry management restructuring saw the end 
of energy ministries and proliferation of SOEs. Despite clear advances towards 
corporatization and decentralization, NOCs remained under tight government control, 
explained, in part, by the dual nature of the former as agents of the state and business 
                                                            
386 Kong, Ibid., 14. 
387 Kong, An Anatomy of China’s Energy Insecurity, 45-7, Kong, China's international petroleum policy, 
14. 
388 For instance, in the early 1980s, China Nanhai Offshore Joint Services Corporation (CNOJSC), a 
joint venture between CNOOC and Guangdong province, was competing with CNOOC and other 
Chinese enterprises servicing recently allowed joint ventures between domestic and foreign companies 
in offshore petroleum exploration and development (Lieberthal and Oksenberg, Ibid., 339-40, 371). 
389 Zhang, Ibid., 6, 134-136. 
390 Their autonomy was the result of initial corporatization of various ministries’ assets in the late 1970s 
– early 1980s, when the Chinese government had started to experiment with the SOEs and appropriated 
power to these units. 
391 Zhang, Ibid., 6. 
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units. The government controlled the functions vital for the profit-driven corporate 
decision-making, and minimized competition in the sector, with four NOCs 
dominating their respective segments of the supply chain. In addition to the 
government restraints, NOCs were powerless against their strong subordinate units. 
 
Continued Corporatization (1993 – 1998) 
Dominated by the three NOCs in 1993, upstream and midstream segments of O&G 
supply chains encountered challenges of “an overheated economy” characterized by 
too fast of a growth in oil and gas compared to other sectors of the economy. The 
central government was concerned with deteriorating performance of many SOEs: 
“falling rates of return on capital investment; a rising proportion of loss-making 
companies; an increasing level of indebtedness to banks and a low level of central 
government tax revenue.”392 Thus, proliferation of SOEs had to be curbed, and focus 
shifted to enhancing their performance.393 
In addition to the shift from quantitative to qualitative growth, this period was 
characterized by a number of new developments. First, strict boundaries between 
NOCs in the supply chain started to erase. CNPC and Sinopec formed joint ventures 
with Sinochem, the major downstream player, which allowed them to enter the 
business of import/export.394 Second, despite the government’s opposition,395 CNPC 
began to invest overseas since the early 1990s in order to boost its profits, having 
“announced that internationalizing its operations was one of its three main 
strategies.”396 At the same time, extensive government support397 continued to 
                                                            
392 Andrews-Speed et al. (2000), 8. 
393 Implemented since 1991, the 8th FYP had shifted a priority from “initiating new” SOEs to 
“improvement of economic returns and upgrading of existing enterprises” (Dorian, Ibid., 81; Wang, 
Ibid., 6). 
394 Wang, Ibid., 65. 
395 The Chinese government changed its stance by the late 1990s and endorsed the “going out” strategy 
by NOCs and other SOEs. 
396 Downs, “China,” 39. 
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negatively affect NOCs’ ability to earn profits independently and sustain their 
existence. Third, the status of a net importer of oil398 and potential accession to the 
WTO399 pushed China towards a more open domestic oil market and active 
international cooperation. 
Thus, despite their curbed proliferation, NOCs continued to accumulate power during 
this period. Zhu Rongji, who was in charge of China’s economy in 1993 – 2003, 
“deliberately enhanced the financial and administrative autonomy of China’s NOCs 
to make them more efficient in preparation for the listing of their subsidiaries on 
international stock exchanges.”400 These few years became a cleaning-up and 
tightening up period preparing the industry for a major overhaul of 1998 – 2000. 
 
SOE Reform, Restructuring and Flotation (1998 – 2002) 
SOE reforms of 1998 have been the most extensive in the history of NOCs thus far. 
First, CNPC and Sinopec were restructured into vertically integrated majors. CNPC 
monopolized operations along the whole supply chain in Northern and Western 
China, while Sinopec’s assets were located in the South and East.401 Also, the two 
NOCs absorbed the remaining provincial level companies.402 
Second, nominally, NOCs lost their regulatory functions to the SETC, 403 but at the 
same time obtained more independence in decision-making. NOCs were now 
                                                                                                                                                              
397 The government provided a guarantee of materials supply, market for their output, controlled prices, 
workers’ employment, and repayment of debt at no interest (Wang, Ibid., 9). 
398 As a net importer of oil, the government now had to devise new comprehensive strategies for 
supplying the resource, but it just stripped itself off the central planning agency – the Ministry of 
Energy. 
399 The negotiation of China’s accession into the WTO presupposed fulfillment of certain conditions. 
Pressured “to open its internal market as a precondition for entering the WTO, China scraped import 
licenses and quotas for 367 commodities in 1995,” including crude oil. However, “the change [had] 
virtually no impact on the domestic market… [because] refineries’ crude intake and production [were] 
completely administrated by the central government… There [was] no refinery capacity outside of 
Sinopec and CNPC to run additional imported crude” (Wang, Ibid., 69-70). 
400 Downs, “China,” 21. 
401 International Energy Agency, “Developing China’s Natural Gas Market: The Energy Policy 
Challenges,” 82; Andrews-Speed et al. (2000), 14. 
402 International Energy Agency, Ibid., 295. 
403 Ibid., 82; Andrews-Speed et al. (2000), 11-2. 
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responsible for financing their operations predominantly through bank loans rather 
than capital allocated to them by the central government, decided on production 
quantities, sources and nature of raw materials and components, determined hiring 
policies and wages of their employees, and had to pay taxes directly to the 
government instead of remitting profits.404 Nevertheless, the government continued to 
play a strong role in the NOCs’ investment decisions, and controlled oil trade and 
prices.405 
The next step of the reform process was “restructuring and flotation” (chongzhu 
shangshi),406 or further organizational changes and listing of companies on 
international stock exchanges in Hong Kong and New York in 1999 – 2000. The new 
shareholding companies were two integrated oil and gas firms, PetroChina as part of 
CNPC and Sinopec as part of Sinopec Group. Both ‘child companies’ were 
“successfully listed on the international market and have entered the league of top ten 
publicly-traded oil companies in the world.”407 
Thus, the proclaimed determination of the Chinese government to “construct 
internationally competitive large firms”408 was finally materializing. In their 
organizational structure, PetroChina and Sinopec were very similar to other 
international integrated oil companies. If in the beginning they lacked “a strong ‘one 
company’ corporate identity and culture,”409 they won authority over their 
subordinate units with the establishment of the ‘one-tier’ legal person system (yiji 
faren zhi). PetroChina and Sinopec starting to centralize their investment, financial, 
and marketing control over the branch companies was the ultimate indication that 
CNPC and Sinopec won the fight against smaller dispersed competitors. Finally, 
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although competition was still absent, the fact that the asset-swap agreement between 
CNPC and Sinopec “did not give exclusive rights to either company… provid[ed] 
room for gradual competition.”410 
 
Value Maintenance and Appreciation of State Assets (2002 - 2015) 
While designing the governance of the oil and gas sector around SOEs was the focus 
of the late 1970s – early 2000s, once flotation was completed and NOCs were 
increasingly looking like self-sufficient corporations, the central government shifted 
its attention to adapting other organizations, responsible for the regulation of the 
sector and NOCs, to changed economic and political conditions. 
From this point forward, the relationship between the government and NOCs has 
been “characterized by increased friction at home and improved coordination 
abroad.”411 Domestically, the central government’s attempt at creating a competitive 
oil and gas market by endorsing private investment in 2005 was against the NOCs’ 
interests. Internationally, the “going out” strategy was expanded in an effort “to help 
NOCs secure trade and investment opportunities and to prevent them from competing 
against each other.”412 
However, even overseas tensions sometimes arise between the government and 
NOCs. This happens when the companies’ objectives clash with the government’s 
objectives, the problem that originates in the profit-oriented vs. national interest 
political priorities. Additionally, there have been instances when Chinese NOCs 
competed against one another internationally for overseas assets.413 
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Although three major NOCs – CNPC, Sinopec, and CNOOC – share the same origin, 
they evolved into “different corporate entities.”414 In terms of aligning their strategies 
with government policies, CNPC is “more attuned to state direction,” CNOOC is “at 
the other end of the spectrum,” and Sinopec “lies in between.”415 Differences between 
the three are reflected in financial performance indicators. Ranking of China’s majors 
in Fortune Global 500 list in the period from 1997 to 2015 is one of the ways to 
illustrate their comparative performance (See Figure 4.7).416 As of 2015, Sinopec is 
ranked 2nd, CNPC 4th, and CNOOC 105th by total revenues. 
Figure 4.7: Ranking of China’s Major NOCs in Fortune’s Global 500 (1997 – 2015) 
 
Source: “Global 500.” 
Note: companies are ranked by total revenues for each fiscal year 
 
The companies’ total assets multiplied in the last 10-15 years, after the flotation of 
their subsidiaries. CNPC’s assets increased five times between 2003 and 2014, from 
808 billion RMB yuan to almost 4,000 billion RMB yuan.417 Sinopec’s total assets 
have seen similar growth in 1998 – 2014, from 312 to 1,451 billion RMB yuan.418 
                                                            
414 Ibid., 40. 
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respectively. As a much smaller company among the three, CNOOC debuted in Global 500 only in 2009 
in 318th place. However, CNOOC’s ascend to the top is much more impressive than that of CNPC and 
Sinopec. CNOOC climbed 239 points in five years (2009 – 2014) and reached 79th position. 
417 CNPC, Annual Reports, 2004 – 2015. http://www.cnpc.com.cn/en/. 

















Finally, CNOOC’s assets in 2013 were nine times larger than in 2003, having 
multiplied from 120 to 1,042 billion RMB yuan in a decade.419 
NOCs’ profitability has been rising steadily as well. Since the late 1990s – early 
2000s, Sinopec and CNOOC’s net profit increased about 10 times. CNPC’s net profit 
growth has been much more moderate, having tripled in 2003 – 2014. In real 
numbers, as of 2014, CNPC’s net profit was larger than that of CNOOC and Sinopec 
combined. Low oil prices of 2015 had a significant negative impact on all three 
companies with Sinopec’s net profit down by 9%,420 and CNPC and CNOOC’s by 
about 65% each.421 
Competition between the three NOCs has intensified, and it is encouraged by the 
central government through the nomenklatura system and leadership appointments.422 
In the 12th FYP (2011 – 2015), the central government also made it clear that support 
for “going out” strategy will endure. This is despite the criticism of the role of foreign 
asset ownership in enhancing national energy security. Active participation of NOCs 
and to a smaller extent private companies in oil exploration and production abroad 
compensates high import dependence. In 2011 – 2013, Chinese companies invested 
US $75 billion in upstream M&A deals overseas.423 As of 2013, their overseas assets 
are estimated to produce 2.1 million b/d of oil, up from 1.36 million b/d in 2011.424 
In a little over thirty years China’s major NOCs have transformed from ministry 
departments to central SOEs to state-run companies struggling to make profits to the 
world’s largest oil and gas firms outperforming major IOCs.  Although that they are 
state-owned and serve the interest of the same country, they are first and foremost 
                                                            
419 CNOOC, Annual Reports, 2004 – 2014. http://www.cnooc.com.cn/col/col7151/index.html. 
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firms. As corporate entities, they are more likely to compete than cooperate, 
especially overseas where the influence of their domestic government is limited. 
 
4.3 Key Findings 
First, in addition to the agreement among policy actors that the referent object is 
threatened, it is important that they agree on what is threatened. In other words, for 
securitization to take place, the boundaries of the referent object have to be clearly 
defined. After all, the referent object is the object of securitizing actor’s actions, not 
the threat. Securitization does not attempt to eliminate a threat. It tries to change the 
behavior of the referent object. 
Second, heterogeneity of the policy arena is expressed not only through the number 
of policy actors in it, but also by the attributes of its actors. Diversity of policy arena 
actors is rooted in the institutional environment. For example, in the case of China, 
factionalism in the CCP (institutional environment) leads to increased diversity in the 
oil and gas policy arena. 
Third, as the Chinese experience demonstrates, it is possible for one type of 
securitizing actor to evolve into another. This is illustrative of the ability of 
securitizing actors to evolve and adapt to new policy arena and institutional 
conditions. 
Fourth, it is possible to trace the beginning of the securitization process to certain 
policy actors (which emerged as securitizing actors), but it is usually difficult to 
attribute it to a single or a combination of events. Instead, all three types of inputs are 
at play, although at various degrees. 
Fifth, as long as the referent object remains relevant in the eyes of any policy actors, 
the securitization process is unlikely to be reversed even if the power of securitization 
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actor fades over time. The process is likely to proceed in waves, with layers adding 
up on one another. Thus, in most cases, the securitizing actor is necessary to kick start 
securitization, but its presence is not required for securitization to endure.  
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Chapter 5: Securitization of Oil and Gas Supply Chains in 
Canada (1947 – 2015) 
5.1 Introduction 
Canada’s oil and gas (O&G) sector is one of the most sophisticated national O&G 
sectors in the world. The government has generally applied a market approach to 
governing the sector, and all components of O&G supply chains, from upstream 
activities and pipeline transportation to refining and downstream operations, are fully 
liberalized. In the downstream sector, gasoline price regulations imposed by the four 
Atlantic provinces425 and Quebec are the only exception to the overarching liberalized 
market framework. 
Historically, hydrocarbon production has been concentrated in Western Canada.426 In 
1950s – 1990s, for geographic, economic, demographic, and policy reasons, 
Canadian provinces east of Ontario and later east of Quebec have been cut off from 
Western Canadian supplies and have had to substitute them with foreign imports. 
Since the mid-1990s, Canada’s participation in NAFTA resulted in further 
transformation of domestic west-east flows between provinces into international 
north-south flows between Canada and the US. As a result of NAFTA, Ontario and 
Quebec also consumed more imported crude oil. Despite the prevalent role of 
exports, imports have played an important part in Canada’s O&G balance of trade. 
Crude and refined oil imports help meet large shares of Canada’s demand in six 
provinces. 
According to the 2014 estimates, Canada holds 10% of the world’s proven reserves of 
crude oil, ranking 3rd after Venezuela and Saudi Arabia, but only 1% of the world’s 
                                                            
425 The region of Atlantic Canada includes four provinces: New Brunswick, Prince Edward Island, Nova 
Scotia, and Newfoundland and Labrador. 
426 Alberta and Saskatchewan are the leaders in crude bitumen production. Much smaller quantities of oil 
have been sourced from Ontario since 1861 and Newfoundland since 1996 (Larry Hughes, "Eastern 
Canadian crude oil supply and its implications for regional energy security," Energy Policy 38, no. 6 
(2010), 2694). Nova Scotia produced offshore crude oil between 1991 and 1999. Light tight and shale oil 
reserves are located in Saskatchewan and Manitoba. Some unconventional oil resources potentially 
suitable for commercial development are also found in Eastern Canada (International Energy Agency, 
“Energy Policies of IEA Countries – Canada 2015 Review,” OECD (2015), 31, 126, 131-132). 
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proven reserves of natural gas, ranking 18th. Canada is also the 5th largest producer of 
oil and 4th largest producer of gas.427 It has been a net exporter of natural gas since the 
late 1950s, a net exporter of petroleum products since 1974, and a net exporter of 
crude oil since 1983 (See Figures 5.1, 5.2 and 5.3). 
 
Figure 5.1: Canada’s Crude Oil Dynamics, million cubic meters (1952 – 2015) 
 
Data Sources: Statistics Canada, “Table 126-0002”; Statistics Canada, “Table 126-0001.” 
Notes:  i Majority of imports are destined for Ontario, Quebec and the Atlantic provinces.428 
ii 97% of exports are destined for the US.429 
iii Sources of imports vary from year to year, and supplies are split unevenly between 
the receiving provinces. In 1990 – 2008, Algeria, the UK, and Norway were the top 
suppliers of Canadian crude oil imports.430 In 2013, the top suppliers were the US 
(20%), Algeria (13%) and Iraq (12%).431 In 2014, the US (54%), Saudi Arabia 





                                                          
427 Natural Resources Canada, Energy Fact Book 2015 – 2016 (Canada, 2015), 3, 20, 42. The majority of 
domestically produced natural gas is shale and tight gas, with reserves spread out across the country 
(Ibid., 44). Concentration of gas reserves in Western Canada is very high, with 98% of production 
located in Alberta, British Columbia, and Saskatchewan (IEA, “Energy Policies of IEA Countries – 
Canada 2015 Review,” 98, 110; International Energy Agency, “Natural Gas Information: 2015 edition,” 
IEA (2015)). But unlike with crude oil, eastern provinces have major shale and tight gas development 
potential, and are likely to dilute the concentration of production in the near future. 
428 Ontario receives a part of domestic production via pipelines, Quebec is currently fully dependent on 
foreign imports via a pipeline and tankers, and Atlantic Provinces are completely disconnected from the 
pipeline infrastructure and receive all supplies via tankers (Hughes, Ibid., 2693). 
429 Natural Resources Canada, Energy Fact Book 2015 – 2016, 5. 
430 Hughes, Ibid., 2695. 
431 Natural Resources Canada, Pipeline Safety (Canada, 2014). 













Figure 5.2: Canada’s Petroleum Products Exports and Imports, cubic meters/day 
(1947 – 2014) 
 
Data Source: Canadian Association of Petroleum Producers. Statistical Handbook. 
Notes: i Amounts of exported and imported petroleum products include condensate and 
pentanes plus and propane/butane/mixes. 
 ii Refining capacity is concentrated in Alberta, Ontario, Quebec, and New 
Brunswick. 
 iii As of 2014, Canada exports 25% of its production and imports 12% of its 
consumption needs. 
 iv 76% of exports are destined for and 92% of imports originate in the US (Natural 
Resources Canada. Energy Fact Book 2015 - 2016). 
 
 
Figure 5.3: Canada’s Natural Gas Exports and Imports, bcm (1957 – 2015) 
 
Sources: Statistics Canada, “Table 131-0001”; Statistics Canada, “131-0003.” 
Notes: i More than half of Canadian natural gas production is exported, and the US is currently the 
only market for Canada’s gas exports. 
 ii Canada’s exports peaked in 2007, and its imports surged 165% in 2003 – 2013 (IEA, 
“Energy Policies of IEA Countries – Canada 2015 Review,” 101-102). 
 iii In 2014, Canada imported 25% of consumed gas, largely from the US, but with supplements 

























By and large, Canada’s oil and gas supply chains can be characterized as non-
securitized. Policy processes around them do not fit the definition of securitization (see 
Chapter 3, Section 3.2.4) where securitizing actors would perceive oil and gas supply 
chains as threatened and attempt to alter their performance to better cope with the 
threat. Although talks on supply diversification and development of new export markets 
have been part of the policy discourse since the 1970s, no significant steps have been 
taken towards achieving either one of these suggested objectives with the exception of a 
brief period in 1973 – 1984. 
When large scale development of the O&G sector took off in Canada in the late 1940s, 
oil and natural gas received equal attention from industry players and different policy 
treatment from the policy actors. Both fuels have always been important items on the 
list of exported products, but natural gas is a preferred source of energy domestically 
since the early 1970s when the government propagated the switch from oil to gas for 
the general purpose of sustainable development.433 
The (non-)securitization of oil and gas supply chains has not always been parallel. The 
period of 1973 – 1984 can be seen as the time of oil supply securitization in Canada 
peaking in 1976 – 1980. The first oil shock of 1973 served as a trigger for oil supply 
chains securitization. It highlighted the fact that Canada was importing significant 
amounts of oil. Also, there was a marginal difference between crude oil imports and 
exports at the time. Eastern provinces fully dependent on imports were suddenly 
perceived as vulnerable to any prolonged supply disruption. Possibly, Canada’s 
concerns were aggravated by an awareness of shrinking US production. The gap in US 
supply and consumption might have diminished the status of the US as a reliable 
partner and a secure transit point for potential oil deliveries to Canada from the 
perspective of Canadian policy-makers. 
                                                            
433 Bregha, Francois. "The Mackenzie Valley Pipeline and Canadian Natural Gas Policy." Canadian 
Public Policy / Analyse de Politiques 3, no. 1 (1977), 65. 
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Natural gas supply chains did not receive the same securitization treatment. Natural gas 
imports were minimal, and its supplies within Canada’s borders were not perceived as 
threatened, although efforts were made to limit exports in the late 1970s. Thus, efforts 
to secure the referent object were limited to decreasing exports and simultaneously 
boosting domestic production. For the reasons discussed throughout this chapter, these 
measures were deemed inappropriate within a few years and scrapped by 1985. 
In the decades that followed, neither oil, nor gas supply chains have seen a return to 
securitization, but Canada does have implicit concerns about security of oil and gas 
demand. These concerns arise from the US shale revolution posing a threat to Canada’s 
oil and gas exports. However, Canada has enjoyed a rather unique position as part of 
the integrated and liberated North American oil and gas market. Due to deep integration 
between Canadian and US energy trade flows, it is arguable whether Canada would 
perceive the US shale revolution and disagreement over bilateral pipeline projects as a 
threat to its O&G sector. Canada’s gas exports decreased in recent years, but pipeline 
flow reversals have ensured that its increased demand for oil and gas imports is met. 
Also, the number of LNG projects is on the rise434 (See Figure 5.4), and alternatives to 
Keystone XL are being considered to take Canadian oil to foreign markets. 
                                                            
434 Having fully relied on pipelined gas for over half a century, Canada is now seriously considering 
LNG as a means of diversification of supply sources and export markets. But as domestic gas production 
is forecasted to increase through 2040 (National Energy Board, Canada’s Energy Future 2016: Energy 
Supply and Demand Projections to 2040 (Canada, 2016)), the country would need to expand its LNG 
facilities quickly to be able to develop new export markets. After 2040, as production growth is expected 
to stabilize, if necessary, LNG infrastructure could be used for importing purposes. 
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Figure 5.4: LNG Infrastructure Development in Select Countries (February 2016) 
 
Data Source: Global LNG Ltd., World’s LNG Plants and Regasification Terminals. 
Notes:  LNG infrastructure includes LNG liquefaction plants and regasification terminals 
  As of February 2016, Canada has only one operational LNG facility. 
 
An analysis of Canada’s O&G supply chains through the lens of the securitization 
framework is an attempt to systematically assess the country’s governance of O&G 
sector with the goal of uncovering securitization trends and explaining the reasons 
behind non-securitization. Guided by the theoretical framework and the research 
question, the case analysis systematizes existing observations and findings on the 
subject and provides insight into securitization processes in Canada’s O&G supply 
chains based on multidimensional interactions between the institutional ecosystem, the 
policy arena, and the supply chains’ performance. 
In the case of Canada, type I inputs (Section 5.2.1) illustrate how embedded institutions 
and the institutional environment constrain long-term securitization and contribute to 
reversing short-term securitization trends in O&G supply chains. Nevertheless, as 
demonstrated by type II inputs (Section 5.2.2), even the institutional environment 
largely opposed to securitization can be vulnerable to securitizing actors’ 
manipulations. In 1972 – 1984, Canada’s O&G supply chains saw the rise of a 
dominant securitizing actor who then transformed into a policy broker. Ultimately, 
however, the heterogeneity of the policy arena minimizes securitization trends. Type III 





















and modification of the institutional arrangement governing oil and gas supply chains. 
Given their significant power as the policy-makers, regulators and administrators of the 
O&G sector, the provinces are able to keep the federal government’s intentions in 
check. Shaping the performance of the referent object, the institutional environment and 
the institutional arrangement have formed a liberalized oil and gas market with a unique 
history of the initial prevalence of foreign IOCs and a short-term government 
intervention through the national oil company. Finally, Section 5.2.4 discusses the key 
findings. 
 
5.2 Canada’s O&G Supply Chains in the Securitization Framework 
5.2.1 Type I Inputs: Institutional Ecosystem 
5.2.1.1 Embedded Institutions 
As the deepest level of the institutional ecosystem, for centuries, embedded 
institutions were laying the cultural foundation for future structural political, 
economic and social choices of the institutional environment that came about in 1867 
with the establishment of the modern Canadian state. 
Similar to the other New World states, foreign embedded institutions transplanted 
from the Old World displaced indigenous cultural values, norms and traditions as 
Europeans settling on the vast lands of North America overwhelmed the sparse and 
largely disconnected groups of indigenous populations. Europeans brought with them 
many features of their home embedded institutions, such as respect for the state 
authority, acceptance of social hierarchy, traditionalism, and conservatism.435 
Although indigenous embedded institutions’ traits were largely overridden by the 
foreign ones, they did contribute to the development of Canadian cultural identity. 
                                                            
435 Symour Martin Lipset, Continental divide: the values and institutions of the United States and 
Canada (New York: Routledge, 1990); Kenneth D. McRae, "The Structure of Canadian History," in The 
founding of new societies, ed., Louis Hartz, pp. 219-74 (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1964); W. 
L. Morton, The Canadian identity (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1961). 
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Arguably, the harsh northern nature predisposed Europeans and Native Americans to 
cooperation more than a milder climate did in the United States.436 Acceptance of a 
wider variety of societal actors promoted the practice of negotiation and compromise, 
and, at the same time, led to the rejection of the idea of a “dominant nation-state 
imposing its will.”437 
In addition to the European settlers and indigenous population, embedded institutions 
of the United States played a role in the formation of Canada’s institutional identity. 
It is not at all surprising that the US, the statehood of which dates back to 1776, 
would be influential in the development of its neighbor. However, Canadians tend to 
think of themselves as “un-American,” or opposing US values.438 This attitude 
provides partial explanation for core Canadian values such as preference for statism, 
conservatism, order and well-defined hierarchy. 
Thus, the combination of multiple elements of originally independent embedded 
institutions resulted in a complex and contradictive institutional environment inside 
the boundaries of the modern Canadian state. Some of the resulting contradictions 
inherent in the institutional environment include the ones between Francophone and 
Anglophone Canada (autonomy vs. integration), between federal and provincial 
governments (overarching oversight vs. local control), and between heavy 
government presence in economic and social affairs co-existing with a strong private 
sector across various economic sectors. 
                                                            
436 John Ralston Saul, Reflections of a Siamese twin: Canada at the end of the twentieth century 
(Toronto, ON: Viking Canada, 1997); Harold Adams Innis, The fur trade in Canada: an introduction to 
Canadian economic history (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1956); Donald Grant Creighton, The 
forked road: Canada, 1939-1957 (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1976); Sherrill Grace, Canada and 
the idea of North (Montréal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2002); Cole Harris and John 
Warkentin, Canada before Confederation: a study in historical geography (Montreal: McGill-Queen's 
University Press, 2000); John M. Murrin, "A Roof without Walls: the Dilemma of American National 
Identity," in Beyond confederation: origins of the constitution and American national identity, eds., 
Richard R. Beeman, Stephen Botein and Edward Carlos Carter, 333-48 (Chapel Hill: University of 
North Carolina Press, 1987). 
437 Saul, Ibid., 81, 106. 
438 Lipset, Ibid.; Blair Fraser, The search for identity: Canada, 1945-1967 (Garden City, NY: 




5.2.1.2 Institutional Environment 
Affected by the demographic, sociocultural, global and other trends, Canada’s 
embedded institutions continue to influence and be influenced by the institutional 
environment and sector-specific institutional arrangements. The legacy of Canada’s 
multifaceted embedded institutions is reflected in the country’s institutional 
framework. The institutional environment is underpinned by the national Constitution 
and is centered around the interaction between three co-dependent branches of 
government within the parliamentary democracy framework, with the Crown – whose 
role arises from the fact that Canada is also a constitutional monarchy – located on 
the periphery. 
The Crown 
The Queen of Canada439 is the head of state in charge of the executive branch of 
government. Similar to other constitutional monarchies, the Queen’s role in Canadian 
policy-making is symbolic, and the Crown’s influence on the institutional 
environment is minimal. However, the symbolism of the Crown is deeply rooted in 
Canada’s embedded institutions. The monarch is an important part of Canadian 
identity because Her/His Majesty provides Canadians with “a collective sense of 
belonging.”440 Moreover, both federal and provincial lands are referred to as Crown 
Land, and natural resources are the property of the Crown. Oil and natural gas 
resources are no exception; they are owned by the Crown and leased to domestic and 
foreign companies for development. 
Federal and Provincial Governments’ Powers Vested in the Constitution 
The Constitution of Canada is a body of legal documents rather than a single supreme 
                                                            
439 The title was formally established by the Royal Style and Titles Act (1953). It is “a role independent 
of that [of the] Queen of the United Kingdom and the other Commonwealth realms” (See "The 
Monarch," Government of Canada (October 16, 2015) and Scott Nicholas Romaniuk and Joshua K. 
Wasylciw, "Canada’s Evolving Crown: From a British Crown to a “Crown of Maples”," American, 
British and Canadian Studies Journal 23, no. 1 (2014).) 
440 “The Monarch,” Ibid. 
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law due to the Canadian colonial past. Prior to completing the patriation process and 
achieving its legislative independence with the passage of the Constitution Act, 1982, 
the country was governed by British laws, which could be amended only by the acts 
of the British Parliament, the most significant of which was the British North 
America Act (1867) (BNA Act).441 The BNA Act defined the sources of the 
Constitution of Canada,442 sketched out the boundaries of the modern Canadian state, 
and established two essential pillars of the Canadian institutional environment, 
namely federal and parliamentary systems. While Canada became a fully sovereign 
state with the implementation of the Constitution Act, 1982, the role of the Queen of 
Canada as the head of state remained unchanged. 
The rights and responsibilities of the federal and provincial governments in the 
management of non-renewable natural resources, including oil and gas, were already 
delineated in the Constitution Act, 1867. Initially applicable to the original four 
provinces in the Canadian confederation, the law included all ten provinces by 
1949.443 Section 109 of the Act states that provinces have ownership rights over their 
“lands, mines, minerals, and royalties.”444 Section 92 details provinces’ exclusive 
                                                            
441 The Constitution Act, 1982 renamed the British North America Act (1867) as the Constitution Act, 
1867. 
442 The Constitution Act, 1982 defined the Constitution of Canada as consisting of: 
(a) the Canada Act 1982 (passed by the UK Parliament to enact the Constitution Act, 1982.) inclusive of 
the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (which makes sure that civil rights and liberties of 
Canadian citizens are protected by the Constitution; it has also added judicial checks to the existing 
legislative checks for “moderating influences in the political system.” (See Dennis Baker and Rainer 
Knopff, "Charter Checks and Parliamentary Balances," Constitutional Forum 16, no. 2 (2007), 76) and 
the rest of the Constitution Act, 1982, 
(b) the Constitution Act, 1867 as well as 29 other Acts and Orders, and 
(c) any amendments that have been made to (a) and (b) (Constitution Act, 1982, Section 52(2)). 
443 The original four provinces included Ontario, Quebec, Nova Scotia, and New Brunswick. British 
Columbia (British Columbia Terms of Union (1871) formerly known as Order of Her Majesty in 
Council admitting British Columbia into the Union (May 16, 1871)) and and Prince Edward Island 
(Prince Edward Island Terms of Union (1873) formerly known as Order of Her Majesty in Council 
admitting Prince Edward Island into the Union (June 26, 1873)) provinces joined the original four in 
1871 and 1873, respectively. The Constitution Act, 1930 (Since the UK still had legal control over 
Canada, the Constitution Act, 1930 was passed by the British Parliament in order to ratify Natural 
Resources Acts, which were a row of agreements between the federal government and the newly 
established provinces of Alberta, British Columbia, Manitoba and Saskatchewan, designed to transfer 
control over land and natural resources from federal to provincial governments.) granted provincial 
status to Manitoba, Alberta and Saskatchewan, whose natural resources had been under federal 
government’s control since the enactment of Dominion Lands Act in 1872. Newfoundland received 
provincial status only in 1949 (The Newfoundland Act (1949)). 
444 Constitution Act, 1867. Section 109. 
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legal powers with regards to non-renewable natural resources. These include 
exploration, development, conservation, and management of resources445; and their 
exports “to another part of Canada.”446 Provinces are also given exclusive direct 
taxation powers.447 
Unlike the ten provinces, three territories – Northwest Territories, Nunavut and 
Yukon – derive their powers from the federal government and not the Constitution. 
Thus, self-governance of the territories is limited compared to that of the provinces, 
although it has evolved significantly in the last few decades. The land and natural 
resources of the territories are under the federal government’s control. 
The responsibilities of the federal government are stated in Section 91 of the 
Constitution Act, 1867. The federal government is “to make laws for the peace, order, 
and good government of Canada,”448 to regulate “trade and commerce,”449 to raise 
money through taxes450, and to regulate other subject areas beyond provincial 
jurisdiction451. Finally, the federal government retains exclusive legislative authority 
over “Indians, and Lands reserved for the Indians.”452 
With regards to land and its significance for upstream oil and gas sector, one more 
category of land owned by the federal government is worth mentioning. Frontier 
Lands are not defined in the Constitution of Canada, but they are governed by the 
same principles of the Constitution as other federal Crown Lands. Frontier lands are 
legally defined by the Canada Petroleum Resources Act and include Northwest 
Territories, Nunavut, Sable Island, their submarine areas, and the continental shelf of 
                                                            
445 Ibid., Section 92A(1). 
446 Ibid., Section 92A(2). 
447 Ibid., Sections 92 (2), 92A (4a). 
448 Ibid., Section 91. 
449 Ibid., Section 91 (2). 
450 Ibid., Section 91 (3). 
451 Ibid., Section 91 (29). 
452 Ibid., Section 91 (24). According to Statistics Canada (2011), there are 3,100 Indian reserves across 
Canada. Also, there are over 630 recognized First Nations governments (bands) across Canada, 
representing the population of more than 850,000 people. 
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Canada.453 
Canadian constitutional documents defining the powers of the federal and provincial 
governments contribute to conflicting nature of the federal system and, at the same 
time, to long-term stability in this environment. On the one hand, the distribution of 
powers makes federal and provincial governments “coequal,”454 meaning that their 
jurisdictions often overlap, that tension between different governments is common, 
and that “bold”455 federal initiatives are rare.456 Moreover, governments can easily 
ignore their obligations in intergovernmental agreements because they are 
accountable to their respective constituencies and legislatures but not to one 
another.457 “Demonstration of the power and determination” by one government to 
another in times of intergovernmental disagreement is part of the bargaining process 
which helps both sides achieve desired outcomes and better terms.458 Also, dispersed 
responsibilities and required intergovernmental consultations create “many lags in 
making decisions” (i.e., obtaining a regulatory approval for the construction of a 
pipeline), which sometimes help reduce economic costs and moderate policy actors’ 
extreme views.459 Finally, despite disagreements with provincial governments, the 
ultimate goal of the federal government is to reconcile the interests of 10 provinces 
and 3 territories under the umbrella of the federal democracy. 
                                                            
453 Government of Canada, Canada Petroleum Resources Act (1985). 
454 IEA, “Energy Policies of IEA Countries – Canada 2015 Review,” 45. 
455 Fen Osler Hampson, Forming economic policy: the case of energy in Canada and Mexico (New 
York: St. Martin's Press, 1986), 106. 
456 Ian McDougall, “Energy, Natural Resources, and the Economics of Federalism: National Harmony or 
Continental Hegemony?” in The Future of North America: Canada, the United States, and Quebec 
Nationalism, eds., Elliot J. Feldman and Neil Nevitte (Cambridge, MA: Center for International Affairs, 
Harvard University, 1979), 173-174; Bruce F. Willson, The energy squeeze: Canadian policies for 
survival (Toronto: J. Lorimer in association with the Canadian Institute for Economic Policy, 1980), 9; 
Hampson, Ibid., 104-5; Bruce G. Pollard, "Canadian Energy Policy in 1985: Toward a Renewed 
Federalism?" Publius 16, no. 3 (1986), 173-174; L. S. Wilson, Robin W. Boadway and Paul A. R. 
Hobson, "Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations in Canada," Canadian Public Policy / Analyse de 
Politiques 20, no. 2 (1994), 4. 
457 D. Macdonald and Matthew Lesch, “Competing Visions and Inequitable Costs: the national energy 
strategy and regional distributive conflicts,” Journal of Environmental Law and Practice 25 (2013), 13-
4. 
458 John F. Helliwell and Robert N. McRae, "Resolving the Energy Conflict: From the National Energy 
Program to the Energy Agreements," Canadian Public Policy / Analyse de Politiques 8, no. 1 (1982), 22. 
459 John F. Helliwell, "Canadian Energy Policy," Annual Review of Energy 4, no. 1 (1979), 176. 
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The Parliamentary Framework: Party Politics and Coalition Building 
While Canada’s parliamentary system is modeled after the Westminster system and 
accounts of its description and analysis are abound,460 this section focuses only on the 
aspects relevant to the study of the institutional environment and securitization 
processes. Three aspects of the parliamentary system stand out with respect to the 
governance of oil and gas supply chains in Canada: the role of the Cabinet, party 
politics and coalition building between the parties in the Parliament. 
First, the Cabinet is a very powerful representative of the federal government. All 
ministerial, agency and other organizations’ decisions are finalized only upon Cabinet 
approval. Even the National Energy Board (NEB), known as “an independent federal 
regulatory tribunal”461 has to receive Cabinet approval before its decisions can be 
implemented. In the 1970s, when the federal government exercised increased control 
over oil and natural gas prices and exports, the NEB saw a few of its major functions 
transferred to the Cabinet, including export permits issuance duty in 1973 and price 
regulation in 1975.462 
Second, Canada’s political parties’ ideological leanings create a “linkage between a 
party and resource policy.”463 With regards to the oil and gas sector management, 
differences arise from the parties’ perspectives on the degree of state participation in 
the industry as well as the division of economic benefits between the province and the 
industry (and the federal government). For instance, parties in producing provinces, 
regardless of their ideology, would like to see their provincial economies benefitting 
from resource development, but their views on how to achieve this objective diverge 
                                                            
460 C. E. S. Franks, The Parliament of Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1987); Maureen 
McTeer, Parliament: Canada's democracy and how it works (Canada: Random House of Canada, 1995); 
D.C. Docherty and S. White, "Parliamentary Democracy in Canada," Parliamentary Affairs 57, no. 3 
(2004): 613-29; Eugene A. Forsey, "How Canadians Govern Themselves" Library of Parliament, 9th ed 
(February 2016). 
461 Government of Canada, National Energy Board, Website. 
462 Bruce G. Doern and Monica Gattinger, Power switch: energy regulatory governance in the twenty-
first century (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2003), 99. 
463 Marsha A. Chandler, “The politics of provincial resource policy,” in The Politics of Canadian public 
policy, eds., Michael M. Atkinson, and Marsha A. Chandler (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 
1983), 43-44. 
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significantly. The left (Liberal Party) is generally seen as leaning towards greater 
government intervention and participation in the oil and gas sector, while the right 
(Conservative Party464) promotes free-market principles.465 Despite the preference of 
the left for greater government involvement, all parties “share a commitment to a 
market economy… based on private property ownership.”466 
Third, coalition building is an important instrument for a ruling party in control of a 
minority government. But alliances with other parties can be costly because 
compromises have the capability to seriously skew the direction of the policy. If the 
minority government party’s ally has a securitization agenda, the coalition can give 
rise to a policy broker. For example, creation of a national oil company was never on 
the agenda of the Liberal party. However, the party was able to secure only a 
minority government in the 1972 federal election and was forced to form an alliance 
with the New Democratic Party (NDP). The demands of the NDP in the coalition 
were partly467 responsible for the Liberal government’s December 1973 decision to 
create a national oil company.468 Thus, minority governments are more vulnerable to 
crises, are dependent on the interests of their allies, and tend to focus on short-term 
micro-political decisions while avoiding any bold initiatives that would not be 
tolerated by the strong opposition (See Figure 5.5). 
 
 
                                                            
464 In 1942 – 2003, the party’s official name was Progressive Conservative Party. 
465 Chandler, Ibid., 43-4. 
466 Chandler, Ibid., 52-3. 
467 The other influential factors include the effect of the 1973 oil crisis which resulted in perception of 
decreased security of supply by the government, and bureaucratic politics (Allan Tupper and G. Bruce 
Doern, Public corporations and public policy in Canada (Montreal: Institute for Research on Public 
Policy, 1981), 107) driven by the desire of the federal departments to extend their control of the energy 
sector. 
468 Tupper and Doern, Ibid., 106-9; D. J. Blair, "Energy Security and Canadian Energy Policy: 
Independent versus Collective Action," Millennium - Journal of International Studies 11, no. 2 (1982), 
131; Hampson, Ibid., 90-1. 
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Figure 5.5: Liberal Party vs. Conservative Party Rule in the Federal Government 
(1968 – 2015) 


































Notes: L – Liberal Party 
 C – Conservative Party (prior to 2003, Progressive Conservative Party) 
 L, C – Majority government 
 l, c – minority government 
 
5.2.1.3 Horizontal Linkages 
In Canada’s institutional ecosystem, horizontal linkages are apparent at all 
institutional levels. At the level of embedded institutions, a number of previously 
independent institutions from different ecosystems blended to form the foundation of 
Canada’s unique institutional environment. 
At the institutional environment level, components of one system of parliamentary 
democracy and constitutional monarchy are both complementary and overlapping. 
The institution of the Crown is weak and complements the Parliament. At the same 
time, the equally powerful federal and provincial governments, designed to 
complement one another, often overlap due to their inseparable Constitutional duties. 
At the level of the institutional arrangement, initially, a group of institutions 
governing Canada’s oil and gas sector developed as relatively independent in two 
ways. First, they were independent from the institutions governing other non-
renewable (coal) and renewable (hydro, nuclear) energy resources. Second, provincial 
oil and gas institutions are independent from federal institutions, with the exception 
of the management of inter-provincial oil and gas infrastructure, which fell under the 
federal government’s mandate. 
However, a closer look at the group of institutions governing Canada’s oil and gas 
sector reveals the complementarity tendencies between institutions governing various 
aspects of the sector. On both federal and provincial levels, proper management of 
  169
O&G supply chains has always required close cooperation between finance 
ministries, land regulators, transportation authorities, agencies managing resource 
development, safety watchdogs, as well as consideration of social and environmental 
objectives. The latter two, social and environmental issues, gained prominence only 
in the 1990s and, as newcomers to the O&G sector playing field, have caused some 
tensions because the objectives they brought in diverge from the traditional objectives 
of the sector. 
Besides, once independent from other parts of energy-related policy-making, 
institutions governing oil and gas sector are now part of a more complex institutional 
arrangement. This tendency has been most apparent in the attempts of provincial and, 
especially, federal governments to bring together ‘energy’ and ‘environment’ as two 
increasingly interdependent policy fields. The federal government can be credited as 
the initiator of these attempts, having joined the Kyoto protocol (ratified in 2002)469 
and having introduced the Clean Air Act (2006)470. 
Nevertheless, oil and gas remained largely the domain of provincial governments. 
The federal government, with the exception of areas where aboriginal interests are 
involved, has applied environmental regulations very loosely.471 The provinces have 
taken over the environmental policy mandate from the federal government, which has 
been expressed in multiple provincial level initiatives directly aimed at regulating the 
environment. Provinces that do not produce much or any O&G472 “have been 
particularly active on climate change issues [as they] envision a potential role for 
                                                            
469 The Protocol was ratified by the Canadian Parliament in 2002, despite provincial “dislike of the 
agreement” and provincial campaigns directed at weakening public support for it (Keith Brownsey, “The 
New Oil Order: The Post Staples Paradigm and the Canadian Upstream Oil and Gas Industry,” Canadian 
Political Science Review 1, no. 01 (2007), 101). 
470 The Clean Air Act was to serve as the basis for “integrated, nationally-consistent policy approach” to 
including environmental concerns into the overall energy objectives (Government of Canada, Notice of 
intent to develop and implement regulations and other measures to reduce air emissions, Canada 
Gazette, Part I (October 21, 2006), 2). 
471 Mark S. Winfield and Clare Demerse, "13. Climate Change and Canadian Energy Policy," A Globally 
Integrated Climate Policy for Canada (2007), 4. 
472 including Quebec, Manitoba and British Columbia. 
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themselves as low-carbon energy exporters.”473 Even producing provinces, which 
would be expected to resist environmental regulations, made significant progress. 
Alberta “became the first jurisdiction in North America to pass climate change 
legislation requiring large emitters to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions.”474 
All provinces, at least to some extent, enhanced their climate change strategies. 
Finally, the federal government exiting the Kyoto protocol, but provincial 
governments showing progress towards meeting international-level climate objectives 
demonstrates that the federal government finally agreed to delegate this responsibility 
to the provinces. 
 
5.2.1.4 Institutional Ecosystem – Policy Arena Link 
In the institutional ecosystem, the most foundational levels of institutions with the 
exception of the ones at the level of the institutional arrangement are too broad in 
scope and too removed from the day-to-day policy decisions to be directly affected 
by or affect sudden changes in securitization processes which are related to specific 
referent objects like oil and gas supply chains. However, they are the enablers, or in 
case of Canada, the sources of constraint, of longer-term securitization processes. 
Thus, Canada’s embedded institutions and the institutional environment offer a 
partial explanation for the lack of securitization of national oil and gas supply chains, 
and also help understand why heightened securitization periods have been short-lived 
and easily reversible. 
On the institutional environment level, complementary and even more so overlapping 
institutions have the ability to stall securitization processes. Heterogeneity of 
institutions with coinciding as well as contradictory objectives creates a lot of work 
for a potential securitizing actor who is trying to mobilize resources or create a shared 
                                                            
473 Winfield and Demerse, Ibid., 8-9. 
474 Emissions Reduction Alberta. About. http://ccemc.ca/about/. 
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threat perception. But as Canadian experience of 1976 policy of self-reliance 
demonstrated, the institutional environment can be vulnerable to securitizing actors’ 
manipulations. Self-reliance is an example of a vague objective put forward by the 
securitizing actor but accepted by policy stakeholders with differing objectives of 
their own as a means to their individual ends. 
Thus, the institutional ecosystem consists of elements, which have the potential to 
enable and constrain securitization processes. It also affects the type of securitizing 
actor likely to emerge in certain conditions. Finally, the relationship between the 
institutional ecosystem and policy arena is not one way. Policy arenas affect the 
institutional ecosystem too, although the institutional arrangements are more likely to 
be immediately affected by the policy actors’ decisions than deeper levels of the 
institutional ecosystem. Policy arena and its participants governing oil and gas supply 
chains are the subject of the next section. 
 
5.2.2 Type II Inputs: Policy Arena 
5.2.2.1 Overview of Policy Actors 
The governance of oil and gas supply chains in Canada exhibits characteristics 
generally shared by federal systems; reflects the North American economic 
integration experience; and underscores the importance of country-specific attributes 
including geography, politics, economics and attitudes towards the private sector. All 
three groups of factors combined, Canada’s oil and gas supply chains management 
represents a unique blend of policy actors: the federal and provincial governments, 
the US government based on bilateral and NAFTA commitments, the oil and gas 
companies, and public interest groups. 
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Federal and Provincial Governments as Equal Policy Actors 
Canada’s complex Federal – Provincial relations on the level of the institutional 
environment are projected onto the oil and gas policy arena. For both the federal and 
provincial governments, the rights and responsibilities towards the sector arise from 
the Constitution that was examined in the section on Canada’s institutional ecosystem 
(See Section 5.2.1.2). Provincial governments are the mineral resources’ owners in 
their respective provinces,475 while the federal government exercises resource 
ownership on Canada Lands476 and is responsible for regulating interprovincial 
trade477. As one of the most decentralized federations in the world478, Canada has 
gone through the ups and downs of dual-level governance. On the one hand, these 
have included comparatively short and infrequent periods when federal and 
provincial interests coincided, and the level of conflict was thus reduced. On the other 
hand, there have been much more frequent situations of conflict. These resulted in 
intergovernmental consultations, legal battles over jurisdictions, fiscal battles over 
taxation powers, and on one occasion went as far as a prolonged stalemate479. 
While the evolution of various administrative units (ministries, agencies, etc.) is 
detailed later in this chapter, in the section on the institutional arrangement governing 
oil and gas supply chains (see Section 5.2.3.2), Table 5.1 provides an overview of the 
major federal and provincial level actors today (See Table 5.1). 
                                                            
475 The Constitution of Canada, Section 109. 
476 Relevant to the oil and gas industry, Canada Lands include the Yukon, Northwest Territories and 
Nunavut, as well as Canada’s offshore area (See "About Canada Lands," Natural Resources Canada 
(December 19, 2016)). However, their governance is not at all straightforward. While the federal 
government (through the Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development) is in charge of oil 
and gas supply chains management in Northwest Territories, Yukon has received control of the 
territory’s land-based resources in 1998 (Peter R. Sinclair, Energy in Canada (Don Mills, Ontario: 
Oxford University Press, 2011), 44). 
477 S91-2 of the BNA Act (1867). Government of Canada, Constitution Acts, 1867 to 1982. http://laws-
lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/const/. 
478 L. Thorlakson,  "Patterns of Party Integration, Influence and Autonomy in Seven Federations," Party 
Politics 15, no. 2 (2009): 157-77; Karen Bakker and Christina Cook, “Water Governance in Canada: 
Innovation and Fragmentation,” International Journal of Water Resources Development 27, no. 2 
(2011): 275-89; David Cameron and Richard Simeon. "Intergovernmental Relations in Canada: The 
Emergence of Collaborative Federalism." Publius 32, no. 2 (2002): 49-72; Pollard, Ibid. 
479 This occasion refers to the federal government – Alberta provincial government stalemate of 1980 – 
1981 as a consequence of the National Energy Program (NEP) implemented unilaterally by the federal 
government. 
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Table 5.1: Federal and Provincial Policy Actors in Canadian O&G (as of 2015) 
Federal Policy Actors Provincial Policy Actors 
The Cabinet of Canada 
____________________________________ 
1935 – Present: Transport Canada 
____________________________________ 
1948 – 1971: Advisory Committee on 
Northern Development (ACND) 
____________________________________ 
1959 – Present: National Energy Board 
(NEB) 
____________________________________ 
1953 – 1966: Department of Northern 
Affairs and National Resources 
1966 – Present: Department of Indian 
Affairs and Northern Development 
(DIAND, or Indigenous and Northern 
Affairs Canada) 
____________________________________ 
1971 – Present: Environment and Climate 
Change Canada (EC) 
____________________________________ 
1966 – 1995: Department of Energy, Mines 
and Resources (EMR) 
1995 – Present: Natural Resources Canada 
(NRCan) 
____________________________________ 
1990 – Present: Transportation Safety Board 
of Canada (TSB) 
Alberta: Alberta’s Energy Resources 
Conservation Board + Alberta Public 
Utilities Board + Alberta Geological Survey 
= Alberta Energy and Utilities Board 
(AEUB) 
2008 – 2013: Energy Resources 
Conservation Board (ERCB) 480 
2013 – Present: Alberta Energy Regulator 
1921 – Present (under AER): Alberta 
Geological Survey 
British Columbia: O&G Commission 
(BCOGC) 
Manitoba: Public Utilities Board (MPUB) 
New Brunswick: Energy & Utilities Board 
(NBEUB) 
Northwest Territories: the Office of the 
Regulator of O&G Operations (OROGO) 
 
Nova Scotia: Utility and Review Board 
(NSUARB) 
 
Ontario: Ontario Energy Board (OEB), 
Technical Standards and Safety Authority 
(TSSA), Ministry of Environment and 
Climate Change 
 
Saskatchewan: SaskOil (Crown 
corporation) in 1974 – 1986; Wascana 
Energy Inc (public company) in 1986 – 
1997; Nexen in 1997 - present 
Saskatchewan Ministry of Economy 
 
Quebec: 12 agencies involved in O&G 
governance 
Federal - Provincial Policy Actors 
(offshore petroleum boards, 1987 - Present) 
Canada – Newfoundland and Labrador Offshore Petroleum Board (C-NLOPB) 
Canada – Nova Scotia Offshore Petroleum Board (C-NSOPB) 
 
                                                            
480 Alberta Petroleum and Natural Gas Conservation Board was originally established in 1938 (See 
David Finch, "The History of the Conservation Board," Alberta Oil Magazine (February 23, 2012)). 
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O&G Companies: from Data Sources to Industry Lobbyists 
Canada’s oil and gas industry participants are given due attention later in this chapter, 
in the section on O&G sector performance (See Section 5.2.3.2). With regards to the 
policy arena, it is worth noting their role as influential stakeholders in the policy 
process alongside government actors. The majority of these influential stakeholders 
are privately-owned, both foreign and domestic, companies. In addition to the private 
sector, a short-lived Canadian national oil company, Petro-Canada (1976 – 1991481), 
assumed some policy functions, too. 
Initially, O&G companies exercised influence as the leading information providers to 
provincial and federal governments.482 The governments relied on private sector data 
for forecasting. This role allowed companies to participate in governments’ agenda-
setting through direct engagement in energy trends forecasting. Eventually, the 
private sector was joined and later completely replaced by government agencies 
designed to collect and analyze O&G sector data. 
Once ‘data provider’ option of participating in the policy-making process was 
exhausted, private companies were left with the only way to influence policy-making 
– lobbying. For instance, the Canadian Association of Petroleum Producers (CAPP) 
is the single most powerful oil and gas lobby in the country, and its history can be 
traced back to the 1920s.483 Other major oil industry associations include Canadian 
Energy Pipeline Association (CEPA) and the Canadian Association of Oilwell 
Drilling Contractors (CAODC). In the gas sector, Canadian Gas Association (CGA), 
Explorers and Producers Association of Canada (EPAC), and Canadian Society for 
                                                            
481 The federal government initiated privatization of Petro-Canada in 1991. In 2004, the government sold 
the remaining 19% of the company in its ownership (Government of Canada, Notice of intent, 5). 
482 Ghislaine Cestre, Petro-Canada: A National Oil Company in the Canadian Context (Committee on 
Energy and Natural Resources, U.S. Senate, 1977), 6; John Bridger Robinson, "Pendulum Policy: 
Natural Gas Forecasts and Canadian Energy Policy, 1969–1981," Canadian Journal of Political Science 
16, no. 02 (1983), 304. 
483 Canadian Association of Petroleum Producers. “Our History.” CAPP Website. 
http://www.capp.ca/about-us/our-history. 
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Unconventional Resources (CSUR) are some of the most well-known industry 
amalgamations. 
Public Interest 
While corporate interests of oil and gas players in the Canadian market are generally 
considered very powerful sources influencing government policies, they are not the 
only interests shaping the federal and provincial governments’ policy-making 
processes. Public interest has been increasingly more represented as well. It includes 
opinions of aboriginal and environmental groups among others, whose access to oil 
and gas decision-making was very limited until the late 1970s. Today aboriginal 
groups are vocal with regards to O&G development and pipeline construction,484 are 
actively involved in coalition-building with like-minded aboriginal and non-
aboriginal interest groups in Canada and the US,485 and are fighting for inclusion in 
the regulatory processes.486 
Moreover, the government co-organizes research and consultation groups on various 
contentious subjects. For example, in 1993, the Alberta government brought together 
industry and government representatives – the National Oil Sands Task Force – in 
order to develop a framework for efficient oil sands development.487 Some other 
examples of multistakeholder collaboration are briefly discussed in the section on 
administrative arrangements (Section 5.2.3.1). 
The Role of External Actors in Canadian O&G Supply Chains Management 
The United States and NAFTA 
Evolving economic integration on the North American continent and US energy 
policy in particular have played a major part in shaping the Canadian oil and gas 
                                                            
484 Jason Markusoff and Martin Patriquin, "Why Trudeau and the oil industry are losing the pipeline 
battle," Macleans.ca (September 29, 2016). 
485 Ross Marowits, "U.S. and Canadian aboriginal groups sign treaty to oppose oil sands development," 
Vancouver Sun (September 23, 2016). 
486 Gordon Jaremko, "Canada's Liberal Government Expands NEB to Accommodate Aboriginal Input, 
Review Energy East," Natural Gas Intelligence (October 21, 2016). 
487 Dan Woynillowicz, Chris Severson-Baker and Marlo Raynolds, "Oil Sands Fever: The 
Environmental Implications of Canada's Oil Sands Rush," Pembina Institute (November 2005). 
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policy arena. The factors that contributed to the interdependence of the US and 
Canada are: a high concentration of US companies in Canada as (co-)owners of 
upstream assets and pipeline infrastructure dating back to the mid-19th and 20th 
centuries respectively, the proximity of the US market ready to consume Western 
Canadian natural gas, oil and petroleum products as early as 1960s, and the repeal of 
restrictions on Canadian oil imports in 1972. The more or less unrestricted flow of oil 
and gas from Canada to the US took care of Canada’s concerns of securing market 
access for its resources. Many, if not all, policy actors in Canada’s O&G supply chain 
management did not believe these supply chains were under imminent threat. 
However, US – Canada bilateral cooperation in oil and gas was not always smooth. 
The partnership ran into difficulties several times in the late 1960s – early 1980s. 
This was partly due to changes in Canada’s domestic conditions which gave rise to 
securitization trends and partly, although to a much smaller degree, due to the 
competition for resources, their transportation, and end energy users between the two 
countries. Competition between the US and Canada in the energy sector was most 
apparent when oil was discovered in Alaska’s Prudhoe Bay in 1968. The discovery 
posed a direct threat to Canada as the major US oil supplier. In order to protect 
Canadian interests and justify the US need for Canadian oil, Canada’s National 
Energy Board (NEB) released a forecast a year later arguing that supplies originating 
from Alaska would not be sufficient to meet US demand in the long term.488  
Both heightened nationalist sentiment and propensity for increased securitization 
were precipitated by drastic changes in Canada’s oil and gas reserves. In just a few 
years, between 1969 and 1971/1972, the status of oil and gas changed from desired 
items among national exports to quickly depleting resources of national significance. 
Canada’s oil exports to the US dropped rapidly with the ultimate objective of being 
discontinued, while natural gas exports were highly regulated. By the mid-1980s, a 
                                                            
488 Robinson, Ibid., 304. 
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turnaround in Canada’s perceptions on the size of its oil and gas reserves and the 
overall policy direction – from self-reliance to market liberalization – led to the 
normalization of US – Canada relations. 
Despite some setbacks along the way and episodes of decreased cooperation, the two 
countries’ continued efforts in aligning their respective multi-level policies 
culminated in the development of sophisticated and fully liberalized oil and gas 
markets by the mid-1990s. Oil and gas trade flows were an integral part of the 1988 
Canada – US Free Trade Agreement (FTA) and 1994 NAFTA agreements, and they 
can no longer be regulated solely by a single provincial or the federal government of 
Canada. Since continent-wide integration processes were formalized, it is hard to 
imagine a reversal of commitments among three interdependent economies of 
Canada, Mexico, and the US. 
In the 21st century, North American integration deepened further with the three 
NAFTA signatories launching the Security and Prosperity Partnership in March 
2005489, and establishing the Energy Ministers’ Working Group on Climate Change 
and Energy in May 2015.490 The first initiative encompasses numerous areas of 
cooperation, but energy security and environmental protection are two of its 
priorities.491 The second initiative aims at harmonizing the three countries’ climate 
change adaptation and energy efficiency policies. In June 2016, NAFTA partners 
committed to reducing their methane emissions from the O&G sector.492 
The most significant developments, illustrative of the deep integration between the 
North American neighbors, are the shale revolution in the US that started in 2009 and 
                                                            
489 "Security and Prosperity Partnership of North America," U.S. Department of State (March 23, 2005). 
490 Leila Mead, "Canada, Mexico, US Partner on Climate Change and Energy," SDG Knowledge Hub 
(May 28, 2015). 
491 M. Angeles Villarreal and Jennifer E. Lake, "Security and Prosperity Partnership of North America: 
An Overview and Selected Issues," Congressional Research Service (May 27, 2009), 2. 
492 "Leaders' Statement on a North American Climate, Clean Energy, and Environment Partnership," 
Office of the Prime Minister of Canada (October 24, 2016). This commitment followed the US and 
Canada’s joint announcement from March 2016 ("U.S.-Canada Joint Statement on Climate, Energy, and 
Arctic Leadership," The White House (March 10, 2016)). 
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the rejection of the Keystone XL Pipeline project by the US Presidential 
Administration in 2015. The shale revolution has changed gas trade flows, increased 
competition, and diminished Canadian gas exports to the US. 493 The negative 
decision on the new pipeline route after over seven years of negotiations and reviews 
limits expected pipeline capacity and potential market access for the Canadian oil 
sands. Nevertheless, despite the new challenges, there have been no major conflicts 
or disruptions of oil and gas flows. The continental market is successfully adapting to 
new conditions and is pushing national energy policies to adjust as well.494 
 
International Community: IEA and UN 
While the United States has always been an influential stakeholder in Canada’s oil 
and gas policy arena, both through bilateral and NAFTA ties, the role of other 
international organizations such as the OECD and the UN has not had a comparable 
effect on the country’s oil and gas policy management. Thus, beyond NAFTA, the 
role of international organizations is minimal. 
In 1974, the federal government made a decision – conditioned by Parliament’s 
approval – to join the OECD’s International Energy Agency (IEA).495 Unlike the 
majority of other OECD member-countries, Canada has been a net exporter of oil 
with the exception of a brief period in 1975 – 1979. Thus, except those years, it has 
not had to comply with the IEA’s 90-day stockholding requirement.496 And when it 
had to (in 1975 – 1979), it did so on paper, but not in reality, for three reasons. First, 
                                                            
493 IEA, “Energy Policies of IEA Countries – Canada 2015 Review,” 11, 122. 
494 For example, the original Keystone pipeline operational since 2010 was extended in 2011 (Cushing 
Extension) and in 2014 (Keystone XL Southern Leg) (See Carrie Tait and Kelly Cryderman, "Keystone 
XL pipeline rejection sends a chill over Canada's energy industry," The Globe and Mail (November 07, 
2015)). Canadian companies are also pursuing domestic provincial markets and access to export 
terminals for Alberta’s oil sands via Energy East, Northern Gateway and Trans Mountain expansion 
pipelines. 
495 The establishment of the IEA was triggered by the 1973 oil crisis. The agency was created by 16 
founding members (as of 2014, there are 29 member-states) aspiring to establish a multilateral 
emergency response mechanism for events of short-term oil supply disruption. 
496 International Energy Agency, “Chapter 4: Emergency Response Systems of Individual IEA 
Countries,” Energy Supply Security 2014, Part 2 (2014), 120. 
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not all emergency stocks were held in eastern Canada where they would be needed in 
case of a disruption. Second, the required amount of stocks was based on a country's 
net imports, which was misleading in the case of Canada because the points of 
entry/exit of exports and imports were located in different parts of the country. 
Moreover, eastern Canadian refineries were not designed to handle west Canadian 
quality of crude oil.497 Third, the IEA’s extremely complex oil-sharing system was 
scrutinized neither by the public nor by the Canadian government due to the lack of 
political motivations to do so.498 
The UN gained some relevance, yet not much influence, in Canada’s decision-
making in the 1990s, when environmental issues climbed to the top of policy agenda 
in many countries around the world. Canada became a signatory to initiatives like the 
UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCC) in 1992 and the Kyoto 
Protocol in 1997. However, Canada’s actions with regards to balancing 
environmental and energy policies in the 2000s suggest that the country’s policy 
actors have a strong preference for federal – provincial consultation in setting their 
targets and for the continentalist approach to energy policy-making over the 
international community approach. These preferences manifested themselves in 
Canada’s withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocol in 2011. 
 
5.2.2.2 Securitizing Actors and Policy Stakeholders 
Put into a historical perspective, the federal – provincial government dynamics can be 
separated into a series of stages with different prevailing trends and corresponding 
effects on the securitization of oil and gas supply chains (See Table 5.2). The height 
of securitization of the country’s oil and gas supply chains is the period between 1972 
and 1981, and the federal government was the principal securitizing actor. During this 
                                                            
497 Blair, Ibid., 135-6. 
498 Ibid. 
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time, Canada first embarked on the search for self-sufficiency (1973 – 1976), later 
modified and framed as self-reliance (1976 – 1980), and complemented it with the 
idea of Canadianization of domestic oil and gas industry (1980 – 1981). 
Implementation of these priorities resulted in a nationalistic energy policy. Put 
forward by the federal government without any provincial consultation, this policy 
course clashed with some provinces’ interests499 and led to a confrontation between 
the federal government and affected provinces. 
Table 5.2: Federal – Provincial Governments Dynamics (1930 – 2015) 
Period Key Trends Resulting Policy 
As a result, 
securitization… 
1930 – 1972 
PGs are largely in charge 
Minimal FG involvement 







1972 – 1980 
Large-scale direct 




1980 – 1981 
FG – PGs stalemate over the 
NEP 
Ò 
1981 – 1985 
FG – PGs consultation 
processes 
Export-oriented Ô 
1986 - 1988 
PGs as dominant regulators 
O&G sector liberalization 
Export-oriented Ô 
1988 - 1997 
FG involvement through 





1997 - 2011 
Multiple FG – PG initiatives 
FG as a signatory to a number 
of new multilateral initiatives 






2011 – 2015 




Notes: FG – federal government 
PGs – provincial governments 
                                                            
499 especially those of Western Canada’s provinces searching for bigger profits from exporting their 
resources than selling them to Eastern provinces 
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In addition to the federal and provincial governments, the actors discussed above 
have included O&G companies operating in Canada, public interest groups, the US, 
NAFTA, the IEA, and the UN. All of them can be put in a category of policy 
stakeholders, with the O&G companies and NAFTA exerting the most influence, and 
international organizations – the IEA and the UN – exerting the least influence. 
Although the US has been an important stakeholder in Canada’s O&G supply chains 
governance, it has not played a role of securitizing actor in Canada’s oil and gas 
sector. This is largely because Canada’s securitized oil and gas supply chains could 
potentially jeopardize the US interest of securing supplies of these resources from its 
neighbor. Domestic factors negatively affected US-Canada cooperation in the 1970s 
– early 1980s when Canada’s oil and gas policy took a nationalistic turn. This is the 
same period when Canada’s oil and gas supply chains were securitized by the federal 
government, for the first time in the country’s history. As discussed above, US-
Canada relations were normalized with the change in Canada’s policy direction and 
oil and gas desecuritization by the mid-1980s. Thus, it is possible to say that US-
Canada and later NAFTA cooperation helped keep potential securitization of 
Canada’s oil and gas supply chains at bay. 
 
5.2.2.3 Summary 
The analysis of the O&G supply chains policy arena demonstrates actor heterogeneity 
that persists in Canada. The sheer number of participants, a variety of interests and 
objectives, as well as apparent links between provincial, federal, and international 
policy contexts have all contributed to minimizing securitization trends. 
The 1972 – 1984 period of strengthened securitization processes in the management 
of O&G supply chains coincided with increased tensions between federal and 
provincial governments, their inability to compromise, and emergence of unilateral 
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decision-making on the part of the federal government. Whereas some provincial 
governments and the O&G sector strongly opposed securitization of any part of 
supply chains, initially, between 1973 and 1980, the federal government emerged as a 
dominant decision-maker “unconcerned with the other stakeholders’ reaction to its 
actions.”500 But the provinces’ ability to block federal decisions on the one hand and 
the federal government’s continued interest in pursuing securitization on the other 
forced the federal government to adapt. As a result of the 1980 – 1981 breakdown in 
federal – provincial communications, the federal government transformed into and 
played the role of a policy broker in 1981 - 1984 who was more willing to 
compromise. 
Relying on the insights about Type I and Type II inputs, the next part of this chapter, 
Section 5.2.3, will explore Type III inputs – the institutional arrangement governing 
oil and gas supply chains and their interaction with the referent object’s performance. 
 
5.2.3 Type III Inputs: Institutions – Referent Object Link 
5.2.3.1 O&G Supply Chains Institutions Decomposed 
Nested within Canada’s institutional environment with characteristics of a 
parliamentary democracy and a constitutional monarchy is the institutional 
arrangement governing oil and gas supply chains. It is complex but not convoluted; 
interdependent components of the legal framework, the policy framework, and 
administrative arrangements co-evolved into intricate, mature, and transparent 
institutions, and both the federal government and the provinces are the sources of 
continuity and change in legislation, policy initiatives and decisions on administrative 
design. 
                                                            
500 Chapter 3, Section 3.2.2.3 (Securitizing Actors Typology). 
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1947 – 1973: Harmony of Multi-Level Public and Private Interests 
Ever since Canada entered the era of substantial oil production in 1947, the federal 
government has been in the difficult position of trying to reconcile various – often 
opposing – provincial interests, and balance them with the overarching national 
interest in the management of oil and gas supply chains.501 Four types of federal-level 
administrative arrangements502 – four departments, four statutory and other agencies, 
as well as one departmental corporation and one special operating agency503 (See 
Figure 5.6) – encompass a wide range of responsibilities,504 and interdepartmental 
conflict exists along with cooperation. The most serious conflicts date back to the 
1960s – 1980s, such as the ones between Indigenous and Northern Affairs Canada 
(INAC) and other federal departments,505 Department of Energy, Mines and 
Resources (EMR, now Natural Resources Canada, NRCan) and the NEB,506 EMR 
and the Department of External Affairs.507 Provincial-level governance mirrors 
federal administrative arrangements. Provinces have departments parallel to the 
                                                            
501 Sinclair, Ibid., 25; Earle Gray, The great Canadian oil patch (Toronto: Maclean-Hunter, 1970), 3. 
502 The federal government of Canada, through the Financial Administration Act, distinguishes six types 
of federal-level organizations, but only four of them are directly relevant to the management of O&G 
supply chains. 
503 The other two types of federal-level organizations are agents of Parliament and service agencies. For 
detailed description of each organizational type see "Glossary of Terms for Parliamentary Returns," 
Government of Canada, Privy Council Office (May 01, 2009). 
504 from regulating export and import of energy, the complete life-cycle of pipelines, as well as traffic, 
tolls and tariffs applicable to these pipelines; monitor secure transportation of hydrocarbon resources on 
roads, by rail and pipelines; ensure safe and sustainable development of resources on federal lands, 
northern territories and aboriginal lands; promote interests of all Canadians including Aboriginal 
peoples; consider effects on the environment and design climate change adaptation measures; supply and 
analyze large amounts of information related to all aspects of O&G sector in Canada; and participate in 
technology and research development (NEB, NRCan, CEAA, EC, TC, INAC, StatCan and the following 
analyses of these agencies: Richard E. Hamilton, “Natural Gas and Canadian Policy” in The Energy 
question; an international failure of policy, eds., Edward W. Erickson and Leonard Waverman, Vol. 2 
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1974), 158; Cestre, Ibid., 6; McDougall, Ibid., 178; Helliwell, 
Ibid., 195; Simon McInnes, “The Policy Consequences of Northern Development,” in The Politics of 
Canadian public policy, eds., Michael M. Atkinson and Marsha A. Chandler (Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press, 1983), 249; Hampson, Ibid., 100; Doern and Gattinger, Ibid., 51-3, 95-6; Winfield and 
Demerse, Ibid., 5; Sinclair, Ibid.; IEA, “Energy Policies of IEA Countries – Canada 2015 Review,” 24 – 
5, 35, 115.). 
505 In the 1960s, Indigenous and Northern Affairs Canada (INAC) created as a way to coordinate federal 
policies in the North was unable to lead the multitude of federal departments because it was given only a 
provincial-type jurisdiction (Edgar J. Dosman, The national interest: the politics of northern 
development 1968-75 (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1975), 3, 9-10). 
506 EMR was created later than the NEB and saw it as a competitor. The two departments fought for 
financing and influence throughout the 1970s and early 1980s (Bregha, Ibid., 68-69; Doern and 
Gattinger, Ibid., 96 – 100). In the 1980s, EMR suffered from internal conflict trying to reconcile its old 
objective of promoting industrial interests with its new objective of sustainable development (Tupper 
and Doern, Ibid., 109). 
507 During the same period, EMR also had disagreements with the Department of External Affairs over 
the nationalistic vs. continental direction of Canada’s energy policy (Blair, Ibid., 132-3). 
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federal ones. Energy, Environment and Climate Change, Northern Development, and 
Natural Resources are among provincial departments that are common across the 
board and have experienced conflicts similar to those between the federal-level 
departments. 
Figure 5.6: Administrative Arrangements* of Canada’s O&G Supply Chains 
Management Institutions (2015) 
Provincial Government (10)** ÍÎ Federal Government (1) ÍÎ Territorial Government (3)** 
           
 The Cabinet    The Cabinet    The Cabinet  
Departments and other 
provincial level agencies 
   Departments and other 
provincial level agencies 
        
        
 Federal Departments508 
- Natural Resources Canada 
- Indigenous and Northern Affairs Canada 
- Environment and Climate Change Canada 
- Transport Canada 
 Federal Statutory and Other Agencies509 
- Canadian Environmental Assessment Agency 
- National Energy Board 
- Northern Pipeline Agency 
- Statistics Canada 
 
   
 Federal Departmental Corporations510 
- Transportation Safety Board*** 
 Federal Special Operating Agencies511 




Notes: * This figure includes only the most relevant organizations; although the figure reflects the 
basic structure of Canada’s O&G supply chain management, in reality, administrative 
arrangement has more levels of details (i.e., intergovernmental boards and interministerial 
councils/commissions, etc.) 
** There are 10 Provincial and 3 Territorial Governments, and governance of O&G supply 
chains in each one of them is structured differently. Thus, governance on provincial/territorial 
level is not detailed in this figure. 
*** Canadian Transportation Accident Investigation and Safety Board (Official abbreviation – 
TSB) 
 
                                                            
508 Departments are ministry-type bodies with the broadest policy mandates among all types of 
organizations. At the same time, they are the least autonomous type, under the control of the assigned 
Minister. 
509 Statutory and other agencies have a more narrow area of responsibilities and are generally operational 
in nature. Despite the fact that they report to the Parliament through the responsible Minister, they have 
much more autonomy from the government than departments. For instance, the National Energy Board 
(NEB), which is the most significant federal body in the governance of O&G, communicates with the 
Cabinet through the Minister of Natural Resources (NRCan). Yet, it is completely independent from the 
federal department of Natural Resources Canada (NRCan). 
510 Departmental corporations are similar to statutory and other agencies in the level of their autonomy, 
but perform research, advisory, and administrative functions. 
511 Special operating agencies (SOAs) are operating units within the department, but have separate 
accountability systems and are service-oriented. Created as part of the Indigenous and Northern Affairs 
Canada (INAC) in 1987, Indian Oil and Gas Canada received SOA status in 1993 in order to be able “to 
promote client-focused service delivery” ("History," Government of Canada; Indigenous and Northern 
Affairs Canada; Communications Branch (September 29, 2010)). 
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The Federal government has embedded the East – West divide, preconditioned by the 
physical resource endowment and already established patterns of IOCs’ operations, 
into the national political and economic discourse with the passage of the National 
Oil Policy (NOP) in 1961. The NOP effectively split the country into two markets, 
west and east of the Ottawa Valley (the Borden Line).512 This decision was to benefit 
the West by providing it with access to domestic and foreign demand, and the East by 
allowing it to import supplies that would be cheaper than resources transported from 
the Canadian West. Canada as a whole would benefit by creating a healthy balance of 
payments between “cheap” imports and “expensive” exports.513 
In addition to different policy objectives, federal and provincial regulations have 
approached the O&G sector from different angles. The federal government is 
concerned with the management of resources on federal lands and ensuring 
uninterrupted flow of resources between provinces, while provincial governments, 
which set out to develop their legal frameworks for the management of oil and gas 
resources much earlier,514 emphasize conservation, proper recovery, safe operations 
on the ground, and fiscal regulations. Largely borrowed from the US and adopted to 
provincial contexts, the main fiscal instruments in the 1960s and 1970s included 
revenues from royalties, land sales, bonus bids for production rights, profit tax, super-
                                                            
512 Joseph G. Debanné, “Oil and Canadian Policy,” The Energy question: an international failure of 
policy, eds., Edward W. Erickson and Leonard Waverman, Vol. 2 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 
1974), 124. 
513 Debanné, Ibid., 133-4; R. M. Hyndman and Meyer W. Bucovetsky, “Rents, Rentiers, and Royalties: 
Government Revenue from Canadian Oil and Gas,” in The Energy question: an international failure of 
policy, eds., Edward W. Erickson and Leonard Waverman, Vol. 2 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 
1974), 192; John F. Helliwell, Paul M. Boothe and Robert N. McRae, "Stabilization, Allocation and the 
1970s Oil Price Shocks," The Scandinavian Journal of Economics 84, no. 2 (1982), 261. 
514 The leading oil producing province Alberta had a regulatory framework in place since 1938 (The Act 
created Petroleum and Natural Gas Conservation Board of Alberta in the same year. However, the first 
iteration of provincial energy regulator was the Turner Valley Gas Conservation Board set up in 1932, 
shortly after Alberta claimed natural resources ownership rights (1930) (See Alberta Energy Regulator, 
Highlights in Alberta’s Energy Development, 2016.)), when it introduced Oil and Gas Conservation Act. 
Ottawa took the first decisive step towards formulation of a federal legal framework in 1959 when it 
created a federal energy regulator with the passage of the National Energy Board Act, NEB Act. Its 
implementation enabled a number of more recent federal regulations: Energy Administration Act (1985), 
Northern Pipeline Act (1985), Mackenzie Valley Resource Management Act (1998), National Energy 
Board Onshore Pipeline Regulations
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royalties, etc.515 At the same time, abundant fiscal incentives provided very generous 
conditions for O&G companies doing business in Western Canada.516 
Both pre-NOP and post-NOP (up until early 1970s) arrangements satisfied the federal 
and provincial governments alike and minimized friction between them. The interests 
of the federal and provincial governments also coincided with those of the oil and gas 
industry operating in Canada. By taking a “hands-off” approach to the regulation of 
the private sector, yet providing it with the necessary incentives517, sponsoring 
essential infrastructure518 and injecting capital519, the federal and provincial 
governments together embodied an effective administrator of the oil and gas industry 
in the eyes of the private sector. 
1973 – 1984: Securitization of Institutional Arrangement Components 
However, the alignment of federal, provincial and private sector interests started to 
unravel in the early 1970s. The years between 1973 and 1984 can be described as the 
most turbulent period in Canadian oil and gas policy-making. Challenges aggravated 
throughout the 1970s, and culminated into a major fall-out in federal-provincial 
relations in 1980. They only improved gradually after numerous changes in domestic, 
regional, and wider international contexts. 
The 1973 – 1984 period in Canada’s O&G policy arena had three major 
characteristics. First, previously minimal federal government’s involvement in the 
legal framework saw the most prolific expansion in the history of Canadian O&G. 
Regulations were directed at deepening government intervention into the sector and 
constraining market forces. Since 1973, corporate income tax, governed by the 
                                                            
515 Helliwell, Ibid., 192; Chandler, Ibid., 50-51. 
516 Hyndman and Bucovetsky, Ibid., 202-4. 
517 Royalty and tax rates attractive for the industry, tax rebates, and other fiscal incentives. 
518 In 1956, federal government sponsored “uneconomic section of the Trans-Canada natural gas 
pipeline” (Tupper and Doern, Ibid., 96-7). 
519 In the late 1960s, the federal government invested in the oil and gas exploration in the eastern Arctic 
Islands (Ibid.). In the Canadian North, large capital investment was required for technical reasons, but it 
was deemed too risky by the private companies. In line with its northern development strategy, the 
government stepped in to finance Frontier resource development projects on several occasions, in the 
1960s and in the 1970s. 
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Income Tax Act520 has been the main fiscal instrument in the hands of the federal 
government with regards to financial regulation of the O&G sector.521 Several major 
regulations were related to security of supply, while some were at odds with the 
traditional continental orientation of Canada’s oil and gas policies. Almost all were 
repealed or gradually reversed.522 
Second, policies put forward were piecemeal, reactive rather than prescriptive, and 
represented incremental rather than fundamental attempts of the Canadian 
government to adapt to new domestic, regional and international realities.523 Such 
policies resulted in a heated confrontation between two levels of government as well 
as the public sector and the private sector. Also, a number of policy initiatives were 
short-lived. For example, the self-sufficiency goal of Energy Policy for Canada 
(December 1973) was replaced with a more realistic and economically efficient goal 
of self-reliance in An Energy Strategy for Canada (April 1976). The March 1973 
decision to completely phase out petroleum exports within the following ten years 
was overturned by 1985. The large-scale National Energy Program (NEP) introduced 
in October 1980 was scrapped by 1985. 
Third, Canadian oil and gas policies quickly developed a nationalistic undertone, a 
trait previously alien to the industry in Canada. According to various estimates, by 
late 1960s – early 1970s, 75% to 91% of oil and gas assets were under foreign 
control.524 Thus, a sharp turn towards unilateralism at the expense of bilateral 
cooperation with the US, the newly proclaimed goal of “Canadianization,” and 
                                                            
520 Government of Canada, Income Tax Act (1985). 
521 Helliwell, Ibid., 192. 
522 Imposed regulations led to full government control over crude oil prices in 1973 – 1985 ("Why 
Canada Doesn't Regulate Crude Oil and Fuel Prices," Natural Resources Canada (November 15, 2013)). 
Some of the introduced measures included: 
- February 1973 oil export controls and license requirement (Debanné, Ibid., 135-8; Helliwell, Ibid., 186-
8; Tupper and Doern, Ibid., 100; Helliwell et al., Ibid., 261), 
- September 1973 ‘voluntary’ freeze on the crude oil price with some concessions for eastern importing 
provinces (Debanné, Ibid., 138; Helliwell, Ibid., 186-8; Tupper and Doern, Ibid., 100-1), and 
- November 1973 subsidies for refineries in eastern provinces (Hampson, Ibid., 90). 
- In 1974, royalty payments were excluded from the list of deductible expenses (Helliwell, Ibid., 192; 
Chandler, Ibid., 47). 
523 Bregha, Ibid., 69-70, 73; Helliwell, Ibid., 186; Tupper and Doern, Ibid., 100. 
524 Tupper and Doern, Ibid., 97; Gray, Ibid., 257; Debanné, Ibid., 128. 
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creation of a national oil company, Petro-Canada, contributed to an already chaotic 
situation in the oil and gas sector. 
Regulations imposed on the oil and gas industry in Canada in 1973 – 1984 had mixed 
effects on the sector and the national economy, but they are generally regarded as 
negative. Although Petro-Canada served as a viable policy instrument for investing in 
otherwise unattractive areas and helped develop Canada’s Frontier areas and the oil 
sands industry, it raised questions among the private sector participants about the 
fairness of competing with the government-backed national oil company. At the same 
time, oil and natural gas price controls, oil export ban and tight natural gas export 
regulations led to Canada becoming a net importer of oil by 1975,525 which was 
reminiscent of 1947, when the country imported 90% of its petroleum 
requirements.526 
1985 – 1990s: Increased Regulations in the Context of Liberalization 
The 1980-1981 impasse between the federal and provincial governments is a lesson 
still remembered today by provincial and federal governments alike. The federal 
government has not tried to implement similar unilateral decisions since. On both 
levels, governments have been working hard to reconcile their differences and 
minimize negative effects on their constituencies. Canada, in conjunction with the US 
and its federal and state agencies, took a course towards both oil and gas markets 
liberalization throughout the 1980s and 1990s. This resulted in a liberalized market 
underpinned by a framework of complex fiscal, technical, safety and environmental 
regulations. 
In 1985 – 1989, oil and gas regulations reflected the return to the ‘pro-market’ 
direction of federal policy,527 but at the same time expanded the presence of the 
federal and provincial governments throughout the 1990s and beyond. Starting in 
                                                            
525 Cestre, Ibid., 7. 
526 Gray, Ibid., 3. 
527 Pollard, Ibid., 168-170; Doern and Gattinger, Ibid., 33. 
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1985, the federal and provincial governments started working together and delegated 
many regulatory functions to the market.528 Promising forecasts for onshore and 
offshore oil and gas resources in Northern frontier lands, which are under federal 
control, led to the introduction of joint management of oil and gas resources by 
federal and provincial governments.529 In Atlantic provinces where sizable offshore 
O&G resources were discovered, intergovernmental federal – provincial regulatory 
regimes were established and governed by two Accord Acts: Canada – Newfoundland 
and Labrador Atlantic Accord Implementation Act (1987)530 and Canada – Nova 
Scotia Offshore Petroleum Resources Accord Implementation Act (1988).531 
Canada’s embrace of O&G market liberalization post-1985 culminated in the signing 
of the US – Canada FTA in 1987532, when national efforts of both Canada and the US 
were joined together to promote further integration. This partnership expanded into 
continent-wide cooperation and resulted in NAFTA in 1994.533 Energy trade is an 
essential component of both the FTA and NAFTA, and is protected from national 
governments’ interventionist policies and regulations. At the same time, well-
functioning oil and gas markets in provincial, federal, and continental contexts 
require a sophisticated regulatory framework for smooth day-to-day performance. 
Thus, liberalization and deregulation should not be equated.534 As liberalization of oil 
and gas sector in Canada progressed, so did the depth and breadth of government 
regulations. 
                                                            
528 Gas well-head prices were deregulated and gas supply chains were fully unbundled in 1986, and 
reserve tests for natural gas exports were abandoned (Doern and Gattinger, Ibid., 88, 102; André 
Plourde, “The Changing Nature of National and Continental Energy Markets,” in Canadian Energy 
Policy and the Struggle for Sustainable Development, ed., G. Bruce Doern (Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press, 2005), 64, 66); crude oil prices were deregulated, oil and gas prices decoupled, numerous 
previously established taxes were phased out, and new incentives to attract foreign and domestic 
investment alike introduced (Pollard, Ibid., 169-70). 
529 These included Canada Oil and Gas Operations Act, COGOA (1985) and Canada Petroleum 
Resources Act, CPRA (1986). 
530 pursuant to the Atlantic Accord, also known as the Memorandum of Agreement between the 
Government of Canada and the Government of New Foundland and Labrador from February 11, 1985. 
531 pursuant to the Canada – Nova Scotia Offshore Petroleum Resources Accord from August 26, 1986. 
532 "Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement (FTA)," Global Affairs Canada (November 17, 2016). 
533 NAFTA Secretariat, North American Free Trade Agreement (1994). 
534 C. Slagorsky and B. Fraser, "The Changing Nature Of The Canadian Oil And Gas Business," Journal 
of Canadian Petroleum Technology 30, no. 02 (1991), 53; Sinclair, Ibid., 24. 
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2000s: Expanded Boundaries of Oil and Gas Governance 
Present on paper, in statutes and regulations of the federal government and provinces 
since at least 1960s – 1970s, the understanding that oil and gas policies impact and in 
turn are affected by social and environmental policies and realities took center stage 
only in the beginning of the 21st century. Various interest groups at home and the IEA 
and UN efforts abroad pushed Canada’s federal and provincial governments towards 
incorporation of social and environmental issues into oil and gas policy framework. 
Federal regulations from the 1990s reflect increased attention of the federal 
government to accommodating (1) aboriginal interests,535 (2) environmental 
concerns,536 and (3) North American cooperation principles in natural resource 
development.537 Focus on these issues provided a push for provincial governments to 
concentrate on these same areas in their respective regulatory frameworks. As a 
result, the majority of regulatory changes of the 2000s have taken place on the 
provincial level, with aboriginal affairs and environment highlighted by new 
                                                            
535 Enabled by an earlier much more general Indian Oil and Gas Act, IOG Act (1984), Indian Oil and 
Gas Regulations, IOG Regulations (1995) specified and improved enforcement of previously vague 
responsibilities of provincial governments “to consult with, and potentially accommodate, aboriginal 
groups if aboriginal or treaty rights may be adversely affected by energy projects.” (Laura Wright and 
Jerry P. White, "Developing Oil and Gas Resources On or Near Indigenous Lands in Canada: An 
Overview of Laws, Treaties, Regulations and Agreements," The International Indigenous Policy 
Journal 3, no. 2 (2012): 1-18). Other significant pieces of legislation with regards to aboriginal rights 
and O&G management include the First Nations Land Management Act, FNLM Act (1999) (The FNLM 
Act applies only to the signatories of the Framework Agreement. Initially, only 13 First Nations signed 
the agreement in February 1996. However, as of February 2010, there are 58 signatories. As part of the 
agreement and under the FNLM Act, these 58 First Nations now have or are developing their own land 
codes) and the First Nations Oil and Gas and Moneys Management Act, FNOGMM Act (2005). Finally, 
previously mentioned IOG Act was amended in May 2009, but its implementation is pending similar 
amendments to the IOG Regulations, which currently (as of April 2016) are under review. 
536 First, Canadian Environmental Assessment Act, CEAA (1992) and now its updated version Canadian 
Environmental Assessment Act, CEAA (2012) requires certain energy projects to undergo an 
environmental assessment. These include offshore projects, pipelines and LNG facilities. Compared with 
CEAA (1992), CEAA (2012) is more flexible on delegating assessment responsibilities to the provinces 
(IEA, “Energy Policies of IEA Countries – Canada 2015 Review,” 103, 107). Canadian Environmental 
Protection Act, CEPA (1999) has a wider scope of “pollution prevention and the protection of the 
environment and human health.” Besides nation-wide regulations, Canada became a signatory to the 
Kyoto Protocol (1997). Despite the fact that Canada’s commitment to the Kyoto Protocol’s targets was 
not realized and the country pulled out of the international agreement in 2011, environmental and 
climate change objectives did remain on the federal and provincial governments’ agenda. 
537 North American integration manifested in an intergovernmental commitment with the 
implementation of the NAFTA. The groundwork for it was completed by the late 1980s with the 
liberalization of oil and gas markets inside Canada, but the federal government had to ensure that 
tensions between provinces and opposition to NAFTA is minimal. As part of its efforts, Agreement on 
Internal Trade, AIT (1994) was implemented the same year as NAFTA in order to “eliminate barriers to 
trade, investment and mobility within Canada.” Chapter 11 on Natural Resources Processing which 
covers production and sale of mineral resources and products derived from them, states that 
“governments are to reconcile differences in any measures that impact on trade in the processing of 
natural resources.” 
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regulations.538 Provinces have also been active in enhancing their O&G regulatory 
frameworks in the 2000s beyond environmental regulations.539 
Despite the dominance of provincial level regulations, a number of significant 
initiatives originated from the federal government. These refer to the review of 
production bases and revenue sources in the late 1990s – early 2000s, elimination of 
the federal capital tax in 2006, and reduction of corporate income tax rates in 2012.540 
Also, in addition to the CEAA (2012), three regulatory acts implemented by the 
federal government in 2010s are worth noting: Northwest Territories Oil and Gas 
Operations Act (2014),541, Energy Safety and Security Act, ESSA (2015),542 and 
Pipeline Safety Act (2015).543 
Active incorporation of social and environmental perspectives into oil and gas policy-
making has been accompanied by increased inter-departmental cooperation since the 
1990s. The departments’ mandates became more comprehensive, and they made 
                                                            
538 One of the examples of federal push is the 2006 announcement by the federal government to regulate 
O&G sector emissions. While the announcement has not resulted into federal regulations, a number of 
provincial governments, including those of oil and gas producing provinces took steps towards flaring 
and emissions limitations in the upstream O&G (Government of Canada, Notice of intent, 2; IEA, 
“Energy Policies of IEA Countries – Canada 2015 Review,” 48). In Alberta, Carbon Capture and 
Storage Funding Act (2009) encourages carbon capture storage (CCS) projects in the province 
dependent on fossil fuels for its economic development (Henry J. Krupa, "The Legal Framework for 
Carbon Capture and Storage in Canada," in Carbon capture and storage: emerging legal and regulatory 
issues, eds., Ian Havercroft, Richard Macrory and Richard B. Stewart (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2011), 
297). Specific Gas Emitters Regulation, SGER (2007) is another Alberta-based environmental initiative 
implemented under the Climate Change and Emissions Management Act that adopts strict GHG 
emission requirements. In November 2015, a comprehensive new climate change plan was announced 
by Alberta Premier. Other provinces active in environment and climate change issues are Quebec (cap-
and-trade system introduced in 2012), Manitoba (carbon pricing and cap-and-trade systems under 
development since 2015), Saskatchewan (commitment to increase a share of power generation from 
renewables) and British Columbia (carbon tax) (Winfield and Demerse, Ibid., 8-9; IEA, Ibid., 51-2). 
539 For example, in Alberta, several acts and many more regulations were introduced or updated since the 
turn of the century. Some of them include the Mines and Minerals Act (2000), the Oil and Gas 
Conservation Act (2000), the Oil Sands Conservation Act (2000), the Public Lands Act (2000), 
Responsible Energy Development Act (2012), and Crown Minerals Registration Regulations (2001, 
2002, 2003, 2004, 2004, 2014). 
540 Harvey Lazar, Toward a new mission statement for Canadian fiscal federalism (Montreal: McGill-
Queen's Univ. Press, 2000), 145-8; IEA, “Energy Policies of IEA Countries – Canada 2015 Review,” 34. 
541 "Fifth Session, Seventeenth legislative assembly of the northwest territories,” Legislative Assembly 
of the Northwest Territories (March 14, 2006). 
542 enforced since February 2016, is designed to enhance regulatory ability of the federal government in 
the North and Canadian Arctic through commitment to improved safety, transparency, and information 
sharing ("Fact Sheet: Energy Safety and Security Act," Government of Canada, National Energy Board 
(December 01, 2016)). 
543 in force since June 2016, the act emphasizes oversight and emergency management of pipeline 
infrastructure, as well as corporate liability (Natural Resources Canada, Pipeline Safety, 4; IEA, “Energy 
Policies of IEA Countries – Canada 2015 Review,” 10, 32, 103). 
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efforts to avoid replication of duties.544 Additionally, numerous networks, information 
portals and alliances between oil and gas sector companies, industry associations, 
environmental groups and other stakeholders supplement intergovernmental 
cooperation.545 Finally, interprovincial,546 federal – provincial,547 and 
intracontinental548 intergovernmental cooperation is on the rise. 
While general directions of provincial energy policies are gradually converging, 
means of reaching similar goals are still divergent. There is no uniform blueprint used 
by provinces and territories for organizing their administrative arrangements for 
governing O&G supply chains. Generally, the governance of the sector is reflective 
of the role oil and gas plays in the province’s economy. While some provinces prefer 
a centralized approach, others choose decentralization of regulatory powers between 
various agencies. Thus, Alberta, which is home to the earliest O&G administration in 
                                                            
544 For instance, the NEB and NRCan signed an MOU “to reduce duplication” and collaborate on data 
collection and energy studies ("Cooperation with Other Agencies," Government of Canada, National 
Energy Board (August 25, 2016)). It has similar agreements with the Northern Pipeline Agency (NPA), 
Transportation Safety Board of Canada (TSB), other agencies and provincial/territorial administrators. 
Horizontal cooperation has also been supported by federal government initiatives like the 2007 Major 
Projects Management Office (MPMO) Initiative, which has been extended until 2020. Under the 
leadership of NRCan, MPMO Initiative brings together 12 federal departments “to enable efficient and 
effective regulatory reviews of major resource projects and to… modernize the regulatory system for 
major resource projects” (See "Horizontal Initiative & Major Projects Management Office Initiative," 
Natural Resources Canada (March 10, 2016)). 
545 Some of them involve government participation, while others do not. Examples include Canada’s Oil 
Sands Innovation Alliance (COSIA) for improved environmental performance of oil sands projects, the 
Beaufort Regional Environmental Assessment (BREA) for supporting environmental and socio-
economic research for better management of oil and gas resources in the Beaufort Sea, and Energy and 
Utilities Sector Networks throughout Canada for information exchange on security state of critical 
energy infrastructure. 
546 Provinces have always promoted information and technology sharing, standardization of technical, 
safety and emergency response procedures, and harmonization of various regulations of oil and gas 
operations. Principles of collaboration and open access to scientific and technical information remain 
relevant today. One of the most recent interprovincial initiatives is the 2012 Canadian FracFocus portal, 
which Alberta, British Columbia, New Brunswick and the NEB are using as “a mandatory online 
registry of hydraulic fracturing fluids and chemical disclosure” (IEA, “Energy Policies of IEA Countries 
– Canada 2015 Review,” 113-114). 
547 In the 2000s, Canadian Council of Ministers of the Environment (CCME) and Energy and Mines 
Ministers’ Conference (EMMC) were set up for federal – provincial work on aligning their 
environmental and energy priorities. Energy Technology Working Group (ETWG), created under the 
EMMC, is a forum for federal, provincial and territorial governments to share their views on energy 
technology priorities and ways to develop and employ such technologies in due time. Introduced in 
2014, MPMO-West, an offshoot of the MPMO Initiative, engages federal departments with the goal of 
enhancing Aboriginal participation in energy development projects. By locating the federal office in 
Vancouver, British Columbia federal government signaled its intention to work closely not only with the 
representatives of the Aboriginal interests in Western Canada, but with the British Columbia and Alberta 
provincial governments as well. 
548 North American Energy Working Group (NAEWG) exists between NAFTA governments since 2001 
to ensure effective functioning of the North American energy market (Government of Canada, Notice of 
intent, 1; Brownsey, Ibid., 102). In 2015, a ministerial-level trilateral working group on energy and 
climate change was launched by NAFTA member-states’ Energy Ministers. 
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Canada, has experimented with various governance models since 1938. In 2013, it 
unified all provincial government responsibilities for O&G management under a 
single body, Alberta Energy Regulator (AER). The AER’s responsibilities go beyond 
the usual regulator’s duties. Its active participation in the O&G sector has also made 
it “the world’s leading and most significant public sector investor” in technological 
research.549 In British Columbia, BC Oil and Gas Commission is a similar “single-
window regulatory agency.”550 Quebec, a net importer of oil and natural gas, has one 
of the most decentralized oil and gas governance regimes. Pipeline regulation alone is 
split between 12 agencies and departments.551 
Overall, the federal government finds itself in a position of having to reconcile 
provincial interests for the benefit of the nation. The federal government is seen as a 
guarantor of national interest and is expected to be a unifier of ten provinces and 
three territories. As such, it is often criticized for the absence of federal energy and 
environment policy.552 On account of this criticism, Canadian Energy Strategy (CES), 
also referred to as National Energy Strategy (NES), received a lot of attention as a 
potential candidate for the long-awaited nation-wide energy policy of the new 
century. Despite undergoing an impressive transformation from a concept in a 2007 
academic paper to an agenda item in the Canadian Premiers’ meeting in July 2015,553 
the CES is yet to be endorsed by the federal government. The inaction from the 
federal government is explained by one of the principles of Canadian energy policy in 
practice, which is mutual respect for jurisdictions. This respect has been nurtured by 
federal and provincial governments since the 1980 NEP fiasco, and is still fragile for 
the federal government to be able to take any bold actions with regards to energy 
                                                            
549 Taymaz Rastgardani, Energy Security for Canada: A Comparison of the Self-Sufficiency and 
Continental Strategies, Master’s Thesis (Simon Fraser University, 2007), 35. 
550 "About Us," BC Oil and Gas Commission (January 22, 2015). 
551 "Quebec's Pipeline Regulatory Regime," Natural Resources Canada (September 26, 2016). 
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policy. The experience of the federal government in the 1990s – 2000s has shown 
that “gentle nagging” of the provinces can give better results than forceful calls for 
action. 
Security of Supply vs. Security of Demand 
In addition to a complex situation around national energy policy-making, the views 
on Canada’s security of energy supply are not straightforward either. The argument 
provides space for both advocates and challengers of the concerns over security of 
energy supply. While the IEA supports the view that security of supply is a 
concern,554 all components of Canadian institutional arrangement – including policy 
framework – governing O&G supply chains suggest otherwise.555 Neither NEB nor 
NRCan mention ‘energy security’ or ‘supply security’ in their mandate descriptions. 
No recent legal or policy changes had an explicit focus on security of supply. Instead, 
in 2010 – 2015, the policy framework has been dominated by initiatives dealing with 
social acceptance of large energy projects, environmental impact reviews, and, safety 
of oil and gas transportation by rail and pipelines. 
However, Canada has implicit concerns about security of demand rather than supply. 
This has to do with the US shale revolution underway since 2009 and Canada “losing 
some ground” in its large oil and only gas export markets.556 These concerns 
motivated renewed federal interest in LNG projects as well as a push by the O&G 
industry for the expansion of existing pipeline infrastructure. Incentives557 
encouraging and facilitating LNG facilities development have been put in place, and 
regulatory approval for LNG projects has been sped up (the NEB approved 26 LNG 
terminals projects in 2015).558 With regards to pipelines, despite the fact that the 
Keystone XL project failed to materialize, regulatory approval processes are under 
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555 Sinclair, Ibid., 34. 
556 IEA, Ibid., 122. 
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way for two domestic projects: Energy East that would carry hydrocarbons from 
Western to Eastern Canada and Trans Mountain extension that would ship oil from 
Alberta to a port near Vancouver.559 
Summary 
Institutions governing Canada’s oil and gas supply chains are sophisticated and 
consist of integrated legal, policy and administrative arrangement elements. The three 
elements are nested within a highly complex institutional environment. The 
institutional environment’s influence – combined with the policy actors’ 
manipulations and oil and gas supply chains’ performance – has created and sustained 
liberalized oil and gas markets. 
Provinces tend to focus on the legal framework rather than on the wider policy 
framework. When compared to changes in policy, modifications in the legal 
framework are more likely to result in altered administrative arrangements. The space 
of administrative arrangements has historically been dominated by the organizations 
mandated by the provinces rather than the federal government. 
In recent years, the tendency for collaboration between various provincial-level 
administrators as well as federal and provincial bodies has been on the rise. This is 
explained by numerous motivations on the part of the governments: research 
collaboration to decrease costs to provinces, search for solutions to overlapping 
energy – environment and resource development – social acceptance problems, and 
leverage creation for pursuing specific interests. Increased and more wide-spread 
cooperation can also be attributed to the growing participation of aboriginal interest 
groups in the decision-making and regulatory processes. 
As administrators collaborate, provincial oil and gas laws and regulations, although 
still limited by provincial boundaries, are becoming more harmonized. Growing 
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similarities and adherence to the same, usually federally- or continentally-mandated, 
standards improve inter-provincial understanding and facilitate dialogue. In the 
absence of official federal energy policy, collaborative tendencies in the oil and gas 
supply chains institutions are beneficial for Canada’s energy sector. 
 
5.2.3.2 Referent Object Performance 
Canada’s oil and gas sector performance can be analyzed with regards to four 
different periods in the evolution of the sector. Although temporal borders between 
these periods are vague560, they are defined based on changes in the configuration of 
various O&G sector players. As Table 5.3 demonstrates, the country’s O&G sector 
can be argued to have gone through three periods: internationalization (1947 – 1973), 
Canadianization (1973 – 1984), and liberalization (1984 – 2012). The current period 
– Liberalization* - has not seen any major changes in the configuration of actors, but 
is singled out due to newly implemented restrictions on foreign NOC participation in 
the O&G sector (See Table 5.3). 
Table 5.3: Ranking of Major Players in Canada’s Oil and Gas Sector (1952 – Present) 
Internationalization Canadianization Liberalization Liberalization* 
1947 – 1973 1973 – 1984 1984 – 2012 2012 - Present 
1. IOCs 
2. Domestic Cs 
3. F/P Crown 
Corps 
1. Domestic Cs 
2. F/P Crown Corps 
3. Petro-Canada (NOC) 
4. IOCs 
1. IOCs 
2. Domestic Cs 
3. Petro-Canada 





Net Crude Oil 
Importer Exporter Importer Exporter 
1952* - 1968 1969 - 1974 1975 - 1982 1983 - Present 
Pre-NOC period NOC period Post-NOC period 
1947 - 1975 1976 - 1991 1992 - Present 
Source: Author 
Notes: * - 1952 is the first year for which data are available, but 1947, the year of discovery of major 
O&G reserves in Alberta, is generally treated as the starting point of large-scale O&G industry in 
Canada 
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 IOCs – international oil companies 
Domestic Cs – domestic companies 
 F/P Crown Corps – federal and provincial Crown corporations 
 NOC – national oil company 
 
In 2012, the federal government implemented restrictions on participation of foreign 
NOCs in Canada’s O&G sector. The restrictions immediately followed the 
government approval of two large acquisition projects, one by China’s CNOOC561 
and the other by Malaysia’s Petronas562. Since the new regulation is preventative in 
nature and did not have a measurable effect on the O&G sector performance, the 
regulation is analyzed below as part of the legal framework. For the purposes of 
sector performance, the third and fourth period are combined in a single period 
encompassing the years between 1984 and the present. 
Thus, the sector’s performance is analyzed according to the three periods and along 
the lines of criteria set by the securitization framework, including physical, financial, 
economic efficiency, and compliance indicators. 
Internationalization (1947 – 1973) 
Since the early days of O&G development, provincial governments – as owners and 
managers of natural resources – welcomed foreign companies to explore, develop and 
transport Canadian oil and natural gas resources. Explained by geographic factors and 
international oil market conditions of the post-World War II world, Canada’s domestic 
oil and gas sector became host to US-owned international oil companies (IOCs). Facing 
challenges from increasingly nationalistic governments around the world, US majors 
were attracted by the friendly investment climate of Canadian hydrocarbon sector, 
which also happened to be in close proximity with these companies’ home markets. In 
the 1950s – 1960s, “the big four” established themselves as major players in Canadian 
O&G. Out of four, three companies – Imperial (Exxon), Gulf Oil Canada (Gulf Oil 
                                                            
561 CNOOC acquired petroleum producer Nexen for $15.1 billion. Acquisition was finalized in 2013. 
562 Petronas acquired natural gas producer Progress Energy Resources for $6 billion. 
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Corporation) and Texaco – were subsidiaries of US firms. The fourth one, Shell, was a 
Dutch-English firm.563 The same companies dominated the refining sector. 
Following discoveries of large reserves in Western Canada in the late 1940s, Canada’s 
pipeline network experienced a development boom in the 1950s and 1960s. Unlike in 
the upstream sector, pipeline infrastructure projects initiated in this period were owned 
and controlled mainly by Canadian companies (Interprovincial Pipe Line Inc., Pembina 
Pipeline System). However, participation of US-based companies, as was the case with 
TransMountain Pipeline System, and ventures jointly financed by both sides, such as a 
50-50 partnership between TransCanada Pipeline Ltd and its US counterpart, were 
common.564 
Both crude oil supply and domestic consumption were on the rise throughout the 1960s, 
but production outpaced consumption. By the end of the decade, Canada’s crude oil 
exports grew larger than imports, and the country changed its status from a net importer 
to a net exporter of oil in 1969. During the same decade, the volume of exported natural 
gas increased more than six times, from 3.1 bcm in 1960 to 19.3 bcm in 1969 (See 
Figure 5.3). At the same time, refinery crude runs saw a steady rise; imports of 
petroleum products increased sharply, especially in the late 1960s, while their exports 
remained minimal and flat. 
Overall, internationalization in the Canadian oil and gas sector can be characterized as 
the time when Canada took the first steps towards establishing itself as a significant 
exporter of crude oil and natural gas. Also, encouraged by the federal and provincial 
regulators, private companies invested into oil and gas pipeline infrastructure to bring 
Canadian hydrocarbon resources to various markets. In this period, it is possible to see 
the first roots of the long-term focus on supply expansion as opposed to demand 
moderation measures. Finally, the active role of the government recognizing the value 
                                                            
563 Gray, Ibid., 257; Sinclair, Ibid., 25. 
564 Helliwell, Ibid., 196; "About Pipelines: Our Energy Connections," CEPA (November 2012); IEA, 
“Energy Policies of IEA Countries – Canada 2015 Review,” 143. 
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of extracted resources became clear in the 1960s. In Alberta, the province accounting 
for the lion’s share of Canada’s oil and gas production, royalties paid by the petroleum 
industry to the provincial government were on the rise representing about 4% of total 
annual expenditures accruing to the companies in the late 1940s, 7% in the 1950s, and 
12% in the 1960s (See Figure 5.7). Hence, the government welcomed the IOCs’ 
expertise in the exploration and development of Canada’s resources, but these activities 
were to be regulated to benefit both private and public interests. 
Figure 5.7: Breakdown of Net Cash Expenditures of Alberta Petroleum Industry 
(1947 – 2014) 
 
Data Source: Canadian Association of Petroleum Producers, Statistical Handbook. 
 
Canadianization (1973 – 1984) 
With the growing production and surging exports of oil and gas came the wide-spread 
criticism of multinational companies operating in Canada. Negative attitude towards 
foreign control of domestic resources in Canada coincided with dramatic events of 
the 1973 oil crisis in the international market and led to a wave of Canadianization 
measures in the oil and gas industry. These included a range of new ownership 
regulations, taxation, export controls and foreign investment restrictions. 
Canadianization resulted in large-scale divestment by the IOCs and created a new 
market environment. Domestic and foreign companies’ market shares during the late 

















assets were under foreign control, while the rest were split between domestic private 
companies and Petro-Canada, a newly established national oil company. Some 
provincial governments followed the lead of the federal government and established 
several provincial Crown corporations in the oil and gas sector. For example, in 1974, 
British Columbia established a monopolistic natural gas trading agency BC 
Petroleum Corporation.565 
Petro-Canada “was less a conventional state enterprise than an instrument of specific 
policy.”566 As part of the large-scale government campaign to increase oil and gas 
resources ownership by Canadian companies and make sure that the industry first and 
foremost benefits public interest, Petro-Canada acquired several subsidiaries of IOCs 
operating in Canada, obtained access to federal Crown Lands for exploration and 
development of northern and offshore areas, and received generous government 
funding to support its initial expansion.567 Although plans of turning Petro-Canada 
into an instrument of resource cooperation with foreign governments were floating 
for a few years, it was evident by the late 1970s that Petro-Canada was not a threat to 
the market-based oil and gas industry in Canada despite the backing of the federal 
government. Seen from the perspective of an investment mechanism, Petro-Canada 
can be deemed successful as it expanded exploration and development activities in 
the capital intensive niches of the oil and gas sector, including oil sands and frontier 
development.568 But its operations proved too costly for the government very quickly, 
and the fate of Petro-Canada was not at all clear by the mid-1980s. 
                                                            
565 Chandler, Ibid., 54-55. 
566 Barry Ferguson, “Petro-Canada,” in Encyclopedia of the Great Plains, ed., David J. Wishart (Lincoln, 
Neb.: Univ. of Nebraska Press, 2004), 429. 
567 Cestre, Ibid., 23-9; Bregha, Ibid., 71-2; Helliwell, Ibid., 194; Tupper and Doern, Ibid., 118–34; John 
Erik Fossum, Oil, the state, and federalism: the rise and demise of Petro-Canada as a statist impulse 
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1997), 156; Brownsey, Ibid., 98. 
568 Petro-Canada, whose performance indicators were not different from other typical industry 
representatives at the time, grew dramatically in 1976 – 1984 mainly due to the acquisition of other 
companies and federal land acreage. In less than a decade, its assets value increased from $878 million 
in 1977 to $9,055 million in 1984; and its revenues multiplied from $92 million to $4,991 million in the 
same period. Government priorities in designing an NOC as a guarantor of oil and gas supply were 
reflected in Petro-Canada’s heavy focus on frontier development, much of which was not profitable and 
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Aside from the activities of the newly established Petro-Canada, markets for crude oil 
and natural gas were shrinking. Consumption was the only crude oil indicator making 
steady gains in 1973 – 1984, while supply, exports, and imports exhibited a 
downward trend. In these conditions, fears of a crude oil shortage were very close to 
materialization. Tight crude oil exports regulations quickly turned Canada back into a 
net importer. By 1981, crude oil exports were at their lowest level since 1960. Natural 
gas exports also slowed down in this period, but their decrease was nowhere near as 
rapid as that of crude oil. Exports of petroleum products, on the contrary, picked up in 
1970 making Canada a net petroleum products exporter by 1974. However, exports 
growth was volatile and experienced significant fluctuations up until 1984. 
The most pronounced effects of Canadianization were felt in Alberta, the center of 
Canada’s oil and gas sector. Oil and gas producers there experienced the federal – 
provincial governments’ fight over revenues first-hand. During the initial years of the 
new policy direction, royalties paid by the petroleum industry in the province 
skyrocketed. In 1974, they totaled 45% of total expenditures, compared with 28% a 
year earlier. Throughout the Canadianization period, Alberta’s petroleum industry 
spent an average of 43% of its overall annual expenses on royalties (See Figure 5.7). 
Thus, Canadianization was a time of struggle for the IOCs, which previously 
dominated Canada’s oil and gas market. While foreign participation was decreasing, 
this period saw new domestic players introduced as a counterweight in balancing 
foreign and Canadian interests. The biggest of these players, Petro-Canada, did have 
an impact on the development of domestic non-conventional resources, but did not 
change the configuration of the industry players in the medium-to-long term. By 
1984, security of supply worsened, and the goal of self-reliance did not appear any 
closer than in early 1974. The negative effects of poorly designed policies and 
                                                                                                                                                              
had to be financed through federal grants and incentives. In 1976 – 1986, Petro-Canada spent $2.8 
billion on E&D in frontier regions and $1.97 billion in the provinces (Fossum, Ibid., 157). 
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inappropriate regulations were felt by the governments and were reflected in 
deteriorating O&G sector performance. 
Liberalization (1984 – Present) 
The first signs of market liberalization came in 1981, when the federal and Alberta 
governments reached an agreement on pricing and revenue sharing. Relaxed oil 
exports regulations turned Canada back into a net exporter of crude oil by 1983. 
However, the true liberalization period started in 1984 – 1985 with the comeback of 
the Conservative government to power and gradual dismantling of the National 
Energy Program (NEP), intergovernmental agreements allowing for offshore O&G 
exploration and production (Atlantic Accord) and signifying oil price deregulation 
(Western Accord), de-coupling of oil and gas prices, and full deregulation of gas 
prices. All of the above market liberalization measures were possible not only due to 
the change in the government, from Liberal to Conservative, or due to a shift in 
public sentiment moderating nationalistic mood. To some extent, they should also be 
attributed to external events, like the drop in the international oil price in the early 
1980s. Although unexpected, it was largely a pleasant surprise for the Canadian 
government, as it created an acceptable framework for: (a) a smooth transition to 
deregulated oil and gas pricing, (b) less hostile federal – provincial competition for 
economic rents from O&G industry, and (c) once again accepting foreign investment. 
While upstream and midstream players welcomed the period of liberalization, 
collapsing oil prices created new difficulties for them. They were forced to increase 
operating efficiency by cutting costs and in some cases moving their exploration 
activities from mature (West) and expensive (Frontier lands) Canadian fields to more 
profitable fields abroad. The effect of a rapid drop in oil prices and shrinking 
government funding was felt by Petro-Canada too. In 1986 the company’s 
expenditures in the Frontiers amounted to $245 million, but plummeted to $41 
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million by the next year.569 Nevertheless, Petro-Canada’s increased activity in the 
provinces kept revenues stable up to 1991 and beyond. In 1991, 20% of the NOC was 
privatized, with the remaining government shares sold by 2005. Petro-Canada was 
fully functional as a private company and active in Canada and abroad. It was 
acquired by Suncor in 2009.570 
With the exception of short periods of industry consolidation during hard economic 
times (i.e., low oil prices in 1986 and 2009), since mid-1980s, the number of O&G 
industry players in Canada has always been on the rise. In the 2010s, the approximate 
number of upstream sector participants stands at 200 companies. However, the levels 
of production concentration differ significantly between the oil sands and 
conventional oil sectors. In the former, “19 companies operate 21 in-situ projects and 
5 mining projects.”571 In the latter, top 15 companies (out of approximately 195) 
account for about 70% of production.572 Moreover, top 10 companies hold over 50% 
of O&G production.573 
The share of foreign-controlled upstream O&G assets in Canada increased since the 
mid-1980s, but never reached pre-Canadianization levels. It remained slightly below 
50% in the early 2000s, decreasing further and stabilizing at around 35% – 40% in 
2005 – 2013 (See Figure 5.8). Thus, despite open-market competition in the 
framework of Canada – US FTA since the late 1980s and NAFTA since the mid-
1990s and fears on the part of critics of economic liberalization, Canadian O&G 
companies were able to withstand competition from the IOCs and gradually increase 
their share of the Canadian O&G market. In 2012, top 20 positions among the largest 
companies based on oil and gas production were equally split between Canadian and 
foreign companies (See Table 5.4). 
                                                            
569 Fossum, Ibid., 162. 
570 Sinclair, Ibid., 31-32. 
571 IEA, “Energy Policies of IEA Countries – Canada 2015 Review,” 145. 
572 Ibid. 
573 Natural Resources Canada, Pipeline Safety; Natural Resources Canada, Energy Fact Book 2015 – 
2016. 
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Figure 5.8: Foreign Control of Canada’s Upstream O&G, % (1960 – 2013) 
 
Data Sources: 1960: a rough estimate averaging a range of estimates from 70% to 90% 
 1970: Taylor, "From Branch Operation to Integrated Subsidiary,” 49-50. 
 1976 and 1982: foreign control of mining including O&G production (Carroll, 
Corporate Power and Canadian Capitalism, 164). 
 1980: this percentage of foreign-owned companies was in charge of 81.5% of oil 
market (Bratt, "Tools and Levers,” 214). 
 1982-1999: no data or estimates available from the government of Canada (NRCan, 
Statistics Canada, etc.) or from secondary literature. 
1999-2013: Statistics Canada (Statistics Canada, “Table 179-0004”). 
Notes:  1. Prior to 1999, Statistics Canada released aggregated percentage of foreign-
controlled companies in the Canadian economy. The industry breakdown became 
available only in 1999. These data are collected and made publicly available under 
the Corporations Returns Act (CRA), 1985. 
  2. Foreign controlled company is defined as one with 50% or more foreign 
ownership (Natural Resources Canada. Energy Fact Book 2015 – 2016). 
 
Table 5.4: Top 20 O&G Companies in Canada by Total Production (2012) 
Rank Company Total production of O&G 
(boe/d) 
1 Canadian Natural Resources Ltd. 546, 000 
2 Suncor Energy Inc. 470,000 
3 Husky Energy Inc. 314,000 
4 Shell Canada Ltd. 297,000 
5 ConocoPhilips Canada Resources Corp. 291,000 
6 Imperial Oil Ltd. 277,000 
7 Cenovus Energy Inc. 255,000 
8 Encana Corp. 247,000 
9 Devon Canada Corp. 216,000 











11 Apache Canada Ltd. 135,000 
12 Pengrowth Energy Corp. 120,000 
13 Canadian Oil Sands Ltd. 106,000 
14 Crescent Point Energy Corp. 106,000 
15 Talisman Energy Inc. 105,000 
16 Exxon Mobil Corp. 97,000 
17 ARC Resources Ltd. 94,000 
18 Chevron Corp. 88,000 
19 Murphy Oil Corp. 84,000 
20 TAQA North Ltd. 77,000 
Source: Vanderklippe, “How much of Canada’s energy resource lies in foreign hands?” 
Notes: Canadian-owned companies are highlighted in grey. 
 
Between 2009 and 2013, the oil and gas industry contributed an average of $20.3 
billion to government revenues, making it the largest source of revenues. 
Contributions include income tax ($5.5 billion), royalties ($11.2 billion), and Crown 
Land sales574 ($2.9 billion) among others575  (See Figure 5.9). Upstream oil and gas 
operations of the entire value chain are by far the largest contributor to the total 
amount of revenues. 
Figure 5.9: O&G Royalties Collected by Provincial and Federal Governments (bln 
CAN $) and Their Share in Total Revenues (%), 2008 – 2014 
 
Data Source: Statistics Canada, “Table 385-0042.” 
Notes: Balance sheet data are presented as stocks (in billion CAN $). Stocks refer to holdings of 
assets and liabilities at a specific time – the end of the accounting period. 
 
                                                          
574 Paid to the Crown (the federal or provincial government) in order to acquire the resource rights. 
575 Natural Resources Canada, Energy Fact Book 2015 – 2016, 7. 















In comparison, pipeline operators pay a small share of taxes paid by companies in 
O&G extraction. As of September 2014, there are an estimated 825,000 km of oil and 
gas pipelines in Canada.576 Less than 10% (about 73,000 km) of this extensive 
network is regulated by the federal government (the National Energy Board (NEB)), 
while the rest is under provincial governments’ control. The overwhelming share of 
major oil and gas infrastructure is owned by Canadian companies. For instance, out 
of five largest oil pipeline operators, including such companies as Enbridge and 
Encana, only one – Kinder Morgan – is a US-based company.577 The NEB regulates 
over a hundred pipeline companies, while the number in some provinces is even 
higher578. For example, in British Columbia, provincial regulator overseas operations 
of 120 pipeline companies.579  
The sizable contribution of the O&G sector to government revenues and a small share 
of the sector’s contribution to Canada’s GDP is an indicator of an effective taxation 
system and economic diversification. In 1997 – 2015, the share of O&G upstream in 
the national GDP stood around 6% (See Figure 5.10). At the same time, as non-
conventional production increased, its growing value was captured by contributions 
to GDP (See Figure 5.11). 
Figure 5.10: O&G Extraction Contribution to Canada’s GDP (bln CAN $), 1997 – 
2015 
 
Data Source: Statistics Canada, “Table 379-0031.” 
                                                          
576 Natural Resources Canada, Pipeline Safety. 
577 IEA, “Energy Policies of IEA Countries – Canada 2015 Review,” 143. 
578 Includes transmission and delivery pipelines. 
579 "Pipeline Safety Regimes in Canada," Natural Resources Canada (September 26, 2016). 















Figure 5.11: Conventional and Unconventional O&G Extraction in Canada’s GDP 
(bln CAN $), 2007 - 2015 
 
Data Source: Statistics Canada, “Table 379-0031.” 
 
Continued increase in physical volumes of exported crude oil (1984 – 2015) and 
natural gas (1986 – 2001) are reflected in the growing share of O&G in national 
exports. Its share grew from 7% in 1993 to almost 14% in 2015. Declining exports of 
natural gas after 2001 were compensated by the surging exports of crude oil (See 
Figure 5.1 and Figure 5.3). 
 
Figure 5.12: Share of Upstream O&G (%) in Canada’s Exports and Imports (bln 
CAN $), 1992 - 2015 
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On the provincial level, the share of O&G among various industries’ contribution to 
the province’s GDP is the highest in Alberta and Saskatchewan, registering 18% and 
16% contributions in 2012, respectively (See Figures 5.13 and 5.14). 
Figure 5.13: Share of O&G Extraction in Alberta’s GDP (bln CAN $), 1997 - 2012 
 
Data Sources: Statistics Canada, “Table 381-0015”; Statistics Canada, “Table 381-0030.” 
 
Figure 5.14: Share of O&G Extraction in Saskatchewan’s GDP (bln CAN $), 1997 - 
2012 
 
Data Sources: Statistics Canada, “Table 381-0015”; Statistics Canada, “Table 381-0030.” 
 
Summary 
Canada’s O&G sector has a unique history as a sector that was established primarily 
by foreign IOCs with domestic companies gaining momentum and claiming larger 
shares of upstream and midstream assets only several decades into large-scale O&G 
development. While the ratio of foreign-domestic ownership of firms in different 
segments of supply chains fluctuated over time, the ownership of upstream assets has 
always been the most contentious because it is directly related to the ownership of 
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Canadian resources and a number of regulatory changes in the last 60 years resulted 
in a considerable decrease in foreign ownership in Canada’s oil and gas sector, from 
80% in the 1960s to around 39% in 2013. However, its share has never fallen below 
30% (See Figure 5.8). 
The experience of the O&G sector in Canada also provides a noteworthy example of 
short-term government participation through the national oil company (Petro-Canada) 
but with no symptoms generally associated with the creation of NOCs, such as 
nationalization or repatriation. The special features of the Canadian NOC underscore 
the role of the institutional environment in shaping its actors’ behavior and 
demonstrate that no NOCs are the same. 
Finally, while there is no doubt that the role of the institutional ecosystem is 
paramount in defining major characteristics of the O&G sector, its actors’ behavior 
and sector performance are also responsible for shaping the institutional arrangement 
through direct and indirect influence on policy-making processes, which in turn shape 
legal, policy and administrative arrangements components of relevant institutions. 
 
5.3 Key Findings 
A number of observations emerge from the analysis of Canada’s oil and gas supply 
chains governance and attempts to securitize it. First, the role of perceptions and 
timing of events/decisions/trends appears to be paramount in decision-making and 
initiation of policy processes like securitization. Also, as Canada’s attitude towards 
the 1973 oil crisis demonstrates, perception of a crisis matters more than the nature of 
the crisis itself. 
Second, a number of findings point to the unique characteristics of Canada’s O&G 
sector. The most prominent features include early separation of the two types of fossil 
fuels in policy-making, West-East flows of the resources, and deep integration with 
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US energy markets. Neither one can be singled out as a defining factor in (non-
)securitization of Canada’s O&G supply chains, but each one has undoubtedly 
contributed to shaping actors, institutions, and O&G sector performance. 
Third, securitization of oil, and to a lesser extent gas, supply chains culminated in the 
implementation of the infamous NEP. This policy initiative is remembered as one of 
the bold interventionalist undertakings by the federal government and is always cited 
in O&G governance discussions. But it was also short-lived, and its damaging effects 
were corrected fairly quickly by path dependent stability-supporting institutional 
arrangements. 
Fourth, Canada’s O&G sector experience demonstrates that liberalization should not 
be equated with complete deregulation. At the same time, regulations do not always 
mean restrictions. At least in Canada’s case, regulatory design rather than liberalized 
markets ensure long-term non-securitization. 
Fifth, Canada is well-endowed with oil and gas resources and as a net exporter of 
both it is expected to be most concerned with potential threats to the demand side of 
supply chains. In reality, this is only the case with the Western exporting provinces, 
while net importing provinces are preoccupied with security of supply. Moreover, the 
institutional environment allows for inter-provincial cooperation in order to minimize 
perceived threats on each side. 
Sixth, when it comes to the importance of security of supply for net importers and 
security of demand for net exporters of oil and natural gas, the line between an 
importer and an exporter is very thin. In other words, a net importer status does not 
automatically lead to supply chain securitization, and vice versa. Usually, as the 
analysis through the lens of securitization framework demonstrates, the interplay of 
factors affects the emergence of securitizing actors and initiation of securitization 
processes.  
  211
Chapter 6: Securitization of Oil and Gas Supply Chains in Russia 
(1968 – 2015) 
6.1 Introduction 
The country’s oil and gas sector experienced a wide range of regulatory changes and 
spanned three580 very different political regimes: the Russian Empire (1721 – 1917), 
Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (RSFSR) as part of the USSR (1917 – 
1991), and Russian Federation (1991 – Present). Commercial production of oil in 
Russia dates back to the 1860s. As Figure 6.1 demonstrates, oil became the leading 
fossil fuel in the Soviet economy by 1968,581 and natural gas production increased 
significantly at the same time.582 Hence, 1968 is chosen as the starting point for the 
analysis of Russia’s oil and gas supply chains. 
Figure 6.1: Fossil Fuel Shares (%) in the Russian Empire/USSR/Russia’s Primary 
Energy Mix (1913 – 2014) 
 
Data Sources: Central Statistical Directorate (1959, 1970, 1975, 1980, 1985, 1990); Federal State 
Statistics Service (2001, 2015). 
Notes:  ‘Crude Oil’ includes gas condensate. 
  1940 – 1990 numbers are for the USSR. 
 
                                                            
580 There have been four regimes, but the short-lived Russian Republic (March 15 – September 14, 1917) 
is omitted here as its effect on the O&G sector was relatively insignificant. 
581 In 1968, the share of oil production overtook that of coal for the first time. In real numbers, despite 
the gradually narrowing gap, the Soviet Union has always produced more coal than crude oil. In RSFSR 
alone, the share of oil exceeded that of coal by 1975. 
582 Natural gas production in RSFSR/USSR was minimal and did not receive much attention until the 
mid-1950s. Most of produced gas was associated petroleum gas (APG), flared in the process of oil 
production. But the share of gas in the overall fossil fuel production increased significantly by 1968. By 
1980, the percentage share of natural gas production exceeded that of coal, and by 1989 – that of crude 
oil. In RSFSR, natural gas production followed a similar trend. Its share among other fossil fuels 












Data on petroleum products’ production and consumption in the Soviet Union are 
largely unavailable.583 The only available statistic is the amount of exported 
petroleum products, which peaked at 61mln tonnes in 1988 (See Figure 6.2). The 
numbers on the share of exports in total production have been made available after 
1993584, but the value of petroleum products exports was only partially disclosed, 
omitting the value of generally discounted exports to the Commonwealth of 
Independent States (CIS) countries until 1995. The same is true for crude oil and 
natural gas figures. Starting in 1995, reporting has become more consistent. It allows 
for drawing a clear picture of oil, gas, and petroleum products exports, their value, 
and share in total exports (See Appendix 5). 
Figure 6.2: Petroleum Products Exported from the USSR (1938 – 1990) 
 
Data Sources: Central Statistical Directorate, various years. 
 
While RSFSR represented only one of the fifteen socialist union republics within the 
USSR, it is not surprising that following the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 
December 1991, Russia positioned itself as its rightful successor.585 Since the late 
1960s, RSFSR had been the undisputed center of the Soviet oil industry, contributing 
                                                          
583 Neither production, nor consumption numbers have been reported in the government economic 
yearbooks. Soviet statistics do not provide any information on the value of these exports, or their share 
in total production either. 
584 In 1991 – 1992, only exports to CIS countries were reported; in ‘Million Tonne’ but not in ‘Million 
USD.’ 
585 In January 1992, two weeks after the official dissolution of the USSR, Russian Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs sent out a diplomatic note to all foreign representatives in Moscow stating that the Russian 
Federation would continue to fulfill USSR’s obligations originating from the international treaties 
(Government of the Russian Federation, “A Note from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian 
Federation to the Heads of Diplomatic Representatives,” Moscow: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the 
Russian Federation (January 13, 1992)). This role was further strengthened in the Federal Law “On 


















as much as 82% to national oil production. Also, RSFSR gas fields provided close to 
60% of the total production in 1980 and almost 80% in 1990, although major reserves 
were located in other Soviet republics (See Figure 6.3). 
Figure 6.3: Share (%) of RSFSR in the Soviet Production of Fossil Fuels (1940 – 
1990) 
 
Data Sources: RSFSR (1940 – 1970): Central Statistical Directorate, various years; 
RSFSR (1975 – 1990): Federal State Statistics Service (2001); 
  USSR (1940 – 1990): Central Statistical Directorate, various years. 
 
In both the USSR and the Russian Federation, oil and gas have been the driving force 
behind the national energy strategy. These fossil fuels were and are expected to 
support heavy industrial growth, socio-economic development, and the military 
complex. Hence, energy strategy has been closely linked to the objectives of national 
economic development, national security strategy, budget forecasting, as well as 
scientific and technological development strategies. Prioritized position of oil and gas 
on the policy-makers’ agenda has consistently resulted in close oversight from the 
broader institutional environment (i.e., central decision-makers such the Central 
Committee and Politburo in the Soviet Union and President and presidential 
administration in Russia) and often advanced securitization as a way to express 
urgency and importance of supply chains. 
Securitization trends were not constant and uniform across oil and gas sub-sectors. In 
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attention from political elites and investment securitized oil supply chains. The gas 
industry was aided by the policy guidelines implemented at the time, which referred 
to oil supply chains as threatened and promoted securitization while treating gas 
supplies as reliable and abundant. In the 1990s, oil and gas sub-sectors switched their 
places in relation to securitization. Ambiguous policies, yet clear legal changes 
signifying gas asset consolidation and gas supply chain monopolization suggested the 
emergence of the gas securitization trends. In similar conditions of policy ambiguity 
but legal and regulatory preference for privatization and relaxed government control, 
previously explicit securitization of oil supply chains was reversed. Since the 
beginning of the 21st century, securitization of oil and especially gas supply chains 
has been progressing. Stemming from the institutional environment and sustained by 
the politicization of oil and gas sector, securitization ensures the leading role of the 
NOCs in the sector and the central government in the management of supply chains 
domestically and overseas. On the supply side, the role of foreign participants was 
significantly curbed. On the demand side, Russian companies are trying to expand 
their customer base in order to preserve their world market share. 
Following the structure of the securitization framework constructed in Chapter 3, this 
chapter analyzes securitization trends in Russia’s upstream and midstream segments 
of oil and gas supply chains. Type I inputs (Section 6.2.1) demonstrate that the 
pervasiveness of informal institutions and strong centralization trends along with 
weak horizontal linkages between various institutional elements increase the 
probability of the rise of an unchecked dominant decision-maker. At the same time, 
the qualities of the institutional environment impair the ability of policy stakeholders 
to oppose a strong securitizing actor. Type II inputs (Section 6.2.2) illustrate the 
strong negative effect of weak institutional checks and balances on the heterogeneous 
policy arena governing Russia’s oil and gas supply chains. Their most important 
implication is the rise of securitizing actors from the institutional environment rather 
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than sector-specific institutional arrangement. Type III inputs (Section 6.2.3) analyze 
the changing policies, the delayed establishment of the legal framework, the 
conflicting nature of the administrative arrangements, and their combined effect on 
the sector’s performance that underwent significant transition between 1968 and 
2015. The key findings on the securitization processes in Russia’s O&G supply 
chains are discussed in the final section (Section 4.3). 
 
6.2 Russia’s Upstream O&G Supply Chains in the Securitization Framework 
6.2.1 Type I Inputs: Institutional Ecosystem 
6.2.1.1 Embedded Institutions 
Russia’s embedded institutions have endured centuries of changes in the national 
institutional environment associated with feudal wars and foreign invasions, and the 
events of 1917 and 1991 were not an exception. The endurance of cultural norms and 
traditions, however, should not be mistaken for inertia. Even though embedded 
institutions are reluctant to change, changes in higher levels of the institutional 
ecosystem push them to adapt and leave “formidable legacies.”586 
The events of 1917 and 1991 both signified a “complete break with the past,”587 but 
many components of modern Russian identity go as far back as the origins of Russian 
statehood in the 9th century.588 They translate into unique ways of organizing a 
political system, running a business, and building relationships. First, there is a 
general inclination to ignore rules because historically they have made “little sense, 
or [have been] difficult to comply with.”589 Second, the absence of well-functioning 
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rules leads to the rise of informal relations based on personal connections and 
tendency to distrust individuals and organizations outside one’s personal network.590 
Third, Russia “has a heritage of top-down, hierarchical management,”591 and an 
effective state apparatus is equated with a strong leader in charge of the country 
whose authority is rarely questioned. Fourth, it is widely accepted that the primary 
function of the Russian government is to provide security of the state borders. This 
results in society’s low expectations about the role of state in economic development. 
Even though the state is perceived as the main provider of economic and social 
services, in the case of dissatisfaction with their quality, the state is excused as 
dealing with far more important issues such as ensuring Russia’s security and 
greatness in the world. Thus, “basic legitimacy of the system [is] strongly linked to 
providing defense rather than economic development.”592 Fifth, a long tradition of 
authoritarian governments established the idea that state leaders are above the general 
public. This perception makes accountability, universal applicability of laws and 
public-private partnership problematic. 
Russia’s experience with communism left a visible imprint on the country’s cultural 
foundation. Principles of central planning and command economy blended well with 
already existing characteristics of Russian culture, but the effects of new ideology 
and rapid industrialization had both positive and negative implications. On the one 
hand, the ideology of materialism reduced the power of fatalism and religion in the 
outlook of the Russians. On the other hand, Soviet leaders’ attempt to eradicate 
religion and subordinate idealism to materialism resulted in a backlash reinforcing the 
role of religion and fatalistic attitude after the fall of the USSR. Notwithstanding a 
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brief period of “emotional rejection of Soviet patterns and symbols in the 1990s,”593 
the “nostalgia for the Soviet empire, and resentment of the West”594 are back in full 
force since the early 2000s. A wistful longing for the great Soviet past is also closely 
associated with Russia’s self-image, which has been reflected in President Putin’s 
campaign aimed at “projecting an image of Russia as a strong country.”595 
In the institutional ecosystem, embedded institutions and an individual policy arena 
are separated by a multitude of structures and processes. Hence, it is hard to make a 
definite connection between the features of embedded institutions and securitization 
trends related to a particular policy arena and referent object. However, in the case of 
Russia several characteristics stand out as the ones making Russia’s oil and gas 
supply chains predisposed to securitization. First, due to historical experience, the 
Russian state tends to see the outside world as a threat. Since oil and gas resources 
are vital to the survival of the Russian state and large portion of demand for these 
resources is concentrated abroad, oil and gas supply chains are very likely to be 
perceived as threatened and thus they become securitized. 
Second, securitization of oil and gas supply chains is in line with the Soviet tradition. 
In the USSR, the oil and gas sector was so deeply integrated within the state (the 
same can be said about other core economic subsectors like heavy industry) that the 
sector units’ (enterprises and associations) performance was equated with the 
performance of the state as a whole. For instance, there was no differentiation 
between the finances of industrial associations and the finances of the state. As a 
result, any threat to oil and gas supply chains was generally perceived as a threat to 
the state. In post-Soviet Russia, even though the oil and gas sector is managed in a 
completely different manner, and there is differentiation between the state and 
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companies, the tradition of perceiving a threat to the oil and gas sector as a challenge 
to the state persists. 
Third, Russia’s embedded institutions are responsible for producing strong 
authoritative leaders. Unless their ambitions are kept in check by the institutional 
environment and policy arena participants, they can easily evolve into securitizing 
actors. The ease with which securitizing actors can rise is not limited to oil and gas 
supply chains and holds true for any referent object worthy of central leadership’s 
attention. 
The following analysis of the institutional environment will shed more light on 
securitization processes in the governance of Russia’s oil and gas sector in 1968 - 
2015. 
 
6.2.1.2 Institutional Environment 
Russia’s institutional environment transformed from a one-party system of the 1917 – 
1991 to a market-based multi-party system after 1991. This major transition 
illustrates the fragility of seemingly perpetual political regimes and ideologies on the 
one hand and robustness of deeply rooted elements of embedded institutions on the 
other. 
Defining Features and Resulting Inefficiencies 
Several distinctive features kept the Soviet institutional environment afloat for 
decades, but eventually led to its demise. The first is overreliance on planning. Five-
year plans and annual plans were central elements of the decision-making process. 
They were the tools for controlling resource allocation and for keeping numerous 
bureaucracies compliant with the central government objectives.596 But they failed to 
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reflect supply-demand dynamics and to help policy-makers make informed decisions, 
and, thus, quickly lost their relevance in each five-year cycle. Moreover, excessive 
focus on planning at the top of the hierarchical system did not translate into effective 
implementation because the latter was much harder to control from the center. 
Finally, each planning process required prolonged negotiations between different, but 
not within the same, levels of government.597 
Second, market-based performance benchmarks were absent in the Soviet system. 
Instead, it relied fully on administrative incentives. From the perspective of the 
central government, such approach helped ensure full control of even the smallest 
units of production. Output was the key performance indicator, and workers were 
incentivized through the Stakhanov system598 of piecework rewards.599 All economic 
production units were compensated exclusively based on quantity with a complete 
disregard for quality. This approach to productivity created a multitude of challenges 
for the command system. They surfaced as unrestrained rent seeking,600 constantly 
declining productivity of the entire economy, mounting inefficiencies, unmanageable 
costs, and inability of Soviet goods to compete abroad. 
Third, the Soviet institutional environment was based on a complete rejection of 
market-based economics including the fundamental concept of pricing, and efforts to 
adapt were delayed and insufficient. A total neglect of classical microeconomics until 
the 1960s gave way to realization that Soviet domestic economy was not immune601 
to fluctuations in the international markets. But even though “economics has become 
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the accepted official language of Soviet policy discourse”602 by the late 1970s, key 
economic principles of cost, profit and price mechanism were not fully understood as 
late as the 1990s. For example, the 1987 Joint Enterprise Law and related legislation 
omitted a definition and mode of calculation of profit.603 During major enterprise 
reform of 1987, a bankruptcy law was omitted from the reform program, which 
effectively halted the entire effort.604 
Fourth, in the Soviet command system, the leaders’ authority was the strongest at the 
top and became more elusive as one went down the hierarchical ladder. On the way 
down, communication channels were becoming more scarce while competition 
between actors increased. Hence, central organs like Gosplan (the State Planning 
Commission) and the Council of Ministers were reluctant to let go of control because, 
in the absence of constant pressure, the regional and local bodies were disinclined and 
slow to implement central-level directives.605 Moreover, the hierarchical structure 
itself was convoluted as it kept branching out on the way down to localities. This 
meant that, in effect, there were “a number of different hierarchies in which 
horizontally linked economic units… were formed in the regions.”606 For example, 
there were at least five ministries in charge of O&G sector management working 
simultaneously, but towards their individual targets. The institutional environment 
provided these multiple ministries with no tools or incentives to initiate and maintain 
communication with one another. 
Fifth, the Soviet Union lacked an independent legal system, a phenomenon that dated 
back to Tsarist Russia.607 As a result, the state, represented by government officials, 
has always served as an arbiter of public and private affairs. It has also put the state 
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above the law, and allowed the state to always place its objectives before any other 
interests (i.e., commercial or private) making it impossible for anyone to argue 
against the state will. 
All of the above features of the Soviet institutional environment led to a host of 
inefficiencies608 that resulted in the implosion of the system in 1991. These 
inefficiencies became so ingrained in the institutional ecosystem of the Soviet Union 
that they survived the change of the institutional environment and became legacies 
influencing the present and future of the Russian state. 
Transition of the 1990s: Institutional Continuity and Change 
Transitional period of the 1990s was pivotal in establishing a strong institutional 
framework for a market-oriented system of a renewed Russian state. While policy-
makers and an army of foreign consultants got some things right, many basics were 
missed for various reasons. The biggest oversight turned out to be the weight of 
embedded institutions and Soviet institutional legacy of the “socialist centrally 
administered economy.”609 
The combination of the system’s immaturity610 and exhaustion of state resources611 to 
deal with frequent emergencies led to a significantly reduced state capacity by the 
late 1980s – early 1990s. Hence, the new Russian leadership, which took over the 
reins in December 1991, was weak, disoriented and desperate for help. The help came 
from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank in the form of 
advice, help with policy and regulation design, and loans. Unfortunately, actors 
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involved in the reform process promoted superficial measures to introduce Russia to 
Western style capitalism. 
Attempts to build markets for various goods and services were based on the historical 
experience of the European states and ignored the fact that the foundations of 
Russia’s institutional ecosystem were very different from those of the Western liberal 
democracies. Russia was missing institutional pillars for successful development of a 
new economic system based on competitive markets, namely: well-defined property 
rights612 and an independent legal system.613 Nevertheless, privatization and price 
liberalization proceeded without the implementation of an effective banking system, 
market regulations and mechanisms for lowering transaction costs. As a result, the 
Soviet challenges of deteriorating productivity and skyrocketing costs were inherited. 
Rent seeking, although now shared between the weakened central government and 
loosely regulated emerging private sector, was thriving. In the case of the O&G 
sector, the government was privatizing assets and creating vertically integrated 
companies in the absence of adequate anti-monopoly regulations, fiscal regime and 
corporate governance culture.614  
As a result, although the institutional environments of Soviet and Post-Soviet Russia 
are fundamentally different, many Soviet institutional challenges persist.615 Five-year 
plans no longer exist, but the current gap between policy formulation and 
implementation is alarming. Market-based incentives have been introduced, but their 
proper work is obstructed by the remnants of administrative incentives, the powerful 
administrative law system, and pervasive rent seeking. Economics has a strong hold 
in the way public and private actors operate, but weak property rights and rule of law 
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often allow political interests, which make no sense from the economic perspective, 
dominate. Centralization was weak throughout the 1990s, but it is back at the core of 
the Russian state since the early 2000s. 
Institutional Challenges of the 2000s: Informal Institutions and Centralization 
In addition to the legacies of the Soviet past, new institutional challenges emerged in 
the chaos616 of the last decade of the 20th century as unintended consequences of 
piecemeal reforms.617 Two insidious characteristics of the Russian institutional 
ecosystem gained momentum: informal institutions and centralization (also known as 
‘vertical of power’). 
The informal sector618 of the economy took center stage in the 1990s and eventually 
clashed with newly established formal rules in the 2000s.619 The evolution of 
informal institutions is best seen through the analysis of the rise and fall of Russian 
oligarchs. Technically, the demise of informal institutions since the early 2000s is 
closely linked to the rise of centralization efforts pushed forward by President Putin. 
But informal institutions have not been eradicated in the framework of strong 
centralization because policy actors “reproduce both informal and formal 
institutions.”620 For instance, for Putin, decreasing the power of oligarchs was not 
about improving the economic situation.621 It was about consolidating power in his 
hands because the current Russian leadership has an inherent distrust in market-based 
mechanisms and sector organization for several reasons: a lack of experience with 
markets, negative experience of the 1990s, and the perception of mature market 
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economies of the world as Russia’s long-standing nemeses. Also, in the absence of a 
functioning property rights regime, the government benefits from preserving informal 
institutions and using them as instruments of rent collection. Thus, “the country’s 
leadership has effectively entangled itself in a network of informal links.”622 
After a short period of decentralization and nascent cooperation between different 
levels of government in the 1990s, centralization returned in full force with the ascent 
of Putin as elected president in 2000. The abolition of the “two-key” principle623 of 
power sharing between federal and regional governments is one of the major setbacks 
experienced by the Russian federal system since then. With regards to O&G 
resources, the principle originally meant joint licensing decisions, joint resource 
management, and shared tax collection between the federal and regional 
governments. Starting in 2001, the role of regional governments was curbed in a 
series of fiscal changes and administrative reforms and was ultimately reduced to 
zero.624 Offshore resources all over Russia became “solely owned by the Russian 
Federation and excluded its subjects.”625 The abandonment of the “two-key” principle 
“risks losing important insights into conditions in specific basins and fields, resulting 
in less efficient exploration,”626 discriminates against independent O&G companies, 
makes regions fully dependent on the federal government, and results in suboptimal 
decisions and uninformed judgments627 due to a lack of attention from the center. 
Hence, centralization continues the Soviet tradition of Moscow’s control of regions 
and their respective natural resources. 
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In the O&G sector, any decisions on project development still arise from the political 
priorities of the federal state leaders and Russia’s foreign policy objectives at the 
expense of economic efficiency.628 Politicization and easy manipulation of the O&G 
sector by the government signifies the failure of the latter to create well performing 
competitive markets. While the O&G sector is just one example of the difficulties the 
new institutional environment of the Russian state experienced trying to adapt to new 
market conditions, it is illustrative of many other economic sectors. 
However, there have been a number of positive institutional changes in Russia. 
Compared to the turbulent 1990s, the political and economic systems are more stable, 
legislative blank spaces in the Russian legal system have been filled, several large-
scale administrative reforms have taken place to improve government efficiency, and 
fiscal regimes have become more transparent.629 Overall, Russia “does seem to be 
embracing free markets and the rule of law,”630 but since 2000 the government has 
become more conservative and suspicious in its attitude to markets, especially in the 
natural resources sectors.631 There is an assumption that if the private sector is given 
control of resource management, it will not work in the interest of the state and the 
population. This superficial fear overshadows a more serious threat from an 
inappropriate institutional environment incapable of regulating the private sector and 
markets efficiently. 
 
6.2.1.3 Horizontal Linkages 
Level-specific horizontal linkages between institutional components were limited in 
the Soviet era and remain very weak in Russia. Typical institutions in Russia’s 
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institutional ecosystem are independent and overlapping, while complementary 
institutions are rare. Since the 1980s the Soviet and successive Russian government 
made attempts to abolish and merge many overlapping institutions governing O&G 
supply chains. A series of unrelated administrative reforms in the 1980s – 2000s did 
reduce inter-institutional conflict by decreasing the overall number of overlapping 
institutions, but the problem of non-cooperation remains acute since large self-
sufficient independent institutions are not offered any incentives for initiating 
dialogue with one another. 
The predominantly vertical movement of information and coordination challenges are 
the subjects of the discussion on the institutional arrangement (See Section 6.2.3.1). 
There is a prevalent perception among policy-makers that these issues stem from the 
governance of O&G sector itself (i.e., inability of specific ministries to moderate 
conflicts and reach consensus) rather than from the wider institutional environment. 
In reality, however, a lot of challenges faced by the legal and policy frameworks as 
well as administrative arrangements of the policy arena governing O&G supply 
chains are rooted in the traits of embedded institutions and the institutional 
environment that were discussed earlier (See Sections 6.2.1.1 and 6.2.1.2). 
Impaired horizontal linkages have an ambivalent effect on securitization practices. 
On the one hand, poor communication between institutions suppresses the rise of 
securitizing actors who would be trying to mobilize resources and build consensus. 
On the other hand, it precludes policy stakeholders from coming together in order to 
oppose the actions of an already existing securitizing actor. Hence, in such a system, 
lower-level organizational actors are always at a disadvantage compared to the 
higher-level ones because the former are unable to build alliances and coordinate 
their actions. For instance, regional governments have no means of cooperating to 
oppose a central government’s decision. Thus, securitization of O&G supply chains is 
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more likely to originate from the institutional environment than from the relevant 
policy arena. 
 
6.2.1.4 Institutional Ecosystem – Policy Arena Link 
The analysis of embedded institutions and the institutional environment reveals the 
link between the institutional ecosystem and the policy arena. Putting behavior of 
policy actors in the prevailing institutional context helps distinguish institutional 
behavioral patterns from policy arena-specific ones. In the case of Russia’s O&G 
sector, special treatment of oil and gas resources as a national security priority is a 
unique feature because many other economic sectors do not enjoy a similar position. 
At the same time, behavior exhibited by the policy arena actors in charge of O&G 
supply chains generally fits the expectations associated with Russia’s institutional 
ecosystem. 
Contradictions within the evolving institutional environment are best witnessed in the 
O&G policy arena that struggles to shake off the defining features of the obsolete 
Soviet regime and incorporate attributes of Russia. The transition from one to another 
was triggered by changes in the institutional arrangements – laws, policies and 
organizational structures – but is taking a while to materialize. This is because 
institutions have been reformed formally, but many of the people in charge of these 
reforms and institutions are the same as 25 years ago, prior to the political and 
economic overhaul. 
The institutional ecosystem does not have a straightforward causal effect on 
securitization. Nevertheless, such conditions as the prevalence of informal institutions 
and strong centralization tendencies as well as weak horizontal institutional linkages 
in the absence of well-defined property rights and independent legal system create a 
strong potential for any authoritative leader to turn into an uncontrollable securitizing 
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actor able to singlehandedly impose his will on the entire institutional arrangement 
and sector performance. Thus, while securitizing actors materialize within a specific 
policy arena and in relation to a particular referent object, the clues to their rise are 
located in the institutional ecosystem. 
 
6.2.2 Type II Inputs: Policy Arena 
6.2.2.1 Overview of Policy Actors 
Accustomed to private participation and enjoying the free flow of foreign capital 
since 1872, Russia’s oil sector faced radical changes with the establishment of the 
Soviet Union. Overnight, all land and natural resources became the property of the 
state, domestic private companies were nationalized, and foreign players’ assets were 
expropriated. Hundreds of players in Russia’s upstream and midstream oil and gas 
industry were reduced to a handful of government agencies representing the Soviet 
people. Along with all other economic activities, the energy sector was subordinated 
to the single most important mission of the Soviet state, namely the transformation of 
a capitalist society into a socialist one via four key means: socialization, 
collectivization, industrialization, and a planned economy.632 The fuels industries633 
found themselves on top of the Soviet government agenda as the recognized basis for 
extensive countrywide industrialization. 
A large number of interests and goals have resulted in a heterogeneous policy arena 
in charge of oil and gas supply chains. Undoubtedly, heterogeneity of the policy 
arena grew more complex and actors became even more diverse over the decades, 
and, in particular, as the Russian state transitioned to a radically different institutional 
foundation in the 1990s – 2000s. But even in the Soviet regime where decision-
making appeared to be a straightforward monolithic hierarchical process and 
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“opposing opinions were [effectively] silenced,”634 heterogeneity in the management 
of oil and gas supply chains was present. 
 
Central Level Policy Actors 
Domestic Context 
In the context of both Soviet and post-Soviet Russia, actors at the central government 
level have been more powerful than regional and local government actors. The latter 
have had little to no say in decisions to develop resources on their respective 
territories and received few financial benefits635 from oil and gas production and 
distribution. Prior to 1991, the most powerful policy actors at the central level 
included the Politburo of the Communist Party, the Council of Ministers and 
Gosplan. These three bodies were responsible for guiding the Soviet system and 
allocating resources and, thus, were at the top of the hierarchical ladder. Three more 
influential committees oversaw other essential elements of the economic system 
including supply procurement, technological development, and pricing: the State 
Committee for Material-Technical Supply (Gossnab), the State Committee for 
Science and Technology (GKNT), and the State Price Committee. Directly under 
their control were at least eight ministries relevant to the O&G sector management 
(See Table 6.1). Regional and local ministry branches, known as associations 
(obyedineniye) and enterprises (predpriyatiye), had no control of their own finances 
and were not allowed to conduct domestic and foreign trade transactions. 
Export-import organizations under the Ministry of Foreign Trade, the Bank for 
Foreign Trade (Vnesheconombank), Construction Bank (Stroybank) and State Bank 
(Gosbank) also played important roles. However, Soviet banks were fully 
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is currently the sole beneficiary of O&G activity. 
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subordinated to the system of central planning. They functioned in accordance with 
priorities of five-year and annual plans, and their main task was to control distribution 
of state finances between government entities.636 In the Soviet period examined in 
this chapter (1968 – 1991), many of the ministries listed in Table 6.1 underwent 
“cosmetic”637 organizational changes of mergers and break-ups, but, in essence, 
preserved their core functions all the way through the dissolution of the USSR. 
Table 6.1: Major Central Level Policy Actors in the Oil and Gas Sector (1968 – 
Present) 
1968 – 1991 1991 - Present 
Central Level Policy Actors with Broad Responsibilities 
 Politburo of the Communist Party 
 Council of Ministers 
 State Planning Commission (Gosplan) 
 State Committee for Material-Technical 
Supply (Gossnab) 
 State Committee for Science and 
Technology (GKNT) 
 State Price Committee 
 Bank for Foreign Trade 
(Vnesheconombank) 
 State Bank (Gosbank) 
 Construction Bank (Stroybank) 
 President & Administration 
 Ministry of Economic Development and 
Trade 
- Federal Agency for State Property 
Management (Rosimushchestvo) 638 
 Federal Antimonopoly Service (FAS)639, 
Ministry of Finance 
 Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
 Ministry of Defense 
 Federal Security Service (FSB) 
 Ministry of Science 
- departments for coordination of 
technological progress 
Central Level Policy Actors with O&G Sector Specific Responsibilities 
 Ministry of the Petroleum Industry (MNP) 
 Ministry of the Gas Industry (MGP) 
 Ministry of Geology (Mingeo) 
 Ministry for the Construction of 
Petroleum and Gas Industry Enterprises 
(MCPGIE) 
 Ministry of Petroleum Refining and Petro-
Chemicals 
 Ministry of Chemical and Petroleum 
 Ministry of Energy (Minenergo) 640 
 Ministry of Natural Resources and 
Environment (Minprirodi) 
- Federal Subsoil Resources Management 
(Rosnedra) 
- Federal Service for Supervision of 
Natural Resource Usage 
(Rosprirodnadzor) 
 Federal Commission on the Fuel and 
                                                            
636 Valery Kryukov, The Institutional Structure of the Oil and Gas Sector: Problems and 
Transformations (Novosibirsk: Russian Academy of Sciences, 1998), 153. 
637 Goldman, Ibid., 28. 
638 Previously known as the Federal Agency for Federal Property Management (2004 – 2008), the 
Ministry of Property Relations of the Russian Federation (2000 – 2004), Ministry of State Property of 
the Russian Federation (Mingosimushchestvo) (1997 – 2000), and the State Committee for State 
Property Management of the Russian Federation (Goskomimushchestvo, GKI) (1990 – 1997). 
639 Known as such since 2004. Prior to this it was known as the State Committee for Anti-Monopoly 
Policy and Support of New Economic Structures (GKAP) (1990 – 1997), State Anti-Monopoly 
Committee of the Russian Federation (1997 – 1998), Ministry of Anti-Monopoly Policy and Support of 
Entrepreneurship (1998 – 2004). 
640 Prior to 2008, Ministry of Industry and Energy (Minpromenergo) (2004 – 2008) and Ministry of Fuel 
and Energy (Mintopenergo) (1991 – 2004). 
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Machine Building 
 Ministry of Power and Electrification 
(Minenergo) 




Energy Complex, the Reserve 
Replacement and Improving the 
Economy’s Energy Efficiency641 
 
Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, administrative changes in oil 
and gas sector management were only a small element in the complete overhaul of 
the institutional ecosystem. Policy actors, old and new alike, were facing a new 
political and economic reality and had to embrace new principles of behavior. Some 
agencies were newly created, others experienced significant changes in their 
mandates, and others were dismantled. Some of the more prominent central level 
policy actors in Russia’s O&G sector of the 1990s – 2000s are listed in Table 6.1. 
The collapse of the Soviet Union and the chaotic privatization process of the 1990s 
opened doors to previously non-existent categories of domestic private O&G 
companies, international NGOs and domestic and foreign financial interests. While 
international organizations like the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and foreign 
financial institutions were influencing the overall transition of Russia from a 
command- to a market-based economy, newly created private companies and 
domestic banks were the key actors in the O&G policy arena of the 1990s – the 
decade of ‘Wild West’ capitalism in Russia. Their influence was rooted in their 
leadership, which consisted of former government officials (Red Directors)642 and 
black market operators of the Soviet era.643 Due to a lack of unified leadership and 
clear policy direction from the traditional central government actors, Red Directors 
and former black market operators, who became known as oligarchs, accumulated so 
much power in their hands during the 1990s that they “were on the verge of buying 
                                                            
641 Government of the Russian Federation. Government Commission on the Fuel and Energy Complex, 
the Reserve Replacement and Improving the Economy’s Energy Efficiency. 
642 Reynolds and Kolodziej, Ibid., 943. 
643 Marshall I. Goldman, Petrostate: Putin, power, and the new Russia (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2008), 58. 
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the state.”644 In essence, the oligarchs were both players and rule makers. As a result, 
in the absence of a strong legal and regulatory framework, initiatives like the Loans 
for Shares645 program were implemented, while rent seeking and corruption 
flourished. Even though the central government actors have regained control of the 
O&G supply chains since the early 2000s, many challenges of the Soviet era and the 
1990s are evident in the characteristics of the institutional ecosystem (See Section 
6.2.1) and the institutional arrangement in particular (See Section 6.2.3.1). 
Before and after 1991, central level policy actors have had the broad objective of 
promoting state policies and representing state interests. However, the presence of a 
common goal does not imply that the central government is a unitary actor, or that 
relations between and within numerous agencies have been free of tension or conflict. 
On the contrary, federal actors struggle to reconcile their long- (efficient development 
of resources) and short-term (achieving desired level of financing from central 
government) objectives, to balance their local, regional and nation-wide 
responsibilities, and to coordinate their actions. Such dynamics often require top 
leadership – the Politburo and the Council of Ministers in the past and the President 
and Presidential Administration today – to step in to move policy process forward. 
The problems of reconciliation, balancing, coordination, and constant additional 
oversight from top leaders originate in the wider institutional environment and echo 
in all elements of the institutional arrangements (legal, policy, and administrative 
frameworks), performance of many economic sectors, and finally behavior of policy 
actors and characteristics of policy arenas. 
 
                                                            
644 Gaddy and Ickes, Ibid., 571. 
645 Under this program, newly created banks would lend the cash-stripped government money, and 
shares in state-owned petroleum companies would serve as collateral for the loans. For details on the 
Loans for Shares see Goldman, Ibid., 62-4. 
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International Context 
Active engagement in international trade and broader economic diplomacy with many 
countries, regardless of their ideological stance, was the major source of hard and soft 
currency earnings for the Soviet Union. If trade and partnerships were to benefit the 
Soviet state, “the politics of ideology was seldom allowed to stand in the way.”646 
Imports of Western technology for the oil and gas industry were commonplace prior to 
WWII, but the range of economic efforts on the part of the Soviet Union only grew 
after WWII. Soiuznefteexport, an agency under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
responsible for foreign oil transactions, played a special role linking Soviet O&G sector 
with the outside world in the late 1960s – 1980s via cooperation and competition with 
international oil and gas companies and OPEC, as well as barter trade with the 
European countries.647 
For decades Europe has remained Russia’s top oil and gas customer, but their 
relationship has grown more complex since the fall of the Soviet Union. Oil and gas 
contracts are no longer simply business transactions; they extend into the realm of 
foreign policy on both sides. Hence, international disagreements between the EU and 
Russia today and politicization of O&G supplies are rooted in the incompatibility of 
their respective institutional environments and objectives. The understanding of 
energy security is fundamentally different as one is a supplier and the other one is a 
                                                            
646 Goldman, The enigma of Soviet petroleum, 30 
647 In 1967, during the closure of the Suez Canal, Soiuznefteexport negotiated an oil swap with international 
oil companies in the Black Sea and Persian Gulf ports to meet its commitments to customers in the Far East 
and Japan. By the 1970s, Soiuznefeexport had a number of subsidiaries and affiliates operating abroad: 
Suomen Petrooli-Finska Petroleum and Teboil in Finland, Nafta GB Ltd in the UK, and Nafta B in 
Belgium. In 1973, the Soviet Union, by then actively engaged in O&G trade deals with the Europeans but 
not a member of OPEC, used the oil crisis to its advantage, having replaced the Middle East as the major oil 
supplier for Europe. Since then Russia – OPEC relationship has been based on delicate diplomacy and 
produced one long-term trend: every time “demand [for oil] softens, the relationship grows more 
complicated” (Hewett, Ibid., 215; Goldman, Ibid., 325; Philip Hanson and Jonathan P. Stern, "Soviet Oil 
and Gas Exports to the West: Commercial Transaction or Security Threat?" International Affairs (Royal 
Institute of International Affairs) 63, no. 3 (1987); Gawdat Bahgat, “Russia's oil and gas policy,” OPEC 
Energy Review 34, no. 3-4 (2010), 177). Technology, pipeline construction materials, and services were 
used to extend pipelines beyond the Soviet borders and were paid for in kind for several years once the flow 
of oil and gas in these pipelines was switched on (i.e., the Orenburg – Western border pipeline in the 1970s 
and Siberia – Western Europe pipeline in the 1980s). 
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buyer of energy resources. Hence, “the two sides [are] not playing the same game.”648 
Also, Russia’s actions are based on hard power and national interest, while the EU 
represents a liberal norms-based institutional environment. This difference results in 
misperceptions and misinterpretations of each other’s actions, such as the EU 
expansion of 2004 and multiple Ukraine gas crises.649 It also accounts for Moscow’s 
disregard for Brussels and preference for dealing directly with national capitals of the 
EU member-states. 
 
Regional Level Policy Actors 
Regional level ministries and other executive agencies in some constituent entities of 
Russia exist to complement the key federal level actors overseeing oil and gas sector 
from Moscow. Ministries in the regions are designed to serve as a coordinating link 
between the policies formulated on the federal level and policies implemented 
locally. In practice, policy formulation is still often divorced from implementation 
due to uncoordinated polycentricity that has been characteristic of both Soviet and 
current Russian political systems (as was discussed with regards to the absence of 
horizontal linkages between institutions in Section 6.2.1.3 and organizations in 
Section 6.2.3.1).650 
Although, according to the Russian constitution, all 85 subjects of the federation – 
republics, krays, oblasts, cities of federal significance, autonomous oblasts and 
autonomous okrugs – have equal rights, in reality some of these entities have 
accumulated more powers and have more autonomy in decision-making than others. 
Designated republics are generally more independent than entities like oblasts or 
krays. In oil and gas sector management, such republics as Komi, Tatarstan and 
                                                            
648 Hedlund, Ibid., 29. 
649 Baev and Øverland, Ibid., 1078-9; Jack D. Sharples, "Russian approaches to energy security and 
climate change: Russian gas exports to the EU," Environmental Politics 22, no. 4 (2013), 691; Bahgat, 
Ibid., 173. 
650 Gustafson, Crisis amid plenty, 58-9, 61, 135, 164; Paik, Ibid., 83; Aalto, Ibid., 21. 
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Bashkortostan enjoyed more freedom from the central government than other oil 
producing regions throughout the 1990s.651 With the assertion of the federal 
government’s power since the early 2000s only Tatarstan and Bashkortostan have 
been able to preserve their natural resources and by association financial resources 
independence from Moscow.652 Both republics belong to the Volga Federal District, 
which used to be the center of oil production in the RSFSR until the late 1970s, but is 
currently the sources of only about 20% of Russia’s crude oil production (See 
Appendix 4). With the exception of these two republics, regional governments have 
been generally excluded from the license award processes since 2004. Similarly, they 
are not entitled to any taxes collected from the oil and gas industry operations on their 
territory.653 Therefore, the role of regional governments in the management of oil and 
gas resources is very limited. 
 
Peripheral Policy Actors 
The Duma, the lower house of the Federal Assembly, is peripheral to the 
management of the oil and gas sector. Committees on the subjects related to the oil 
and gas sector, numerous deputies, various interest groups, and debated opinions add 
to the heterogeneity of the policy arena, but these voices are “external to the formal 
governing apparatus”.654 
Research institutes represent another set of policy actors in the O&G governance. 
Major government bodies such as Gosplan, the State Committee on Science and 
Technology and key ministries all had energy research institutes conducting serious 
research, building scenarios and working out long-term energy plans. They have been 
set up quite early but started gaining importance and say in the late 1970s when the 
                                                            
651 Campbell Watkins, "Unravelling a Riddle: The Outlook for Russian Oil," The Energy Journal 15, no. 
01 (1994), 136. 
652 Kurlyandskaya et al., Ibid., 2. 
653 Kryukov, “Special Features of the System of Subsurface Resources’ Use in Russia,” 32; Adachi, 
Ibid., 1403; Kurlyandskaya et al., Ibid., 3. 
654 Lane, Ibid., 6. 
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Soviet Union started running into energy problems. In Russia, the Energy Research 
Institute of the Russian Academy of Sciences is the most prominent research 
organization and its establishment dates back to 1985. 
 
6.2.2.2 Securitizing Actors and Policy Stakeholders 
The decision-making related to the O&G sector has always been adversely affected 
by the tension between centralized control of the essential supply chains and 
polycentric decision-making designed to ensure their proper management. In the last 
half-century (1965 – 2015), with the exception of prevailing decentralization for a 
brief period in the 1990s, central command control changed hands from the 
Communist Party’s Central Committee in the 1960s - 1985 to the USSR Council of 
Ministers in 1985 – 1991 and finally to the Russian President and Presidential 
Administration in 2000 onwards. These powerful actors have served as aggregators of 
multiple interests in the sector and provided a unified oversight of the O&G supply 
chains. 
Polycentricity of decision-making in the oil and gas sector is represented by multiple 
narrow interests below the central leadership’s control. Numerous ministries, 
associations and enterprises, whose duties and resources might be complementary or 
overlapping, govern every segment of supply chains.655 Polycentric decision-making 
                                                            
655 For instance, in the Soviet Union, exploration of oil and gas resources was divided between the 
Ministry of Geology, Ministry of Petroleum Industry, and Ministry of Gas Industry (Hewett, Ibid., 10). 
In the confusion of the early 1990s’ reforms, two organizations represented USSR abroad, 
Soiuzgasexport (formerly under the Ministry of External Trade) and Zarubezhgas (a foreign gas trade 
subsidiary created by the newly formed Gazprom) (Kryukov, The Institutional Structure, 223). Also, in 
Russia of the 1990s, upstream activities were split between two federal level agencies, the Committee on 
Geology and Mineral Resources (Geolcom) and the Ministry of Fuels and Energy (Mintopenergo), 
which performed 63% and 37% of exploration drilling respectively (N. A. Krylov, A. A. Bokserman and 
Evgeniĭ Romanovich. Stavrovskiĭ, The oil industry of the former Soviet Union: reserves and prospects, 
extraction, transportation (Australia: Gordon and Breach Science Publishers, 1998), 63-64). 
Responsibilities of the Federal Energy Commission as the pipeline tariffs regulator and of the 
Mintopenergo as the export system manager inevitably overlapped when oil pipelines crossed Russian 
borders (Bruce Kellison, “Tiumen, Decentralization, and Center-Periphery Tension,” in The political 
economy of Russian oil, ed., David Stuart Lane (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1999), 139). 
When strategic sectors were decided upon in the early 2000s, the Ministry of Natural Resources, 
Mintopenergo and Federal Security Service (FSB) had to work together on issues of foreign ownership 
in the O&G sector and designation of certain deposits as strategic (Adachi, Ibid., 1405-6). 
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is supposed to benefit both the sector and the state, but in practice it has had a 
negative effect.656 With regards to the O&G sector, oil and gas development in 
Western Siberia at the expense of infrastructure construction in the same region and 
oil and gas development and production elsewhere in the country was undertaken in 
the 1970s.657 In addition to regionalism, it was and still is common for actors to form 
alliances inside and across various organizations in search of political protection and 
influence. These actors’ strategies usually prioritize their short-term interests and not 
the sector’s or the state’s long-term objectives. As a result, tasks outside the scope of 
prioritized projects are often neglected, and local administrators without support from 
the center have no tools to fight negligence.658 
Hence, the heterogeneity of the O&G supply chains management policy arena in the 
USSR and post-Soviet Russia was and remains compromised by strong centralization 
tendencies of the political system and weak institutional checks and balances. The 
combination of these factors results in a relatively easy rise of one type of 
securitization actor – a dominant decision-maker. In the Soviet Union, it was the 
General Secretary. In Russia, it is the President. As securitizing actors, the General 
Secretary and the President draw their power from the broader institutional 
environment rather than a specific policy arena managing oil and gas supply chains. 
Although the process of securitization raises O&G supply chains on the government 
agenda, it has long-term negative implications for the sector because dominant 
decision-makers link threats to O&G supply and demand to their own security (i.e., 
leadership position) as opposed to the security of the sector, national economy or 
                                                            
656 It often produced the phenomenon of “regionalism” when a priority is given to particular projects in 
one locality at the expense of other projects in the same place and general development of other regions 
(Gustafson, Crisis amid plenty, 302). 
657 Eric A. Jones, The bureaucratic politics of Soviet energy policy in the late Brezhnev period: 1976 - 
1982: policy process and the energy balance, PhD Dissertation (University of Michigan, 1988), 358-9; 
Gustafson, Ibid., 303. 
658 Gustafson, Crisis amid plenty, 302-3, 306. 
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national security. Hence, policy solutions are directly influenced by their time 
horizons and do not exceed the leaders’ term in office. 
Moreover, the ascent of other types of securitizing actors from within the policy arena 
– a policy entrepreneur or a policy broker – is unlikely either because (1) a dominant 
decision-maker would try to avoid competition at all costs, or because (2) in the 
absence of a strong leader, the institutional ecosystem does not provide policy actors 
with the tools to consolidate varying interests and use policy arena heterogeneity to 
their advantage. The first case explains the dominant role of centralization, in the 
context of which regional governments and ministerial units are devoid of any 
significant power. The second case is ensured by the conflict inherent in relations 
between different policy actors and indispensable role of the top leaders (who can at 
the same time be dominant securitizing actors) in sector-specific policy processes. 
Finally, as the Soviet Union and Russia’s successful engagement with the international 
O&G markets demonstrated, securitization of O&G supply chains can persist despite 
evident economic benefits of trade and cooperation and in the absence of additional 
securitization measures or new threats to supplies. This was the case with the oil supply 
chains throughout the 1970s and gas supply chains throughout the 1990s. 
 
6.2.2.3 Summary 
Examination of the policy arena and major groups of policy actors demonstrates the 
unique position of the O&G sector in Russia’s national energy complex as well as 
broader economic and political systems. While three groups of actors are 
distinguished – central level, regional level and peripheral actors, top leaders at the 
central level are by far the most influential players in the management of O&G 
supply chains. Also, there is no strong interdependence between central and regional 
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level actors, which puts the latter at a disadvantage in their ability to participate in the 
policy-making process and gives the former a lot of freedom. 
Despite the dominance of central level actors, the policy arena governing O&G 
supply chains is heterogeneous. The presence of a variety of interests results in 
cooperation as well as tension, but generally restrains the emergence of securitizing 
actors among state commissions and ministries. At the same time, the heterogeneity 
of the policy arena is vulnerable to the rise of a dominant securitizing actor whose 
mandate is larger than that of O&G sector specific organizations. Hence, the 
participation of such high-ranking actors as the President in the securitization of one 
sector suggests that securitization trends might not be limited to O&G supply chains, 
and their source of origin is the broader institutional environment rather than the 
analyzed policy arena. 
 
6.2.3 Type III Inputs: Institutions – Referent Object Link 
6.2.3.1 O&G Supply Chains Institutions Decomposed 
The history of Russian statehood dates as far back as the 9th century, but the post-
Soviet Russian state was established only in 1991. Hence, the current institutional 
environment underpinning the state is still in its formative years and, as a result, the 
upper institutional layers including the three components of the institutional 
arrangements are very fluid. In fact, the state of the institutional arrangement 
governing Russia’s O&G sector in the 2010s is comparable with that of Canada in the 
1960s and China in the early 1990s. As a referent object, the O&G sector has an 
unfair advantage of being more mature than the legal, policy and administrative 
arrangement frameworks designed to keep it in check. At the same time, the sector 
lacks the advantages of a mature institutional environment with smooth operating 
mechanisms and transparent regulations. 
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1960s – 1980s: Institutional Arrangement without Legal Framework 
In the Soviet Union, the heterogenous policy arena governed O&G supply chains, but 
the sector itself was homogenous with only designated government agencies allowed 
to participate. Since the government was the single owner of resources and the 
operator659 of the entire sector, and actors on the ground were directly responsible to 
their parent ministries and ultimately the Council of Ministers and the Politburo, there 
was no need to develop an elaborate legal framework. 
The first significant laws and regulations issued by the Soviet government started to 
appear in the late 1980s when the O&G industry was in dire need of foreign 
investment and the entire economy was thirsty for hard currency much of which came 
from O&G exports. The government attempted to create a favorable environment 
based on transparent rules that would attract investors. Joint ventures with foreign 
participation were to pay lower taxes, freely export their production without a license, 
and keep all income from sales.660 However, many new pieces of legislation661 were 
at odds with the Constitution, contradicted one other, and failed to attract sizeable 
foreign investment.662 
If the legal framework for oil and gas has shown some improvement since the late 
1980s, the policy framework governing the sector has always been much less clearly 
defined. It has too many moving parts outside of the sector’s control and offers too 
few precise objectives. For example, today, elements beyond the sector’s sphere of 
influence include Russia’s National Security Concept (2000),663 as well as the 
periodically updated National Security Strategy664 and Energy Strategy.665 These 
                                                            
659 Hassmann, Ibid., 33. 
660 Kryukov, The Institutional Structure, 183. 
661 These included the Joint Venture Law (1987), the Law on State Enterprises (1987), and Basic 
Provisions for Fundamental Perestroika of Economic Management (1987). 
662 Gochenour, Ibid., 705; Considine and Kerr, Ibid. 
663 Initially adopted in 1997 and updated in 2000: Government of the Russian Federation, Conception of 
National Security, Russia’s Security Council (December 17, 1997). 
664 Most recently updated on December 31, 2015. 
665 Precursors of Russia’s energy strategy date back to 1992, 1995 and 2000. The first energy strategy 
was approved in 2003. Current version of the energy strategy was adopted in 2009 and covers the period 
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guiding documents are broad, offer abstract definitions of energy security, provide no 
specific instruments to address challenges and yet have a definitive effect on the 
overall direction of the O&G sector. Current editions of the National Security 
Strategy and Energy Strategy share the theme of “increasing effectiveness of state 
control over the energy and fuel industry” serving the goal of ensuring Russia’s 
energy security.666 Moreover, the goals of foreign energy policy assume close 
cooperation between the state and companies, and include the following: 
- “appreciation [of] Russia’s national interests in the… world energy markets; 
- provision of… guaranteed demand and sound prices for major exported… 
resources; 
- synchronized activity of the state and energy companies.”667 
Programs specific to the oil and gas sub-sectors within the energy and fuel complex 
are designed as the roadmaps for achieving the above objectives and similar ones in 
the past. In the gas sub-sector, the first relevant policy dates back to 1956 when the 
Ministry of Gas Industry was established and a new fuel policy inclusive of gas was 
introduced. Since the early 1980s gas was treated as a bridge fuel between 
increasingly unreliable oil and its future replacement in the form of combined coal 
and nuclear energy. In the oil sub-sector, policies have historically been reactive, 
short-term in nature and often addressed specific production crises.668 In-between 
crisis responses, the sub-sector received guidance based only on annual and five-year 
targets, which ignored essential policy areas like conservation. Energy conservation, 
in general, and oil conservation, in particular, were the victims of “inertia, 
                                                                                                                                                              
up to 2030. The draft of Energy Strategy of Russia for the Period up to 2035 is under consideration (as 
of July 2016). 
666 National Security Strategy, Article 61; Energy Strategy, V.4. Development of Domestic Energy 
Markets. 
667 Energy Strategy of Russia for the Period up to 2030, V.9. Foreign Energy Policy, 57. 
668 Examples of such policies were Brezhnev’s crash campaign of 1977 and Gorbachev’s attempt to 
counter yet another production slowdown in 1986. Both times, a surge in investment served as a solution 
that proved temporary and inefficient in the long-term (Gustafson, Crisis amid plenty, 28-9, 58-9, 67). 
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uncertainty, expense,” and lack of political attention.669 A number of conservation 
measures were formulated as early as 1973, but comprehensive implementation 
began only in 1983 – 1985 as part of Andropov’s energy program and oil policy 
review.670 Overall, the lack of decisive action in the area of conservation reflected the 
inability of policy actors to reconcile their differences in the 1970s and their fear of 
embarking on a risky, yet more promising, road in the 1980s. 
Ambiguity of the policy framework has often been exacerbated by the limitations of 
the administrative arrangements, where organizational conflict remains pervasive. 
Many ministries are still simultaneously involved in several arguments on different 
aspects of O&G resources governance. In the 1970s – 1980s, the Ministry of Geology 
tended to overstate, while the Ministry of the Oil Industry tended to understate 
reserves in order to comply with the annual targets set by Gosplan.671 Jurisdiction 
over offshore resources was delegated to the oil industry before 1978 and after 1988, 
while the gas industry received a full mandate over offshore exploration in 1978 – 
1988; finally, Russian regional governments claimed rights to these resources 
throughout the 1990s until the federal government rejected such claims in the early 
2000s.672 Different sets of ministries673 as well as regional governments have been 
involved in conflicts over pricing, tariffs, taxation and resource ownership throughout 
the 1990s and 2000s.674 Finally, the problem of flaring, which dates back to the 
origins of the gas industry in the USSR, is still prominent because of inter-
organizational conflict between oil and gas producers and relevant government 
agencies.675Thus, the system lacks a mechanism for reconciling differences between 
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conflicting organizations. The responsibility to moderate inter-organizational 
relations fell on the shoulders of the Council of Ministers in 1984 when MGP and 
MNGS refused to cooperate and prioritize Yamburg gas development.676 The history 
repeated itself when the Ministry of Natural Resources had to step in and reverse 
geological asset privatization in 2008677 after the federal government had 
miscalculated the willingness of the private sector to invest in geological exploration 
and downsized its financing significantly in 1992 – 2005. 
The origins of various administrative units in the O&G sector have also contributed 
to continuous tension between them. While the Ministry of Petroleum and Gas 
Construction was created for the development of Siberian natural resources, other 
primary O&G ministries including the Ministry of Geology “originated outside 
Siberia.”678 This organizational history resulted in reluctance expressed by the 
Ministries of Oil Industry, Gas Industry and Geology to prioritize Western Siberian 
O&G exploration and production. By the early 1980s “none of the top leaders of 
these agencies had made their career in Siberia”679 and by the late 1980s, the Ministry 
of Petroleum Industry performed most of its exploration activities elsewhere. 
1990s: Divergent Paths of the Oil and Gas Sub-Sectors 
In the 1990s, legislation on foreign investment and the management of domestic 
mineral resources proliferated. The major law “On Subsoil” was enacted in February 
1992 and still serves as the foundation for the governance of oil and gas resources in 
Russia.680 The first private and state-owned oil companies in the history of Russia 
were a result of multi-step reform681 based on the November 1992 Presidential Decree 
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#1403.682 The long overdue legislation on the status and management of the 
continental shelf683 and guidelines on the crude oil products684 were formulated in 
1995-1998. 
Not only did Russia remain interested in foreign capital, it also had to address new 
problems associated with the break-up of the Soviet Union. For instance, the Soviet 
oil services industry was concentrated outside Russian borders, in Azerbaijan, 
Georgia and Ukraine;685 large gas storage facilities were located in Ukraine;686 and, 
finally, oil and gas pipelines (See Appendix 6) were now crossing independent state 
borders putting transit out of Moscow’s control.687 Although generous joint venture 
incentives were gradually phased out in January 1992 – September 1997, the Russian 
government was hoping to amplify foreign interest in the O&G sector by introducing 
Production Sharing Agreements (PSAs)688 in December 1995. Unfortunately, it failed 
to attract and sustain the desired volume of foreign investment, and oil production in 
Russia slowed down significantly by 1998. No PSAs have been signed since the late 
1990s, and licensing became the predominant mode of O&G sector operation with 
the introduction of a unified tax regime in 2001.689 
While Russia’s oil sub-sector underwent radical reorganization in the 1990s, the gas 
sub-sector took a completely different route. The Russian government emphasized 
the role of gas industry in the national economic development as early as 1992.690 
                                                            
682 In the years following the implementation of the Presidential Decree #1403 , legislation was passed to 
create Surgutneftegaz, LUKOIL, YUKOS, and Rosneft as well as Transnefteproduct and Transneft, 
SIDANKO, East Oil Company, Slavneft, ONAKO, and the East Siberian Oil & Gas Company. State-
owned Rosneft and several private companies dominate Russia’s oil market today, and the dynamics in 
the sector have been discussed earlier, in Section 6.2.3.1. 
683 Federal Law “On the Continental Shelf of the Russian Federation” (1995) and Federal Law “On the 
Exclusive Economic Zone of the Russian Federation (1998). 
684 Parliament decree #897 (1995) on licensing the activity on maintenance and exploitation of oil 
product bases and petroleum stations; Parliament decree #394 (1996) on licensing the activity on storing 
crude oil and oil products. 
685 Watkins, Ibid., 142. 
686 Högselius, Ibid., 203-4. 
687 Watkins, Ibid., 136. 
688 under the Federal Law “On Production Sharing Agreements” 
689 A unified tax regime led to the establishment of flat taxes and de facto cancellation of the PSA 
regime by 2006. 
690 Presidential decrees #538, #539. 
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Several presidential decrees made it clear that all gas industry assets, including the 
entire pipeline infrastructure (Unified Gas Supply System), were to remain in the 
hands of the federal government. Gazprom received the status of natural monopoly,691 
is in charge of the entire gas supply chain692, and is the sole exporter of pipeline 
gas.693 Since December 2013, the gas monopolist no longer has an exclusive right to 
export LNG.694 Although Gazprom unbundling is still out of the question, the 
government is gradually changing the rules of access to the gas pipeline network by 
independent producers in order to establish a wholesale gas market in the near 
future.695 
Unlike the oil sub-sector’s legal framework and administrative arrangements, the oil 
policy framework of the 1990s saw little change in detailed programs. The federal 
government was active in opening up the oil sub-sector to foreign investors. 
Otherwise, the state was divorced from the oil industry’s daily operations. Policies in 
the 2000s scaled back foreign involvement and brought back the dominant role of the 
state as the oil industry player (not just the owner of resources). Yet another decline 
in oil production, this time in West Siberia, prompted the government to turn to East 
Siberia and Far East oil development programs since 2008. These have been a 
priority for the oil sub-sector for almost a decade, and are reflected in the regional 
breakdown of crude oil production (See Appendix 4). 
2000s: Escalating Government Involvement 
In the gas sub-sector, the first big policy since the 1980s was put forward only in 
2002 when the Ministry of Economic Development brought forward the Concept for 
Developing the Gas Market. However, it was shelved until 2006 when natural gas 
conservation and price liberalization measures were introduced in a series of reforms 
                                                            
691 in accordance with the Federal Law “On Natural Monopolies” (1995). 
692 in accordance with The Federal Law “On Gas Supply in the Russian Federation (1999). 
693 in accordance with the Federal Law #117-FZ “On the Export of Gas” (2006). 
694 "Russian parliament opens up LNG exports for Gazprom's rivals," Reuters (November 27, 2013). 
695 Andrei V. Belyi and Kim Talus, States and markets in hydrocarbon sectors (Houndsmills, 
Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), 112. 
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aimed at curbing gas demand, increasing gas tariffs, establishing gas delivery 
contracts, and significantly increasing mineral extraction tax (MET).696 In 2008, the 
gas market reform aimed at closing the gap between domestic and international prices 
was accelerated.697 Finally, Gazprom has increasingly come under pressure to 
improve its performance in order to preserve its natural monopoly status in pipeline 
gas transportation in Russia and beyond. The policy direction of the federal 
government has contributed to the erosion of Gazprom’s dominance domestically. 
One of the most recent and extensive policies in the gas sub-sector is the Eastern Gas 
Program implemented in conjunction with Russia’s pivot to Asia and O&G 
companies’ search for new clients since September 2007.698 
In addition to policies specific to the oil and gas sub-sectors, there are a number of 
initiatives encompassing oil and gas sector as a whole. Some programs for the 
development of resources in Eastern Siberia and Russia’s Far East were announced in 
the late 1980s and early 1990s, but the state had no resources to implement them. 
Since the early 2000s, old programs have been revitalized and new programs for 
geological exploration and replenishment of the national resource base have been 
introduced.699 With regards to the development of Eastern Siberia and Russia’s Far 
East, the issue of O&G industry leaders committing to projects far away from the 
headquarters of their organizations and state-owned companies is still relevant today. 
                                                            
696 Vladimir Milov, Leonard Coburn, and Igor Danchenko, "Russia's Energy Policy, 1992-2005," 
Eurasian Geography and Economics 47, no. 3 (2006), 293; Matthew J. Sagers, "Developments in 
Russian Gas Production Since 1998: Russia's Evolving Gas Supply Strategy," Eurasian Geography and 
Economics 48, no. 6 (2007), 656-7. 
697 Oleg S. Anashkin and Valeriy A. Kryukov, “On the complex character of the regulation of the 
subsurface use process (oil and gas economic sector case study),” Mineral Resources of Russia. 
Economics and Management 3 (2010), 23. 
698 "Gazprom's strategic objectives in East are to supply Russian consumers with natural gas and create 
center for gas export to Asia-Pacific," Gazprom (June 18, 2013); James Henderson and Jonathan 
Stern, The Potential Impact on Asia Gas Markets of Russia's Eastern Gas Strategy (The Oxford Institute 
for Energy Studies, Oxford Universtiy, February 2014). 
699 They include the Long-Term State Program for the Study of Subsurface Resources and the 
Replenishment of the Mineral Raw Material Base (2005 – 2020), Program for the Integrated 
Development of Hydrocarbon resources of the North-West Russia, Program for Geological Surveying 
and Provision for Use of Raw Hydrocarbon Fields in Eastern Siberia and the Republic of Sakha 
(Yakutia) and Conception of the state program for exploration and exploitation of the continental shelf 
of the Russian Federation (Paik, Ibid., 32, 35; Michael V. Alexeev and Shlomo Weber, The Oxford 
handbook of the Russian economy (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013), 421). 
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In 2012, the Ministry for the Development of the Russian Far East 
(Minvostokrazvitiya) was established with two headquarters, one in Moscow and one 
in Khabarovsk located near the Chinese border. In June 2014, Gazprom, Rosneft and 
Transneft became part of the list of state-owned companies ordered to move their 
headquarters from Moscow to the Far East in order to boost the region’s economic 
development.700 
If in the 1990s legal changes laid out the framework for co-existence of traditional 
and new players in the O&G sector, since the mid-2000s measures of tighter control 
and deeper government involvement have been introduced. The swings in regulatory 
control are made possible by the Russian Constitution (1993), which, similar to the 
Soviet Constitution (1977)701, does not provide much detail on the governance of 
natural resources702, thus, allowing for relatively easy manipulation of the sector-
specific legislation. The subsoil law was amended in April 2008 with the enactment 
of the strategic sectors law, Federal Law #57-FZ, which effectively limited foreign 
participation in the oil and gas sector through the establishment of criteria for fields 
of special importance to Russia’s national security. Also, a consensus is growing that 
the unified tax regime, which significantly improved the government’s ability to 
collect rent from O&G companies,703 is not ideal for a country with resources in 
diverse locations and of varying quality.704 Since comprehensive reform proved 
difficult due to existing challenges in the administrative arrangements, the 
government started to gradually diverge from the unified investment and taxation 
                                                            
700 "Giant state companies wait to hear on 'Go East' move," The Siberian Times (June 6, 2014). 
701 Prior to 1977, the Soviet Union had two editions of its constitution: 1924 and 1936, but they are not 
analyzed here. According to the Article 11 of the Soviet Constitution, “the land [and] its minerals… are 
the exclusive property of the state.” 
702 The Russian Constitution stipulates that mineral resources can be subject to private and public forms 
of ownership (Article 9.2), and that they fall under the joint jurisdiction of federal and regional 
governments (Article 72 c (72 в) 72 i (72 к)). 
703 In 2004, oil companies “paid roughly ten times more in taxes” than in 1999 (See Gaddy and Ickes, 
Ibid., 564). 
704 Kryukov, The Institutional Structure, 134-6; Konoplyanik, Ibid., 35-7. 
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system through project- and region-specific subsidies and privileges.705 As a result, 
every new project requires a negotiation of fiscal conditions between O&G sector 
participants and the government. This tendency undermines systemic application of 
the legal framework and ensures that the central government is an indispensable 
component of all decisions in the O&G sector. 
Finally, the element of energy policy that received increased attention around the 
world, but has been largely unattended to by the Russian government, is domestic 
environmental policy. Instead, Russia is more concerned with environmental policy 
of its foreign customers because it has the potential to threaten “the security of 
Russia’s hydrocarbon exports.”706 
Summary 
Evidence from the governance of Russia’s O&G sector suggests that neither the 
absence nor the presence of clear policies automatically makes a referent object 
predisposed to securitization. In the 1980s, policies treated oil supply chains as 
threatened and actively promoted securitization. Securitization did not affect gas 
supply chains because policies regarded it as an abundant bridge fuel. In the 1990s, 
the gas sub-sector exhibited securitization trends in the absence of clear policy 
guidelines, while the oil sub-sector did not under the same conditions. In the 2000s, 
sources of O&G supply chain securitization were located in the broader institutional 
environment, namely, national security strategy, which clearly politicizes the oil and 
gas sector by making the state a dominant actor at home and abroad. 
The legal framework is in the process of institutional development. It was largely 
non-existent until the late 1980s, was established to guide new international and 
domestic private sector players in the 1990s, and evolved into a system constraining 
                                                            
705 EY, "Oil and Gas Tax Alert: Russian Federation Oil Tax Reform," (September 2011), 4-5; Ivetta 
Gerasimchyuk, “State Support of the Oil and Gas Development in Russia: What Price?” (February 
2012), 36; EY, "Global Oil and Gas Tax Guide," (January 2015), 517-8. 
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the activity of these players in the 2000s. Development of the legal framework 
contributed to the securitization of gas, but not oil, supply chains in the 1990s. In the 
oil sub-sector, the legal framework paved the way for asset transfer from the 
government to the private sector and divorced the central government from day-to-
day management. In the gas sub-sector, it encouraged asset consolidation in the hands 
of one state-owned monopoly and linked Gazprom’s mission with the Russian 
national interest, which escalated any threats to the supply chain to the highest level 
of government priorities. In the 2000s, the legal framework granted Rosneft functions 
similar to those of Gazprom, thus replicating gas sub-sector securitization trends in 
the oil sub-sector. Finally, arising from the imperfect legal system and surfacing in 
other aspects of O&G sector performance are the tight control of oil and gas 
resources by the federal government,707 the tension between administrative and civil 
law principles in the tax regime resulting in an ineffective property rights system,708 
and questionable transparency of rules defining government – private sector 
dynamics as well as participation of foreign investors.709 
As the most tangible component of the institutional arrangement, administrative 
arrangements of Russia’s O&G sector enact the core principles of legal and policy 
frameworks by establishing an organizational framework that defines jurisdictional 
boundaries of participating actors and outlines channels of communication between 
them. Administrative arrangements of Russia’s O&G have several defining features, 
which persevered throughout the Soviet regime and were reinforced further in the 
institutional environment of the modern Russian state: centralization and polycentric 
decision-making have always been problematic and made administration of O&G 
supply chains inconsistent; organizational structure has been fraught with conflict 
                                                            
707 Gustafson, Wheel of Fortune, 96; Konoplyanik, Ibid., 32. 
708 Considine and Kerr, Ibid., 305; Adachi, Ibid., 1396-7; Konoplyanik, Ibid., 31. 
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between organizational actors; and organizational origins and history have had a 
visible effect on the behavior of various administrative units. 
The challenges that administrative arrangements encounter stem from the 
characteristics of the broader institutional environment. As a result, the administrative 
arrangements and the institutional environment as a whole have restricted the 
emergence and development of securitizing actors from within the O&G policy arena. 
Aspiring securitizing actors have no choice but seek alliances with actors outside 
O&G policy arena and hierarchically superior to them. Given an already high 
position of the O&G sector on the government agenda, their choices are limited to the 
top leadership of the country: Central Committee and Politburo in the Soviet Union 
and President and presidential administration in Russia. As a result, actions of the 
federal government and policy actors with the mandate specific to the O&G sector 
are generally closely coordinated, and emergence of policy brokers or policy 
entrepreneurs as securitizing actors is unlikely. 
 
6.2.3.2 Referent Object Performance 
The evolution of Russia’s O&G sector from 1968 to 2015 can be divided into three 
periods. The first period encompasses the Soviet era up to 1991 and is characterized 
by absolute dominance of the state represented by ministries and their subordinate 
units. During this period, there was no distinction between policy-makers in charge of 
policy formulation, implementation and evaluation, and operators in charge of O&G 
supply chains. The second period coincides with economic reforms and market 
liberalization (1991 – 1999). This period gave rise to two major novelties in the 
Russian oil sub-sector: private and foreign participation. The gas sub-sector 
experienced far less dramatic changes; the monopoly of the gas ministry, transformed 
into a state-owned company Gazprom, was preserved. This was also the time when 
Russia’s O&G sector had to familiarize itself with multiple levels of government 
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taxation. The third period (2000 – 2015) is associated with the ascent of national 
champions, state-owned O&G companies, through aggressive private asset take-
overs. Rosneft and Gazprom – major national champions in the O&G sector – have 
both benefited significantly from favorable policy and legal frameworks since the 
early 2000s. However, Gazprom, which initially held monopoly rights on all 
components of the national gas supply chain, is now facing credible competition from 
fellow NOC Rosneft and independent gas producers. 
Absolute State Dominance (1968 – 1991) 
The special place of oil and gas resources in fueling (production) and financing 
(exports) the development of the Soviet Union led to an enduring inseparability of the 
O&G sector from state performance. Prior to 1991, the close association of the 
sector’s successes and failures with those of the Soviet state resulted in the complete 
subordination of the sector to the state annual and five-year plans at the expense of 
sector-specific challenges710 such as mounting inefficiencies and rising costs. 
In effect, the government “treated minerals in the ground as free goods.”711 “No value 
added or profits were accrued” along the supply chain, with local oil enterprises being 
“reimbursed for [their] incurred costs” and rents pooled together into a single pool of 
finances by the central government.712 The single most important measure of 
performance used to be (un-)met production objectives. In the absence of policies 
designed to curb demand and promote conservation, production targets were 
constantly growing. As a result, since the late 1970s, multiple consecutive crises of 
missed targets have been tearing the oil industry apart, but solutions were short-term, 
                                                            
710 Alexander Nazaroff, "The Soviet Oil Industry," Russian Review 1, no. 1 (1941), 86; Iain F. Elliot, The 
Soviet energy balance: natural gas, other fossil fuels, and alternative power sources (New York: 
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additional investment was wasted on wrong projects,713 and disrupted investment did 
not help either714; finally, the real sources of crises rooted in the institutional 
environment were ignored. (See Section 6.2.1.2) 
By the early 1980s, a constant atmosphere of emergency in the oil sub-sector715 
allowed major actors in the gas industry, which until then had remained in the 
shadow of the oil industry, to exploit the perception of insecure oil supply chains in 
order to promote natural gas as a reliable replacement for oil. In other words, the gas 
industry securitized oil supply chains for its own benefit including increased attention 
from the political elite and enlarged investment. Nevertheless, limited by many of the 
same problems originating from the institutional environment similar to the oil 
industry, the gas industry could not react fast enough to a sudden advantage: 
investment could not be absorbed fully and some large projects were prioritized over 
smaller yet essential ones, field services were delayed, and infrastructure was 
insufficient. 
Privatization (1991 – 1999) 
In the 1990s, the oil and gas sub-sectors appeared to take different routes in their 
respective relationships with the state. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia 
embarked on the road of oil market liberalization and, at the same time, gas industry 
consolidation in the hands of the state. In the oil sector, the decision was made to 
transform state-owned oil enterprises into joint stock companies and gradually 
transfer ownership from the government to private shareholders. The gas ministry, 
with its assets and system of pipelines, was to be kept intact under a state enterprise – 
Gazprom, which was responsible for 92% of gas production in 1999.716 By the late 
1990s, dozens of private vertically integrated oil companies and one gas company 
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had taken center stage as the major players of the Russian O&G sector (See Table 
6.2). 
Table 6.2: Key Players in Russia’s Oil and Gas Sector (1991 – 1999) 
 1991 - 1992 1993 - 1994 1995 - 1997 1998 - 1999 
Oil 
LUKOIL LUKOIL LUKOIL LUKOIL 
Rosneft Rosneft Rosneft Rosneft 
Zarubezhneft Zarubezhneft Zarubezhneft Zarubezhneft 
Bashneft Bashneft Bashneft Bashneft 
Tatneft Tatneft Tatneft Tatneft 
Surgutneftegas Surgutneftegas Surgutneftegas Surgutneftegas 
 YUKOS YUKOS YUKOS 
 Slavneft Slavneft Slavneft 
 Eastern Oil Co.   
 Orenburg Oil Co. Orenburg Oil Co. Orenburg Oil Co. 
 Siberia Far-East Oil Siberia Far-East Oil  
  TNK TNK 





Transneft Transneft Transneft Transneft 
 Transnefteproduct Transnefteproduct Transnefteproduct 
   CPC 
Gas 
Gazprom Gazprom Gazprom Gazprom 
Itera Itera Itera Itera 
 Novafininvest Novafininvest Novafininvest 
 Northgas Northgas Northgas 
Source: Author   
Notes: state-owned company   
 
CPC – Caspian Pipeline Consortium 
Gas transportation is not included as it remained unchanged in 1991 – 1999, under control of 
Gazprom 
 
The oil business “was a money-losing proposition”717 throughout the last decade of 
the 20th century. It was hindered by the relatively low international oil prices and the 
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shortcomings of immature domestic institutional arrangements. Limitations of the 
institutional arrangements surfaced in daily activities as inconsistent policy directives, 
poorly conceived legislation and multi-level, multi-agency fiscal mechanisms. The 
reform of the economic system was ongoing, but newly created companies were 
expected to make money and contribute to federal and regional government budgets. 
The fact that O&G sellers and buyers were constrained by the same institutional 
environment was largely ignored. Even when companies were able to deliver 
production, their customers were not able to participate in transactions in the absence 
of basic legal and financial instruments such as cash, loans, and secure property 
rights. In these conditions, oligarchs heading the oil companies found numerous 
loopholes and flourished, but performance of the oil sub-sector as a whole was 
disappointing. As a result, the non-payment problem became commonplace,718 oil 
field equipment located in the former USSR countries was no longer available,719 and 
the desperate federal government had to turn to rent sharing720 giving rise to the 
virtual economy. 
Oil production collapsed by 1998, but the gas sub-sector, that had been largely 
isolated from the reforms of the 1990s sustained production levels throughout the 
decade (See Figure 6.4). Gazprom had little to worry about as it enjoyed numerous 
government subsidies, a privileged position as a natural monopoly and full control of 
gas pipeline infrastructure for domestic distribution and exports. However, even 
though a slowly growing number of independent gas producers were not strong 
competition, by the late 1990s there were talks about privatizing and unbundling 
Gazprom. 
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Figure 6.4: Fossil Fuel Production in RSFSR/Russian Federation (1940 – 2014) 
 
Data Source: Central Statistical Directorate (1940 – 1989), Federal State Statistics Service (1990 – 
2014) 
Notes: ‘Crude Oil’ includes gas condensate 
 
Tax payment was a new responsibility for O&G companies, while tax administration 
was a new function for the state. Each side had no blueprints and had to develop an 
efficient model of behavior by trial and error. Naturally, companies were looking for 
ways to avoid taxes, whereas the government was trying to perfect the system of tax 
collection. As the overall economic situation in Russia deteriorated through the 
1990s, the number of taxes imposed on oil companies increased from four in 
November 1990 to ten in 1994721 totaling about 62% of the average domestic 
wholesale price722. Moreover, it was the revenue that was taxed and not the profit 
meaning that taxes could exceed a company’s profits in a given year.723 Thus, the 
taxation system in the 1990s largely ignored companies’ costs, profitability, 
differences in geographical conditions, and quality of reserves. 
Securitization of neither oil nor gas supply chains was on the sector’s agenda during 
this period. In the oil sub-sector, new players were busy consolidating their assets and 
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devising ways around government regulations. In general, short-term horizons and 
prospects of easy profits from developing resources inherited from the Soviet past as 
well as asset stripping discouraged long-term planning, investment in exploration and 
concerns for supply chains beyond personal interest. In the gas sub-sector, Gazprom 
was on a mission to preserve its monopoly, and any signs of insecure gas supply 
chains would damage its reputation. Hence, attempts to securitize oil and gas supply 
chains would attract government attention, which was undesirable for the O&G sector 
players. At the same time, the federal and regional governments were preoccupied 
with far more pressing issues like keeping the economy afloat and preserving 
integrity of Russia and had no resources to devote to the management of the O&G 
sector. 
National Champions (2000 – 2015) 
The credit for improving oil sector performance is usually attributed to the new 
federal government under President Vladimir Putin who assumed power in 2000. 
However, the oil sector had started to recover in 1999 due to climbing world oil 
prices and devaluation of the Russian currency in the previous year and, as a 
consequence, renewed investment into upstream activities. The election of Putin 
started a new era of political centralization and leadership of state-owned companies 
in the management of natural resources. 
During this period, the state reemerged as the dominant figure in the O&G sector 
proving that the link established during Soviet times was deeply institutionalized and 
simply masked by the chaos of the 1990s.724 As such, the establishment of national 
champions in the early 2000s cannot be equated with nationalization of the O&G 
sector.725 Rather, it was a way to recapture control of the sector by transferring power 
                                                            
724 The ownership of oil and gas resources has always remained in the hands of the state. Also, although 
new companies were nominally private, they were a product of the redistribution of government-owned 
assets so as to be ultimately controlled by insiders. 
725 Markku Kivinen, “Public and Business Actors in Russia’s Energy Policy,” in Russia's energy 
policies: national, interregional and global levels, ed., Pami Aalto (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 
2012), 48-9. 
  257
from disobedient oligarchs into the hands of those willing to “act as agents of the 
state and adhere strictly to the goals set out by [the]… state officials.”726 The growth 
of private O&G companies was curtailed, but the majority of key players of the 1990s 
remain influential today (See Table 6.3). 
Table 6.3: Key Players in Russia’s Oil and Gas Sector (2000 – 2015) 




LUKOIL LUKOIL LUKOIL LUKOIL 
Rosneft Rosneft Rosneft Rosneft 
YUKOS YUKOS   
Slavneft Slavneft Slavneft  
RussNeft RussNeft RussNeft RussNeft 
Bashneft Bashneft Bashneft Bashneft 
Tatneft Tatneft Tatneft Tatneft 
Surgutneftegas Surgutneftegas Surgutneftegas Surgutneftegas 
TNK TNK-BP TNK-BP  
Sibneft Gazprom Neft Gazprom Neft Gazprom Neft 
Zarubezhneft Zarubezhneft Zarubezhneft Zarubezhneft 
 Neftisa Neftisa Neftisa 









n Transneft Transneft Transneft Transneft 
Transnefteproduct Transnefteproduct   




Gazprom Gazprom Gazprom Gazprom 
Itera Itera Itera  
Novafininvest Novatek Novatek Novatek 
Northgas Northgas   
Source: Author   
Notes: state-owned company   
 
Gas transportation is not included as it remained unchanged in 1991 – 1999, under control of 
Gazprom 
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The fiscal burden on the O&G companies increased significantly in the 2000s. By 
2004 oil companies were taxed ten times more than in 1999.727 The current taxation 
regime, as of 2016, consists of mineral extraction tax (MET), corporate profit tax and 
export duties.728 Although the fiscal system is still evolving, the state has learnt from 
its earlier mistakes and is designing a more flexible, profit-oriented taxation system 
that by 2017 is supposed to take into account companies’ performance, as well as 
differences in oil and gas field location and efficiency. But challenges remain; for 
instance, many subsidies are given out on the basis of specific projects rather than 
systematically. This tendency is damaging to the overall effectiveness of the fiscal 
system.729  
As of 2015, there are over 325 oil and gas producers in Russia, but about half of them 
are subsidiaries of or have substantial amount of their shares in state-owned 
companies.730 These include large players such as Gazprom Neft and Novatek. In 
addition to Rosneft and Gazprom, the regional and federal governments in part own 
Bashneft, Tatneft and Zarubezhneft (See Table 6.4). Among over 150 privately 
owned companies only a handful are vertically integrated including LUKOIL, 
Surgutneftegas, RussNeft, and Neftisa. Five to eight largest companies731 have 
dominated Russia’s oil market since the early 2000s (See Figure 6.5) having supplied 
95% of crude oil in 2004732 and about 70% in 2010.733 As of 2013, state-owned 
companies provided more than 60% of the oil supply (See Figure 6.6). The monopoly 
of state-owned companies in the gas sub-sector is even more pronounced with almost 
90% of production originating from Gazprom and Rosneft (See Figure 6.6). But 
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Gazprom is facing growing competition from independent gas producers, and its 
share of produced gas has declined from 94% in 1998734 to 75-77% in 2012.735 
Table 6.4: Ownership Structure of Russia’s Major Oil and Gas Companies (as of July 
2016) 
Company Key Shareholders 
Rosneft1 
Rosneftegaz* – 75.2% 
BP – 19.75% 
Gazprom2 
Federal Agency for State Property Management* – 38.37% 
Rosneftegaz* – 10.97% 
Rosgazifikatsiya* – 0.89% 
ADR holders – 28.39% 
Zarubezhneft3 Federal Agency for State Property Management* – 100% 
Bashneft4 
Federal Agency for State Property Management* – 50.08% 
Ministry of Land and Property Relations of the Bashkortostan Republic* – 25% 
Tatneft5 
National Settlement Depository (under Moscow Exchange) – 59.55% 
Central Depository of the Tatarstan Republic* - 30.45% 
Notes: * - entitites representing or controlled by the Russian government 
Sources: 1 RBC, “Rosneft.” 
2 Gazprom, “Shares.” 
3 Zarubezhneft. “About Company.” 
4 Bashneft, “Ownership Structure.” 
5 Tatneft, “Structure of Capital.” 
 
Figure 6.5: Oil Production by Major Russian Companies in 2013 (million tonnes) 
 
Notes: Company names in bold represent state-owned companies 
 
                                                          
734 Sagers, Ibid., 658. 















TOTAL: 468.4 million tonnes 
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Notes: State-owned oil producers include Rosneft, Gazprom Neft, Tatneft and Zarubezhneft 
 Private oil producers include LUKOIL, Surgutneftegaz, Bashneft and RussNeft 
 State-owned natural gas producers include Gazprom and Rosneft 
 Private natural gas producer is Novatek 
 
Rosneft and Gazprom are the principal actors in Russia’s O&G sector. Gazprom 
stepped into the 21st century as a clear frontrunner. But, as Rosneft expanded its 
resource base and gained more political support, Gazprom’s advantage has declined. 
The two companies have acquired interests in each other’s sub-sectors, and compete 
fiercely for access to new promising resources in Russia’s Far East. At the same time, 
Rosneft is actively engaging Gazprom’s competitors736 in a campaign for access to 
domestic and export gas pipelines.737 Both companies are now equally important 
national champions in the O&G sector. While Rosneft has been in ascent since 2008, 
Gazprom still has a status of “a federal monopoly,”738 “an integral part of the Kremlin 
administration,”739 and “it is hard to tell where Putin begins and Gazprom ends.”740 
                                                          
736 However, Demakova and Godzimirski (2012) argue that permission given to Novatek to export LNG 
from the Yamal peninsula should not be taken as a sign of gas exports liberalization. According to the 
authors the reason Novatek is an exception rather than the trend setter is that “Gennadiy Timchenko, 
who had good political connections, acquired a significant portion of shares in Novatek.” (Ekaterina 
Demakova and Jakub M. Godzimirski, “Russian External Energy Strategy: Opportunities and 
Constraints,” in Dynamics of energy governance in Europe and Russia, eds., Caroline Kuzemko, Andrei 
Belyi, Andreas Goldthau and Michael F. Keating (Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2012), 159) 
737 Hedlund, Ibid., 69-70; Belyi and Talus, Ibid., 104; Aalto, Ibid., 23-4, Goldman, Ibid., 192. 
738 Aalto, Ibid., 22. 
739 Hedlund, Ibid., 95. 






Crude Oil Natural Gas 
  261
In theory, competition between SOEs is supposed to be beneficial for the 
development of a competitive market. In practice, the privileged position of these two 
companies suppresses participation from the private sector and creates a “quasi-
market” where only state and limited private interests are represented.741 But the 
challenge of balancing state and corporate interests is a common problem among 
SOEs worldwide. As Rosneft and Gazprom gain experience in the international 
market and their shareholding structures and resource bases diversify, the two 
companies are becoming “more commercially oriented.”742 Dependence on the state 
is not always straightforward, and at times makes these companies vulnerable to 
political battles and swings in leadership priorities. 
The national champions’ rivalry goes deeper than relations between individual SOEs, 
revealing oil vs gas dynamics in the sector. Preference for outcompeting one another 
instead of cooperating goes back to the mid-1950s when gas gained autonomy from 
the oil sector, the 1980s when gas officials used weaknesses of oil supply to their 
advantage, and the 1990s when the gas industry was isolated from otherwise 
overarching economic and administrative reforms. Moreover, the basic characteristics 
of oil and gas sub-sectors differ. Oil supply is more limited than that of gas,743 
produced oil is destined mainly for export and “pays the bills abroad”, while gas is 
for domestic consumption and “subsidizes the economy at home,”744 and finally, the 
domestic oil market is integrated745 while the gas market consists of two distinct 
regions.746 
Securitization of oil and especially gas supply chains has been progressing during the 
third period of the O&G sector evolution (2000 – 2015). The process was triggered 
                                                            
741 Legvold and Grace, Ibid., 65; Malisheva et al., Ibid., 150; Anashkin and Kryukov, Ibid., 19. 
742 Mike Olsen, “The Future of National Oil Companies in Russia and How They May Improve Their 
Global Competitiveness,” Houston Journal of International Law 35, no. 3 (2013), 619-20. 
743 Gray, Ibid., 6. 
744 Gustafson, Wheel of Fortune, 3. 
745 Kryukov, The Institutional Structure, 204. 
746 Professor Paik discusses two regional gas markets in Russia: West Siberia vs. East Siberia & Far East 
(See Paik, Ibid., 77). 
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by the poor performance of the sector in the 1990s, supported by changes in the 
institutional environment (i.e., centralization and administrative reform among 
others), and reinforced by the policy actors’ manipulation of cultural symbols pulled 
from embedded institutions (i.e., Soviet Union nostalgia and the theme of Russia’s 
greatness). Both ends of the two supply chains – upstream O&G producers in Russia 
as well as buyers of Russian O&G abroad – have exhibited signs of securitization 
since the early 2000s. 
Securitization of the supply side involves foreign O&G companies doing business in 
Russia. Foreign participation was severely curbed compared to the 1990s out of fears 
that Russian O&G resources were handed out below their actual value and exploited 
at the expense of Russia’s national interest. Hence, foreign interest was seen as a 
threat to Russian O&G supply chains. First, the use of PSAs as a mechanism for 
cooperation with foreign companies was abandoned. Next, legislation on strategic 
O&G fields was introduced limiting access to the largest and most promising O&G 
fields to Russian companies. Throughout 2000s – 2010s three existing PSAs 
(Sakhalin I, Sakhalin II, Kharyaga) and one strategic partnership (TNK-BP), which 
all included foreign participation have been transformed into purely Russian or 
Russian interest-dominated ventures. Gas projects were first, and oil projects 
followed. In 2006 – 2009, Gazprom obtained large shares from Shell, Mitsui and 
Mitsubishi in Sakhalin II, from TNK-BP in the Kovykta gas field and other smaller 
gas projects, and a stake in Sakhalin I from ExxonMobil and partners.747 In 2012, 
Rosneft acquired TNK-BP, and in exchange for its 50% share in the company BP 
increased its stake in Rosneft from 12.5% to 19.75%.748 Most recently, in January 
                                                            
747 Hedlund, Ibid., 70 – 2. 
748 Rupert Neate, "Rosneft takes over TNK-BP in $55bn deal," The Guardian (March 21, 2013). 
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2016, TOTAL decreased its share in Kharyaga to 20%, having transferred half of its 
interest to Zarubezhneft.749 
Securitization of the demand side of O&G supply chains concerns customers of 
Russian oil and gas abroad. Shrinking demand for fossil fuels750 and diversification of 
foreign supplies in Europe, the major buyer of Russian oil and gas for decades, is 
perceived as a threat to Russian supply chains. Europe’s access to LNG as an 
alternative to pipeline gas and incorporation of renewables into the energy mix, and 
Asia’s growing demand for oil and gas are making Russian companies rethink their 
customer base priorities.751 However, only the largest and most profitable companies 
can afford to make bold decisions in conquering new markets. In Russia these 
companies are Rosneft and Gazprom. Since their success is closely linked with the 
prestige of the Russian state, they are too important to fail in negotiations with the 
potential customers. As a result, such negotiations often involve high level officials 
from the Russian government. Goals often expand beyond pure business and profit 
into the realm of foreign policy and produce very expensive deals. Examples of 
Russian companies’ engagement in projects that are loss-making include Gazprom’s 
Blue Stream and Nord Stream, Rosneft’s ESPO pipeline, and Transneft’s crude oil 
deliveries to China. 
 
6.2.3.3 Summary 
The institutional arrangement governing Russia’s O&G supply chains are very young 
and still evolving. Their lack of sophistication is reflected in the dominance of 
administrative as opposed to civil law principles, short-term as opposed to long-term 
                                                            
749 "Russia: Total transfers 20% interest and operatorship of Kharyaga to Zarubezhneft," TOTAL 
(January 21, 2016). 
750 European demand for fossil fuels is declining not only due to flattening economic growth and 
maturity of EU economies, but also due to new environmental policies. Regardless of the origins, 
declining O&G demand poses a threat to Russia’s exports of these resources. See Sharples, Ibid., 686. 
751 More attention is paid to developing resources in East Siberia and Russia’s Far East. See Bahgat, 
Ibid., 165 and Paik, Ibid., 28-9. 
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policy priorities, and tension as opposed to cooperation between the sector’s 
administrators. These characteristics present challenges for both oil and gas sub-
sectors despite apparent differences in all three components of the institutional 
arrangement between the two sub-sectors since the early 1990s. Additionally, oil and 
gas sub-sectors have one important commonality – the prominence of the federal 
government and the leading role of state-owned companies. Thus, individually, each 
of the three components of the institutional arrangement does not predetermine 
securitization of O&G supply chains. But, given the context of Russia’s institutional 
environment, together, they create settings conducive to producing a dominant 
securitizing actor. 
Between 1968 and 2015, Russia’s O&G sector has gone through three very different 
periods. The overall performance of the oil and gas supply chains as the referent 
object of this study has been affected by organizational and institutional factors more 
than by the physical availability of resources. 
Securitization trends in the O&G sector were analyzed with regards to each of the 
three periods. First, in the late 1970s – 1980s, the gas industry securitized oil supply 
chains for its own benefit including increased attention from political elites and 
enlarged investment. In the 1990s, securitization of both oil and gas supply chains 
was on hold as it was not on the government and private sector agenda. Finally, 
securitization of oil and especially gas supply chains has been in full swing since the 
early 2000s. On the supply side, the role of foreign participants was significantly 
curbed. On the demand side, Russian companies are trying to expand their customer 
base in order to preserve their world market share. 
Common to all three periods, and an important aspect of Russia’s O&G sector 
securitization are attempts by the oil sub-sector to securitize gas supply chains and 
vice versa. In Russia, oil and gas sub-sectors have historically been opponents trying 
  265
to outcompete one another. When they cannot outperform each other, they resort to 
securitization in order to expose the rival’s vulnerability. 
In addition to the ‘oil vs. gas’ dynamic, securitizing actors can also emerge from 
other sub-sectors of the energy complex, including hydro, nuclear and coal power. 
They would argue that O&G supply chains are more threatened and therefore 
unreliable than their respective supply chains. This is a way for the actors 
representing other fuels to promote their interests. Their ultimate objective is not to 
protect O&G supply chains, but to make sure that they remain threatened and 
insecure to eventually be replaced with more reliable sources. 
 
6.3 Key Findings 
Detailed examination of upstream O&G supply chains in the securitization 
framework reveals several insights about the securitization process in general and the 
Russian context in particular. First, there is a clear distinction between three different 
groups of actors within Russia’s O&G policy arena – central level, regional level and 
peripheral actors, but interdependence between them is almost non-existent. Hence, 
the highest-ranking central level policy-makers dominate the policy arena despite its 
apparent heterogeneity. Similar to China’s case study, it challenges the assumption of 
this study’s securitization framework that dominant decision-makers are more likely 
to originate from a homogenous policy arena than from a heterogeneous one. 
Second, this case study provides an example of the policy arena that restrains the 
emergence of securitizing actors from within the ranks of its actors, but cannot resist 
securitization from the institutional environment. This observation has two 
implications. One is that national institutional environments that are relatively young 
and inexperienced are more vulnerable to the rise of dominant decision-makers. 
Another one is that when the securitization process originates from the institutional 
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environment, as opposed to a specific policy arena, it is likely to be more enduring 
because institutional path dependence would make it hard for the institutional 
arrangement at the policy arena level to make any changes to the widely accepted 
course of action. 
Third, from the analysis of the institutional ecosystem, it is evident that Russia’s 
institutional environment is struggling to reconcile the differences between the values 
of embedded institutions and novel characteristics of the institutional arrangements 
specific to O&G supply chains. The case of Russia’s O&G supply chains governance 
is also demonstrative of how the institutional ecosystem is in many ways responsible 
for shaping policy actors and sector participants’ behavior.  
Fourth, performance of O&G supply chains in the case of the Soviet Union and 
Russia shows that the abundance of resources cannot substitute for the organizational 
and institutional factors necessary to ensure successful performance of supply chains. 
Also, in the Russian context, oil and gas sub-sectors see each other as competitors, 
which often negatively affects the performance of the overall O&G sector. 
Finally, the analysis of policy, legal and organizational components of the 
institutional arrangement demonstrates that securitization is a process and not an 
event. For instance, securitization of Russia’s gas supply chains was already evident 
in the legal framework in the 1990s, but was not yet exhibited by the sub-sector’s 
performance. Thus, there was a lag time between implemented securitization 
measures and modified sector performance. 
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Chapter 7: Discussion & Conclusions 
Energy security is a matter of concern for all national governments, and it is a 
concept that attracts attention of international organizations, policy analysts and 
academics alike. Despite being an issue of high interest, energy security has a wide 
range of interpretations, and no agreement exists on how it can be best defined. As a 
result, this study took a more focused approach to ‘energy’ by exploring two of the 
key energy supply chains – oil and gas, and examined how governance issues 
relevant to these two supply chains are framed as ‘security’ issues, or how oil and gas 
supply chains are securitized. 
The analysis of securitization in the theoretical framework made four significant 
contributions: 
 enhancement of the original securitization theory by reinterpreting the concept of 
securitization as a policy process and addressing five major sources of its criticism 
through the multidisciplinary approach; 
 methodological advancement of the understanding of securitization processes; 
 systematization of existing knowledge on the governance of oil and gas supply 
chains in China, Canada, and Russia; and 
 in-depth exploration of securitization processes in these three national contexts. 
While case-specific findings were discussed at the end of each case study chapter 
(Chapter 4 – 6), this chapter examines the findings from the comparative analysis of 
the three case studies (Section 7.1). It also discusses valuable insights from the 
theoretical framework as the basis for analyzing the case studies (Section 7.2). It also 
addresses the future research agenda by specifying research propositions, limitations 
of the theoretical framework, and avenues for future research (Section 7.3). Finally, 
the chapter discusses the theoretical and policy implications of this study (Section 
7.4). 
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7.1 Significant Case Study Findings 
Equal attention to oil and gas supply chains as two referent objects co-existing within 
the same national context presents a rare opportunity for the analysis of the same set 
of antecedent conditions resulting in either converging or diverging performance of 
two dependent variables. Three case studies then create three sets of contexts for the 
exploration of six supply chains, which is useful for deriving both within- and 
between-case insights. 
Introductory overviews of each country’s O&G sectors already suggest differences in 
the management of oil and gas supply chains. In China, oil and gas resources were 
united under a single institutional arrangement umbrella until the early 2000s. This is 
when natural gas started to play an increasingly important role in China’s energy mix 
and national economy. As a result, China is building up legal and policy frameworks 
for natural gas independent of oil supply chains. In Canada, oil and gas can be seen as 
two independent sectors as they have been equally prioritized since the 1950s. 
Although policy actors and sector participants of oil and gas sectors overlap, they 
follow separate policy and regulatory guidelines. Similar to Canada, oil and gas 
supply chains in Russia have been independent from one another since the 1950s. But 
unlike in Canada, Russia’s oil and gas sector participants see one another as 
competitors. The differences in treating oil and gas as a single sector or as two 
independent sub-sectors are predetermined by physical resource endowment, but they 
are also perpetuated by the established institutional arrangements over time. 
Ultimately, understanding these differences is important for the specification of a 
referent object and its performance in securitization processes. 
Relevant to oil and gas sector players are country-specific timelines of sector 
development (See Table 7.2). China and Russia took a similar path at different times, 
transitioning from a state dominated (until 1982 in China and until 1991 in Russia) to 
a NOC-centered (1982 – Present in China and 2000 – Present in Russia) O&G sector. 
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The two countries also have a sizeable presence of domestic private companies. 
While foreign and private domestic participation has been on the rise in China since 
the 2010s, the former has been declining and the latter stagnating in Russia since the 
2000s. Although the Canadian government created an NOC (1976 – 1991), Petro-
Canada was never the leader of the O&G sector. Instead, foreign (1947 – 1973, 1984 
– Present) or domestic (1973 – 1984) private companies have dominated Canada’s 
O&G sector. 
Table 7.1: Stages of O&G Sector Development in China, Canada and Russia (1947 – Present) 
CHINA 
 State Dominance Transition to NOCs Corp* SOE Reform Value Maintenance 
CANADA 
 Int’lization** Canadianization Liberalization  
RUSSIA 
   Absolute State Domination Privatization National Champions 
      
                            





As the evolution of O&G sectors in China, Canada, and Russia demonstrates, all 
three had experience with NOCs. Nevertheless, the rationale behind their 
establishment, as well as their roles as policy actors and sector players differ 
significantly between China and Russia on the one hand and Canada on the other. In 
China and Russia, the NOCs were created through redistribution of ministerial assets, 
and they inherited some bureaucratic functions in the management of oil and gas 
supply chains. China and Russia’s NOCs enjoy access to the best quality resources, 
take advantage of continuous government support and are reluctant to face 
competition from the private sector. These features make them very different from 
Petro-Canada. The latter was created to develop the least attractive oil and gas 
resources, operated in a liberalized market, and benefited from the federal 
government’s subsidies mainly to offset the higher costs it incurred. Thus, although 
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united under one umbrella term, NOCs might serve different purposes and behave 
differently in their respective environments. 
The boundaries of each period in O&G sector development correspond752 to changes 
in or perceptions about resource availability, changes in the institutional arrangement 
(legal, policy, administrative) or significant transformations in the institutional 
environment. In China, the transition from ministries to NOCs initiated in 1982, the 
beginning of NOCs’ corporatization in 1993, and the start of the SOE reform in 1998 
are all directly related to implemented changes in the institutional arrangement and 
the country’s switch to a net oil importer status. In Russia, large-scale privatization of 
the 1990s was a result of drastic changes in the institutional environment and 
introduction of national champions in the early 2000s required a new legal and policy 
bases. 
However, boundaries between different periods in Canada’s O&G sector are less 
straightforward because the sector is more organic. The chain of events linked to 
securitization – the start of Canadianization in 1973, assumption of a net importer of 
oil in 1975, and the establishment of the NOC in 1976 – unfolded relatively quickly. 
However, the return to liberalization in 1984 and dismantling of the NOC in 1992 had 
a slower pace. Thus, the evidence from the three case studies suggests that the gap 
between a change in the institutional environment or the institutional arrangement’s 
components and the adjustment in the sector’s behavior is smaller in less diverse 
O&G sectors and more securitized supply chains. 
Unlike the perception about the availability of supplies, the country’s 
exporter/importer status does not predetermine the likelihood and intensity of 
securitization. An exporter and an importer can be equally concerned with different 
ends of supply chains – supply vs. demand, or both at the same time. It is the 
                                                            
752 but are not necessarily caused by (e.g., Canada’s O&G sector entered the period of Canadianization 
in 1973, and Canada became a net importer of oil in 1975; not the other way around). 
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combination of factors originating from the institutional ecosystem, the policy arena 
and supply chains performance that play a part in initiating and sustaining 
securitization processes. Hence, as a net importer of oil, China chose to securitize its 
oil supply chains in 1949 - 1972, while Canada did not prior to 1968. Similarly, as net 
exporters of oil, Canada and Russia did not securitize their oil supply chains in the 
1990s, but Russia securitized it prior to the 1990s and after 2000. 
Perceptions also matter when it comes to response to crises. Shaped by societal norms 
and values, influenced by the organizational and personal objectives, interests and 
beliefs, and a function of the sector’s performance, different perceptions result in 
different reactions to crises. The nature of a crisis itself is less relevant than the 
characteristics of the policy arena and supply chain performance in defining potential 
threats. For example, the oil crisis of 1973 had distinct effects on China, Canada, and 
Russia, all net exporters of oil at the time. China was self-sufficient in crude oil and 
oil products, and it also benefited from exports of these energy resources to neighbors 
in the region. Hence, neither China’s O&G sector, nor policy arena governing supply 
chains experienced any major negative impact from the oil crisis. At the same time, in 
Canada, perceptions of decreased security of supply were taking hold, bureaucratic 
and party politics worsened the fears of threatened supply chains, and a number of 
regulations extending the federal government’s control were implemented. In these 
conditions, the oil crisis served as a multiplier of existing concerns and triggered 
securitization of both oil and gas supply chains. Like China, the Soviet Union was 
actively engaged in the oil and gas trade with its neighbors. Not a member of the 
OPEC, the USSR used the oil crisis to its advantage, having replaced the Middle East 
as the major oil supplier for Europe. 
Beyond the sector and policy arena characteristics, certain traits of the institutional 
environments are worth noting. In theory, federal political systems of Canada and 
Russia are similar. In both countries, regional units (13 provinces and territories, and 
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85 subjects) draw their powers from their respective constitutions. In reality, 
Canadian provinces are much more powerful in the management of oil and gas policy 
arena and supply chains than Russian subjects. The single biggest difference is the 
source of legal and fiscal regulations: in Canada, provinces collect the majority of 
taxes; in Russia, O&G-rich regions collect zero taxes. In China, where provinces are 
theoretically under tighter central government control than in Russia, provincial 
governments have more say in the governance of oil and gas supply chains. Active 
central – regional government interaction results in the diversification of interests, 
and ensures balance of power between securitizing actors and policy stakeholders. In 
the institutional environments where regional interests are silenced, the rise of a 
dominant decision-maker, whose actions are unchecked by the policy arena 
participants, is more likely. The threat of an uncontrolled securitizing actor is even 
higher when a dominant decision-maker emerges from the broader institutional 
environment rather than the policy arena governing O&G supply chains. 
All of the above findings are relevant only to the examined case studies, and 
conclusions are not generalized beyond the three institutional environments. 
However, these cases were analyzed in the framework designed for the purpose of 
uncovering securitization processes in the governance of oil and gas supply chains 
with a number of questions in mind. As such, the analysis is systematic, allows for 
comparisons, and can help draw generalizable insights about the elements of the 
theoretical framework – type I, type II, and type III inputs. These insights are 
analyzed below based on the components of the central research question: two 
questions related to Type I, four questions on Type II, and two questions relevant to 
Type III inputs. 
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7.2 Theoretical Framework Insights: Influential Variables and Generalizable Conclusions 
7.2.1 Elements of Research Question 
7.2.1.1 Type I Inputs 
Q1.1: Do quantifiable and easily observable trends affect the process of 
securitization more than qualitative and barely visible trends? 
Depending on policy-makers’ perceptions, both quantitative and qualitative trends 
can be equally powerful. In China and the Soviet Union/Russia, a lot of policy 
decisions were driven by the fundamental ideas embedded into the levels of the 
institutional ecosystem deeper than where trends originate. In China, the concept of 
“self-reliance” and strategy of “growth at all costs” had much more influence on 
decision-making and in many ways determined political and economic trends. In 
Russia, the outside world is perceived as a threat to the Russian state, which presents 
an opportunity to securitize O&G supply chains that are vital for the state’s well-
being. Hence, the evidence from Russia and China illustrates the power of qualitative, 
subjective and barely visible trends over evidence-based (quantitative) decision-
making. However, in Canada, government forecasts providing quantitative outlooks 
for oil and gas trends have had a significant impact on O&G policy-making known 
for its focus on evidence and economic indicators. In the 1970s, pessimistic forecasts 
about the state of Canada’s O&G reserves were comparable with external triggers of 
the first and second oil shocks in their combined effect on putting a securitization 
process in motion. 
 
Q1.2: What are the indicators of securitization originating from the 
institutional environment as opposed to the institutional arrangement? 
As discussed in all three case studies, the institutional environment can either 
constrain, or enable securitization processes. In Canada, it is dominated by 
complementary and overlapping institutions, which create heterogeneity and tend to 
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constrain securitization. However, the experience of Canada’s oil and gas supply 
chains governance demonstrates that even institutions historically opposed to 
securitization can be vulnerable to the emergence of a strong securitizing actor. In 
order to achieve its securitization objective, the federal government manipulated the 
meaning of a deeply embedded cultural concept of self-reliance. 
China and Russia have significant experience with securitized oil and gas supply 
chains and represent two contrasting examples of securitization originating from the 
institutional arrangement (China) and the institutional environment (Russia). In 
China, the nature of the institutional environment dominated by the CCP ensures the 
presence of this core institutional element in the securitization processes of any policy 
arena and referent object. However, the CCP generally plays a role of an ally to the 
securitization process, when it considers fit to do so, while securitizing actors emerge 
from the policy arenas governing a specific referent object. This was the case with the 
petroleum group of the MPI and later with the NOCs. In Russia, securitizing actors 
originate from the institutional environment, such as the general secretary in the 
USSR and the president of modern Russia. In an environment where horizontal 
linkages between institutions are weak and cooperation is rare, policy stakeholders 
have no means to oppose such a strong securitizing actor. 
7.2.1.2 Type II Inputs 
Q2.1: Can the securitization process move forward if policy actors perceive the 
referent object as threatened, but do not share a common definition of 
threat? 
China and Russia’s case studies suggest that policy actors have to agree that the 
referent object is threatened for the securitization process to be initiated, but they do 
not need to share the understanding of the threat or have common objectives. Every 
policy actor can see a different threat and interpret threats differently, but as long as a 
common perception that the referent object is threatened exists, a securitization 
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process can be initiated. The case studies also clearly demonstrated that in the 
securitization process, policy actors’ initiatives are not directed at eliminating a 
threat. Instead, they are always designed to change the performance of the referent 
object to develop immunity against the threat. Securitization of O&G supply chains 
in Canada took place over a very short period of time (1973 – 1984), but the evidence 
from the analyzed securitization period is in line with the insights from the other two 
case studies. 
 
Q2.2: Do external triggers of securitization incentivize competing policy actors 
in a heterogeneous policy arena to compromise their conflicting beliefs 
and share their resources? 
The evidence from all three case studies points to the negative answer. In China’s oil 
and gas sector, none of the external triggers, including outside policy entrepreneurs, 
systemic perturbations and policy spillovers, appeared to have any particularly 
important role in the securitization process. Entry into the oil and gas policy arena is 
strictly guarded against outsiders. The role of spillovers from other policy arenas has 
also been limited mainly because the petroleum sector was historically one of the 
leading sectors of the entire economy. Systemic perturbations did take place 
including changes in political leadership in China and foreign events such as the 
1973-1974 oil crisis and Iraq war of the early 2000s, but none of these perturbations 
became a single most important trigger of securitization. Rather, one of the internal 
triggers – negotiated agreements – has been prevalent in the context of China’s oil 
and gas policy arena. Nevertheless, these insights hold only if China’s oil and gas 
policy arena can be qualified as heterogeneous. 
None of the external triggers encountered by Canada’s O&G supply chains over the 
course of over 65 years were able to create favorable conditions for a securitization 
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process. There have been no instances of outside policy entrepreneurs. Policy 
spillovers from other economic sectors in the national context did take place, but 
these spillovers were not able to smooth conflicting beliefs and interests of diverse 
policy actors. Systemic perturbations are very common and originate from within the 
institutional environment on a regular basis (i.e., federal elections) as well as from the 
outside (i.e., there were at least 10 major international oil supply disruptions between 
1956 and 2005)753. The combination of the 1973 and 1979 oil crises, and events in 
Canadian domestic politics during the same period were the most significant external 
triggers in the studied time period. However, they were not powerful enough to erase 
differences between the federal and provincial governments for the purposes of a 
smoother securitization process. On the contrary, these triggers had the opposite 
effect and led to non-cooperation and intergovernmental conflict. 
In Russia’s O&G sector, external triggers have not resulted in compromised beliefs 
and shared resources between competing policy arena actors. The appearance of 
outside policy entrepreneurs is not possible due to a strictly guarded entrance to the 
policy arena. Even when policy entrepreneurs succeeded in getting attention of the 
central leadership, which was the case with pro-nuclear and pro-coal coalitions in the 
Soviet Union, it did not contribute to resource mobilization in the O&G policy arena. 
Systemic perturbations were numerous and diverse, ranging from policy arena 
specific crises (oil crises in the late 1970s as well as throughout the 1980s and 1990s) 
to more predictable leadership successions (General Secretaries and presidential 
elections) to unexpected large-scale changes (political environment transition from 
the socialist command economy to a democratic market-based system). Once again, 
they failed to unify the diverse policy arena participants. The role of spillovers from 
other policy arenas has been limited because the O&G sector was one of the leading 
sectors of the national economy. 
                                                            
753 Gordon Laxer, Freezing in the dark: why Canada needs strategic petroleum reserves: a report 
(Edmonton, Alta.: Parkland Institute, 2008), 33-34. 
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Q2.3: Do policy stakeholders have any influence on 
pausing/reversing/advancing a securitization process led by a dominant 
decision-maker? 
According to evidence from all three case studies, policy stakeholders do play an 
important role in the securitization processes led by dominant decision-makers. The 
case study of China demonstrates that even dominant decision-makers care about the 
policy stakeholders’ reaction because the latter have significant influence on the 
ultimate success of the securitization process. Dominant decision-makers cannot 
completely disregard the opinion of other policy stakeholders because they will risk 
losing their power. Canada’s case study clearly demonstrates that strong actions of 
the policy stakeholders opposing dominant decision-maker’s policies can lead to 
changes in the securitizing actor’s behavior and help reverse the securitization 
process. The evidence from Russia is the weakest because the reaction of policy 
stakeholders to the dominant decision-maker’s action is the least visible among the 
three case studies. This is due to the exceptionally strong power of the securitizing 
actors who originate from the institutional environment (as opposed to the oil and gas 
policy arena) and tend to minimize access of unfavorable stakeholders to decision-
making. 
 
Q2.4: Do securitizing actors always try to build a policy core belief consensus 
among policy stakeholders and under what conditions? 
In China’s O&G sector, it is the actions of securitizing actors (the petroleum group 
and NOCs), which worked towards securitizing the referent object at different times. 
As policy entrepreneurs and policy brokers, the two securitizing actors worked 
towards building up support for policies conducive to promoting securitization. As 
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dominant decision-makers, until 2010s NOCs possessed more power and influence 
over other policy actors than before and were less concerned with building a policy 
core belief consensus. However, changes in the legal and policy frameworks 
introduced since 2010s have curbed the power of NOCs. 
Dominant decision-makers in charge of O&G supply chains in the Soviet Union did 
not see the need to build a policy core belief consensus because they perceived their 
own resources as sufficient for moving forward with the securitization process. Policy 
entrepreneurs, whose resources were limited in comparison with the dominant 
decision-makers, were attempting to build a policy core belief consensus. Similarly, 
since 2000, the dominant decision-makers, who initially had less power than their 
predecessors (until 1991), had to ensure that deep core beliefs are shared and only 
then build a policy core belief consensus. 
In Canada, as a securitizing actor, the federal government did not concern itself with 
building a policy core belief consensus; a decision that backfired once the nation-
wide energy strategy was implemented without provincial approval. 
 
7.2.1.3 Type III Inputs 
Q3.1: Does securitization involve changes in all three components of the 
institutional arrangement (legal and policy frameworks, and 
administrative arrangements) relevant to the referent object? 
The evidence from the case studies suggests that changes in all three components of 
institutions do take place, but in different sequence and at different pace. In China, 
securitization by the petroleum group took off after changes in the administrative 
arrangement and increased autonomy of the MPI. During the securitization process of 
the 1960s – 1970s, policy framework changes preceded changes in the legal 
framework. In the case of NOCs as securitizing actors, it was also administrative 
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arrangement modifications that allowed for the ascent of NOCs in the policy arena. 
But this time, policy and legal frameworks underwent reforms simultaneously. 
Securitization of O&G supply chains in Canada involved changes in legal and policy 
frameworks, but was missing significant changes in administrative arrangements. 
Even though an NOC was established in the form of a Crown corporation, it did not 
affect the overall administrative arrangements in existing institutions. It is likely that 
securitization would have taken place even without the creation of Petro-Canada. 
In the case of Russia, there are differences in the roles the three components of the 
institutional arrangement have played in the securitization of oil and gas supply 
chains. In the oil sub-sector, securitization trends appeared prior to the first changes 
in the policy framework and in the absence of changes in the legal framework and 
administrative arrangement in the late 1980s. In the 1990s, there were clear changes 
only in the administrative arrangement, which led to a much less pronounced 
securitization process. In the gas sub-sector, changes in the policy and legal 
frameworks coincided with initial securitization in the absence of changes in the 
administrative arrangements. In the 2000s, when the securitization process unfolded 
with full force in both oil and gas sub-sectors, changes in all three components of the 
institutional arrangement took place. 
Q3.2: Do independent, complementary and overlapping institutions have a 
different impact on the securitization of a referent object? 
In China, securitization of oil and gas supply chains took place in the framework of 
independent institutions. Canada’s O&G supply chains were governed by overlapping 
institutions when a securitizing actor emerged in 1973. Russia’s securitized O&G 
supply chains have been governed mainly by overlapping institutions. Therefore, 
examined case studies do not provide a straightforward answer to this question. 
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7.2.2 Key Variables in Securitization Framework 
A number of influential variables and generalizable insights can be derived from the 
above discussion addressing the elements of the central research question. 
First, the evidence from three case studies demonstrates that embedded institutions 
can be manipulated by securitizing actors through reinterpretation of core ideas, such 
as ‘self-reliance’ and ‘growth at all costs’ in China, and the deeply-rooted perception 
of the outside world as a threat in Russia. 
Second, the role of horizontal institutional linkages is peculiar. At the level of the 
institutional environment, unlike independent institutions, complementary and 
overlapping institutions appear to constrain securitization. As a result of these 
institutional dynamics, independent institutions in Russia are not able to resist the rise 
of a dominant decision-maker from within the institutional environment. However, at 
the level of the institutional arrangement, independent and overlapping institutions 
both favor securitization. The role of complementary institutions at this level is 
unclear because they were not present in any of the three case studies. At the time of 
securitization, oil and gas supply chains in Canada and Russia were governed by 
overlapping institutions, in China – by independent institutions. 
Third, the evidence from three case studies demonstrates that the aim of securitization 
is not the elimination of threat; instead, it is directed at changing the referent object’s 
performance. Policy actors might not agree on the definition of a threat, but they 
share a perception of a threatened referent object. 
Fourth, the role of external triggers of securitization is much more limited than that of 
internal triggers in influencing policy actors’ decisions to build consensus, 
compromise their beliefs, and share resources for the purposes of advancing 
securitization. In the three case study contexts, none of the external triggers – outside 
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policy entrepreneurs, systemic perturbations and policy spillovers – had an 
exceptionally strong effect on or could be seen as the single most important factor in 
changing policy actors’ attributes to aid the securitization process. 
Fifth, based on the evidence from the case studies, securitization can originate in each 
one, a combination of or all three components of the institutional arrangement – legal 
framework, policy framework, and administrative arrangements. As discussed in the 
previous sub-section, securitization of oil and gas supply chains in Russia and China 
involved changes in single and a combination of two or three components of the 
institutional arrangement at different times. In Canada, a short period of securitization 
of oil supply chains was a result of changes in legal and policy frameworks, but not in 
administrative arrangements. This illustrates that multiple paths to securitization 
exist, and they can be equally effective depending on the circumstances. 
Sixth, there is a lag time between securitization measures implemented within the 
institutional arrangement and changes in the referent object’s performance. Hence, 
the narrow focus on the referent object at a certain point in time may result in 
incorrect conclusions about its securitization status. Securitization may be underway, 
but is not yet exhibited in the referent object’s performance. The referent object can 
be wrongly judged as de-/non-securitized. 
Therefore, the theoretical framework helped explore the role of such influential 
variables as the link between embedded institutions and securitizing actor, horizontal 
institutional linkages, external and internal triggers of securitization, components of 
the institutional arrangement and their impact on the performance of the referent 
object. Insights about these variables are generalizable within the theoretical 




7.3 Future Research Agenda 
7.3.1 Research Propositions 
Based on the findings discussed above, a number of research propositions can be 
constructed for use in future analysis of securitization in the governance of oil and 
gas supply chains in contexts beyond China, Canada, and Russia (Table 7.2). 
Table 7.2: Research Propositions for Further Analysis 
Research Question Æ Research Proposition 
Type I Inputs [institutional ecosystem] 
1.1: Do quantifiable and easily observable 
trends affect the process of securitization 
more than qualitative and barely visible 
trends? 
 Qualitative, more subjective in nature, and 
barely visible trends are able to create a 
more powerful impact on the process of 
securitization than quantifiable and easily 
observable trends and events. 
1.2: What are the indicators of 
securitization originating from the 
institutional environment as opposed to the 
institutional arrangement? 
 A securitizing actor originating from the 
institutional environment is much harder to 
resist that the one originating from a 
specific institutional arrangement. 
Type II Inputs [policy arena] 
2.1: Can the securitization process move 
forward if policy actors perceive the 
referent object as threatened, but do not 
share a common definition of threat? 
 In the securitization process, policy actors 
do not need to share a common definition 
of a threat or have common objectives as 
long as there is a shared perception that a 
threat exists and measures need to be taken 
to protect a common referent object. 
2.2: Do external triggers of securitization 
incentivize competing policy actors in a 
heterogeneous policy arena to compromise 
their conflicting beliefs and share their 
resources? 
 In a heterogeneous policy arena, external 
triggers do not create favorable conditions 
for a smoother securitization process. 
2.3: Do policy stakeholders have any 
influence on pausing/reversing/advancing 
a securitization process led by a dominant 
decision-maker? 
 Policy stakeholders can play a role in 
pausing/reversing/advancing a 
securitization process led by the dominant 
decision-maker. 
2.4: Do securitizing actors always try to 
build a policy core belief consensus among 
policy stakeholders and under what 
conditions? 
 Securitizing actors turn to building a 
policy core belief consensus among the 
policy stakeholders only when they 
perceive their own resources as 
insufficient for going through with the 
securitization process. 
Type III Inputs [institutional arrangement + referent object’s performance] 
3.1: Does securitization involve changes in 
all three components of the institutional 
arrangement (legal and policy frameworks, 
and administrative arrangements) relevant 
to the referent object? 
 Securitization involves changes in all three 
components of the institutions relevant to 
the referent object. 
3.2: Do independent, complementary and 
overlapping institutions have a different 
impact on the securitization of a referent 
object? 
 If the referent object is governed by 
complementary institutions, securitization 




Since the securitization framework is qualitative, and the current study is exploratory 
in nature and relies on the empirics from a very small population of cases, it would be 
misleading to argue that the above research propositions can be tested. Rather, the 
three cases provided evidence against or in support of the various assumptions and 
relationships derived from the theoretical framework through the exploration of its 
core components – type I, type II, and type III inputs. Suggested research 
propositions specify the questions explored in this study and can be useful for 
systematizing data from other contexts and improving the explanatory power of the 
framework. These propositions can then be further refined and used in quantitative 
research designs, which would also be beneficial for the development and application 
of the securitization framework. 
 
7.3.2 Limitations of the Theoretical Framework 
While the application of this new securitization framework provided numerous 
insights into the national contexts of three case studies and questions discussed 
above, it also revealed a number of weaknesses of the securitization framework, 
namely, the absence of discussion on desecuritization, the exclusion of the 
downstream segment of oil and gas supply chains, the erroneous assumption about 
the relationship between the dominant decision-maker as one type of securitizing 
actor and policy stakeholders, and the lack of attention to construction of actors’ 
perceptions. 
First, desecuritization is a much more ambiguous theoretical concept than 
securitization. Relatively rare desecuritization processes and enduring nature of 
securitization processes are two sides of the same coin and can in part be explained 
by examining the reasons behind persistent securitization processes. Once in place, a 
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self-reinforcing securitization process is difficult to stop or reverse due to the nature 
of path dependent754 institutions. At the same time, path dependency can be affected 
by technological innovation, presence/absence of conjunctures when change is 
perceived as beneficial, and social learning processes.755 Desecuritization requires a 
precise definition prior to being used as part of the framework. Nevertheless, its 
incorporation could be beneficial for explaining why and how securitization 
processes can be stopped and reversed. 
Second, the downstream segment of oil and gas supply chains is not part of the 
referent object of this study for reasons discussed in Chapter 2 (See Section 2.8.3.3). 
However, refining and distribution are indispensable components of supply chains, 
and their exploration would add insights into the supply chains’ performance, as well 
as relations between upstream – midstream – downstream players. Also, as the 
segment most affected by physical threats, it would create a more complete 
understanding of securitization processes. Finally, activities and products of this part 
of oil and gas supply chains often require an active involvement from regional and 
municipal policy actors, providing a more detailed look into the respective policy 
arena. 
Third, all three case studies reject the assumption that “dominant decision-makers are 
more likely to originate from a homogenous policy arena.”756 In China’s oil and gas 
sector, a securitizing actor in the form of a dominant decision-maker emerged in the 
period when the policy arena was the most heterogeneous to date – the NOCs in the 
2000s. In Canada, a dominant decision-maker emerged from a heterogenous policy 
arena as well. Finally, the policy arena governing Russia’s O&G supply chains has 
always been more or less heterogenous. Yet, a dominant decision-maker has 
controlled it most of the time, with the exception of the 1990s. Although three case 
                                                            
754 Mahoney, “Path Dependence in Historical Sociology.” 
755 David Wilsford, "Path Dependency, or Why History Makes It Difficult but Not Impossible to Reform 
Health Care Systems in a Big Way," Journal of Public Policy 14, no. 03 (1994): 251-283. 
756 See Chapter 3, Section 3.2.2.4. 
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studies out of a potentially larger population of cases do not provide conclusive 
evidence in favor of rejecting this assumption, the findings highlight the importance 
of providing a clear definition of a heterogeneous policy arena. As discussed in 
Chapter 3 (Section 3.2.2.4), heterogeneity should not be equated with the large 
number of actors. Rather, it signifies the diversity of objectives, interests, and 
resources among the policy arena’s participants. 
Fourth, this study stresses the importance of perceptions in the process of 
securitization: in the identification of threats, in the response to crises, and in defining 
an insecure referent object among others. Nevertheless, the framework does not 
explicitly define the factors shaping perceptions. The addition of such discussion 
would undoubtedly enhance the framework because it would also involve further 
analysis of some of the most elusive components of the policy arena and institutional 
ecosystem attributes such as actors’ beliefs and the role of ideas. 
Further application of the framework is expected to discover other limitations, while 
similar reflections and modifications will gradually improve its explanatory power, 
conceptual strength and the validity of its theoretical assumptions. 
 
7.3.3 Avenues for Future Research 
In order to take advantage of the contributions of this study, address its limitations 
and further improve the study of securitization, three avenues for future research are 
suggested: theoretical, methodological, and empirical. 
Theoretically, using the constructed theoretical framework, this study provides the 
groundwork for understanding securitization processes. Research propositions 
identified in Section 7.3.1 can be used to further refine the theoretical framework 
through the creation of typological theories. As more nuanced theories, they are 
useful for “modeling complex contingent generalizations… identify[ing] recurring 
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conjunctions of mechanisms and provid[ing] hypotheses.”757 The number of 
independent variables for hypothesis testing can be reduced based on the identified 
influential variables resulting from this study, and typologies of securitizing actors, 
institutional horizontal linkages and triggers of securitization can all be put to a test. 
Methodologically, future studies of securitization based on the theoretical framework 
of this study would benefit from mixed-method research design, using methods like 
the qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) and analytic narratives. These methods 
take advantage of statistical and formal models on the one hand and process-tracing 
on the other, resulting in robust triangulation – a system of interdependent checks and 
balances in the research process. 
Empirically, the study of securitization would benefit from the analysis of other cases 
of oil and gas supply chains’ (non-)securitization for the purposes of cross-validation 
of the theoretical framework. In addition to the question of how securitization occurs, 
questions of to what extent securitization affects affordability of energy supplies and 
whether or not securitization leads to security of the referent object should be 
considered. Other referent objects within the energy complex and beyond can be 
studied within the framework as well. Examples include civil nuclear energy within 
national energy systems, the role of environmental policy and, more specifically, the 
impact of climate change on securitization processes among many others. 
 
7.4 Theoretical and Policy Implications 
This study offers a fresh perspective on energy security by changing the focus of 
analysis from security to securitization and simultaneously narrowing it down from 
‘energy’ to ‘oil and gas supply chains.’ Using a multidisciplinary approach – 
theoretical insights and analytical tools from four social science disciplines – this 
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study advances systematic understanding of securitization processes in the 
governance of upstream and midstream segments of oil and gas supply chains. The 
methodological and empirical value of the securitization framework is illustrated 
through its application to three case studies – China, Canada, and Russia, 
identification of influential variables and a number of generalizable conclusions 
useful for future research. 
With regards to the theoretical implications, the framework helped uncover the 
mechanisms behind such ambiguous concepts as ‘(in)secure supply chains’ and 
‘(in)security of supply’ in the context of the oil and gas sector. It established 
associational links and causal relations between numerous actors, processes, events, 
and trends involved in a generally complex and lengthy process of securitization. In 
order to paint a comprehensive picture of the dynamics in a single sector in over 40 – 
65 years, the framework took in consideration a multitude of interdependent 
variables: cultural, societal, political, and economic factors originating from the 
institutional ecosystem; legal, policy, and organizational components of the 
institutions managing the O&G sector; beliefs, interests, and objective of the policy 
actors in charge of the sector; and finally, the performance indicators and 
organizational evolution of the sector’s players. 
Three case narratives presented in this study are not simply descriptive, but also 
analytical and can easily be subjected to comparative analysis between themselves 
and other case studies on the governance of O&G supply chains guided by the same 
framework. The major value of the theoretical framework is in its ability to provide 
nuanced understanding of securitization. At first sight, state – company relations 
constitute the core of securitization processes: while state involvement is associated 
with securitization, liberalized supply chains free of state intervention with 
desecuritization. However, as the evidence from analyzed case studies demonstrates, 
this assumption is misleading. For example, in the context of Russia, the period of 
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broad liberalization in the 1990s was associated with deescalated securitization of oil 
supply chains, but at the same time securitization of gas supply chains progressed. In 
Canada, during the federal government’s increased intervention into the oil and gas 
sector in the mid-1970s – 1980s, securitization of oil supply chains took place in the 
absence of securitization of gas supply chains. Thus, the mechanism of securitization 
cannot be explained simply by the regulation – liberalization dichotomy. Exclusive 
focus on state – company relations can result in omission of securitization trends, 
excessive emphasis on the interventionist nature of a state in less liberalized sectors, 
and limited insights into the changing nature of securitizing actors within the broad 
definition of a “state.” 
Finally, as discussed in the previous section on the avenues for future research, the 
securitization framework can be applied to other referent objects beyond the subject 
of this study, such as other areas of non-traditional security including food, health, 
migration, and environment. 
As for the policy implications, clear understanding of securitization processes is a 
valuable asset at the decision-makers’ disposal. It can inform decision-makers about 
the challenges of insecurity and securitization and their effect on the performance of a 
referent object like O&G supply chains. Taking into consideration the nature of 
resources and their importance to the national energy complexes, oil and gas are 
widely traded commodities which make interaction between private and public sector 
companies as well as between companies and governments unavoidable. In addition 
to international trade, companies and governments actively engage in the exploration 
and production of oil and gas resources in the multitude of host countries, and 
understanding unfamiliar context-specific securitization processes would be 
beneficial for their engagement in foreign countries. Understanding securitization is 
useful for untangling seemingly irrational behavior of their counterparts and 
analyzing their motivations. Additionally, familiarity with the details of securitization 
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helps make sense of other states’ reactions to international events, their national 
energy policies and energy security priorities. Ultimately, appreciation of highly 
contextual mechanisms of securitization is important because it addresses the biggest 
challenge of energy insecurity – ensuring efficient regional and global energy 
governance. The analysis of securitization trends uncovers sources of extreme 
diversity in private and public sector voices in the energy sphere, and can be a useful 
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Appendix 1: The CCP’s Network of Control Mechanisms 
Organization Department  the institutional heart of a Leninist party system”1 
 employs the robust nomenklatura system2 
CCP Propaganda Department 
(CCPPD) 
 the Party’s propaganda apparatus3 
 responsible for the control of information flowing 
into and throughout China 
Central Political and Legal Affairs 
Commission (CPLC) 
 ensures Party’s domination in all legal affairs.4 
 directly responsible to the Political Bureau Standing 
Committee5 
Central Commission for 
Discipline Inspection (CCDI) 
 responsible for enforcing discipline and fighting 
corruption within the party ranks 
 performs sporadic judiciary functions 
 its power, mandate and autonomy relative to the 
Party changed in 1980s – 20146 
Chinese People’s Political 
Consultative Conference (CPPCC) 
 promotes extraparty consultation and interparty 
cooperation under the leadership of the CCP7 
 “a broadly representative organization of the united 
front… that is composed of democratic parties and 
people’s organizations.”8 
central leading small groups 
(CLSGs) 
 help the Party control the central government9 
dangzu (Party groups)  are located inside the government bureaucracies10 
xitong (systems)  penetrate the whole system from the center to 
provincial and local levels11 
 encompass the judicial system and the military12 
Sources: Shambaugh, China's Communist Party, 106-108, 132-133, 137-138, 141; Zheng, The Chinese 
Communist party as organizational emperor, 65-66, 100, 112-113. 
Notes: 1 Shambaugh, China's Communist Party, 141. 
 2 Shambaugh, The Modern Chinese State, 173-175. Even though this management system was 
modified in 1984 with the Central Committee being responsible for appointments one level down instead 
of two levels down, this change was implemented not to decentralize or relax the power of the CCP, but 
on the contrary, “to strengthen its power and management efficiency” (Zheng, The Chinese Communist 
Party as organizational emperor, 103-107). 
 3 Although its power “eroded” and some of its tools “atrophied” over time, the CCPPD 
remains a strong instrument of control in the hands of the Party (Shambaugh, China’s Communist Party, 
3, 106-110). First, it retains its “capacity to censor when and where it sees fit” (a crackdown on the 
media under Hu Jintao). Second, major foreign telecommunication companies, who wish to take 
advantage of China’s large customer base, choose to comply with government censorship regulations in 
order to gain access to the Chinese market (Shambaugh, China’s Communist Party, 107, 110). 
 4 Shambaugh, China’s Communist Party, 113. 
 5 Despite the provision in the Article 5 of the Constitution of the PRC which states that “no 
organization or individual may enjoy the privilege of being above the Constitution and the law,” the 
Party crafts and adjusts the legal framework to fit its needs. 
 6 Until the early 1980s, local offices of CCDI were elected by the local party committees 
making the former dependent on the latter and, thus, limiting the actual investigative power of CCDI 
(Sullivan, “The Role of the Control Organs in the Chinese Communist Party, 1977-83,” 601). Reforms 
of the 1980s and 1990s strengthened CCDI at the central and local levels through the dual leadership 
system (Manion, Corruption by Design, 123), implementation of “five forbiddens” (Guo, "The Growth 
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of Intra-party Democracy and Its Implications for China’s Democratic Future," 602), and expanded 
investigative powers (vetting officials before their appointment to a post (Manion, Corruption by 
Design, 123) and shuanggui (double designation) system (Guo, "The Growth of Intra-party Democracy 
and Its Implications for China’s Democratic Future," 605).) Under Hu Jintao, CCDI’s power was further 
strengthened through the establishment of central inspection teams, and consolidation of numerous local 
CCDI offices on the prefecture/county level. Xi Jinping’s administration continues to advance 
institutionalization of the CCDI’s autonomy from the CCP’s operations. In 2013, Propaganda 
Department and Organization Department were established within the CCDI making its personnel 
control functions independent from those of the Party Committee. (Rose-Ackerman and Lagunes, Greed, 
Corruption, and the Modern State, 141; Wo-Lap Lam Lam, “Growing CCDI Power Brings Questions of 
Politically-Motivated Purge”). In 2014, CCDI created an internal office – Office for the Supervision of 
Disciplinary System Officials - for monitoring its own officials at all levels. In addition to this internal 
office, CCDI also set up inspection teams in the Central Committee’s offices (i.e., Organization 
Department, Propaganda Department, etc.) as well as government bodies (ministries, commissions, 
SOEs) under State Council’s control. In order to ensure their impartiality and independence, these teams 
are responsible only to the CCDI and not the organizations within which they are set up (Zhang, “CCDI 
sends graft-busters to 26 State organizations”). 
 7 Following the proclamation of the Central Committee’s initiative on “…building the system 
of multi-party cooperation and consultation” in 2005, cooperation between the CCP and eight recognized 
political parties visibly improved. Prior to 2007, for instance, non-Communist party leaders – current 
chair people of their respective parties were appointed at the vice-ministerial positions at the highest. 
Wang Exiang of the Revolutionary Committee of the Kuomintang served as a Vice-Person of the 
Supreme People’s Court (1998 – 2013). Zhang Baowen of China Democratic League was appointed a 
Vice-Minister of Agriculture (2000 – 2008). Chen Changzhi of China Democratic National Construction 
Association held a Vice-Minister position in the Ministry of Supervision (1998 – 2008). Yan Junqi of 
China Association for Promoting Democracy used to be a Vice-Mayor of Shanghai (2001 – 2007). After 
2007, two current chairpeople served in the national government at the Ministerial rank. Chan Zhu of 
Chinese Peasants’ and Workers’ Democratic Party served as the Minister of Health (2007 – 2013). Wang 
Gang is leading the Ministry of Science and Technology (2007 – Present). 
 8 Constitution, Preamble. 
 9 Zheng, The Chinese Communist Party as organizational emperor, 109, 111. For instance, 
Energy Leading Small Group was created in the context of energy sector re-centralization in the early 
2000s. 
 10 Zheng, The Chinese Communist Party as organizational emperor, 111. 
 11 Andrews-Speed, The governance of energy in China, 126. 
 12 Zheng, The Chinese Communist Party as organizational emperor, 112-113. Judicial xitong 
is coordinated through two mechanisms described above – the CPLC and CCDI. As for the military 
system, civilian-military relations were based on relative personal power of Party and military officials. 
But in 1997, the National Defence Law legalized and thus institutionalized the Party’s control over the 




Appendix 2: Peripheral Actors in China’s O&G Policy Arena: Research, 
Academic, and Media Establishments 
Research Institute Parent Organization Areas of Expertise 
Bodies directly involved in policy-making 
Development Research Center 
(DRC) 
State Council 
 advice on demand to the parent 
agency;1 
 policy research and consulting 
services;2 
 reports on China’s energy policy 
priorities.3 
Bureau of Seismology4 
State Council 
 “involved in technical exchange and 
equipment purchase”5 
Bureau of Geology 
Bureau of Oceanography 
Chinese Academy of Sciences State Council 
 initiate or respond to direct technical 
exchanges involving energy 
delegations to and from China6 
Chinese Academy of Social 
Sciences 
State Council 
Chinese Academy of 
Engineering 
State Council 
Energy Research Institute (ERI) NDRC 
 “submits reports and policy 
recommendations; 
 focuses on macroeconomic analysis 
rather than on project assessment; 
 has tremendous influence on 
“demand side” issues such as 
efficiency but virtually no impact on 
“supply side” policies such as 
exploration.”7 
China International Engineering 
Consulting Corporation 
NDRC 
 examines submitted feasibility 
studies for construction of new 
refineries 
Oil and Gas Strategic Research 
Center (OGSRC) 
MLR 
 conducts studies on petroleum 
security; 
 organizes inter-agency research 
committees8 
Office of Economic Diplomacy 
and Cooperation 
MFA 
 studies on international relations 
 research on China’s bilateral 
relations Policy Research Department 
China Institute of International 
Studies (CIIS) 
 research on energy security; 




NOCs’ Research Institutes 
Research Institute of Petroleum 
Exploration and Development 
(RIPED) CNPC 
 research in upstream petroleum 
business; 
 strategic development planning; 
 technical support for 
CNPC/PetroChina.10 
Research Institute of Economics 
and Technology (ETRI) 
 tendency analysis; 
 strategic research.11 
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Petrochemical Planning and 
Engineering Institute 
Sinopec 
 examine submitted feasibility studies 
for construction of new refineries; 
 head interdisciplinary, multi-agency 
teams of experts for assessment 
purposes;12 
 a total of 8 research institutes.13 
Exploration and Production 
Research Institute 
Research Institute of Petroleum 
Processing 
Research Institute of Petroleum 
Engineering 
Geophysical Research Institute 
CNOOC Research Institute CNOOC 
 convention deep-water technique 
support; 
 service for O&G EP. 
Academic Community14 
Shanghai Institutes for 
International Studies (SIIS) 
 
 studies on international politics and 
China’s security strategy15 
Renmin University 
MOE 
 Center for International Energy and 
Environment Strategy Studies 
 Top social sciences and policy 
research 
Xiamen University 
 Center of China Energy Economics 
Research (CCEER) 
Peking University 
National School of Development (NSD) 
 one of the top think tanks in the 
country 
 gathers academic intelligence 
 comprehensive interdisciplinary 
research 
Tsinghua University 
 Division of Energy and Environment 
 Vice-ministerial university 
Nankai University 
 comprehensive academic programs 
 focus on science and engineering 
China University of Petroleum 
 chemical engineering and technology 
 mineral resources prospecting and 
exploration 
 oil and gas well engineering 
 oil and gas storage and transportation 
engineering 




 - in 1960s – 1970s, “number one in 
China’s hierarchy of  [international] 
organizations.”16 
World Bank n/a 
 in the past, a loan provider to 
Chinese government; 
 today, close cooperation with CEIB, 
MOF in development issues around 
the world.17 
IEA OECD 
 1996 Memorandum of Policy 
Understanding in the Field of Energy 
between IEA and Chinese 
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government 
 Studies on various aspects of energy 
policy 
 Technology collaboration programs 
 2015 IEA Ministerial meeting: China 
activated Association status18 
Media19 
Xinhua News Agency State Council 
 a ministry-level institution 
 official press agency of the PRC 
 biggest and most influential media 
organization 
China Central Television 
(CCTV) 
State Administration of 
Press, Publication, 
Radio, Film and 
Television (SAPPRFT) 
 state television broadcaster 
 a network of 45 channels 
People’s Daily 
Central Committee of 
the CCP 
 official newspaper of the CCP 
 direct information on policies and 
viewpoints of the government 
Other newspapers, magazines, 
TV channels, online 
publications, etc. 
independent  reporting on various policy issues 
Notes: 1 Downs, "The Chinese Energy Security Debate,"27; Constantin, Ibid., 17-18 
2 Development Research Center of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China, Who 
Does What, The State Council of the People's Republic of China. 
3 Meidan et al., Ibid., 596. 
4 In 1998, these bureaux were merged under the new Ministry of Land and Resources (MLR). 
5 Woodard, Ibid., 79-81. 
6 Ibid.; Constantin, Ibid., 17-8. 
7 Downs, "The Chinese Energy Security Debate," 27. 
8 Kong, China's international petroleum policy, 51. 
9 Downs, "The Chinese Energy Security Debate," 27-8. 
10 RIPED. “Overview.” The Research Institute of Petroleum Exploration and Development. 
11 Bloomberg. “Company Overview of CNPC Research Institute of Economics and 
Technology.” Bloomberg.com. 
12 Wang, Ibid., 128 
13 Sinopec Corp. Research Institutions. 
14 Universities are closely related to the government with many of them being responsible 
directly to the Ministry of Education. Also, the most prominent universities, for example, 
Peking University, have appointed party secretaries who ensure that university activities are in 
line with the Party’s interests. 
15 Lin Liyao, "Top 10 think tanks in China," China.org.cn (September 26, 2011); Constantin, 
Ibid., 17-8. 
16 Woodard, Ibid., Chapter 9. 
17 "China Eximbank and World Bank Come Together to Sign Cooperation Memo," World 
Bank (May 21, 2007); "China Launches First World Bank Trust Fund to End Poverty and 
Promote Development," World Bank (July 16, 2015). 
18 "Joint Ministerial Declaration on the occasion of the 2015 IEA Ministerial meeting 
expressing the Activation of Association," International Energy Agency (November 18, 2015). 
19 The government acknowledges the role of society that is increasingly active in the policy 
issues, and “conducts extensive public opinion polling on the performance of local (but not 
central) leaders and governments.” (Lewis, Ibid., 19-20) New forms of media (online blogs, 










Policy Arena (1954 – 1978) 
 









Policy Arena (1982 – 1988) 
 
Notes: 1 – EPB (1982 – 1984) under Ministry of Urban and Rural Construction; NEPA (1984 – 1987) 





Policy Arena (1988 – 1998) 
 









Policy Arena (2003 – 2008) 
 
Policy Arena (2008 – Present) 
 
Note: NEC was established in 2010 
 
Appendix 4: Crude Oil Production in RSFSR/Russia by Region (1970 – 2010) 
Regional breakdown of crude oil production reflects major national oil policy priorities through the 
years. The post-WWII objective of developing oil resources further away from external borders led 
to the dominance of the Volga region and decline of the South. In 1970, the Volga region 
contributed 71% and South – only 15% to the total RSFSR’s oil output. In the period between 
1970 and 1990, Siberian and Far Eastern resources were developed while the role of the South 
continued to decline. In 1990, each of these three areas – Siberia, Far East, and South – contributed 
1-2% to the total production. During the same period, newly developed resources in the Urals 
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Appendix 6: The Length of Oil and Gas Pipelines in Russia (1990 – 2013) 
Rail and water (sea, river) used to be the dominant mode of hydrocarbon transportation 
in the early days of the Soviet Union. But pipeline capacity was expanded quickly. 
About 75,000km of crude and petroleum product pipelines were built in 1940 – 1985, 
and 174,000km of gas pipelines were constructed. Today, Russia continues to prioritize 
gas pipeline construction. Since 1990, about 30,000km of gas pipeline capacity has 
been added as opposed to only 3,000km of crude oil pipelines and 5,000km of oil 
product pipelines. 
 
Data Source: Federal State Statistics Service (2014). 
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